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1. CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION – A NEW EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE LEGITIMACY 
OF HMI 
 
“War, to be abolished, must be understood. To be understood, it must be studied.” 
Karl Deutsch in introduction of Quincy Wright’s Study of War (1965)1 
 
This study empirically analyses the ‘humanitarian military interventions’ 
(HMI’s) between the years 1946 and 2005 by assessing a degree of 
‘humanitarianism’ of the interventions in their ‘motives and means’ as well as 
in their ‘outcomes’. The analysis adds radically new elements in the debates 
and controversies that are raised on every occasion a HMI is undertaken.  
1.1. The complexity of ‘humanitarian military intervention’ (HMI)  
Justifying the so-called ‘humanitarian military interventions’ (HMI’s) and 
defending the underlying concept in international debates are highly problematic 
undertakings. Despite the very poor and contested legal status of the very concept 
of HMI within the current international law2, it is impossible to simply disregard 
the concept and define its related applications as not being justifiable. If HMI as a 
concept was accepted to be legitimate, it would have a power to challenge its 
presumed illegality.3 It would put pressure on the accepted norms and (gradually) 
lead to the acceptance of HMI within the framework of the international legal 
order in the future.4 Therefore, it is important to study whether the underlying 
virtue of morality of HMI and thus its legitimacy is not so robust that it could 
overcome the burden of its claimed illegality, providing the interveners with a 
legitimate right to intervene for the ‘humanitarian’ purposes despite the presumed 
illegality.  
     There are strong and valid arguments both supporting and condemning the 
HMI as a legitimate action, reflecting thus a tension between two moral 
perspectives. On one hand, it is argued that the respect of the ban on use of force in 
the international relations for the virtue of preserving peace and stability is an 
imperative and should make HMI not only illegal but also illegitimate. On the 
other hand, it is argued that guaranteeing international justice and protection of 
human rights provide interveners with the legitimate right to intervene for the 
                                                            
1 Wright, 1965. 
2 The legal perspectives on the HMI will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this study. 
3 Legitimacy represents the ‘validity’ of a given social order. See: D’entrèves, 1963. 
4 Popovski & Turner, 2008. 
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‘humanitarian’ purposes outside their own territory. Should the predominant 
concern be the respect for the political and territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the nation states, or should the main concern be the preference of human rights? 
This basic question about the legitimacy of HMI has gained importance 
particularly since the end of Cold War when the system of collective UN security 
became revitalized and the ‘humanitarian’ interventionism started to be used more 
frequently in practice. Among the most debated events from this time period that 
greatly influenced the discourse of HMI and added controversy to its application 
belong the crises in Rwanda in 1994 and in Kosovo in 1999. On one hand, the 
international community failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. On the other 
hand, the NATO decided to bomb Kosovo to end the ethnic cleansing and other 
mass atrocities without receiving an authorization by the UN Security Council.5 In 
fact, HMI is controversial both when it happens and when it does not. When a 
particular HMI is launched, there are serious doubts and debates about its 
legitimacy; however, when the international community remains inactive in the 
light of ongoing massive human rights violations, it is accused of a moral failure. 
Due to the strong moral positions of both supporters and opponents of HMI, the 
question, whether the HMI can be justified as a tool of crisis management or 
whether its use forms merely an illegal act, leads to inevitable disagreements not 
only among lawyers, moralists, and political scientists, but also within the public 
opinion worldwide.   
     The recent behavior and attitudes of the international actors seem to be 
increasingly inclined toward acceptance of legitimacy of the HMI and the 
acceptance of the underlying concept. The fact that the concept is frequently used 
to justify military actions indicates that legal considerations are less predominant 
and that international law is often disregarded in the politically sensitive questions 
in favor of the moral arguments.6 In spite of the increasingly supportive attitudes 
towards legitimacy of HMI’s, unauthorized HMI’s have so far been just ‘silently’ 
tolerated and the countries intervening for the ‘humanitarian’ purposes act on an 
ad hoc basis without having any framework available to rely on.7 More recently, 
new legal developments try to fill the discrepancy between the existing legal 
doctrines and between what the states and international organizations defend as 
morally right and legitimate. The international community has been pushing 
interpretation and development of the existing legal doctrines regulating the HMI 
step-by-step further to catch up with the actual behavior of the countries. The most 
remarkable step in this respect has been the adoption of a ‘responsibility to protect’ 
at the UN level as a new concept encouraging the international community to act 
in cases when the nation states fail to prevent or to stop serious violations of 
                                                            
5 Simma, 1999; or Independent International Commission of Kosovo, 2000. 
6 Caplan, 2000. 
7 See: Simma, 1999; Independent International Commission of Kosovo, 2000; or Franck, 2001. 
3 
 
human rights within their territories. In spite of the fact that the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ does not represent a legally binding prescription and that it is still labeled 
only as an ‘emerging legal norm’,8 the concept represents a significant tool of a 
moral pressure on the countries to react to the human rights violations abroad.9 
These developments, however, do not imply that the relaxation of the principle of 
non-interventions continues without passionate debates. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that none of the attempts to restrict in a legally binding way the scope of 
the non-intervention norm embedded in the UN Charter or to enlarge the number 
of its allowed exceptions has so far managed to generate a consensus within the 
international community.10 
     This study proposes a radical departure from the difficult and sensitive moral 
and legal debates surrounding the HMI concept and its application. As an 
alternative to putting weights to a variety of moral claims defending or rejecting 
the legitimacy of HMI, this study intends to clarify the debate by empirically 
assessing the degree of ‘humanitarianism’ behind 1114 cases of military 
interventions in the time period between 1946 and 2005. The novelty of this 
approach is based on a systematic evaluation of the ‘humanitarianism’ behind the 
‘motives and means’ of military interventions on the one hand and of the 
‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘outcomes’ of military interventions on the other 
hand. Based on the empirical evidence, it assesses how much are the ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ actually decisive for the achievement of the ‘humanitarian 
outcomes’ at the end; it proposes an empirically validated version of a ‘legitimate 
HMI’ and it filters out a resulting sample of historical cases of military 
interventions that represent potential candidates for receiving a label ‘legitimate 
HMI’. If the findings of this study discover that it is possible to improve the 
humanitarian situation in the target state by waging a military intervention for 
‘humanitarian’ purposes, it would serve as an empirically supported illustration of 
an existing gap between legitimacy and legality of HMI, and it would provide an 
argument for claiming that the legal framework should catch up. If the results of 
this study, however, suggest that the military interventions - though intended to be 
‘humanitarian’ - tend to make the humanitarian suffering even worse, it would be 
an indication that the moral arguments calling for the legalization of the right of 
HMI are blind toward the actual negative effects of such interventions on the target 
state and that the legal obstacle to such interventionism makes sense and should be 
legitimately kept. Taming this normative debate about legitimacy of HMI into a 
long-run empirical analysis assessing its actual applications on the ground 
represents a new perspective that could move the scientific community a step 
                                                            
8 See: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; MacFarlane, Thielking & 
Weiss, 2004; Barbour & Gorlick, 2008; or Bellamy, 2009. 
9 Weiss, 2004. 
10 Reisman, 1990. 
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further while solving this dilemma. In spite of its novelty, the study builds on the 
insights provided by a limited number of earlier empirical studies. 
1.2. Empirical evaluation of the legitimacy of HMI in the existing literature 
The scholarly debate about legitimacy of HMI is very rarely of a quantitative 
nature. Due to the fact that HMI has traditionally been primarily a concept for 
theologians and legal theorists, a great majority of the existing literature about 
HMI is dominated by the single qualitative studies theoretically dealing either with 
the moral or legal aspects of the interventions11 or with the more technical issues of 
implementation and coordination failures of individual military missions.12 A new 
stream of research efforts focusing on the problem of legitimacy of HMI has been 
initiated by the increased capability of the UN Security Council to act in cases of 
the massive human rights violations after the end of Cold War. Only between 
April 1990 and March 1999, there were over 330 new articles published under the 
subject heading ‘United Nations Armed Forces’.13 Among the most important 
recent triggers stimulating the research efforts on the legitimacy of HMI belong the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999,14 and obviously the US operations in Iraq in 
2003,15 which were both openly presented as ‘humanitarian’ but both lacked a clear 
mandate from the UN Security Council. The controversial legal standing and the 
debated morality of the two above mentioned interventions have resulted in a 
massive production of studies devoted to the issue of HMI.16 Despite the recent 
attention, only few studies have dealt with the concept of HMI using a quantitative 
approach.  
     There are just some empirical studies quantitatively addressing the impacts of 
HMI on the target state. Unfortunately, most of these impact assessments do not 
examine HMI in general, but rather focus on a certain sub-part of it.17 They can be 
classified into a number of categories. First, there are existing studies evaluating 
the crisis management activities of a single actor – typically the UN.18 Some of 
them conclude that the UN has a limited short-term success in settling the 
conflicts;19 while others claim that there is no difference in the success rate of the 
UN-led interventions if compared to the non-UN-led ones.20 A second stream of 
                                                            
11 For example: Hoffmann, 1995; Mandelbaum, 1996; Bloom, 1999; Wheeler, 2000; Murphy, 2000; Maull 
& Stahl, 2002; Crawford, 2003; Brock & Müller, 2004 or Waltzer, 2004. 
12 For example: Yannis & Levy, 1999; Traub, 2000; Counsens & Cater, 2001; or Smith & Dee, 2003. 
13 This statistic was measured using the Social Sciences Index. See: Paris, 2000. 
14 For example: Henkin, 1999; Byers & Chesterman, 2003; Clark, 2005; or Handrick, 2005. 
15 For example: Farer, 2003; or Bulley, 2010.  
16 For example: Stein, 2004; or Bellamy, 2006. 
17 Pickering & Kisangani, 2006. 
18 For example: Haas, 1986; Meernik, 1996; Hermann, 1998; or Doyle & Sambanis, 2000. 
19 For example: Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997; or Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothschild, 2001. 
20 For example: Heldt, 2004. 
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research specializes on the management of a particular type of conflict, notably 
only genocide or politicide, excluding the other types of humanitarian crises.21 
Their conclusions suggest that the most effective way to intervene into ongoing 
instances of the state-sponsored mass murder is to directly challenge the 
perpetrator or to aid the target group of a brutal policy, suggesting a conclusion 
that an impartial intervention is ineffective. Thirdly, some studies focus merely on 
a particular type of the crisis management technique such as mediation, 
peacekeeping or peacemaking.22 In general, the conclusions of these studies are 
heterogeneous, depending on the aspect of HMI being researched and the adopted 
methodology. In spite of shedding some light on the problematic of HMI, these 
studies do not evaluate systematically all types of HMI so as to generate a 
comprehensive picture about the broader impacts of the HMI’s on the target states 
and thus to serve as an indication of their overall legitimacy. 
     The scholarly debate dealing with the general consequences of wars does not 
offer a particularly fertile ground for theory building in relation to the HMI, since 
military interventions are a distinct and presumably much less destructive 
phenomenon than the full-blown wars. However, the literature on a narrower 
subject of a ‘third-party’ intervention focusing on one type of conflict while 
controlling for the occurrence of another represents an interesting source of an 
inspiring research related to the HMI. Even though, the theory of a ‘third-party’ 
military intervention does not provide an integrated approach, it could be a 
foundation for the future theoretical development describing the issue of HMI.23 
There are two major works attempting to explain the effects of the ‘third-party’ 
interventions on the target state. The study by Elbadawi and Sambanis models a 
relationship between the ‘third-party’ intervention and the duration of a civil 
war.24 The authors distinguish among the military, economic, and the mixed 
interventions waged in favor of either a government or a rebel movement involved 
in a civil war. The main findings of this study point to the importance of targeting 
for the resulting conflict duration. More particularly, the study indicates that the 
interventions in favor of the government tend to shorten the conflict, while the 
interventions in favor of the rebels tend to prolong the conflict.25 Another major 
                                                            
21 For example: Krain, 2005. 
22 For example: Haas, 1993; or Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997. 
23 For example: Raknerud & Hegre, 1997; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates & Gleditsch, 2001; or Hess & 
Blomberg, 2002.  
24 Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000. 
25 ‘Third-party’ interventions supporting the target government have a higher probability of ending the 
conflicts than the interventions opposing the target government. This phenomenon is explained by the 
fact that any intervention reduces the cost of sustaining a rebellion. It not only increases a likelihood of 
success of the rebellion, but it also lowers the rebels’ costs of fighting and facilitates a recruitment of 
more rebels. Without existence of such an intervention, the rebellion would be much more quickly 
suppressed by the government.  
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study dealing with the effects of ‘third-party’ interventions on the dynamics of civil 
war was conducted by Regan.26 He concludes by listing four major criteria 
influencing the probability that the intervention is waged and the probability of its 
success: a strategic environment of the ongoing conflict; existence of a 
humanitarian crisis; number of fatalities; and intensity of the conflict. Regan 
confirms the conclusions of Elbadawi and Sambanis by a finding that the ‘third-
party’ military interventions can be successful in achieving their goals, if waged in 
support of the target state’s government.27  
     As indicated above, none of the empirical studies has attempted to evaluate 
impacts of the HMI’s over a large number of conflicts and interventions in general. 
This is caused mainly by the lack of agreement on what cases of military 
interventions should belong to the sample of HMI’s. This study overcomes this 
classification challenge by making a systematical quantification of a degree of 
‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘motives and means’ of individual interveners. By 
doing that the study is capable to generate a comprehensive empirical evaluation 
of HMI’s, contributing thus with a new perspective on this controversial issue.  
1.3. The structure of this study 
Chapters 1 and 2 elaborate on the complexity of the HMI concept. They discuss its 
historical development and provide an overview of the theoretical debate about its 
legality and legitimacy. The chapters point to the tension between legality and 
legitimacy of the concept that is illustrated by the efforts of the international 
community to introduce and to formalize the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. 
The main question discussed in these chapters is whether the vague legal status of 
the right of HMI can be overcome by its accepted legitimacy, and the right of HMI 
should thus be incorporated into the legal framework; or whether the legitimacy of 
the right of HMI is dubious and the status quo of an illegal HMI should not be 
challenged. The chapters then propose an innovative approach trying to judge the 
legitimacy of HMI based on the empirical evidence.  
     The first step in the process of empirically assessing the legitimacy of HMI is 
choosing a theoretical framework to be used as a basis for the quantification of the 
multi-layered aspects of HMI. Chapter 3 describes a rationale for selecting a 
particular theoretical framework together with an acknowledgment of its possible 
weaknesses. The entire model is built on an assumption that so as to be 
acknowledged as ‘legitimate’, a HMI has to have both the ‘humanitarian motives 
and means’ as well as a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ on the target state, 
reflecting thus a controversy between the ‘motives and means’ versus the 
‘outcomes’ of any action. The ethical considerations found in the Just War ethics 
                                                            
26 Regan, 2000 & 2002. 
27 Regan, 2002. 
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and the consequentialist ethics serve as the main inspiration for the quantification 
of these two complementary criteria of a ‘legitimate HMI’. While the Just War 
Theory (JWT) serves as the leading theoretical framework for evaluating a degree 
of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘motives and means’ of individual interveners, the 
existence of a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ is assessed by counting the lives 
saved by the intervention using the consequentialist approach.  
     Having selected the most appropriate theoretical framework, the 4th chapter 
takes up a next challenge to quantify each of the six JWT criteria of ‘jus ad bellum’: 
‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, ‘just authority’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportionality’ and a reasonable 
‘probability of success’. Level of fulfillment of the individual JWT criteria is 
evaluated on the scale of 0-100, assigning to each identified yearly record of a 
military intervention a single score for every criterion. Consequentially, the JWT 
criteria are weighted according to their relative importance within the theory as a 
whole. Being assigned a corresponding weight, they can be used to generate an 
aggregate JWT index approximating a degree of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the 
‘motives and means’ of each intervention. To the knowledge of authors of this 
study, the JWT criteria have not yet been quantified in a systematic way in the 
earlier studies and their use for the empirical evaluation of the legitimacy of HMI 
represents an innovative approach. 
     Having quantified the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of the interveners; the 
5th chapter confronts the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ with the ‘humanitarian 
outcomes’ of the interventions using a regression analysis. First, the aggregate JWT 
index is studied in association with the ‘humanitarian outcomes’, in order to assess 
the legitimacy of the HMI concept if defined according to the JWT theory of ‘jus ad 
bellum’ as a whole. Next, each quantified JWT criterion is also studied separately so 
as to compare, which JWT criterion is more and which less relevant for the 
‘humanitarian outcome’ of these military undertakings. This process allows us to 
identify, which JWT criteria are most crucial for defining a ‘legitimate HMI’.  
     The last 6th chapter then presents the concluding remarks about the legitimacy 
of HMI, if evaluated by the quantitative model used in this study. This chapter 
introduces an empirically validated definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ that fulfills 
both set conditions of having ‘humanitarian motives and means’ but also resulting 
in a ‘humanitarian outcome’. Additionally, the chapter presents a sample of 
military interventions between the years 1946-2005 that constitute potential 
candidates for being awarded the label ‘humanitarian’. Based on the presented 
empirical findings, it assesses whether the concept of HMI is legitimate and thus 
whether the gap between legality and legitimacy of the HMI concept really exists. 
This chapter concludes by discussing the derived appropriateness of introducing 
the right of HMI as a legal norm. 
8 
 
     The technical appendum of this study then introduces a huge database 
systematically compiling data on conflicts and military interventions from the 
post-WWII period. The data are organized two-dimensionally: the first dimension 
captures the relationship between the intervener and the target state; and the 
second one traces the developments in the target state only. Apart from bringing 
the heterogeneous data from many different sources together under the unified 
coding rules, the major added value of this compilation is represented by the 
newly created indexes quantifying the JWT. The data compilation not only served 
as a prerequisite for the above described research, but it is made available on-line 
together with a detailed codebook with a hope that it will serve as a useful input 
data source also for the other researchers working in the field of conflict 
management and conflict studies in general. 
     Summarizing the above, this study attempts to formulate answers to the 
following questions: 
• What should be an appropriate definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ based on the 
empirical evidence? 
• Which cases of military interventions fulfill the adopted definition and represent 
the candidates for a ‘legitimate HMI’? 
• Does the concept of HMI have legitimacy if evaluated on the basis of the 
theoretical frameworks of ‘Just War’ ethics and consequentialitst ethics?  
• Are the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military interventions associated 
with their ‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the target state and under what 
conditions? 
1.4. Limitations of the study and its approach 
The use of an empirical approach for the assessment of legitimacy of HMI has one 
major advantage that forms at the same time also its major weakness. It is capable 
of generating one-number answers to the complex set of questions in a seemingly 
exact way. Nevertheless, this exactness is obviously just an illusion. The empirical 
approach really enables the researchers to draw broader, empirically grounded 
generalizations that are validated across many cases; but a quantification of any 
such a complex issue as the legitimacy of HMI requires many painful 
simplifications of the reality. Due to the highly interdisciplinary nature of the HMI 
concept, it is necessary to ease many complicating assumptions from each of the 
touched upon field. This imperfection of the information inserted into the model 
then logically influences the exactness of the one-number solution that comes out 
of the analysis. The study acknowledges this weakness, but it adopts an approach 
that there would be no answer to any question without allowing for a certain 
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degree of simplification. Therefore, it treats the simplification of complexity of the 
issue as a necessary price for reaching any conclusion. 
     Apart from the above described imperfection of the model, the study also faces 
a problem of reliability of the input data, which is a typical feature of all the data 
collected in the conflict zones. Even with the best efforts of the data collectors; the 
countries experiencing violence suffer from the sudden population movements, a 
lack of governmental control, and an inadequate census data, which greatly 
complicate an effective data collection. In addition to that, the statistics generated 
in the war-torn countries are often intentionally manipulated, since the officially 
published numbers have a power of sending important political and military 
messages.28 As a result of that, all the conflict-related data are inherently exposed 
to uncertainty, which is reflected in the existing differences among records 
indicated in the individual datasets that were compiled by different researchers. 
Uncertainty is, however, not unique to this study; and as long as the standard rules 
of inference are used, this uncertainty should not detract from a validity of the 
applied empirical research.29 
     After bringing attention to the most problematic aspects of this study, there is 
one more disclosure to be made. While reading this study, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that the findings of the analysis are not intended to represent ‘the’ answers to 
the question of legitimacy of HMI. The findings should be viewed and understood 
just as a very first attempt to evaluate this sensitive issue on a more systematic 
empirical basis. It is a pioneering trail to classify the multidimensional problem 
and to bring its variously overlapping dimensions together to provide some 
interpretable conclusions. As a result of that, the generated empirical model will be 
kept as simple as possible so as to preserve both a reasonable interpretability and a 
logical coherence. It can be viewed as an invitation for the other scholars from 
many different relevant fields to focus on the sub-parts of the model, and to further 
develop and purify it in the subsequent studies. We hope that our study and the 
generated database will serve other researchers to make different assumptions, to 
seek alternative theoretical tracks and potentially to arrive at different conclusions 
all with the intention that has guided this study as well, namely to shed another 
light on the complex problem of legitimacy of the HMI concept. 
 
 
                                                            
28 Typical examples of such manipulation are when the leaders of the fighting groups inflate a number 
of their followers to demonstrate their strength; when the separatist movements blow up a degree of 
their suffering in a hope of attracting an external help; or when the countries planning to intervene or 
actually intervening into some crisis manipulate information describing the character of the crisis in a 
way to gain a public support for their operations. See: Seybolt , 2007. 
29 Seybolt, 1994. 
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2. CHAPTER 
 THE CONCEPT OF HMI – ITS LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 
 
2.1. Complexity of the HMI concept 
The concept of ‘humanitarian military intervention’ (HMI) is in each respect 
problematic. Its controversial nature is reflected already by the fact that it is 
attempting to bridge two instinctively incompatible words: ‘humanitarian’ and 
‘military’. Nevertheless, this concept has already become established in the field of 
research and the in minds of general public and it appears to be too late to try 
rejecting it.30 Appropriateness of its label represents, however, just a minute 
problem in comparison to the actual implications that this concept casts. Impacts of 
HMI entail serious ethical problems targeting the basic consciousness and fears of 
not only the international actors but also of the general public. HMI is easily 
associated with the concrete images of humanitarian suffering and imposed 
military violence, which evoke in each individual strong opinions and emotional 
reactions to the question of its justice or injustice. This highly normative nature of 
HMI complicates the scholarly debate about the concept and keeps the 
international society short of any consensus on the most basic questions of its 
definition, legality or legitimacy.  
     How should such a complicated concept be approached by the scholars? Is it 
possible to declare it illegal or illegitimate? Use of the HMI as a tool of last resort 
crisis management cannot be supported or condemned merely by an assessment of 
its legality. In such complicated cases, when the major ethical concerns 
surrounding the concept cannot be ignored; it is necessary to get to the very basic 
question of a general justice, focusing plainly on evaluation of its legitimacy.31 Only 
after concluding whether such a concept is or is not legitimate, it is possible to 
confront its assessed legitimacy with its existing legal status, and to call for a 
potential revision of law in case of a discovered non-compliance of the legal 
interpretation with the carried out legitimacy judgment.  
     So as to allow for an assessment of this normatively complex concept, this 
chapter will begin by discussing a definition and historical development of the 
HMI concept. Afterwards, it will introduce a comprehensive overview of all the 
main approaches toward its legality and legitimacy. The last section of this chapter 
will present the latest legislative effort at the UN level, which serves as a good 
indication of an existing gap between legality and legitimacy that the policy 
makers are trying to correct, and thus also as an indication of the direction of 
                                                            
30 Verwey, 1992; or Ryter, 2003.  
31 Smith, 2006. 
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where the next legislative initiative are going to be heading in this respect and 
what are the possibilities of its correction. 
2.2. Definition of the HMI concept  
Given the considerable normative implications of the HMI concept, it is difficult 
for the international community to find a generally accepted consensus on its 
definition. Some of the studies understand and interpret this notion broadly to 
cover all the military interventions waged for the ‘humanitarian’ purposes; while 
other - especially legal studies, reserve this term exclusively for the military 
interventions for ‘humanitarian’ purposes that take place both without the 
authorization by the UN Security Council and without an invitation by the target 
state’s government.32 For the purpose of this study, the term HMI will be used 
broadly, attaching the word ‘unauthorized’ in front of the term, if necessary to 
stress the absence of authorization by the UN or of the invitation by the target state 
government. Nevertheless this legal technicality is not the main problematic aspect 
in defining the concept.  
     The main problem rests in finding an agreement on the conditions, which 
change the concept of a regular military intervention that is generally perceived as 
being associated with an increased level of violence and humanitarian suffering in 
a way that it can be awarded a label ‘humanitarian’ or ‘just’. What constitutes a 
sufficient reason to send a HMI? Who should be intervening with which purity of 
motives? What means and ends are necessary? Who evaluates fulfillment of all 
these criteria and thus grants the label? There is more or less a general agreement 
only on when the HMI should be waged, if at all. Most of the authors agree that a 
legitimate HMI should take place only in cases that ‘shock the conscience of 
mankind’, which should constitute the cases of large-scale and gross violations of 
human rights such as genocides, massacres, mass murders, or ethnic cleansing.33 
Nevertheless, that is where the agreement ends. There are, for example major 
disagreements on the required motivation of the interveners. Classical definitions 
of HMI tend to stress that the motive of HMI should be strictly ‘humanitarian’.34 In 
contrast to that, liberal perspectives tend to be much more permissive regarding 
the motivation, and they often refer merely to the existence of a persuasively 
strong ‘humanitarian’ motive of a various degree of ‘purity’.35 There are many 
different versions of the definition setting various criteria. However, most of the 
                                                            
32 Wil Verwey proposed a classic legalist definition of HMI: “A threat or use of force by a state or states 
abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or putting to halt a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in 
particular the right to life of persons, regardless of their nationality, such protection taking place neither upon 
authorization by relevant organs of the UN nor with permission by the legitimate government of the target state.” 
See: Verwey, 1992, p.114. 
33 Wheeler, 2001; Lepard, 2002; or Finnemore, 2003. 
34 Verwey, 1992. 
35 Parekh, 1997. 
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definitions share a same common base line….the sense of the definition is the use of 
force to save lives.  
2.3. Historical development of the HMI concept 
HMI doctrine owes its origin to the Just War tradition that is based on the 
Christian conception of the Just War Theory (JWT). Foundations of this justice-
based JWT rhetoric can be traced back to the Roman Empire and the influence of 
the St. Augustine’s notion of ‘the Two Cities’. Augustine offered a formula for the 
restoration of peace that includes the commonly cited theme of a ‘just war’ as one 
limited by its purpose, authority and conduct. Following on Augustine’s thoughts, 
Thomas Aquinas concretely specified in his Summa Theologica three main 
conditions for labeling a war as being ‘just’: ‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, and ‘just 
authority’.36  
     A modern and secular conception of the JWT was framed into the HMI concept 
by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in the 17th century, when he introduced an idea of 
intervening militarily for the ‘humanitarian’ purposes. He proposed in his book De 
jure belli ac pacis libri tres that the outside countries can legitimately intervene to 
stop the human rights abuses in a neighboring state.37 In the 18th century, among 
other scholars promoting and further developing these thoughts belonged, for 
example, the Swiss philosopher Emmerich de Vattel who defended a solidarist 
tradition recognizing that the governments have not only a right but even a duty to 
defend the humanitarian values wherever they were threatened in the name of 
international justice.38 As Vattel argued, the natural society of states could not 
continue unless the rights belonging to each by nature were respected. In line with 
this reasoning, he further claimed that it was lawful for any state to support an 
uprising in another country, if the people had been exposed to a tyranny.39 Scholars 
such as Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel and other their colleagues and 
followers have attempted to dissociate the notion of ‘just war’ from its religious 
origins by arguing that the Sovereigns were bound by the fundamental principles 
of humanity and have thus duty to treat their subjects with respect for human 
dignity.40 If updated to the modern realities, this would suggest that states are all 
bound by the natural law of the human society that obligates them to treat their 
own nationals in accordance with the principle of humanity and also to ensure that 
                                                            
36 For a more detailed overview of historical development of the Christian conception of JWT, see, for 
example: Waltzer, 1977; Atwood, 2003; or Butler, 2003. 
37 Grotius (transl.), 1625.  
38 Vattel (transl.), 1758. 
39 Vattel (transl), 1758. 
40 Other scholars debating  the legitimacy of HMI based on the JWT in the 18th and 19th century were: 
Christian Wolff, Henry Wheaton, Robert Phillimore, John Stuart Mill, Moutague Bernard, or William 
Edward Hall. For a more detailed description of the development of the concept, see: Knudsen, 2009.  
13 
 
the other states do.41 These propositions immediately started heated debates 
among theologians and legal theorists about the right of HMI that have not been 
resolved until now.  
     In spite of the fact that the concept of HMI has been a subject of scholarly 
debates for about 1600 years, a first acknowledged recorded case of HMI occurred 
only in 1827, when France was authorized by the other European powers to 
intervene into the Ottoman Empire to save the Maronite Christians in Syria from 
being suppressed in practicing their traditional religion. This precedent was 
followed by two other cases of interventions in 19th century that were generally 
considered to be ‘humanitarian’: the Russian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Bulgaria (1977-1830), and the US intervention in Cuba (1898). There were also 
some acknowledged instances of HMI during the Cold War. Among the most cited 
belong, for example: the Indian intervention in East Pakistan (1971), the 
Vietnamese invasion to Cambodia (1978), or the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda 
(1979). Even though, none of the above listed interventions was directly called 
‘humanitarian’, their humanitarian motives, means and effects were clearly 
apparent.42 
     The end of the Cold War has brought new threats of terrorism, genocides and 
failed states that forced the international community to reexamine the notion of 
‘sovereignty’ and the reasonability of blindly following the legally established 
norm of non-interventionism into the other states’ internal affairs. This trend has 
been further encouraged by the strengthened role of the UN, which has catalyzed 
the idealist thoughts about the international ability to protect the human rights 
violations globally. The readiness and the capacity to promote human rights 
abroad have certainly grown over the past two decades, which is visible on a 
growing number of interventions labeled ‘humanitarian’ that took place in this 
time period: Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1993-1995), Rwanda (1994), Haiti 
(2004), Sierra Leone (1998), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), Liberia (2003), or 
Congo (2003). Nevertheless, the use of HMI in practice has been complicated by 
the unresolved legality and legitimacy of the concept, which remain to be a topic of 
the heated academic and political discussions. Among the strongest recent 
manifestations of the international disagreements about the concept belong: the 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, the 
latest intervention in Libya in 2011, and the ongoing debates about appropriateness 
of waging a HMI in Darfur. The questions regarding what criteria actually 
constitute an HMI and whether it can represent a legal and/or a legitimate tool of 
crisis management still continue being unanswered.  
                                                            
41 Secularization of the JWT is described in greater detail in, for example Haar, 2000; Harhoff, 2001; or 
Kabia, 2009. 
42 Kabia, 2009. 
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2.4. Difference between legality and legitimacy  
Having gone through the problem of definition of HMI and the historical 
development of the concept, the chapter will move to a more analytical section 
devoted to the assessment of its legality and legitimacy. First of all, it is necessary 
to bear in mind that the evaluation of legality and legitimacy are two completely 
different activities. Evaluating legality of some action or policy is usually carried 
out by referring to the existing legal texts and customary law, and the answers 
tend to be relatively straightforward declaring the act or the policy as being either 
legal or illegal. In contrast to that, evaluation of legitimacy is much more 
subjective, depending on the complex normative decisions of what is desirable and 
appropriate. Legitimacy judgment loosens the constraints of legality, and evaluates 
the actions using the more sensitive ethical and political considerations. As a result 
of that, legitimacy is a much more fluid category that can be easily gained and lost. 
It always stays open-ended and evolves over time.43 
     Under the ideal circumstances, what is legal should be legitimate and what is 
legitimate should be legal. However, this is usually not the case. If compared with 
legality, legitimacy has a broader perspective based in basic morality. It suggests 
that nobody should be obliged to follow blindly a rule of law, if it runs counter to 
what is generally considered to be just. It means that legitimacy has a power to 
both reinforce the existing law, but also to challenge it based on the legitimacy of 
some higher rationale, so as to ensure that laws serve their fundamental purpose of 
improving the lives of those whom they govern.44 This corrective mechanism of 
legitimacy is particularly important in case of the international law, which is often 
a compromise between the demands for regulation on one hand and a desire of 
governments to keep their hands free on the other.45 If simplified, it is possible to 
claim that legitimacy exerts a constant corrective pressure on the legality to evolve 
in its direction. This struggle between legitimacy and legality is thus a never 
ending process of conversion with the ultimate utopist goal of a synthesis of the 
two doctrines. Therefore, while evaluating the concept of HMI, it is necessary to 
explore both these perspectives and to identify a potential gap that is to be 
corrected. 
2.5. Legality of HMI 
2.5.1. Theoretical approaches toward the legality of HMI 
Scholarly debate about legality of HMI is divided into two opposing camps. First 
one is represented by the so-called ‘restrictionists’46 who defend the legalist 
                                                            
43 Popovski & Turner, 2008. 
44 Popovski & Turner, 2008. 
45 Haar, 2000. 
46 Jackson, 2000. 
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position coming out of the realist tradition of state sovereignty and 
noninterference. This position considers unauthorized HMI to be illegal based on 
the ban on use of force in the international relations as imbedded in the Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. Second stream is represented by the so-called ‘counter-
restrictionists’47 who represent the affirmative liberal perceptions of the 
international politics. Proponents of this position claim that there is an established 
customary right of HMI regardless of existence or absence of authorization, which 
is based on the commitment of the UN Charter to protect human rights globally.48  
2.5.2. Key legal provisions relevant for the right of HMI  
So as to prevent other international violence and to protect the international order 
after WWII, international community codified a basic principle of the ‘non-use of 
force’, which has committed all the member states of the UN not to use force in 
their international affairs. This principle has become a cornerstone of the UN 
Charter regulating the use of force in the international arena. The exact text of the 
key Article 2(4) stipulates: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”49 
Importance of this rule is generally acknowledged by most of the legal scholars 
and this particular provision has become considered to be a part of ‘jus cogens’ – a 
legal norm that has become accepted by the international community as a principle 
from which no derogation is permitted.50 The UN Charter mentions only two 
possible qualifications to this rule. The first one is the right to use force in self-
defense, which is stipulated in the Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”51 The second exception 
imbedded in the UN Charter relates to the use of force under the authorization by 
the UN Security Council in the cases of an existing threat to or a breach of 
collective peace and security. It is well described by the following extractions from 
the Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter. The Article 39 states: “The Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken …… 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.”52, while the Article 42 
                                                            
47 Bull, 1966; Arend & Beck,1993; Tesón, 1997; or Linklater, 1998. 
48 To gain more detailed overview about the division of the theoretical approaches toward the HMI 
concept, see, for example: Wheeler & Bellamy, 2001& Rytter, 2001; or Atwood, 2003. 
49 UN Charter, 1945, art. 2(4). 
50 ‘Jus cogens’ is regulated by the Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. For an interesting discussion about the issue, see: Gray, 2008. 
51 UN Charter, 1945, art. 51. 
52 UN Charter, 1945, art. 39. 
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stipulates: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 
41[non-forcible measures] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”53  
     If simplified, the legal interpretation of the UN Charter regarding the legality of 
any type of military intervention can be summarized by the following single 
sentence. The use of force in the international relations is prohibited54, but there are two 
accepted exceptions to this rule: a use of force in self-defense55, or a use of force to maintain 
or restore international peace and stability if authorized by the UN Security Council56. 
Codification of this rule delegitimized individual acts of war, leaving the UN 
Security Council as a sole authority with a capability to provide a legal status to 
any non-defensive use of force. Main rationale behind its adoption was to limit 
interventionism into the internal affairs of individual states with the goal to 
provide not only peace and security but also to ensure protection of the values 
such as national independence, diversity or mutual restraint.57 Internally, it has 
endowed the states with the right to organize their internal affairs according to 
their own preference; and externally, it has provided them with a protection 
against international aggression and with a possibility to participate in the 
international relations on an equal level with the others.  
      Should the legality of right of HMI be evaluated based on the explicit meaning 
of the above listed key legal provisions of the UN Charter, the judgment would be 
quite straightforward. In case that a military intervention - even for the 
‘humanitarian’ purposes - is not granted an authorization by the UN Security 
Council, the act of intervention would be based on the Article 2(4) clearly 
unlawful. A HMI could be considered as legal only if authorized by the UN 
Security Council.58 In addition to that, HMI remains legally controversial even after 
being authorized by the UN Security Council, since using force for the 
‘humanitarian’ purposes does not qualify as fulfilling any of the accepted 
exceptions to the ban on the use of force. HMI is clearly not an act of self-defense, 
neither is it reasonable to assume that that the framers of the UN Charter intended 
to treat human rights violations as a threat to the international peace and security.  
2.5.3. Alternative sources of the legal status for the right of HMI 
                                                            
53 UN Charter, 1945, art. 42. 
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Nevertheless, there are also other alternative sources of law that could potentially 
provide the right of HMI with a legal status. The above presented legal 
interpretation of the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the related articles has 
become complicated by the development of international human rights law and 
humanitarian law, as well as by the way the states have used the HMI in practice. 
These developments allow viewing the legality of the right of HMI also from a 
different angle. Those arguing in support of the right of HMI view the Article 2(4) 
as being open to a changing interpretation over time and not as having a fixed 
meaning. This position is based on the argument that the UN Charter is not a 
historical will, which the states are obliged to follow in its original meaning, but 
that the subsequent practice gives expression to the reality of the Treaty.59 It does 
not mean to suggest that the drafters of the UN Charter meant the HMI being legal 
in the year 1945, but rather that the right of HMI has been gradually emerging and 
developing over time. This idea is supported by the Nicaragua Case, which stated 
that Article 2(4) is potentially subject to change as a result of a customary law 
development.60 If these arguments are acknowledged to be valid, it is possible to 
identify three major possible alternative sources of legality of a general right of 
HMI that have been gradually formed alongside the Article 2(4) since 1945: 1) the 
international human rights law; 2) the international humanitarian law; and 3) the 
international customary law.  
2.5.3.1. International human rights law  
Proponents of legality of the right of HMI point to the fact that the UN Charter has 
also other dimensions than only ensuring international peace and security, and 
point to the obligation of a worldwide protection of human rights that was 
anchored into the UN Charter in reaction to the massive violations of the 
fundamental human values during the World War II. The UN effort to establish a 
legal framework for the international human rights protection has crystallized into 
a formation of the new body of law – international human rights law – whose basic 
stone represents the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in the year 
1948.61 A current legal trend is undeniably heading toward a greater international 
authority in promoting and protecting international human rights, where the states 
still maintain a primary responsibility but the international community has a 
subsidiary one. The claim that promotion and protection of human rights is a 
legitimate concern of international community was confirmed in the UN report of 
the World Conference on Human Rights.62 It is increasingly becoming the case that 
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when the principles of human rights and sovereignty come into conflict, the 
human rights tend to be given preference.63 
     As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has gradually advanced to a 
universal acceptance, it started to represent a powerful tool in applying diplomatic 
and moral pressure on the governments violating any of its articles.64 There seems 
to be a broad agreement among the legal scholars that certain provisions of the 
international human rights law have gradually evolved into a customary law, 
which means that the states are bound by all their legal provisions regardless of 
their ratification of the treaty that has originally introduced them.65 Some legal 
theorists go even so far as to claim that some key human rights provisions have 
evolved into the ‘ius cogens’ - just as the Article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force in 
the international relations.66 Would the theory that certain human rights provisions 
are ‘ius cogens’ be accepted as correct; it would be theoretically possible to argue 
that they could override the ‘ius cogens’ prohibition on the use of force in the 
international system, providing thus the general right of HMI with legality. 
Nevertheless, this argument is refused by a majority of legal scholars and states; 
since its acceptance would require not only a demonstration that human rights are 
accepted and recognized by the international community as a rule from which no 
derogation is permitted - which is highly debatable, but also that the international 
community accepts the right to use force to protect these rights in a similar manner 
- which is not the case.67  
     Another argument of the proponents of the right of HMI based on the 
international human rights law brings attention to the last part of the key sentence 
outlawing the use of force in the Article 2(4), which stipulates that states should 
refrain from the use of force “…in a manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”68 They argue that given the above mentioned growing importance 
of the human rights’ protection within the UN system and the international law in 
general; military intervention for the protection of human rights could be treated 
as being consistent with the ‘purposes’ of the UN. Nevertheless, such an 
interpretation of Article 2(4) would go against the UN General Assembly 
resolution on the use of force, which outlawed a forcible intervention in absolute 
terms making no provision for HMI69; and additionally against the UN General 
Assembly resolution dealing with the definition of ‘aggression’ that explicitly 
states that: “no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or 
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otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression”.70 It is necessary to recognize that 
the violations of the human rights provisions - however severe - do not provide an 
explicit legality for waging a HMI - neither authorized nor unauthorized. This is 
caused by the fact that even though the international human rights law sets 
sanctions for the human rights violations, it does not mention a forcible action by 
en external party as a lawful remedy.71 
2.5.3.2. International humanitarian law  
Another potential source of legal status of a general right of HMI arises from the 
international humanitarian law that is based on the old tradition of ‘jus in bello’ 
defining the conduct and responsibilities of the states and individuals engaged in 
the warfare. A legal corpus of international humanitarian law is comprised of the 
Geneva Conventions72 that provide a legal protection to the specified classes of 
people during wartime; the Hague Conventions73 that govern the overall methods 
of combat; and the Genocide Convention74 requiring the states to undertake all 
appropriate measures to prevent and to punish a genocide; as well as of the 
subsequent treaties, case law, and customary international law that have gradually 
emerged since the Nuremberg Trails.75  
     The main purpose of the humanitarian law is to restraint violence by protecting 
the lives and dignity of the non-combatants in the armed conflict – either civilians, 
refugees or prisoners of war, and to ensure that combatants and their political 
leaders respect these norms.76 As stated in the Hague Convention, there should be 
a desire “to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit.”77 
Therefore, the parties are bound by the humanitarian law to the extent that such 
compliance does not interfere with achieving their legitimate military goals. For 
example, they are obliged to make every effort to avoid killing and wounding of 
civilians or damaging their property, if these are not involved in the combat; but 
they are not guilty of a war crime, if a bomb mistakenly hits a residential area. The 
Genocide Convention is more concrete, it directly relates to one of the crimes 
against humanity directed against non-combatants. It stipulates that genocide is a 
crime under the international law that should be punished, giving the parties to 
the Convention right to demand the UN to take such an action as they “consider 
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appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide“, which can implicitly 
suggest also the potential use of military force.78 
     Over the past two decades, the international humanitarian law has been 
invoked more frequently than ever, especially in the area of human rights and war 
crimes. A growing importance of the humanitarian law has been demonstrated by 
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), and most 
importantly by the establishment of the International Criminal Court (1998).79 The 
legal framework of the International Criminal Court has criminalized “intentionally 
directing attacks against the civilian population as such” and “extensive destruction . . . of 
property, not justified by military necessity”.80 Creation of these courts has served to 
reinforce the position that those who are responsible for the massive and 
systematic violations of human rights such as genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity within the state borders, are not immune from the international 
law and can be punished.81 This means that the above listed crimes could 
theoretically constitute a legal ground for waging a HMI under certain limited 
circumstances, even for an unauthorized one.  
     The legalizing effect of the international humanitarian law has been enhanced 
by the recent development of the international human rights law. Due to the fact 
that the international human rights law and the international humanitarian law are 
greatly interconnected by their common basis in humanity; a gradual recognition 
of the evolvement of the international human rights law into the customary law 
has affected a parallel acceptance of the international humanitarian law.82 In 1996, 
the International Court of Justice held regarding a compliance with the 
international humanitarian law that “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable 
in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’……that… these fundamental rules are to be observed by all 
States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they 
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law”.83 Nevertheless, it 
is still important not to ignore the significant differences between these two bodies 
of law that persist in spite of their growing convergence. While the humanitarian 
law regulates a struggle of the equal combatants for life and death that tolerates 
killings, wounding, or deprivations of personal freedom for the purpose of 
achieving a victory as long as certain rules of basic concern minimizing the 
unnecessary human suffering are being followed; human rights law protects a 
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physical integrity and a human dignity under all circumstances and it is applicable 
mainly to the relationships of the unequal parties such as the citizens and the 
governments.84 
2.5.3.3. International customary law  
The last relevant source of law that could serve as a potential legal framework for 
the right of HMI is represented by the international customary law developed in 
reaction to the state practice. As is codified in the Article 38(1) of the Statue of the 
International Court of Justice; in addition to the codified doctrines, treaties and 
court judgments, the international law is also based on the established customary 
behavior.85 Customary rules can be by their origin illegal; but they can become 
subsequently accepted as lawful, if the states continuously act in such a manner, 
and if they believe they are legally obliged to act in such a manner – existence of 
‘opinio juris’. To prove that states continuously act in a certain manner is the easier 
task of proving the existence of a customary law, since the state practice is more 
objectively measurable than the subjective believes of the states. Therefore, the 
requirement of a consistent and generally accepted international practice 
represents a necessary element of the customary law. In contrast to that, the second 
requirement of ‘opinio juris’ can be lessened, if there is a consistent state practice 
over a longer period of time. It is only in cases of just a few applications of the 
emerging norm in practice that the presence of the belief becomes more 
important.86  
     Some legal scholars representing the affirmative position to the right of HMI 
point to the process of how the customary law is developing, and they claim that 
the interpretation of the Article 2(4) can be changed by a state practice that is 
gradually becoming transformed into the customary law. They argue that a state 
practice of the repeatedly launched military interventions for the ‘humanitarian’ 
purposes that has been running and developing parallel to the codified non-
intervention legal instruments, has gradually established a legal norm of HMI.87 
They bring attention to the fact that HMI has been increasingly used as a last resort 
conflict management tool in extreme situations, when the UN Security Council was 
paralyzed by a veto power of some of its permanent member states and when the 
traditional non-military tools of conflict management seemed to be incapable of 
dealing effectively with the large-scale human rights violations.88 They cite 
numerous cases of state practice as evidence supporting the crystallization of a 
legal right. For example, Nicholas Wheeler identifies six cases of military 
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interventions in the post-WWII era that could because of the grave and extensive 
human rights abuse in the target state be labeled as HMI: India’s intervention into 
Bangladesh in 1971, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzania’s 
intervention in Uganda in 1979, UN intervention into Northern Iraq in 1991, the US 
and UN intervention in Somalia in 1992, late intervention to Rwanda in 1994, and 
the UN and NATO’s interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo and Serbia in 
1999.89 Nevertheless, it would be also possible to add other interventions to this 
list, such as: the Economic Community of West African States’ interventions into 
Liberia in 1990, UN intervention in Haiti in 1994, UN intervention in East Timor in 
1999 and the British and UN interventions in Sierra Leone in 2000; or the highly 
controversial US interventions/wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, or the 
intervention in Libya in 2011.90 
     The advocates of the existence of the customary right of HMI not only relate to 
the existing state practice, but also to the gradually established ‘opinio juris’. 
According to the affirmative position, there is a partial consensus among the liberal 
states that there is a moral right to intervene in the extreme cases of humanitarian 
suffering even without authorization by the UN Security Council.  This would 
suggest that while intervening for the declared ‘humanitarian’ purposes, the 
interveners could have reasonably acted with a defendable feeling of being legally 
obliged to stop the ongoing human rights violations based on the universally 
accepted international human rights law and the international humanitarian law.91  
     If both assumptions of the existing consistent state practice and a sufficient 
‘opinio juris’ were accepted as being valid, both conditions for the emergence of the 
international customary law would have been fulfilled and it would be possible to 
declare existence of the customary right of HMI. This position is defended, for 
example, by the former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia who stated that the customary law could provide a legal basis 
to intervene militarily for the limited humanitarian purposes and, indeed, that 
international law was moving in this direction. Similarly, the judge Antonio 
Cassesse concluded that: “Based on these nascent trends in the world community, I 
submit that, under certain strict conditions, resort to armed force may gradually become 
justified, even absent any authorization by the Security Council.”92 Validity of this 
affirmative argument that there has been a sufficient amount of cases of HMI that 
could be reasonably considered as representing a consistent and a generally 
accepted practice and that the actors have acted with a necessary ‘opinio juris’ is, 
nevertheless, highly contested.93 
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     The affirmative position is being challenged by the legalist one, which refuses 
both the existence of a general acceptance of the right of HMI within the 
international community, and its consistent usage in practice that could jointly 
transform the illegal HMI into a legal custom.94 Legalist position points to the 
absence of a consensus about the existing right of HMI that is demonstrated by the 
behavior and declarations of both states and international organizations. It 
emphasizes that the right of HMI tends to be perceived predominantly as a 
Western driven principle, which is strongly opposed not only by the weaker 
developing countries that tend to be the most typical targets of such interventions, 
but also by the stronger powers such as China or Russia that follow the lower 
human rights standards and fear a possible interventionism into their domestic 
affairs.95  
     The legalist position also criticizes the inconsistent usage of the concept of HMI, 
which arises from the fact that states intervening militarily for ‘humanitarian’ 
purposes have appeared to be reluctant citing the human rights protection as an 
indicated reason for the interventions - even if the consequences of the conflict 
seemed to provide a ready-made justification for doing that. In spite of an 
increasing willingness to address the tragic humanitarian consequences of the 
conflicts while justifying some military intervention; claiming to be acting on the 
basis of self-defense is still considered to be an easier way of relating to the UN 
Charter in most of the cases.96 A similar reluctance has been notable on the 
behavior of the UN Security Council, when it tried authorizing interventions for 
‘humanitarian’ purposes. Due to a lack of legal basis for exempting the HMI from a 
general ban on use of force as stipulated in the UN Charter, the UN Security 
Council often artificially stretched the definition of the legally allowed exception to 
the ban on use of force - the ‘threat to international peace and security’, which in 
spite of the severity of the humanitarian crisis could not have been reasonably 
evaluated as such a threat.97 The UN Security Council defended this interpretation 
of the UN Charter by a statement that a mere absence of military conflict among 
states does not itself ensure ‘the international peace and security’; rather that the 
intrastate humanitarian crises can also become threats to peace and security.98 
What is important to note is that while giving its consent to the military 
interventions for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, the UN Security Council usually 
described the situation as having a ‘unique character’ or being of an ‘extraordinary 
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nature’ and thus requiring an ‘exceptional response’.99 This reluctance to explicitly 
acknowledge the ‘humanitarian’ purposes as a main motive for interventions 
reveals a clear unwillingness on the side of the UN Security Council to set an 
explicit precedent for mandating a HMI, which has had a secondary effect of an 
inconsistent application of the HMI concept and has thus complicated its 
acceptance as a customary law.100 It is just recently, that the UN Security Council 
has started to refer to the ‘humanitarian motives’ more directly, by referring to the 
‘responsibility to protect’ framework that will be debated in detail in the later parts 
of this chapter. 
     To sum the legalist position up, it suggests that there is a lack of a sufficient 
evidence of state practice of a genuinely ‘humanitarian’ military intervention based 
upon the ‘opinio juris’.101 As a leading international lawyer noted facing the United 
Kingdom House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee following the Kosovo air 
campaign: “The proponents of humanitarian intervention are distinctly in a minority. 
More significant, however, is the position in customary international law, which depends 
upon the practice of States based upon ‘opinio juris’, that is to say, a belief that the action is 
in accordance with international law. There can be no doubt that the UN Charter can be 
modified by the congruent practice of the Member States crystallizing as a new principle of 
customary law. But there is a burden of proof upon proponents of a change in the 
customary law. The central point is the absence of evidence of a change of view by a 
majority of States.”102  
     The final and maybe the most important argument opposing the existence of a 
customary right of HMI views this dilemma from a different angle by weighting 
the relative legal strength of the treaty law versus the customary law. In support of 
the legalist objections, it suggests that privileging the custom over the treaty - 
whose provisions are additionally ‘jus cogens’ such as the Article 2(4) - would be a 
dangerous approach potentially leading to the serious misuses of the customary 
law due to the shifting perspectives and controversies of what constitutes a 
custom. 
2.5.4. Final evaluation of legality of HMI 
While evaluating the legality of HMI, it is necessary to start with the interpretation 
of the UN Charter and to determine, “whether the application of an agreement to a 
particular situation is or is not in accordance with the shared intentions, expectations and 
objectives of the parties.”103 In spite of some disagreements about the interpretation of 
the Article 2(4), the above presented analysis clearly shows that the legalist 
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position refusing the existence of the right of unauthorized HMI has much more 
support within the scholarly legal debate about the concept. It is thus possible to 
conclude that there is a majority legal opinion that the general right of HMI does 
not exist within the current international law, and that there are only two legally 
acceptable versions of HMI - the one authorized by the UN Security Council or the 
one waged on the invitation by the target state’s government. Under the current 
state of international law, any suggestion to violate sovereignty of any state using a 
military force without the UN Security Council authorization would be unlawful. 
     Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the alleged cases of HMI still lack a legal 
standing that would transform the exceptions into the norm104; it would be difficult 
to ignore the importance and moral validity of the affirmative arguments that have 
managed to divide the scholars in their opinion about the legality of the concept. It 
is necessary to take into consideration that the poor legal status of the 
unauthorized HMI and a foreseeable condemnation by the international 
community have not prevented the countries to intervene anyway in many cases of 
humanitarian disasters in spite of the lacking mandate by the UN Security Council. 
It is necessary to admit that it is not uncontroversial to denounce any of the two 
approaches toward the legality of the general right of HMI as being completely 
wrong, since both the legalist and the affirmative positions have their strengths 
and inherent problems. Problem of the legalist position is that it fails to provide a 
legal basis for taking a firm action to prevent the ongoing atrocities against the 
civilians, degrading thus the international human rights law and humanitarian 
law. Similarly, it is problematic to fully adhere to the affirmative liberal position 
and to advocate the legality of unauthorized HMI plainly by referring to the 
universal human rights and the custom, while ignoring the existing legal structure. 
Opting for anyone of them would entail serious moral implications that need to be 
taken into consideration. 
2.6. Legitimacy of HMI 
In case of such a morally loaded legal trap, it is usually a habit to retreat a step 
back and to return to the basic legitimacy of the concept, letting the legitimacy to 
shape the interpretation of its legal status. 
2.6.1. Mainstream approaches toward the legitimacy of HMI  
There are three key works framing the debate about legitimacy of HMI in the 
existing literature. First work Just War or Just Peace? written by Simon Chesterman 
supports a legalist perspective in the debate about legitimacy of HMI. Chesterman 
frames the dilemma of HMI as a choice between “the just war or just peace”105 and 
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concludes by rejecting the legitimacy of the right of HMI.106 Second key work 
Saving Strangers written by Nicholas Wheeler represents a more permissive liberal 
perspective on the problem. He describes cases of the use and misuse of HMI in 
practice, and traces the justifications declared as a ground for individual cases of 
HMI and their actual goals. Wheeler concludes by recognizing the norm of HMI as 
a legitimate exception to the rule of nonintervention, calling for a solidarist 
approach of a “guardianship of human rights everywhere”.107 The final key document 
is the UN-contracted report produced by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that is positioned theoretically 
somewhere in-between the legalist and the liberal positions. Authors of the report 
try to reconcile conflict between the norms of nonintervention and the respect for 
human rights; and attempt to create some guidelines for responding to the massive 
human rights violations.108 Conclusions of this study support legitimacy of the 
emerging HMI norm by introducing a concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. The 
report bases its reasoning on the shifted understanding of state’s sovereignty in the 
international system. It entails that states no more possess an unlimited control 
over their delimited territory. Instead, it interprets sovereignty as being conditional 
upon the states’ respect for a minimum standard of human rights: “…sovereignty 
implies a dual responsibility: externally to respect the sovereignty of other states, and 
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all people within the state”.109  
2.6.2. Moral arguments supporting the legitimacy of HMI 
Moral principles supporting existence of legitimacy of the right of HMI are based 
mainly on the natural law and the related Just War ethics. Natural law represents a 
set of rules with a universal character regulating the behavior of states in their 
international relations. What is unique about the natural law is that it has a 
primacy over and exists independently of both treaty and customary law.110 
Natural law accepts existence of the right to use force in case of a moral imperative 
of protecting the innocents, even if the suffering occurs in another state. As Grotius 
stated in his De jure belli ac pacis libri tres: “According to the new understanding of 
international relations that was emerging together with the idea of sovereign state, any 
sovereign state has the right to enforce natural law against any other sovereign who is 
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guilty of violating it….providing the offence is very atrocious and very evident.”111 
Natural law constitutes a major inspiration for the foundations of the Just War 
Theory (JWT), which deals with the justification of HMI much more specifically, 
concretizing the exact conditions for both waging and conducting a ‘just war’.112 
Based on the JWT, an act of war can be classified as ‘just’ when the following six 
criteria become fulfilled: 1) ‘just cause’; 2) ‘just intent’; 3) ‘just authority’113; 4) ‘last 
resort’; 5) ‘proportionality’ of the used force to the ends it seeks to achieve; and 6) a 
reasonable chance of ‘success’.114  
     There is a powerful moral intuition at work in thinking of those who advocate 
legitimacy of the right of HMI that apparently goes beyond the current 
international law. Coming out of the natural law, the supporters of legitimacy of 
HMI argue that a complete prohibition of use of force outside the framework set in 
the UN Charter is clearly incapable of protecting the inviolable human rights of 
individuals. They claim that the UN Charter should be treated as a living 
instrument that needs to be interpreted in its contemporary context to allow 
dealing effectively with the cases of humanitarian suffering. Michael Walzer wrote 
in support of this position: “Any state capable of stopping the slaughter has a right at 
least, to try to do so. The legalist paradigm indeed rules out such efforts, but that only 
suggests that the paradigm, unrevised cannot account for the moral realities of military 
intervention.”115 These affirmative thoughts have crystallized into the elaboration of 
the ICISS report, which has introduced new concepts such as a ‘limited 
sovereignty’ and the derived ‘responsibility to protect’ that have been conceptually 
adopted at the UN level in 2005, and that have served as a major legitimizing factor 
supporting the legitimacy of HMI so far. 
     The ICISS report points to the existing shift in understanding of the notion of 
‘sovereignty’, which is no more perceived merely as an ‘authority’, but also as a 
‘responsibility’.116 While the former treats the state sovereignty as an unrivaled 
control over a delimited territory and the population residing within it, the later 
suggests that sovereignty is conditional upon the state’s responsibility for 
respecting the dignity and basic human rights of all its citizens. This suggests that 
sovereignty should no more serve as a protective shell for the governments 
committing massive human rights violations against their citizens, but should be 
interpreted as being bound by certain limitations. As the former UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, repeatedly declared; the sovereignty should not be meant to 
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leave governments free to persecute their citizens. Only good governance and the 
consequent international recognition can fully establish a sovereignty of the 
state.117 In 1999, Kofi Annan publically proclaimed that: “Emerging slowly, but I 
believe surely is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will 
and must take precedence over concerns of State sovereignty. No government has the right 
to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental 
freedoms of its peoples.”118  
     Introduction of the concept of a ‘limited sovereignty’ has constituted grounds 
for challenging the nonintervention norm with the new concept of ‘responsibility 
to protect’. Its basic idea is set on an assumption that functioning of the 
international system is dependent on the willingness of states to play by the system 
rules. If this fundamental condition is not respected and some state completely 
disregards the fundamental human rights, such a moral collapse is outside the law 
and so can be the tool used by the international community to deal with it. From 
this follows that HMI can be perceived as a legitimate response of the international 
community to such an abnormal behavior - though illegal in principle, which 
provides the individuals living under oppressive regimes with a hope that an 
abusive government may confront international action.119  
2.6.3. Moral arguments opposing the legitimacy of HMI 
Moral concerns motivate not only the supporters but also the opponents of the 
HMI concept. Negative arguments represent a mix of realist, colonialist, pluralist 
and consequentialist perspectives that point to the institutional and practical 
limitations for controlling the use of HMI in practice. There are about five major 
ethical objections to the legitimacy of the right of HMI. First objection follows the 
realist way of thinking by claiming that the establishment of such a right would 
endanger international peace and stability that could unleash an uncontrollable 
anarchy.120 This argument is based on an assumption that the world peace is better 
preserved and international stability is more effectively guaranteed, if the states 
respect each other’s sovereignty without any reservations. It puts an emphasis on 
the moral obligation to maintain order at the expense of the moral obligation to 
promote human rights and democracy elsewhere. It points to the fact that the value 
of an international peace should be given a particular weight; since it is in the 
situations of war, when the humanitarian values are most likely to be threatened. 
Therefore, based on this argument, standing firm on the prohibition of use of force 
should represent a lesser evil. 
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     Second criticism of the HMI concept questions the real motivations of the 
interveners and the related abuses of the right of HMI mainly for the national 
interests. As Michael Walzer suggests in his publication Just and Unjust Wars, 
interventions intended mainly to protect the human rights are rare, since states are 
not willing to use own military forces unless having some substantial national 
interests at stake.121 In fact, demanding a purity of humanitarian motives to qualify 
some military intervention as being ‘humanitarian’ is not a very realistic option; 
since under such conditions, there would hardly ever be any. It is necessary to take 
into consideration that any type of a military endeavor is politically risky and has 
real costs - both in terms of finances and death soldiers. If no national interests are 
involved, it is obviously more rational for the political leaders to remain inactive 
and to wait until some other country takes the burden of bearing the costs of HMI 
on itself. Political leaders are thus confronted with a need to justify their decision 
to send young men into the distant conflict zones not only by referring to the 
morality of such an operation, but also by referring to the existing national 
interests to justify the entailed risks that the country would undergo.122 This 
necessity is demonstrated by the fact that if a conflict appears in some 
economically and politically uninteresting region, the international community 
faces a totally opposite problem than having to stop the fighting willing countries 
from sending their troops. Just to the contrary, it is often very difficult to find the 
volunteers that would be willing to contribute the troops. Low willingness to fight 
for merely moral reasons often leaves the main global governor of human rights – 
the UN – paralyzed from stopping the humanitarian suffering in the politically or 
economically unattractive areas. Having no own military capabilities to act and 
having no troop contributions from the member states without direct interests in 
the conflict region; the UN is often incapable of waging any operation no matter 
how severe the ongoing humanitarian crisis is. In such cases, the UN is left with 
two possibilities: either to remain inactive and to let the suffering continue; or to 
give the mandate to intervene even to the states with the obvious side interests but 
to the only ones willing to act. This argumentation explains also the other often 
criticized aspect of the HMI concept in practice, which is its selectivity in targeting. 
As argued above, it is just a logical consequence of the necessity of intervening 
countries to count the possible risks and costs associated with each military 
endeavor, and thus a necessity to carefully considerate when and where these risks 
and costs will be born based on the other strategic interests. It is just a logical 
consequence of the limited resources that even with the best will in the world, it 
would be just impossible to take action in every single case of the human rights 
violations.123 
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     Next critical argument suggests that establishment of the right of HMI could be 
extremely prone to the potential abuses for the sake of power politics of those 
countries, which have the sufficient financial and military means to actually 
conduct such endeavors.124 Given the imbalanced power relations among states 
and within the entire institutional framework at the international level, there is no 
body capable of controlling the great powers from misusing the HMI. There are 
about two scenarios of how the control mechanism over the use of the potential 
right of HMI could be possibly carved. Assuming that the decision to intervene for 
‘humanitarian’ purposes would be left upon the sensitivity of individual countries, 
it would potentially lead to an uncontrollable unilateralism by the strongest 
powers. Similarly, assuming that the UN Security Council would be given the 
authority to decide upon legitimacy of the launched HMI, which is the most 
probable scenario; its militarily strong permanent members entitled with a veto 
power would be capable of stopping any legitimate HMI from happening, while 
themselves enjoying a de facto immunity regarding their own acts of aggression. 
Critics of the right of HMI thus argue that the nonintervention norm needs to be 
preserved, since it is intended to be applied to all states equally, representing thus 
a protection of the weaker states from being violently exploited by the stronger 
powers that seek to further their selfish interests or to impose their views on how 
the weaker states should be internally organized.125  
     Third criticism of the right of HMI represents a mix of pluralist and 
neocolonialist perspectives that follows from the previously debated abuses of 
such a right by the great powers. Pluralists argue that there is no common 
universalist agreement on the political, social and cultural values; and stress that 
each society cherishes different religious, ethnic, and civilization habits. As a result 
of that, it is very subjective to evaluate certain policies as being oppressive toward 
the human rights and thus as being a viable reason for a breach of some state’s 
sovereignty. They point to the fact that a majority of the militarily strong states that 
tend to be the most frequent interveners, as well as most of the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council belong among the representatives of the 
Western culture. Human rights as understood in the West differ from those valued 
in the developing world, which makes the concept of the ‘universal’ human rights 
questionable. It suggests that introducing the right of HMI into the current 
international system that is so imbalanced in the power-values distribution would 
put the Western countries in a position and in power to evaluate and punish other 
states for the claimed noncompliance with the subjective human rights standards, 
forcing a majority of the mankind to accept the ideological hegemony of the 
Western establishment. Without clearly separating a minimalist conception of the 
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human rights’ protection from a maximalist intention to reshape societies 
according to the Western liberal-democratic image; the right of HMI would be 
highly probably portrayed as a Western-driven norm reflecting the Western ability 
to manipulate the international opinion and to construct an illusory ‘consensus’.126  
     Similarly as pluralists, the neocolonialists perceive the right of HMI as a mere 
cover for legitimization of the Western power politics. They claim that the concept 
of HMI bears the shades of the medieval crusades or the later European colonial 
imperialism that is just veiled in the ‘modern’ clothes of human rights protection 
and democracy. They present the concept of HMI as being built on the traditional 
stereotypes and hegemonial discourses in favor of the right to intervene, by which 
the Western powers authoritatively present their own moral and civilization 
superiority. They argue that even if the now-a-days motivations and objectives of 
the interveners were of a substantially different nature form those during the 
colonial period; separating substance and symbols for those being intervened upon 
may be a difficult task. These concerns seem to be supported by the fact that most 
of the typical targets of HMI tend to have a post-colonial character.127  
     Fourth major objection to the right of HMI follows the argumentation of 
consequentialist ethics. It states that - no matter how well intentioned - HMI can 
easily produce more problems than it solves, resulting in a negative humanitarian 
outcome. Intervention could, for example, provoke a violent resistance by the 
government of the target country; may provoke a violent reaction of the 
government in the neighboring state; alternatively, it may also prolong or intensify 
the conflict by injecting the new weapons and men-power into the conflict zone or 
by increasing the prospects and willingness to fight of the conflict party in those 
support the intervention was carried.128 Nevertheless, conflict environment is 
highly complex, which makes any speculation about the possible effects of HMI 
highly problematic. Results of any such evaluation can be strikingly different 
depending on which set of consequences and which time frame are taken into 
consideration, or by whom and on the basis of which data are the evaluations 
carried out. It is impossible to evaluate precisely in advance whether some HMI 
can succeed or not, since there are simply too many unknown and unpredictable 
factors outside the control of the intervener. 
     Last major argument criticizing the concept of HMI is a product of the practical 
experience with usage of this term. Combining the words ‘humanitarian’ and 
‘military’ within one term creates undesired associations between the two, which 
complicates and endangers work of the non-military humanitarian workers 
stationed in the conflict zones. In contrast to the practices of the military personnel, 
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humanitarian workers typically tend to follow three guiding principles in their 
work: neutrality, impartiality, and independence. These principles not only 
symbolize the core values of their mission; but most importantly, they represent a 
practical tool for their own protection. Being perceived as representatives of the 
neutral charitable organization serves as a guarantee that humanitarian workers 
are not attacked upon by any side of the conflict. Nevertheless, when the 
humanitarian organization operates in a close proximity to the military forces that 
call themselves ‘humanitarian’; all sides inevitably view also the non-military 
humanitarian workers as political actors driven by the strategic goals of the 
military planners. These allegations about their interconnectedness are often 
correct, since humanitarian aid is sometimes openly manipulated by the 
intervening forces in an attempt to build a local support for their military and 
political goals. This happens particularly when the intervening states are at the 
same time also the major funders of humanitarian activity in the target state so as 
to win the support of the civilian population by demonstrating a goodwill and 
power of the donor. An unfortunate consequence of such practices is a rapid 
increase in the number of humanitarian workers killed in the battle fields129, and 
open accusations of the military sector of ‘devouring’ the humanitarian space.130  
2.6.4. Final evaluation of legitimacy of HMI 
Question about existence of a sufficient moral ground for legitimizing the right of 
HMI seems to have no clear answer. HMI cannot be from the moral perspective 
declared neither plainly legitimate nor illegitimate. On one hand, it would be 
possible to question morality of the international system, in which the states can 
massacre their people without having to fear a punishment, and in which the 
oppressed people have no hope of receiving external assistance. On the other hand, 
apart from the unsure positive humanitarian outcomes of HMI; establishing the 
right of HMI could potentially increase the risk of new conflicts and could serve as 
a cover for the powerful states to impose their power and subjective human rights 
standards on the weaker ones. Even though, the above provided list of moral 
arguments seems to indicate more criticism of HMI relative to the arguments 
supporting the concept; it is just an overview of as many possible perspectives on 
the concept as possible. It is important to critically assign the weights of moral 
importance to individual arguments that justify or denounce the concept before 
making any final judgment.  
     Nevertheless, what appears to be obvious from the above carried out analysis is 
that the arguments against legitimacy of the right of HMI cannot be dismissed 
merely by a claim that sovereignty is not absolute. It cannot be ignored that any 
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type of warfare destroys lives, health, property, infrastructure, and natural and 
cultural environment in a degree that far overreaches any alternative diplomatic or 
economic tools of crisis management. Due to the fact that any military intervention 
- including the ‘humanitarian’ one - involves deliberate killing and destruction; a 
resort to it logically demands a heavy burden of justification. As a result of that, it 
would be necessary to provide really reasonable and solid reasons why waging a 
military intervention can be justified and under which criteria to award the 
concept of HMI with legitimacy. 
2.7. Gap between legality and legitimacy - ‘responsibility to protect’ concept 
As is visible from the historical development of the HMI concept that was 
presented at the beginning of this chapter, the international community seems to 
be adopting an increasingly affirmative approach toward the right of HMI. The 
behaviour of the international actors suggests that the right of HMI is gradually 
becoming accepted as legitimate, and that there is an effort to correct its illegality 
by providing it with an increasingly solid legal status. The main impulse to 
institutionalize the right of HMI was initiated by the former UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan. He addressed the issue of HMI in the Millennium Report to the 
General Assembly in 2000, posing a question: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed 
an unacceptable assault of sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every percept of 
our common humanity?”.131 As a reaction to his appeal, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established to 
approach the problem of HMI in a comprehensive manner with the task of finding 
a global consensus about how and when the international community should 
respond to the emerging humanitarian crises.132 In 2001, the ICISS released a report 
introducing a new concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, which commits states to 
take action to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing when they know or should know that populations are at grave risk.133 
The main declared purpose of the ICISS report was to introduce a broad doctrine 
of crisis prevention. It stated: “prevention is the single most important dimension of the 
responsibility to protect”.134 In spite of this original goal, the ICISS report has been 
mainly discussed in relation to the potential legalization of the right of HMI, since 
it allows for a possibility of waging a HMI as a last resort solution when dealing 
with a humanitarian crisis.135 
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     The entire ‘responsibility to protect’ concept is based on a two-dimensional 
understanding of responsibility: (1) the responsibility of a state to protect its 
citizens from atrocities; and (2) the responsibility of the international community to 
prevent and to react to the massive human rights violations. The ICISS report 
argues that states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens. When 
they are unable or unwilling to do so, “the principle of nonintervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect” 136, and “it becomes the responsibility of the 
international community to act in its place”.137 The concept shifts the debate away 
from the controversial ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘responsibility to protect’ - 
meaning to a perspective focused on the victims of human rights violations.138  
Based on this perspective, human rights are not perceived as limitations to the 
sovereignty, but rather as their inherent elements. According to this logic, HMI 
does not contradict the principle of sovereignty, but rather complements it, where 
a state does not fulfill its responsibility.139 Nevertheless, as is emphasized in the 
ICISS report; a resort to a military intervention should only be acceptable in the 
extreme cases of large-scale human rights violations or ethnic cleansings – ‘just 
cause’, and only when all of the additional four criteria are met: (1) ‘just intent’; (2) 
‘last resort’; (3) ‘proportionality’; and (4) a reasonable ‘probability of success’.140 
     In answering who can authorize a HMI, the ICISS report adopts a rather 
cautious approach leaving a key role with the UN Security Council as is stipulated 
in the UN Charter.141 Nevertheless, in case that the HMI is blocked by a veto vote 
by some permanent member of the UN Security Council; the report suggests a 
possibility to obtain legitimization from the General Assembly, or alternatively 
through authorization by a relevant regional organization.142 The drafters of the 
report justify this position by a statement that scenario, in which “one veto can 
override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern” is 
unacceptable.143 They admit that there is no realistic prospect for passing an 
amendment of the UN Charter abolishing the veto power in cases of ongoing 
humanitarian emergencies, but they urge the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council to adopt a “formal, mutually agreed practice” of giving it up in these 
exceptional situations.144 Concerning the legal status of an unauthorized HMI; the 
ICISS report mentions a lack of global consensus on this controversial question, but 
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it avoids explicitly calling such an intervention illegal.145 It explains this seemingly 
confusing position by pointing out a potential damage to the international order if 
the UN Security Council is bypassed; but at the same time, it also emphasizes a 
“damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the UN Security Council 
stands by”.146 It warns that if the UN Security Council fails to live up to its 
responsibility, the states might take the law into their own hands and might 
intervene either in the ad hoc coalitions or unilaterally, which could have negative 
consequences for both international order and justice.147 The ICISS report 
concludes by suggesting a following hierarchy of responsibility for the 
management of the severe human rights violations: host state, the UN Security 
Council, the General Assembly, regional organizations, coalitions of the willing, 
and finally individual states external to the violations.  
2.7.1. World Summit Outcome of 2005 
The ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine has been elevated to the global level by 
being endorsed by the UN General Assembly at the World Summit in 2005. The 
state representatives explicitly acknowledge in the World Summit Outcome 
Document that each state has a responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; and if some 
state bearing the primary responsibility for its population “manifestly” fails to live 
up to its responsibility, they agree on the existence of a collective responsibility to 
help protecting such populations using the peaceful means.148 Concerning a 
possibility of initiating a collective military operation to protect these populations; 
the proclamation is phrased more vaguely stating that the states are prepared to 
act in a timely manner and on the basis of a case-by-case evaluation.149  
     There are some notable differences between the ICISS Report of 2001 and the 
World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 that were a price for gaining a 
sufficient support for approving the Document within the UN framework, since a 
number of states voiced serious concerns about a potential of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ concept for being abused, equating the concept with the highly 
controversial right of HMI.150 Critical remarks were voiced across a whole 
spectrum of the international arena. While the great powers feared losing their 
privileged position within the UN Security Council and thus a power to decide 
when and where the force can be used;151 other countries also adopted a generally 
cautious approach, suggesting that a failure to act in the past was more caused by a 
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lack of political will rather than by a lack of authority.152 As a result of these 
doubts, the original ideas from the ICISS report had to go through some significant 
changes so as to persuade the states to adopt the concept at least in an adjusted 
form. In particular, the proposal to include criteria governing the use of force was 
dropped, and it was agreed that any HMI under the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
framework would require an authorization by the UN Security Council. The World 
Summit Outcome Document also dropped the possibility of appealing to other 
bodies such as the UN General Assembly in case of the veto being applied to block 
a potential HMI, as well as the possibility of waging a HMI outside the UN 
framework.153 The UN Secretary-General defended a lack of discussion about the 
possibility of unauthorized HMI by stating: “The task is not to find alternatives to the 
Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better.”154  
     Since the endorsement of the World Summit Outcome Document, the UN 
Security Council has five times successfully included the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
concept into the resolutions – once  in the resolution to protect the civilians in 
armed conflicts in general155, and four times in reference to the concrete situations 
in Sudan156, Libya157 and Ivory Coast158. In 2009, the UN Secretary-General asked 
the UN General Assembly to further develop the World Summit Outcome 
Document, and to provide the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ with a more 
concrete legal basis.159 In 2009, the UN General Assembly started a debate about a 
potential strategy for implementing the ‘responsibility to protect’. The outcome 
was a resolution reaffirming the principles listed in the UN Charter and the World 
Summit Outcome Document, and declaring its interest in further considerations on 
the ‘responsibility to protect’.160 
2.7.2. Legal interpretation of the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
Endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005 has triggered continuous academic and political debates about 
its legal content.161 There are ongoing disagreements about whether the 
‘responsibility to protect’ constitutes only a conceptual framework for political 
discourse, or whether it has some more concrete legal implications. In fact, a legal 
status of the concept that is challenging the key provisions on the non-use of force 
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in the UN Charter has been supported merely by the declaration of the World 
Summit and by the UN General Assembly resolution, none of which has a legally 
binding effect under the international law.162 Even though, the World Summit 
Outcome Document remained silent regarding the legal status of the 
‘responsibility to protect’; most of the scholars qualify it as an ‘emerging norm’ not 
yet included in any legally binding international document but that might 
gradually develop into the international customary law.163 They argue that in its 
current form, the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept is still not a suitable candidate 
for a legal norm. It is constructed as a comprehensive framework without a 
sufficient degree of precision, which causes that not all of its aspects are fit to be 
translated into the legal rights and obligations. It is only in conjunction with other 
more concrete rights or duties that such a broad concept could gain a legal 
significance.164  
     To sum it up, based on the majority legal opinion; the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
concept is constructed primarily as a non-legal concept introducing a more 
concrete set of criteria and procedures for determining when the responsibility of 
the international community to intervene should be triggered;165 nevertheless, the 
concept has a generally acknowledged potential to gradually evolve into a 
customary law, which allows for categorizing it among the ‘emerging legal norms’. 
It is thus possible to claim that its legal content can be summarized as evolutionary 
rather than as revolutionary.166  
      One of the most controversial topics touched upon by the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ concept is the question of legality of HMI without authorization by the UN 
Security Council. Some authors argue that endorsement of the concept supports 
the claim that unilateral military intervention could be legal even in absence of the 
authorization by the UN Security Council.167 Nevertheless, such an interpretation 
would go too far. In spite of the fact that the original ICISS report does not 
explicitly deem the unilateral HMI without a Security Council mandate illegal, its 
drafters were unable to find a consensus with regard to its legality. The ICISS 
report solves this question by describing a potential bypass of the UN Security 
Council as a “damage to international order”.168 The World Summit Outcome 
Document is even more skeptical regarding the legality of the unauthorized HMI. 
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Due to the fact that the majority of the states explicitly refused to accept legality of 
the unauthorized HMI during the negotiations about the final draft of the 
Document169, it entirely places the ‘responsibility to protect’ within the institutional 
framework of the UN, which means as being conditional upon the authorization 
by the UN Security Council.170  
     A surprising endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept at the UN 
level can be explained by the fact that its adoption has not added anything 
substantially new to the international law regulating the use of force in the 
international relations. The concept has not created any legally binding criteria for 
the UN Security Council to act, it has not managed to legally restrict the use of veto 
power by the permanent members, and it has not legalized an unauthorized HMI. 
The powers and competences of the General Assembly as well as of the other 
international actors have remained legally unchanged. It was possible to push 
through the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ at the UN level, because it is not 
as radical as the HMI concept. Building a similar support for the general right of 
HMI would have been much more improbable. 
2.7.3. Impact of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept on future policy 
making 
The main contribution of the ICISS report are its conceptual insights into the 
relationship among sovereignty, responsibility, and intervention. The report 
presents a rather affirmative perspective on the right of HMI, forming a convincing 
argument in favor of the legality and legitimacy of such an action. By endorsing 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ at the UN level during the World Summit of 2005, the 
international community for the first time formally declared that the sovereignty 
might sometimes give way to the concerns about human rights. The international 
community has thus moved from away from tolerating the practice of authorizing 
the HMI by the UN Security Council to explicitly approving it. Endorsement of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ can thus be understood as a codification of the emerging 
HMI norm that has been gradually developing especially since 1990s. Seemingly 
degrading fact that the concept represents just a mix of political and moral 
responsibilities and cannot be equated with a legal obligation should not diminish 
its significance. Political and moral implications may often have an even greater 
impact on the behavior of international actors than the legal norms.171 The concept 
should be perceived as a tool of political and moral pressure preventing the world 
from standing aside the mass killing and ethnic cleansing like it happened in 
Rwanda or, more recently, in Darfur - as a tool making the governments more 
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likely to act.172 To sum it up, in spite of a weak legal standing of the concept173; it 
has had and will have a tremendous impact on the political discourse of HMI.174  
     Obviously, it is necessary to be critical regarding the use and misuse of the 
concept in practice. The desired effects repeatedly mentioned by the proponents of 
the concept could be just a wishful thinking that will be far from reality. It is 
always necessary to bear in mind that the application of the agreed-upon criteria to 
the real cases is always open to interpretation. Skilled lawyers and diplomats can 
use the criteria entailed in the concept to construct the convincing arguments both 
for and against particular cases of HMI.175 A biased interpretation of the concept 
could go in various directions. This study will mention just two most probable 
ones. 
     First possible misinterpretation could be used to argue for a more restricted use 
of collective security within the UN framework. This scenario can be caused by the 
fact that the concept assigns a key responsibility to safeguard the massive human 
rights violations to the states themselves. It is then a subjective question to decide 
whether a state has already failed to live up to its responsibility, and whether a 
responsibility of the international community has thus already been triggered.  
This suggests that the concept of dual responsibility might prove to be a political 
obstacle for waging a collective action, which could greatly hinder an effective and 
timely reaction to the cases of genocide or other massive human rights 
violations.176 There have already been instances of applying the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ concept in this way. For example, when the UN Security Council members 
discussed about the Darfur crisis in 2005, they were unable to find an agreement 
whether or not the Sudanese government had indeed proven itself ‘unable and 
unwilling’ to protect its people. During the discussions, states emphasized the 
primary responsibility of Sudan, claiming that a collective response would be 
premature.177 Without an authoritative judge to determine such matters, the criteria 
contained in the concept will always be debatable. On the other hand, it is 
necessary to point out that it was exactly this potential restraint on interventionism 
that facilitated a consensus on the ‘responsibility to protect’ at the World 
Summit.178  
     Another possible way how the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept could be 
applied against its original purpose is, if misused to justify the unauthorized 
unilateral military interventions with the various self-interested motives – 
                                                            
172 Weiss, 2004. 
173 Smyser, 2003. 
174 Weiss & Hubert, 2001. 
175 Bellamy, 2005 
176 Wheeler, 2005. 
177 Bellamy, 2005. 
178 Wheeler, 2005.  
40 
 
especially by the big powers. It is unfortunately a reality that interpretation of the 
norms by the powerful states with a capacity to reward and punish others is likely 
to have a greater weight in the deliberations of governments than the arguments of 
the states that do not possess these incentives and disincentives to steer the 
negotiations in their preferred direction. The most recent international practice 
unfortunately confirms these fears. For example, the USA and the UK invoked the 
‘responsibility to protect’ by referring to the serious human rights violations 
committed by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath regime in order to legitimize the 
invasion of Iraq.179 Similarly, Russia employed the ‘responsibility to protect’ in the 
context of Russia’s use of force in Georgia.180 Although scholars have convincingly 
argued against this kind of misuse of the concept,181 these incidents show how 
susceptible to abuse it is. Obviously, there have been many states skeptical about 
the concept already since its introduction; nevertheless, there are also states that 
have withdrawn their support later on as a result of the perceived misuse of the 
humanitarian rationales in the Iraqi war.182 Kenneth Roth of the Human Rights 
Watch commented the situation concerning the use of humanitarian justifications 
in relation to Iraq by stating that “it will be more difficult next time for us to call on 
military action when we need it to save potentially hundreds of thousands of lives”.183 This 
worrying development was manifested by a failure of the international community 
to prevent or end the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.  
     Based on the above listed weaknesses, it is obvious that the concept of 
‘responsibility to protect’ needs a clarification that would decrease not only the 
existing uncertainty surrounding its meaning and legal status, but that would also 
decrease its potential for abuse. It should not be possible to justify a forcible breach 
of sovereignty by simply claiming to act in the fulfillment of some vague concept. 
To make the concept effective, it is necessary to control its employment outside the 
intended framework. The concept needs to be clearly interpreted and the 
justifications of the military actions based on this concept must be located within 
the established rules of international law. Otherwise, the concept would be a 
dangerous tool threatening stability within the international system. Nevertheless, 
no matter how many problematic aspects the concept seems to have at its current 
stage; a general acceptance of the concept - no matter how interpreted, the 
increasing UN tendency to refer to the concept, and the claims by the international 
lawyers equating it with an emerging customary law make it clear that the concept 
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of ‘responsibility to protect’ will play a key role in the debates about legality and 
legitimacy of HMI in the future. 
2.8. Conclusion – legality vs. legitimacy 
The above elaborated analysis of legality and legitimacy of the HMI concept does 
not provide a clear-cut answer to the justification of the concept. From the legal 
point of view, an overwhelming majority of academic opinion seems to be inclined 
toward a conclusion that an unauthorized HMI is based on the Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter an illegal act. In spite of its illegality, HMI has been increasingly used 
as a last resort crisis management tool by the states in case that many lives were 
immediately in danger. Based on this state practice and a gradual development of 
international human rights and humanitarian law, some legal scholars have started 
to suggest a possibility that the right of HMI could have evolved as a part of the 
international customary law. Nevertheless, the majority legal opinion refuses this 
position, claiming that there is an absence of a sufficient evidence of a coherent 
state practice based upon ‘opinio juris’ – the necessary ingredients for a customary 
international legal right to emerge.  
     Facing the absence of a solid legal status for the right of HMI, the proponents of 
its existence point to its morality and claim its legitimacy based on a higher moral 
rationale. Nevertheless, is it possible to claim that the concept though being illegal 
is legitimate? Could it be the case that legitimacy of the concept is so strong that it 
could overweight its illegality? Is there a gap between legality and legitimacy that 
should be filled in by adjusting the international law? Answering these questions is 
a normatively controversial and extremely complicated task. The existing academic 
debate seems to be equally divided regarding the question of legitimacy of HMI, 
presenting strong moral arguments that both support and condemn the concept. 
The whole debate rotates around assigning the relative weights of importance to 
the following two clashing moral concerns. On one hand, should the general right 
of HMI be legitimized; it would put into question a value of state sovereignty, 
which provides the states with a right to manage their own affairs, and which 
represents a main tool for maintaining peace and stability in the international 
system. On the other hand, there are also undoubtedly good reasons for being 
suspicious about an absolute right of states to be left immune from a possible 
outside intervention in case that they mistreat their own populations. It seems 
apparent that the question, whether the legal interpretation of the Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter should be brought into compliance with a legitimate concern of 
preventing or stopping the huge humanitarian suffering or whether it should be 
rather left untouched due to the concerns of international peace and stability, 
entails a very difficult moral weighting.  
     The current trend in the international law suggests that the customary law is 
increasingly driven much more by a concern for protecting the human rights than 
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by the traditional Westphalian respect for sovereignty of the state. This trend has 
been demonstrated by the endorsement of the new concept of ‘responsibility to 
protect’ at the UN level in 2005. The introduction of ‘responsibility to protect’ has 
significantly changed the political discourse of HMI, and has greatly influenced the 
ongoing debates about its legality and legitimacy by moving the debate to focus on 
the perspective of victims of the human rights violations. The concept represents 
an interesting solution to the tensions between sovereignty and human rights by 
embedding the notion of human rights within the idea of state sovereignty. It 
suggests that intervention within a state that fails to protect its citizens from the 
massive human rights violations does not constitute a violation of that state’s 
sovereignty, but rather that it constitutes a realization of the responsibility that is 
shared by the state and by the international community. In spite of the fact that the 
‘responsibility to protect’ still does not have a binding legal status, it seems to take 
a more affirmative stance pushing the international community toward an 
increasing legalization of the HMI concept. Its endorsement seems to imply that 
the political opinion is inclined toward the option that there is an existing gap 
between legality and legitimacy regarding the right of HMI that needs to be 
corrected. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that this revisionist enthusiasm 
is not globally shared, and that it is very difficult to neglect the morally significant 
objections that are raised against the introduction of such a right.  
     After reading this chapter, the reader could gain an impression that it has not 
given clear answers to the questions stated at its very beginning. This impression is 
partially correct, since it was not the main purpose to provide the reader with the 
black or white answers. The aspiration was to present the entire academic debate 
about the concept of HMI in such a comprehensive picture as possible, and to 
present how extremely complicated it is to take sides in this normative argument. 
The chapter should have motivated the reader to assess independently his position 
toward the concept without presenting any of the approaches as being right or 
wrong. The only apparent message that this chapter should have transmitted to the 
reader is the paralysis of the moralists and lawyers in solving the dilemma 
surrounding the right of HMI. Particularly this indecisiveness of the normative 
sciences has served as a main impetus for initiating an effort to evaluate the 
concept of HMI on the empirical basis, making a daring attempt to tame the 
justice-based rhetoric into the more structural and measurable terms. So as to 
achieve this goal, the following chapters of this study will be devoted to the 
empirical evaluation of the HMI by assessing its actual impacts on the target states.  
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3. CHAPTER  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE LEGITIMACY OF 
HMI 
 
Debate about legitimacy of HMI is part of a broader question of morality of war, 
inheriting much of what is morally problematic about war and other uses of 
political violence. Similarly as in case of war, the most frequent way of evaluating 
the legitimacy of HMI in the existing literature is by a reference to a commonsense 
morality.184 The arguments of the authors draw from the morally reasoned ethics 
that is familiar to everybody and that - in spite of some disagreements about 
particular details - tends to be widely accepted.185 There are also some studies that 
have approached the question of legitimacy of HMI more theoretically and 
systematically, drawing from the various theoretical traditions such as realism, 
liberalism, or applied ethics.186 Nevertheless, the existing literature still lacks an 
analysis encompassing the entire ethical discourse related to the issue of HMI 
legitimacy. This study will attempt to fill in this gap by introducing a combined 
theoretical framework that would not only represent a balanced ethical 
perspective, but that would also enable a really systematic evaluation of the 
concept by quantifying its aspects and by making an empirical comparison over 
many historical cases. The goal of this chapter is to present a solid theoretical 
framework for the quantification of the complex issue of HMI legitimacy that 
would ensure preservation of a theoretical validity and relevance of the simplified 
empirical findings of this study within the existing ethical discourse.   
3.1. Controversy about ‘motives and means’ versus ‘outcomes’ 
While constructing a theoretical framework for the planned empirical analysis, this 
study begins with a basic assumption that evaluation of legitimacy of any action is 
connected with a controversy about ‘motives and means’ versus its ‘outcomes’187, 
which is derived from the inevitable gap between even the best intentions of the 
actors and the resulting effects of their activity. Therefore, while evaluating the 
legitimacy of HMI, it is necessary to pose a question whether the ‘motives and 
means’ justify the ‘outcomes’, or whether it is the other way round. In other words, 
which of the two main ethical models - whether the intrinsicist or the 
consequentialist one - represents a better tool for evaluating the ‘justice’ of HMI. 
Inherent problem with both these ethical models is that when it comes to war, they 
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become either too vague or too restrictive. Intrincist model puts the main emphasis 
on the ‘motives and means’, permitting a little flexibility in the rules of war. The 
extremist intrincist position claims that possessing a ‘just motive’ constitutes the 
only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or 
caused. Based on this approach, a ‘legitimate HMI’ should have either a sole or a 
primary ‘humanitarian motivation’, suggesting that the ‘humanitarian’ component 
of the intervention should not be an unintended by-product of an otherwise unjust 
act perpetrated for the self-interested reasons. Apart from the motivation of the 
interveners, intrinsicism regulates the actual conduct of the intervention. It 
restrains a military operation to the targeting of permissible targets only, which 
can be very complicated given the messiness of conflict environment, in which 
military targets are often dispersed among the civilian population or even covered 
by the civilian centers.188 On the other hand, consequentialism is an open-ended 
model oriented on the ‘outcomes’ of the use of force that is highly vulnerable to the 
pressing military or political needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war. This 
approach assumes that the rules can be broken, if it is necessary for achieving a 
better result. It considers the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of HMI to be the only 
legitimizing criteria, even if the intervention was actually not motivated by any 
‘humanitarian concerns’.189  Both of these approaches have own relevance and 
moral weight. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a narrow focus solely either on the 
‘motives and means’ or on the ‘outcomes’ oriented approach does not represent a 
sufficiently encompassing theoretical framework for evaluating such a complex 
issue as the HMI.190   
     So as to avoid a necessity of making a normative decision about a greater 
validity of one of the above described ethical approaches, this study will introduce 
a theoretical framework situated in the intersection of the two. The adopted 
theoretical framework will neither be tied to the intrinsicist’s absolutism nor to the 
consequentialist’s open-endedness; instead, it will bridge the main arguments of 
these two perspectives by explicitly acknowledging that the ‘motives and means’ 
as well as the ‘outcomes’ represent the relevant parts of the equation of legitimacy. 
So as to qualify a military intervention as a legitimate HMI, the study will not only 
set a requirement of ‘humanitarian motives and means’, but it will additionally 
extend the legitimating function to include merely such operations that resulted in 
a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’. To situate this definition within a theoretical 
framework, a degree of humanitarianism behind the ‘motives and means’ of the 
interveners will be evaluated by employing the Just War ethics, while existence of 
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a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ will be evaluated using the consequentialist 
ethics. 
3.2. JWT as an evaluation framework of the legitimate ‘motives and means’ 
of HMI 
The primary and generally acknowledged ethical model for considering whether 
the ‘motives and means’ of any act of war can be considered ‘just’ is the Just War 
Theory (JWT).191 JWT is a justice-based rhetoric concerned on the theoretical 
ground with a moral justification of planning and prosecuting wars of any kind. It 
attempts to distinguish between the justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized 
armed forces, aiming to make the use of arms as restrained and humane as 
possible with the goal of establishing a lasting peace and justice.192 When trying to 
situate the JWT between the two traditional schools of thought of the International 
Relations - realism and idealism, JWT is located somewhere in-between the two 
extremes.193 While realists focus on how to avoid a mistake of fighting when one 
should not; idealists deal with a failure of not fighting when one should. JWT skips 
this moral dilemma and rather combines sensitively both these approaches - it 
represents a moral restraint of war together with a readiness to accept that war 
may sometimes be necessary.194 Criteria constituting the JWT are neither 
unrestricted nor too restrictive. On one hand, this provides the JWT with an 
advantage of flexibility; on the other hand, a lack of a strict ethical framework 
makes its criteria open to the broad interpretations.195 All together, a generally 
acknowledged complexity of the JWT makes it a robust theoretical framework for 
examining legitimacy of the ‘motives and means’ of any military endeavor that 
balances main moral arguments both supporting and opposing the concept. JWT 
thus represents an adequate starting base for any research trying to capture the 
ethical essence of the HMI.196  
3.2.1. History of the JWT 
Historically, the JWT tradition is based on the natural law and has evolved over 
1600 years. Its purpose is to regulate and to restrain the use of violence by 
establishing the widely recognized moral guidelines for waging a war.197 Origins of 
the JWT have their roots in the Christian theology, and can be traced to the 
Romanized Berber philosopher and theologian, St. Augustine (354-430), and his 
                                                            
191 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; or Coady, 2002.   
192 Janzekovic, 2006. For an insightful analysis of the JWT tradition, see also: Christopher, 1994; or 
Butler, 2003. 
193 Bull, 1979; or Christopher, 1994. 
194 Crawford, 2003; Janzekovic, 2006. 
195 Christopher, 1994; Welsh, 2002; or Ryter, 2003. 
196 Christopher, 1994; or Coady, 2002. 
197 While both natural law and JWT deal with the justification of resort to war, JWT is much more 
concrete about when and how the force can be used. See: Johnson, 1981.  
46 
 
notion of ‘the Two Cities’. St. Augustine claimed that violence was sometimes 
justified, referring to the concept of ‘just’ war as one limited by its purpose, 
authority, and conduct. He shifted the understanding of ‘justice’ in relation to 
warfare by suggesting that the use of force for own self-protection was not so 
much noble or legitimate when compared with legitimacy of employing force for 
the sake of defending other innocent parties unable to defend themselves.198 He 
was the first one to formalize the JWT within the Christian Church. His proposition 
that killing the human beings could sometimes be justified represented a 
significant shift away from the pacifism of the early Church, and this proposition 
was later adopted as a justifying tool for the ‘Holy just war’ of the Christians 
against the ‘infidels’- the Crusades.199 In the 13th century, following on 
Augustinian thoughts; the Italian priest, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), specified in 
his Summa Theologica a general outline of what has gradually developed into a 
coherent JWT. He introduced first three concrete criteria for waging a ‘just’ war: 
‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, and ‘just authority’; which have become known as the ‘jus ad 
bellum’.200  
     Inspired by the work of Aquinas a couple of centuries later, Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645), a Dutch jurist; Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), a Spanish Dominican priest; 
or Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a Spanish Jesuit priest, subsequently dissociated 
the notion of ‘just’ war from its religious origins and helped to spread the idea of 
JWT beyond the Christendom. They argued that even the Sovereign was bound by 
the fundamental principles of humanity, and could thus not lawfully defy the duty 
to treat his subjects with a respect for their human dignity. In Grotius’ view, the 
emerging Nation States were all bound by the law and morals of human society, 
and they were obliged not only to treat their own nationals in accordance with the 
principle of humanity but also to ensure that others did. Grotius and his 
contemporaries extended the three already established JWT criteria of ‘jus ad 
bellum’ by adding three additional ones: ‘last resort’, ‘proportionality’, and ‘probability 
of success’.201  
     The Reformist Movement in the 16th century and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 
opened a new era of a modern state that has brought many dramatic changes into 
the development of Just War ethics. The increasing secularization of power within 
individual states has caused that there ceased to be the only ‘just’ authority 
represented by the Pope, but that there appeared many of them having both 
secular and religious character. Therefore, so as to preserve the international peace 
and stability among the newly emerging power actors, an emphasis began to be 
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placed on order over justice.202 The sovereignty of individual countries was 
acknowledged and respected as a guarantee of order, and the questions of justice 
were left to be decided within the national boundaries. JWT has started to 
experience a new revival at the end of 20th century. This revival was marked by a 
gradual shift away from the paradigm that states should never intervene into the 
internal affairs of the other states. In this period, a debate about whether a HMI can 
be considered ‘just’ has again started to be evolving, referring to the arguments 
from the JWT.  
3.2.2. Applicability of the JWT to modernity 
JWT has been refined and clarified throughout the centuries. It has developed into 
a broadly acknowledged actor-oriented approach, which conceptually represents a 
synthesis of both idealist and realist conceptions of war utility. This proposition is 
demonstrated by the repeated acknowledgments of its preserved relevance and 
validity for evaluating the justice of any military endeavor not only by the Church, 
but also by the UN, and by many respected scholars. The Roman Catholic Church 
reconfirmed a continuous relevance of the JWT in the pastoral letter The Challenge 
of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response203, which states that the methods of 
precaution imbedded in the JWT remain a valid source of concern regardless of the 
evolution of war making and the occurred structural changes within the 
international system. The letter is concluded by a statement that the JWT offers a 
set of principles to objectively examine and to guide the decisions and the conduct 
of any type of a military endeavor. More recently, the Pope John Paul II issued the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, which lists four strict conditions for a legitimate 
use of military force that directly reflect the traditional JWT criteria.204 
     Similarly, a modern applicability of the JWT has been repeatedly confirmed 
outside the Christian Church. For example in September 2000, the UN Millennium 
Assembly launched the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) with the aim to explore particularly the question of legitimacy 
of HMI. The appointed Commission considered various perspectives on the issue 
of HMI ranging from the legal, moral, operational, to the political ones; covering 
the widest possible range of opinions so as to assist the UN in finding a common 
ground in this debate. The Commission introduced in its final ICISS report a new 
concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, which overtakes with just minor adjustments 
all the traditional JWT ‘jus ad bellum’ criteria. This conclusion of the Commission 
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serves as a confirmation that the JWT can still represent a legitimate tool for 
evaluating the justice of HMI.205 The fact that the JWT is generally accepted by the 
academic circles is also demonstrated by its frequent use as an evaluative 
framework of the warfare by the scholars.206 Although, these studies reflect some 
differences in opinion over the meaning of individual JWT criteria and over their 
implementation207; all share a basic assumption that the JWT remains applicable to 
the modern realities and that it represents a legitimate and a robust tool for 
evaluating justice of any type of military intervention, including the HMI.208 
3.2.3. Description of the JWT criteria 
JWT theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the ‘justice’ of waging a 
war (‘jus ad bellum’) from those that govern a ‘just’ conduct of war (‘jus in bello’), 
and from the most recently added rules governing the responsibility and 
accountability of the warring parties after the war (‘jus post bellum’).209 Each of the 
above listed set of JWT rules corresponds to a certain stage of military operation, 
and fixes exact conditions that must be fulfilled to preserve ‘justice’ of any military 
endeavor. This study will be focused merely on the most traditional ‘jus ad bellum’ 
JWT criteria, which are within the humanitarian context of a primary 
interest.210Nevertheless, so as to get an overall picture of how comprehensively 
constructed the JWT is while considering the ‘justice’ of the use of force, all sets of 
the JWT rules are listed below.  
‘Jus ad bellum’ JWT criteria: 
• ‘Just cause’ 
•  ‘Just intent’ 
•  ‘Just authority’  
•  ‘Last resort’ 
•  ‘Proportionality’ 
• ‘Probability of success’211  
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‘Jus in bello’ JWT criteria: 
• ‘Target discrimination’ 
• ‘Proportionality’ 
• ‘Responsibility’212 
‘Jus post bellum’ JWT criteria: 
• ‘Just war resolution’213 
3.2.3.1. JWT criteria of ‘jus ad bellum’ 
Due to the fact that this study will frame the identification procedure of the HMI 
cases on the ‘jus as bellum’ JWT criteria, it is crucial to describe in detail the original 
meaning of these criteria and how has been their meaning adjusted to the modern 
realities. First of all, each of the criteria will be discussed in general – referring to 
any act of war; and then they will be related to the concept of HMI, debating what 
implications and what practical complications could follow from setting such 
criteria as an evaluative framework of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of a 
military intervention. 
3.2.3.1.1. JWT criterion of ‘just cause’  
The first JWT criterion of ‘just cause’ requires the intervener to justify the cause of 
the waged military operation. It is arguably the most important condition for 
evaluating the justice of any military endeavor.214 Originally, the JWT theorists 
considered self-defense against a physical aggression as the only sufficient ‘just’ 
reason for waging a war. In fact, moral right of self-defense represents almost 
universally accepted justification for using force.215  Nevertheless, the acceptance of 
‘justice’ of using the violence in case of self-defense has recently been extended to 
cover also the more controversial cases such as a preemptive intervention when an 
act of aggression is just being anticipated216, or for our study more relevant external 
intervention aimed at assisting the oppressed civilians in a severe humanitarian 
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crisis.217 The JWT theorists generally agree that a military intervention for 
‘humanitarian’ purposes is acceptable in some special cases; when it is aimed at 
preventing, stopping, or correcting the ‘wrong behavior’ that entails the massive 
human rights violations ‘shocking the conscience of mankind’.218 These special 
cases are usually interpreted as referring to genocide or ethnic cleansing. 
Nevertheless, there is no agreement among the JWT theorists, on what the ‘wrong 
behavior’ that ‘shocks the conscience of mankind’ should exactly entail, and this 
proscription thus remains rather open-ended. The imprecise specification of the 
special cases is further complicated by a highly political nature of the HMI. First of 
all, full information is extremely difficult to obtain and verify in the conflict zones.  
Moreover, the issue of HMI is easily subjected to a political and media 
manipulation. Whether, when and how the politicians and especially the media 
report about the humanitarian crisis makes an enormous difference in the 
subjective perceptions about a degree of justice entailed in a possible military 
intervention, creating a corresponding public pressure in favor or against a 
possible dispatch of the troops.  
3.2.3.1.2. JWT criterion of ‘just intent’  
The second JWT criterion of ‘just intent’ stipulates that the use of force can be 
considered ‘just’, only if waged for the purpose of justice and not for the reasons of 
self-interest. Therefore, while evaluating the legitimacy of HMI; correction of a 
suffered wrong is considered to represent a ‘just intent’; while material gains, 
maintaining economies, or extending the sphere of influence are not. 219 However 
theoretically reasonable this criterion might seem, it is very problematic to apply it 
in practice. First of all, it is impossible to objectively evaluate someone’s intent. 
There can be a huge difference between a stated and a real motivation of the 
intervener, and the real intentions of any actor can always be doubted and 
questioned. The second main criticism reflects the realist way of thinking by 
claiming that it is irrational for a country to commit its troops to a military 
intervention on behalf of the human rights protection without having some 
complementary economic or other military side-interests to intervene. Sending the 
troops to some distant unknown country without any attached national interests 
might be reasonably considered too expensive and/or too politically risky in the 
eyes of the political decision-makers, regardless how just the cause may be.220 
Unfortunately, the fact that the self-interested motives cannot be excluded from 
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any foreign policy act greatly complicates the requirement of a purely 
‘humanitarian motivation’ of the intervener.221 For these reasons, most of the JWT 
theorists interpret this requirement in a way that it is sufficient, if there is a 
minimum level of ‘humanitarian’ motivation to qualify some military intervention 
as fulfilling the JWT criterion of ‘just intent’. Other JWT theorists claim that the 
criterion of ‘just intent’ is reasonably fulfilled; if the motivation to create or restore 
peace, to correct damages, or to assist the victims of aggression are paramount or 
overwhelm the reasons of national interest.222 Some scholars even consider a mere 
absence of territorial acquisition, intimidation, coercion, cruelty, hate, and 
vengeance constitutes a sufficient fulfillment of this criterion.223 Nevertheless, 
acceptance of this position would suggest that the criterion of ‘just intent’ refers 
more to a notion of the limited wars, whose conduct is regulated by the ‘jus in bello’ 
JWT criteria. 
3.2.3.1.3. JWT criterion of ‘just authority’  
The third JWT criterion of ‘just authority’ stipulates that an act of war can be 
considered ‘just’ only if backed up by a legitimate authority. The traditional JWT 
notion of ‘just authority’ resided in the concept of a state sovereignty, and was 
originally interpreted as a lawfully declared war. The basic argument rested on an 
assumption that if a government was ‘just’, then giving the officers of the state 
right to declare war was reasonable and justifiable.224 Nevertheless, the traditional 
interpretation of the criterion has become old-fashioned in a contemporary world, 
and has been gradually transformed into a requirement of authorization by a more 
globally acknowledged authority that should optimally function as a control 
mechanism deciding about a ‘justice’ of such operations.225 Nowadays, the only 
institution with the sufficient legal powers and an adequate authority to evaluate 
justice of the use of force in the international relations is the UN Security Council. 
Nevertheless, neither this updated interpretation of the criterion is unproblematic. 
In spite of the fact that the UN Security Council was established to serve as ‘a 
guardian of international peace and security’, and as ‘a protector of human rights’; 
the veto power possessed by its permanent members disqualifies its decisions as 
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being influenced by the national interests.226 The veto power provides the 
permanent members not only with a protection from being targets of any UN-
authorized military intervention; moreover, it provides them with a possibility to 
block authorization of any intervention - however ‘just’ - for their own narrow 
political interests. As a result of the anticipated use of veto power by some of the 
permanent members, the HMI often had to take place without being consulted at 
the UN level; and though being unauthorized, some cases of HMI are generally 
acknowledged to be legitimate. For example, Harhoff identified ten unauthorized 
interventions, whose legitimate ‘humanitarian purpose’ cannot be doubted, which 
brings into question the ability of the UN to decide about the ‘justice’ of such 
military operations.227 
3.2.3.1.4. JWT criterion of ‘last resort’  
The following JWT criterion stipulates that war should always be used only as a 
‘last resort’ tool, and only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been 
seriously tried and exhausted. Originally, it meant that all peaceful alternatives 
had to be tried according to the escalating logic, and that war was only to be 
started if all these alternatives had failed. This approach has been, however, 
challenged; since it has proved to be problematic in practice. In many cases, 
negotiations were utilized as a mere delaying tactic, in spite of knowing that the 
party will not make any meaningful concessions anyway. Requirement of using 
force only in a ‘last resort’ is problematic especially in case of dealing with the 
humanitarian crises. If many lives are immediately endangered due to the severe 
humanitarian conditions, the effectiveness of the HMI is usually a question of a 
timely reaction. Under such circumstances, it is generally considered to be 
sufficient and also more ‘just’, if all the other alternative escalating acts have been 
at least honestly considered before waging a military intervention.228  
3.2.3.1.5. JWT criterion of ‘proportionality’  
The fifth JWT criterion of ‘proportionality’ stipulates that the desired ends of war 
should be proportional to the means used to achieve them, as well as to be 
proportional to those applied by the aggressors. This criterion commonly entails a 
general balance of power consideration and an effort to minimize the destruction 
of war by using a minimum amount of force necessary to achieve one’s 
objectives.229 This principle overlaps with the ‘jus in bello’ criteria, which require the 
force to be directed only against the legitimate targets, and which consider any 
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excessive or unnecessary use of military force to be morally unacceptable.230 Critics 
of this criterion point to the subjective nature of the criterion that is dependent on 
what the intervener considers to be proportional and how high personal price the 
intervener is prepared to pay. It is, for example, implausible to expect that the 
intervener would ignore its technological supremacy and would use only arsenal 
that is similar to the one possessed by the enemy, putting thus its own soldiers into 
danger.  
3.2.3.1.6. JWT criterion of ‘probability of success’  
The last JWT criterion sets a requirement that any ‘just’ war must have a 
reasonable ‘probability of success’. There must be solid grounds for believing that the 
desired outcome can be achieved.231 This criterion suggests that while evaluating 
the ‘justice’ of a military endeavor such as the HMI, a possible resistance in the 
target country should be taken into consideration so that the intervention does not 
cause more harm that it relieves. For example, if the intervention is waged against 
the government of a militarily strong state, or if the military resistance by the 
indigenous people is expected to be large relative to the scale of human rights 
violations that the intervention is intended to end; the prospects of success of the 
HMI are deemed to be low. As stated in the ICISS report: “some human beings simply 
cannot be saved except at an unacceptable cost...”.232 This criterion thus imposes a moral 
obligation to carefully assess a balance between the risk entailed by the military 
intervention and the relief it can bring, before waging it. The criterion refers to the 
outcome of military operations only theoretically - based on the reasonable 
assessment of the situation and not based on their actual effects. Obviously, such a 
weighting of costs and benefits also poses a moral problem, because it suggests 
that the massive human rights violations should be ignored, if there is no 
conceivable chance of success.233 The opponents of such an interpretation argue 
that in the cases of a huge injustice, it is necessary to intervene for the sake of moral 
justice and for the sake of national pride, even if the ‘probability of success’ is very 
low.  
3.2.4. Major criticisms of the JWT 
In spite of many advantages of the balanced approach of the JWT, the Theory 
clearly remains a normative account those propositions can be easily challenged by 
billions of global citizens in a variety of different settings. As a result of that any 
conclusions made on the basis of such a normative account that aspire to claim a 
global validity can only be presented, if accompanied by an acknowledged list of 
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the major criticisms of a given approach and by an overview of the other 
competing theories that challenge the assumptions of the selected approach.234 
     The main criticism of using the JWT as a theoretical framework for evaluating 
the legitimacy of ‘motives and means’ of the HMI is coming from the supporters of 
nonintervention norm such as the realists, anti-imperialists or pluralists, who point 
to the fact that the flexible JWT criteria are too permissive, which could lead to a 
growing interventionism in the international relations. The realists base their 
argument on the Westphalian tradition of respecting states’ sovereignty and 
mutual noninterference into the internal affairs. They emphasize the primacy of the 
order represented by the international peace over the justice represented by the 
human rights. Anti-imperialist and pluralist, on the other hand, fear the weakened 
role of the nonintervention rule entailed in the JWT logic, since this rule protects 
the small and weak states from being dictated upon by the great powers how to 
rule within their own territory. They claim that the nonintervention rule should be 
respected in order to preserve order, self-determination, and justice.235  
     Next often debated criticism of the JWT is directed against its historical roots. 
Theory is often rejected because of its solely Western-Christian cultural 
background. This criticism, however, refers just to the origin of this Theory, but 
says nothing about its validity or its concrete relevance to the parallel theories from 
the other cultures. In fact, similar moral considerations about a ‘justice’ of war as 
those set in the JWT are to be found not only in the Christianity, but also in most of 
the other religions.236 For example, the Chinese philosophical tradition addresses 
almost identical questions regarding a resort and a conduct of war as the JWT 
does.237 Universality of the Theory is confirmed by the fact that the secular 
humanists who specifically reject whatever religious dogma as a basis of morality 
and decision-making accept the JWT based on the universal ethics without making 
any reference to the Christianity.238 
     Other critique of the JWT invokes a plethora of practical problems that stem 
both from the vagueness and from the inherent subjectivity of its criteria. The fact 
that there is no definite answer to the issues of ‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, ‘just 
authority’, ‘last resort’, let alone a reasonable ‘proportionality’ or ‘probability of success’ 
greatly complicates their practical usability as tools for legitimizing the HMI. 
Flexibility of the JWT criteria enables both a too narrow and a too broad 
interpretation, which makes them easily subjected to a political manipulation and 
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abuse.239 For example, it is extremely difficult to identify a presence of ‘just cause’ 
for a military intervention into an internal conflict, where some fighting ethnic 
group keeps referring to a real or imagined wrong committed centuries ago, and 
where the ethnic hatred has escalated into a vicious circle of mutual violence 
making it impossible to identify the actual wrong-doer.240 Vagueness and 
subjectivity of the JWT criteria have thus resulted in the numerous historical cases 
of misapplication of the Theory by both the interveners and the actors in the target 
states. The most famous case of misuse of the Theory by the intervener was the 
‘Holy war’ of the Christians against the ‘infidels’. A similar misapplication was 
often displayed by the countries intervening militarily for the sake of own national 
interests, but officially declaring ‘just cause’ or ‘just intent’ as a mere cover for an act 
of aggression. Sometimes, the JWT criteria were also misinterpreted reversely, as 
an excuse for not intervening when a real humanitarian crisis was actually taking 
place.241 In spite of the criticized existence of a too wide space for maneuver in 
interpreting the criteria, given the extreme political sensitivity of the issue; this 
flexibility is also a question of necessity, since having the precisely stated criteria 
would make it often difficult to expound the Theory in particular conflict 
situations, and the Theory would lose its universal applicability.242 
     As a final critical remark against the use of the JWT as a framework for 
assessing the legitimacy of HMI, it is necessary to take into consideration that 
establishing any concrete criteria legitimizing the use of force may represent a 
potential danger of producing the perverse reactions from the conflict actors. For 
example, if the existence of a supreme humanitarian emergency - JWT criterion of 
‘just cause’ - represents a criterion of a legitimate HMI; the rebel groups desiring the 
outside assistance might trigger the large scale human right abuses themselves and 
might intentionally provoke the mass killing. Similarly, if the established criterion 
stipulates a possibility to use force merely against the legitimate targets - JWT 
criterion of ‘proportionality’, the opponents might put the civilians next to the 
military targets so as to protect themselves from the possible air attacks by the 
interveners.  
3.3. Consequentialism as an evaluation framework of the legitimate 
‘outcomes’ of HMI 
Given the aspiration of this study to introduce an encompassing empirical model 
of a legitimate HMI, the adopted theoretical framework will not be based solely on 
the existence of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ in accordance with the JWT 
ethics, but this condition will be also complemented by the requirement of a 
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positive ‘humanitarian’ outcome of these military interventions as follows from the 
consequentialist logic. Why is it necessary to complement the legitimacy model 
with an additional criterion? It is possible to answer this question by posing two 
different ones with a self-evident inner message. Could a military intervention be 
legitimately labeled ‘humanitarian’, if the ‘motives and means’ of the intervention 
were ‘humanitarian’, but its effects actually increased the humanitarian suffering 
of the local population in the target state? What if the military interventions - 
though being sent for the ‘humanitarian purposes’ - do not tend to produce the 
positive ‘humanitarian outcomes’? If this was the case, the concept of HMI as such 
would not be justifiable, and there would be no reason to make an exception to the 
nonintervention norm in the existing international law when dealing with the 
humanitarian emergencies. These concerns and a logical sequence of the 
arguments follow from the consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism evaluates 
morality of the acts solely in terms of the ‘goodness’ of their consequences, 
meaning in terms of their contribution to the aggregate sum of general welfare.243 
According to its logic, a right act is the one that is expected to yield the greatest net 
good or, in case of no realistic prospect of achieving any good, the one yielding the 
least net evil.244 Based on the consequentialist perspective, a ‘legitimate HMI’ 
should not cause more damage than it is intended to correct - meaning that a net 
‘humanitarian outcome’ should end up being positive.  
3.3.1. Strengths of the consequentialist approach 
The first major advantage of integrating the consequentialist approach into the 
theoretical framework of legitimacy of HMI is that the ‘outcomes’ of actions are 
relatively objectively measurable, which could enhance a practical usability of the 
proposed model in practice. So as to be able to claim a status of legitimacy, the 
actors would be encouraged to evaluate and rank the possible options based on 
their morality, opting for the most moral way of acting. It means that when, for 
example, political decision makers would consider whether to wage a HMI, they 
should count the expected moral costs and benefits, and weigh them against each 
other. Assuming existence of rationality and good intent, this weighting should 
prevent them from waging a military operation that has a high probability of 
causing a net increased humanitarian suffering.245 Moreover, putting an emphasis 
on the ‘outcomes’ of military interventions would compel the political leaders to 
carefully consider strategies employed during the conduct of these interventions in 
an effort to maximally prevent the unnecessary bloodshed.246 This suggests that 
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employing methodological key of consequentialism as a criterion of legitimacy of 
HMI provides easily understandable guideline and promotes measurable 
efficiency and effectiveness of the actors in their aspiration of achieving a global 
welfare. 
     In contrast to the measurable consequentialist rationale, the inherently 
subjective ‘jus ad bellum’ JWT criteria are sentenced to the never-ending 
disagreements about a degree of their fulfillment. For example, does the amount of 
fifty killed people represent a sufficiently ‘just cause’ for waging a military 
intervention? Or to what degree was the military intervention really waged as a 
‘last resort’ given the generally unstable and unpredictable developments in any 
conflict zone? The always present doubts and reluctance of the JWT theorists to 
identify some military intervention as ‘humanitarian’ is a logical consequence of 
the fear that the concept of HMI could be abused to hide a violence that is 
motivated by the other self-interested objectives. Nicholas Wheeler - one of the 
main proponents of using the consequentialist approach for evaluating the 
legitimacy of HMI - recognizes this weakness of the JWT and argues that it is 
implausible to insist on the existence of a purely ‘humanitarian motive’ of any 
military intervention because of the inevitable mix of interests shaping the 
behavior of the states in the international arena. Instead, he advocates an emphasis 
on evaluating the legitimacy of HMI using their quantifiable effects on the target 
state.  He claims that as long as the ‘motives and means’ of the intervention do not 
undermine the ‘just outcome’ of the intervention in a form of an improved 
humanitarian situation; the intervention could be considered ‘legitimate’, even if 
its ‘motives’ were accompanied by some more strategic rationale.247 Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that consequentialism is gaining plausibility from the weakness 
of the available alternative theories that are too subjective to be utilized for the 
practical decision-making. Its measurability generates a promising potential for 
reaching at least some consensus while assessing even such normatively complex 
concepts as the one of HMI. 
     Another major positive aspect of the consequentionalist approach follows from 
its universal appeal. In spite of the fact that many philosophical approaches 
criticize consequentialism and do not perceive it as a complete theory for all moral 
judgments per se, most philosophers conceptually accept its logic as an appropriate 
method in general, acknowledging its undisputed complementary function in the 
other theories of moral judgments. In fact, virtually all the ethical theories give the 
consequences of an act a considerable weight while evaluating its moral status.248 
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What makes consequentialism so universally plausible is, first of all, the basic idea 
that it is impossible to morally criticize its effort to aspire for the maximalization of 
an overall welfare. Secondly, there seems to be no good alternative to it, because 
any ethical approach not based on the human well-being seems to be inhuman. 
Even those who reject consequentialism are thus forced to admit that a greater 
good of society outweighs the private interests, or that a proportionate reason can 
justify doing an act with negative side effects. This general acceptance gives 
consequentialism an irreducible and indispensable role in assessing morality of 
any action.249 And finally, a fundamental importance of consequentialism to the 
HMI discourse is also reflected by the appearance of its ethical arguments for and 
against the legitimacy of HMI in the public debates and the scholarly literature.250  
3.3.2. Weaknesses of the consequentialist approach 
In spite of many undisputable advantages of having the consequentialist approach 
integrated into the theoretical framework of legitimacy of HMI, it has also some 
major drawbacks. One of its main weaknesses is that it assumes the welfare to be 
measurable.251 This assumption is controversial, because it presupposes existence 
of a general agreement on the desirable consequences of any action, which is not 
the case. There is no consensus about what makes the outcome ‘good’, neither 
about who should determine the resulting ‘goodness’ in individual instances. 
Reaching agreement on such normative accounts is an unrealistic task. Assume, for 
example, that the society decides to save resources for building a protected house 
for the mothers exposed to domestic violence by the means of euthanizing your 10-
year old daughter who is lying in the coma in hospital for two months without any 
sign of improvement. If a general welfare was evaluated, your daughter really 
represents a severe economic burden with no guarantee of a positive effect, and the 
money would surely be much more effectively spent elsewhere. But would you 
consider such a decision to be moral? 
     Another major weakness of the consequentialist approach is that our foresight is 
radically limited. The approach incorrectly presumes that actors direct their actions 
by a cool logic, have extreme analytical skills, and are able to radically abstract 
from their emotions, or cultural and historical experience. In fact, it is often 
difficult to accurately predict outcomes of even the short-term simple actions, 
because the actors are incapable of performing calculations of all possible scenarios 
and their respective probabilities. This limitation is growing exponentially while 
analysing possible consequences of action in such a complex, unstable, and non-
transparent political setting as a violent conflict that exposes actors to a pressure of 
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making quick uninformed decisions. Consequentialists recognize this problem, but 
they offer no adequate solution of how to overcome it.252   
     Additional objection to the consequentialist ethics raises a question, which 
‘motives and means’ are justifiable by which ‘outcomes’. Those being abused 
would say that any means – even the violent ones - to stop the abuse are 
acceptable, but the international community sill needs to consider the wider 
ramifications of the use of force.253 In relation to the problem of warfare, 
consequentialists tend to be inclined toward adopting the arguments of  ‘military 
necessity’, claiming that if a military victory is sought then all methods should be 
employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of lost lives, injuries, and lowest 
possible expenditures.  For example, while they would surely agree that using the 
nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a tragic event and that the death 
of so many civilians was very unfortunate, they would also add that bombing of 
the civilian centres in Japan was necessary to finish the WWII. They would defend 
this stance on the moral grounds, claiming that this seemingly ‘inhuman’ decision 
to sacrifice so many civilians probably saved in its result much greater amount of 
lives, since it removed the need of a full invasion of Japan that would lead to the 
death of many soldiers and to an immense suffering of hundreds of thousands and 
perhaps millions of Japanese. From the consequentialist perspective, the goal of 
ending the WWII justified the means of employing the weapons of mass 
destruction. It is possible to criticize this argument as being based on the ‘cold 
utilitarian calculations’, since it only takes into consideration the aggregate human 
suffering, which justifies the commitment of certain great evils for the sake of 
promoting an overall good. For these reasons, it is for many scholars unacceptable 
to adopt a purely consequentialist approach as a basis for evaluating the legitimacy 
of HMI. They accuse consequentialism of permitting too much, making nothing 
unthinkable - not even a deliberate killing of the innocent civilians as an 
instrumental mean to achieve the strategic objective of an overall net positive 
‘humanitarian outcome’.254  
     Next criticism of using the outcome-oriented consequentialist approach as a sole 
tool for assessing the legitimacy of HMI stipulates that it could legitimize also such 
type of military interventions that were carried out purely for the sake of national 
interests, but which just accidently happened to have a fortunate but unintended 
‘positive outcome’. There is a broad opposition against allowing that the fortunate 
indirect consequences could transform a ‘wrong’ act into a ‘just’ one. Opponents of 
this scenario claim that adoption of such a permissive approach could be misused 
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for the legitimization of a massive use of force without any control.255 For these 
reasons, many scholars seem to be reluctant making an explicitly consequentialist 
argument in relation to the legitimization of the HMI concept.256 
     Last criticism of the consequentialist approach relates less to its moral validity 
but rather more to its practical usability as a tool for evaluating the legitimacy of 
HMI. It points to the fact that the approach enables legitimization of any action 
only retrospectively, based on the occurred results, but not beforehand.257 
Therefore, this approach cannot serve as a prescriptive tool for the political leaders 
when deciding about the legitimacy of a planned HMI. On the other hand, this fact 
does not degrade usability of this approach as a tool for evaluating the legitimacy 
of the historical cases of military interventions for the purposes of learning from 
the past experience and adjusting the current policies, which is the goal of this 
study.        
3.4. Adopted theoretical framework in a summary 
This chapter has presented various concerns that have been taken into 
consideration while constructing the theoretical framework for assessing a 
legitimacy of HMI that will be used in the later chapters of this study. Due to the 
highly normative nature of the HMI concept, there has been an effort to construct 
such a theoretically balanced evaluative framework as possible so as to allow for a 
transformation of this sensitive issue into the quantified empirical model without 
losing too much of the theoretical validity. The adopted theoretical framework 
reflects a controversy between the ‘motives and means’ versus the ‘outcomes’ of 
any activity and their respective relative weights. This controversy divides the 
scholars regarding the assessment of legitimacy of any action into two major 
ethical approaches: intrinsicism and consequentialism. This study does not want to 
take sides in the debate, which of these two approaches has a greater moral 
validity, since both of them are grounded on the very strong moral arguments that 
cannot be easily ignored. Instead, this study will utilize strengths of both these 
perspectives by transforming them into two complementary parts constituting a 
legitimizing function of HMI. It means that for the purposes of this study, a 
‘legitimate HMI’ will need to possess both the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ - 
that will be evaluated based on the JWT, as well as to result in a net positive 
‘humanitarian outcome’. By combining the both opposing ethical approaches, their 
main weaknesses will become balanced out and mutually controlled for. Making 
such a sensitive choice of a theoretical framework should help bringing the highly 
emotive, controversial, and politically charged issue of the use of force in the name 
                                                            
255 Blume, Junk, Schöndorf & Steibel, 2006. 
256 Frost, 1986. 
257 Kagan, 1998. 
61 
 
of humanitarianism into a balanced evaluative framework that would enable the 
applied empirical model to generate theoretically robust results. 
  
62 
 
4. CHAPTER 
QUANTIFICATION OF THE ‘MOTIVES AND MEANS’ OF MILITARY 
INTERVENTIONS BASED ON THE JWT  
 
Main foal of this chapter will be to quantify the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ 
of military interventions based on the theoretical propositions of the JWT. 
Quantification of the JWT criteria of ‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, ‘just authority’, ‘last 
resort’, ‘proportionality’ and a reasonable ‘probability of success’ represents a very 
complex theoretical assignment that requires major simplifications of the reality 
that could obviously result in much criticism from many sides. The fact that there 
are no final true or false solutions to this assignment makes this chapter the most 
controversial part of the whole study. Nevertheless, however subjective the 
presented results can be; it is necessary to stress the importance of this empirical 
assignment for the whole debate about legitimacy of HMI. Existence of the 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ represents a key part of the legitimizing 
function of HMI. Therefore, a quantification of ‘humanitarianism’ behind ‘motives 
and means’ of military interventions is a necessary prerequisite for enabling an 
evaluation of HMI on any more systematic basis. The presented model is a very 
first attempt to quantify this highly normative issue, and should be read and 
understood as a pioneering work that needs to be further developed and 
improved. This chapter will begin with description and justification of the 
variables that were selected to approximate individual JWT criteria. Afterwards, 
the chapter will present outputs of the factor analysis that was utilized to reduce 
the amount of variables quantifying the JWT criteria by classifying the input 
variables into the related components based on their common variation. The final 
part of this chapter will be devoted to the issue of weighting and index building.  
4.1. Quantification of the JWT criteria - conceptualization  
In spite of the subjective nature of the JWT criteria and the related impossibility of 
making any definite judgment about their fulfillment; it is possible to at least 
approximate a degree of their fulfillment based on a systematic and coherent, 
though simplified evaluation. Therefore, this study has developed six indexes that 
represent the simplified proxies for each of the JWT criterion. Composition of the 
below described indexes always reflects various perspectives on how the concept 
could be evaluated, often including various control indicators weakening a 
possible ‘humanitarianism’ behind the military intervention.  
4.1.1. ‘Just cause’ index258 
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Variables used for quantification of the JWT criterion of ‘just cause’ evaluate the 
severity of humanitarian crisis in the target state. The more severe the 
humanitarian crisis is, the greater legitimacy is awarded to a potential intervention 
for ‘humanitarian purposes’. First four variables composing the ‘just cause’ index 
are focused on the degree of humanitarian suffering experienced by the local 
population due to the ongoing violence in the target state. One measure simply 
counts the scaled number of civilians and combatants killed in the course of 
battle.259 This variable alone would not be sufficient to capture the amount of 
violent deaths, since it counts only fatalities resulting from the conflicts that 
involve government as one of the warring parties. It does not cover ethnic 
massacres that occurred without the coordinated involvement of any 
governmental forces. Therefore, the second variable was introduced to estimate a 
scaled number of fatalities resulting from the ongoing genocide or politicide in the 
target state.260 This variable covers all types of coherent actions against the 
unarmed civilians causing a complete or partial destruction of that people’s 
existence.  
     Obviously, counting the number of violent deaths is not a sufficient measure of 
humanitarian suffering. Most of the people do not die as a direct result of violence 
in the conflict zones; but rather indirectly as a result of starvation, exhaustion and 
diseases. Therefore, it could be possibly argued that a simple change in crude 
mortality should have been used instead of the two above listed input variables. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that this study attempts to justify the use of military 
personnel to manage the humanitarian crises, the crisis management should be of 
such a complicated nature to necessarily require a presence of soldiers to become 
successful. In the poor but otherwise peaceful countries suffering from hunger; the 
civilian sector of NGOs and humanitarian aid should be given the stage in 
managing the humanitarian crisis instead of the military sector. In such cases, 
deployment of soldiers would not be defendable. Therefore, this study rather put 
an emphasis on the deaths that could have been prevented only by establishing the 
security either with a mere demonstration or an actual use of force. From the less 
battle-related indicators of humanitarian suffering, the ‘just cause’ index includes 
only the scaled number of forcibly displaced people who can be reasonably 
assumed to be exposed to the severe humanitarian conditions due to the violence 
in the target state.261 This indicator was included into the index, since a forcible 
displacement of the local population is something that can be either prevented or 
at least logistically better managed with the presence of intervening troops in the 
war zone. None of the three above listed variables describing the complexity of 
humanitarian crisis was adjusted by the number of population, since the study 
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attempted to avoid attaching a lower value to the lives lost in the more populous 
countries. Due to the very imprecise statistics on fatalities and refugees from the 
conflict zones, the included indicators were constructed by compiling the data 
from more sources and by scaling them to control for the potential outliers. 
Furthermore, the imprecise statistics were controlled for by incorporating one 
additional variable into the model, which evaluates the scaled level of ethnic and 
civil violence in the target state that is not dependent on the count of fatalities, but 
rather determines the type of violence in general.262     
     The remaining two variables constituting the ‘just cause’ index reflect a concern 
that a mere existence of the internal conflict and the resulting humanitarian crisis 
should not by itself represent a sufficient reason for an external party to 
legitimately break a sovereignty of another state. Each country should be given an 
opportunity to solve its internal matters without an external intrusion; and the 
legitimacy of the ‘cause’ for an intervention can be considered ‘just’ only if the 
treatment of the humanitarian crisis from inside is improbable. Therefore, a second 
group of indicators building the ‘just cause’ index is more structural, looking at the 
ability and willingness of the local government to manage the humanitarian crisis 
on its own. There are two possible scenarios that could provide justification for 
waging a military intervention into a humanitarian crisis taking place in a 
sovereign country, and which are approximated by the last two variables. The first 
situation occurs in case that the local government is unable to manage the ongoing 
crisis by itself. So as to control for this scenario; a variable indicating a joint 
magnitude of state failure, degree of collapse of democratic institutions, and 
violence associated with adverse regime transition in the target country was 
introduced.263 The higher the summed scale, the less probable it is that the 
government is capable of handling the violence on its own without any external 
assistance. The second scenario takes place when the violence is perpetuated by the 
government itself, suggesting that the oppressed population has no reasonable 
prospects of being assisted from inside. In such cases there is typically at least 
some manifestation of an active domestic rebellion against the government that 
explicitly demonstrates a dissatisfaction of the local population with the current 
political situation and a willingness of the people to fight for a change. To control 
for this possibility, the last variable capturing the most serious manifestation of 
rebellion of the local population against the government was added.264  
4.1.2. ‘Just intent’ index265 
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265 Index approximating JWT criterion of ‘just intent’ -  “jwt_intent”. 
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JWT criterion of ‘just intent’ aspires to evaluate ‘humanitarian motivation’ behind 
the military interventions. Evaluating the intent of the intervener was a 
problematic assignment, since the declared reasons can be completely different 
from the real motivation of the actor. Therefore, the real motivation can always be 
questioned. Bearing this in mind, this study divided the variables building the ‘just 
intent’ index into two subgroups - one serving as an indicator of ‘humanitarian 
intent’ of the intervener, the other serving as a control group for the other possible 
economic and political side motives. The first variable composing the index 
evaluates the existence of a ‘just intent’ behind the interventions on a binary 
scale.266 Obviously, such a simplified binary indicator needs to be treated only as a 
very rough approximation of the real motives. To make the argument more 
persuasive, this binary variable is accompanied by three other indicators of ‘just 
intent’; one indicating a degree of intervener’s expected utility from waging an 
intervention into the target country267, and the other two indicating a degree of 
mutual solidarity symbolized by the existing ties between the intervener and the 
target state, such as a joint historical relationship268 or a similarity of the two states’ 
alliance portfolios269. 
     The second group of variables building the ‘just intent’ index controls for the 
possible side motives of the interveners. Its first four variables evaluate the 
possible economic side motives of the intervener. They establish whether the 
military intervention attempts to protect own economic or resource interests270, 
whether the target state represents a potentially interesting economic partner for 
the intervener271, whether the economic attractiveness of the target state has an 
increasing or decreasing potential272; and finally, whether there are some lootable 
resources present in the target country – such as gemstones or oil273. Last four 
variables in the control group reflect the possible political, strategic and territorial 
concerns that the intervener could have toward the target state. They indicate 
whether the intervention has political motives aimed at affecting domestic 
policies274; whether the intervention is aimed at acquisition or retention of the 
territory, delineation of frontiers, or specification of sovereign status275; whether the 
intervention attempts to restore a regional balance of powers, stability, or is led by 
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the ideological motives276; and finally, whether the intervention is aimed at 
protecting own interests and property inside or outside of the target state277. By 
doing that it is possible to assume that the resulting ‘just intent’ index represents a 
balanced estimate of a real ‘humanitarian motivation’ of the intervener. 
4.1.3. ‘Just authority’ index278 
Quantification of the JWT criterion of ‘just authority’ was based on two major 
assumptions. The first assumption stipulates that if the government of the 
intervening state is ‘just’; then giving its officers the right to declare war is 
reasonable and justifiable. ‘Just authority’ criterion can thus be approximated by the 
level of democracy in the intervening country; since the more democratic the 
country is, the more political support the politicians need from the citizens to be 
able to wage the military operation. Therefore, the first variable building the index 
measures a level of democracy in the intervening country.279 Nevertheless, 
evaluation of justice of a military intervention should not be left solely up to the 
decision of one country, regardless of how democratic the country is. Due to the 
global implications of HMI authorization, existence of a ‘just authority’ also 
requires the international consent with the operation. While examining the 
presence of such consent, this study assumed that an active involvement of the 
international organization should increase an authorization of the intervention due 
to its internationally recognized status. Therefore, two additional variables 
evaluating the participation of some international organization in the leadership of 
the intervention were added to the model. While the first one treats all the 
internationally recognized organizations at equal footing and evaluates merely a 
participation of whatever international organization280; the second variable looks 
solely on the active participation by the UN281, since the UN is generally considered 
to be an institution with the highest authority in matters of evaluating justice of 
any military endeavor. 
     The second assumption is set on a similar logic as the first one, but turns the 
argument the other way round. It focuses on the level of democracy in the target 
state, arguing that the sovereignty of an undemocratic country could justifiably be 
questioned under certain extreme circumstances. To put it more specifically, an 
undemocratic government lacks accountability for its actions or inactions, which 
could provide an implicit authorization for some external party to correct a 
potential misbehavior or a lack of action of such an undemocratic government if 
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the consequences entail a humanitarian suffering. Therefore, there were two 
additional variables added to form the ‘just authority’ index - one assessing a 
degree of democracy in the target state282; the other one indicating whether the 
country currently undergoes the process of autocratization.283 While the first one is 
concerned merely with the level of democracy as such, the second one wants to 
complicate authorization of intervention that would be waged into the target 
country currently experiencing a process of democratization regardless of the 
actual level of democracy. 
4.1.4. ‘Last resort’ index284 
JWT criterion of ‘last resort’ requires that the military intervention is waged only in 
a last resort, after all the non-violent escalatory acts have been at least honestly 
considered. Nevertheless, there are practical difficulties in satisfying this otherwise 
rational criterion when dealing with the humanitarian crises. Requiring the 
fulfillment of all the prerequisite steps of escalatory tactics of diplomatic or 
economic interventions usually does not make sense in case of a humanitarian 
emergency, in which time tends to be of essence. It would be too time consuming 
to wait for the UN to pass escalatory resolutions and then to wait whether the 
target country is going to comply with it or not, especially if some big massacre is 
taking place or many lives are immediately endangered. Therefore, this study 
quantifies the ‘last resort’ criterion in a way that an immediate forcible reaction by 
an external party becomes justified, if the humanitarian situation escalates 
dramatically in the target state. For this purpose, the study uses the already 
constructed JWT index of ‘just cause’ that approximates the severity of 
humanitarian crisis by capturing its percentage change from the previous to the 
current year. This means that the same variables that quantify the ‘just cause’ are 
also used for the quantification of ‘last resort’, just in a slightly adjusted way.285  
4.1.5. ‘Proportionality’ index286 
Ranking high on ‘proportionality’ index requires that a military intervention uses 
forcible means proportionally to its ‘humanitarian’ objective of bringing a 
humanitarian relief to the target state. This suggests that the intervention should be 
waged in a manner that the negative effects of using force should not overweight 
the improvement of humanitarian situation brought by the presence of the 
intervening forces, and that the use of force by the intervener should be as minimal 
as possible just as to stop the violence. To quantify whether individual 
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interventions fulfill this JWT criterion, there were two types of indicators selected 
that should be weighed against each other. The severity of the existing or the 
perceived threat is compared to the type of military strategy actually applied by 
the interveners to manage that threat. By comparing the two, this study attempts to 
approximate how ‘proportional’ the intervention is. 
     One side of the equation constituting the ‘proportionality’ index approximates the 
severity of security threat that is to be encountered by the intervener both 
internally coming from the violent resistance against the intervention from the 
target state and externally from the possible third-parties intervening into the 
conflict.  Security of the threat is quantified by eight variables. First four variables 
count the number of lives lost in the course of battle to indicate to what degree are 
the warring parties willing to shed blood for their goals. Two of them measure an 
overall number of battle-related deaths.287 They do not distinguish among 
individual interveners and the target state, but count all the fatalities regardless of 
who was dying and who caused it, as long as the deaths resulted out of violence 
and occurred in the target state. Additional two variables reflect even more closely 
the security concerns of the interveners, taking into the consideration a pressure 
that the politicians sending the troops are exposed to from their domestic 
electorate. They capture exclusively the battle-related deaths suffered by the 
interveners.288 This information plays a crucial role during selection of an 
appropriate military strategy, since the interveners need to minimize own losses in 
the external battle-field so as to maintain a domestic political support for the 
operation.  
     Next variable assessing the threat estimates the strength of opposition that the 
intervener could face in the country.289 This estimate combines information about 
the military capability index of the target state with the intended target of 
intervention. It distinguishes among the cases, when all the interventions in 
particular country-year are intended to support government, cases when all 
support the rebels and cases when the interventions clash in targeting. The 
estimated value is calculated based on the two simplified assumptions influencing 
the multiplier effect of the estimate. First of all, the interventions against the 
government are assumed to result in a greater amount of opposition than the 
interventions supporting the government against a rebel movement. Secondly, the 
mixed target interventions are assumed to be the most dangerous type of endeavor 
for the interveners, since they tend to be most complex and least predictable 
regarding the behavior of individual conflict actors.  
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     Last three variables complementing the information about the expected military 
threat to the intervener bring an international perspective into the consideration. 
They refer to the potential of the conflict to draw additional third-party actors and 
to the related increase in complexity of the security threat. First variable is more 
theoretical, evaluating how vulnerable the target country is to be intervened into in 
general.290 This evaluation is based on the alliance portfolio of the target state and 
the summed utilities of the other states toward this country. The remaining two 
variables describe the already existing internalization of the conflict, serving as an 
indicator of how much the conflict actually draws attention and activity of the 
other external parties. While the first variable provides a total number of foreign 
soldiers that intervened into the target country in a given year291; the second 
variable counts the number of intervening countries currently present.292  
     The second side of the equation constituting the ‘proportionality index’ represents 
a better measurable counterweight to the first, more subjective one. It does not 
describe how the threat could have been perceived by the interveners; instead, it is 
composed of three variables describing a robustness of the forcible strategy 
actually employed by the interveners during the operations. First two variables in 
this group provide information about a level of violence used by the interveners. 
One indicates the most violent troop activity employed by any intervener293, while 
the second one takes into consideration a number of interveners and sums the 
highest degree of violence employed by each of them. 294 The last variable measures 
the size of the waged military operation by counting the number of troops sent to 
the target state.295 
4.1.6. ‘Probability of success’ index296 
Last JWT criterion of ‘probability of success’ stipulates that there should be a 
reasonable hope of success in achieving the desired goals when deciding about 
waging an intervention or about extension of presence of the troops in some 
foreign country. Existence of this hope was roughly approximated by two groups 
of variables in this study. First group of variables derives the expected ‘probability 
of success’ from the military strength of the target state. It is assumed that a military 
intervention waged into a militarily strong country has a higher probability to fail, 
because the powerful countries have a higher potential of a forcible counter-
reaction, meaning that the intervention could easily result in a greater bloodshed 
than it was intended to prevent. First variable in this group is very simple, 
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indicating whether the target country does or does not belong among the so-called 
‘big powers’.297 Countries denoted as ‘big powers’ are capable of a relatively quick 
mobilization of massive military and economic resources, and represent thus a 
difficult target of any military endeavor. Next variable evaluates a level of the 
expected military strength of opposition in the target country that is adjusted 
depending on existence or absence of the mixed targeting.298 Following variable 
relates to the fact that the military strength of the state hosting the conflict 
diminishes a tendency of the conflict to draw new external parties, which could 
further destabilize the conflict situation. Therefore, it indicates how the alliance 
portfolio of the target state leaves it vulnerable or invulnerable to a possible 
involvement by the other third parties.299 Last variable in this group compares the 
distance data, national military capability data, and regional risk attitude scores 
between the intervener and the target state; and transforms them into a joint score 
capturing a general ‘probability of success’ of their potential mutual military 
confrontation.300  
     The second group of variables evaluates the ‘probability of success’ of the 
intervention in the light of complexity of the conflict and its pervasiveness. First 
included indicator captures a culture of political violence in the target country, 
which is quantified as a number of violent years relative to those peaceful ones that 
the target state experienced since the year 1946 till the year of concern.301 Inclusion 
of this variable is based on an assumption that the more permanently present the 
violence is in the society, the more difficult it is to succeed in stopping it. Second 
included indicator is in fact the newly generated ‘just cause’ index, which is 
approximating the conflict severity and thus also a difficulty in succeeding in its 
management.302 The very last variable again looks at how much the conflict is 
drawing attention of the third parties; nevertheless, this time not theoretically in 
relation to the general characteristics of the target state, but more concretely in 
relation to the particular conflict. It measures the number of ongoing interventions 
in the target state and thus a growing number of actors in the field and the related 
unpredictability of the conflict development.303 
4.2. Quantification of the JWT criteria – factor analysis 
So as not to create the JWT indexes arbitrarily a statistical method of exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) was used to classify the variables composing individual JWT 
indexes into the linear clusters with a similar variance and with the attached 
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weights within a relevant linear function. Factor analysis is a data reduction 
technique that makes the large amount of data better descriptively and analytically 
manageable without losing much information about their variance.304 It 
disentangles the complex interrelationships among the variables and reveals a 
latent structure that causes them to co-vary in space and time. Factor analysis is 
thus capable of explaining the input manifest variables in terms of a much smaller 
set of empirically based latent variables, which contain interrelated data with 
similar characteristics, and which are expressed as relatively simple linear 
expressions with the assigned respective weights.305 Before presenting results of the 
analysis; it is necessary to discuss several methodological decisions, which could 
have major impact on the presented findings, and which need to be explicitly 
acknowledged to allow for a critical evaluation of this research.306 Therefore, the 
following paragraphs will be discussing issues such as a choice of the factor model; 
data examination; component retention, rotation, and labeling.  
4.2.1. Methodological issues 
4.2.1.1. Choice of a factor model – principal component analysis (PCA) 
Modern factor analysis is divided into two different approaches: principal factor 
analysis (PFA) and principal component analysis (PCA). The major assumption 
that distinguishes the two relates to the nature of variance of the variables, how 
they are distributed relative to each other. While PFA defines the patterns of 
common variation only among the set of variables, ignoring the variation unique to 
a variable; the PCA patterns all the variation in a set of variables, both common 
and unique. This study adopted the more common PCA model, which is especially 
convenient for the purposes of data reduction with the aim to maximize the 
described variance of the observed variables, which corresponds with the desired 
goal of this study. PCA takes the manifest data and seeks their linear combinations, 
the so-called latent variables or components, so that the maximum variance in the 
manifest variables is extracted. Afterwards, it removes this identified variance (1st 
component) and seeks a second strongest linear combination (2nd component) in 
the remaining variance, and so on. The number of so extracted components is 
equal to the number of manifest variables in the analysis. The resulting 
components presented in this study are orthogonal, uncorrelated, and they analyze 
the total variance – both common and unique.307  
                                                            
304 Among the competing techniques belong, for example, a cluster analysis or a multidimensional 
scaling. See: Rummel, 1970. 
305 It is important not to stretch the interpretation of factor analysis behind of what it is capable of doing. 
The below presented results are thought of as heuristics rather than being interpreted in absolute terms.  
306 See: Weiss, 1976; or MacCallum, 1983. 
307 For a more detailed description of factor analysis, see, for example: Tucker, Koopman & Linn, 1969; 
or Truxillo, 2003. 
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     In spite of a general acceptance of validity of the PCA model by most of the 
statisticians308; as in case of any other statistical model, appropriateness of the PCA 
for generating the JWT indexes could be questioned.309 The major critique of the 
PCA is directed to the fact that component model does not differentiate between 
common, unique and error variance. The original set of manifest variables is just 
transformed into a new set of latent variables, which are linear composites of the 
original ones. Due to this fact, PCA is criticized for producing merely the 
convenient groupings of variables rather than the theoretical constructs.310 
However, this criticism can be opposed with a counterargument that PCA does not 
base its conclusions on an assumption that the causal model actually underlies the 
data.311  
4.2.1.2. Data examination  
Having chosen a statistical model, it was necessary to review whether the model 
fits the capabilities of the data. The main rule regarding the appropriateness of the 
data for PCA is that the stability of component loadings is a direct function of the 
sample size.312 Without a sufficiently large data sample, PCA might produce 
seemingly ‘meaningful’ components even from the randomly generated numbers, 
based on a mere sampling variability.313 In spite of an existing agreement that a 
larger sample size is considered desirable for any type of factor analysis; there is no 
agreement about the minimally required observations-to-variables ratio. For 
example, while one study suggests five observations per variable314, another study 
recommends a minimal ratio of ten observations per variable.315 Below presented 
table that lists number of observations and variables used for the quantification of 
individual JWT indexes in this study shows that data samples are sufficiently 
large, satisfying even the strictest requirements. 
 
 
 
                                                            
308 PCA is a generally accepted statistical tool. Some statisticians claim that there is almost no difference 
between PFA and PCA, or that PCA is preferable. (See, for example: Arrindell & Ende, 1985; 
Schonemann, 1990; Steiger, 1990; Velicer & Jackson, 1990.) For example, a survey in PsycINFO found 
that out of over 1700 studies using some form of explanatory factor analysis in years 2003 and 2004, 
more than half of the studies applied PCA method. See: Costello & Osborne, 2005. 
309 For a criticism of PCA, see, for example: MacCallum & Tucker, 1991; Widaman, 1993; or Floyd & 
Widaman, 1995. 
310 See: Hakstian & Muller,1973; or Kim & Mueller, 1978. 
311 Kim & Mueller, 1978. 
312 Arrindell & Ende, 1985. 
313 Cliff & Pennell, 1967. 
314 Gorsuch, 1974. 
315 Nunnally, 1978. 
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Table 1: Variables-to-observations ratio 
 
JWT CRITERIA Number of variables Number of observations 
Just cause 6 12000 
Just intent 12 1695 
Just authority 5 1695 
Last resort 6 12000 
Proportionality 11 1695 
Probability of success 7 1695 
 
     Even though, most of the data requirements were solved by the fact that the 
tested samples of observations are relatively large; neither the large data samples 
must guarantee valid components. Component invalidity can be caused also by an 
inconvenient input data distribution. For example, categorical variables with 
similar splits tend to correlate with each other regardless of their content.316 The 
most problematic in this sense are the dichtonomous variables. Regardless of the 
sample size, dichtonomous data often tend to yield the loaded components even 
for the randomly generated data.317 For these reasons, the input data are rarely 
structured into the clearly cut scales or dichtonomous variables in this study. 
Instead, observations in most of the variables were divided by a number of 
interveners in particular country-year, making thus the categories more fluid. In 
addition to that, in case that some higher underlying metric correlation was 
discovered between a pair of input variables; it is discussed whether the 
discovered correlation is defendable on the theoretical grounds in the technical 
appendix of this study.  
4.2.1.3. Number of the retained components 
The outcome of PCA heavily depends on how many principal components are 
retained prior to the rotation. A general theory states that only the components 
accounting for a maximal variance should be retained and that the rest should be 
dropped. Nevertheless, there are no precise variance thresholds for the component 
retention, and the researchers use various rules-of-thumb that often lead to the 
different solutions.318 So as to identify a correct number of components to be 
retained, this study used two methods. First of them was the most typically used 
Kaiser test319, which retains all the components explaining more than 1.0 of 
variance (eigenvalues λ > 1.0).320 A rationale behind this threshold is that since PCA 
                                                            
316 Gorsuch, 1983.  
317 Kim & Mueller, 1978. 
318 Humphreys & Montanelli, 1974. 
319 Kaiser, 1960. 
320 Eigenvalue is not a percent of variance but rather a measure of amount of variance in relation to the 
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standardizes each variable to have a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of ±1.0, 
variance of each variable ends up as being 1.0. It is thus logical that a useful 
component should account for more than 1.0 unit of variance; otherwise, the 
extracted component would explain no more variance than a single variable, which 
would contradict the PCA goal of explaining multiple variables by a lesser amount 
of components. Therefore, the Kaiser test stipulates that the components 
contributing less than 1.0 to the explanation of variance in the variables may be 
ignored as redundant.321  
     Second method used in this analysis for the purpose of assessing the number of 
components to retain took into consideration the main criticism of the Kaiser test 
for its tendency to overestimate the true number of components.322 Therefore, so as 
to ensure a correct decision about the retained number of components; the study 
applied an additional control Cattell scree test323 that retains components located 
above the point of inflection on a plot of eigenvalues ordered by a diminishing 
size. Cattell scree test plots the components on the X axis and the corresponding 
eigenvalues on the Y axis. While moving toward the later components, the 
eigenvalues drop. When the curve makes an elbow toward a less steep decline, the 
test suggests that all further components including the one starting the elbow 
should be dropped. The major weakness of this method is that picking the right 
elbow is again a subjective decision, since there are often more of them on the 
curve.324  
     This study used both these tests to complement each other. In case that the 
number of factors suggested by the Kaiser test was different from the number 
suggested by the Cattell test; the number of components was set manually and the 
analysis was run to test both possibilities. After component rotation, the loading 
tables representing both possibilities were compared and the one with a ‘cleaner’ 
component structure – loadings above 0.40, no or few ‘cross-loadings’325, and no 
components with fewer than two variables – was retained as having the best fit to 
the data. In addition to that, before dropping any controversial component; the 
study tested its correlation with the dependent variables that are to be used in the 
subsequent analysis for assessing the ‘humanitarian’ effects of military 
interventions. Even if the component seemed to be of a lesser importance; the 
component was retained, if it was highly correlated with any of the dependent 
variables.  
                                                            
321 For a more detailed debate about the Kaiser test, see: Weiss, 1976; or Costello & Osborne, 2005. 
322 In spite of the fact that the evidence suggests that it is better to overestimate rather than 
underestimate the number of factors; Kaiser test is sometimes criticized for this tendency. See: Guertin, 
Guertin & Ware, 1981; Velicer & Jackson, 1990; or Lance, Butts & Michels, 2006. 
323 Cattell, 1966. 
324 See: Zwick & Velicer, 1982. 
325 A ‘cross-loading’ item is an item that loads at 0.32 or higher on two or more components. 
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Table 2: Results of Kaiser and Catell tests and the related decisions about component 
retention 
 
JWT CRITERIA 
Kaiser 
test 
Cattell scree test 
Number of 
components 
retained 
Cummulative 
variance 
explained 
Just cause 1 1 1 60,19% 
Just intent 4 unclear result - 4 possible 4 58,18% 
Just authority 2 1 2 - cleaner structure 69,64% 
Last resort 1 1 1 60,19% 
Proportionality 3 3 3 62,46% 
Probability of success 2 2 2 51,16% 
 
4.2.1.4. Method of rotation - orthogonal  
PCA method produces components in more possible forms. Due to the fact that the 
simplest form of the unrotated PCA solutions tends to load on multiple 
components, and is thus hard to be interpreted; the components are usually rotated 
until the distinct clusters of interrelated variables are defined.  Rotation is a linear 
data transformation that changes the loadings and the eigenvalues of individual 
components, and produces a basis for imputing their weights and labels. In its 
result, component rotation facilitates interpretation, meaningfulness, reliability and 
reproducibility of the PCA analysis.326 There are two main types of component 
rotation: orthogonal327 and oblique328. While the orthogonal rotation produces 
uncorrelated components; the oblique rotation produces both correlated and 
uncorrelated patterns of variables.329  
     For the reasons of greater conceptual clarity and better suitability for a 
subsequent regression analysis, this study gave a preference to the orthogonal 
method that produces statistically uncorrelated components. It rotates the total set 
of components as a rigid frame around the origin until the system becomes 
maximally aligned with the separate clusters of variables. The more correlated the 
separate clusters are, the less capable the orthogonal rotation is to identify them. 
The adopted orthogonal approach has two major advantages for the realization of 
the aims of this study. First of all, it is suitable for the purposes of index building, 
since the generated component loadings are equivalent to the correlations between 
                                                            
326 Weiss, 1976. 
327 Orthogonal rotation means a 90 degree angle rotation. 
328 Oblique rotation means other than a 90 degree angle rotation. 
329 If correlation of oblique rotated factors is 0, the patterns are in fact orthogonal (= uncorrelated to each 
other). See: Nunnally, 1978. 
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manifest variables and components. The second main advantage of the orthogonal 
approach is that by producing the statistically uncorrelated components, it 
transforms the data in a way to meet the assumptions of a multiple regression 
technique, which is the method to be used to test the relevance of individual JWT 
criteria for the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions in the following 
chapter.   
     Nevertheless, the study cannot completely ignore the theoretical weakness of 
the orthogonal approach that arises from the fact that behavior in the social 
sciences can rarely be described as being partitioned into the clusters that function 
independently of one another. Therefore, relying merely on the orthogonal rotation 
results could result in a loss of valuable information. Taking this potential 
weakness into consideration, in spite of a methodological decision to draw the 
component loadings from the orthogonally rotated solutions; a control oblique 
rotation was always run to check the effect of letting the rotated components being 
correlated and thus to better reflect the correlated realities of the real world. In case 
that the preferred orthogonal rotation discovered some cross-loadings of the input 
variables over more components, assigning the variable to a correct pattern was 
reconciled or verified based on the results of oblique rotation.  
4.2.1.5. Construction and labeling of the components  
In the final step of PCA analysis, the generated component loadings, which are in 
fact the estimated weights for each variable building the component, were used to 
calculate the component scores. The component scores were obtained by 
multiplying each input variable by its respective component loading and by 
summing the results for the component together. The only remaining task was to 
assign the identified components the adequate labels. Labeling of the identified 
components is a highly subjective process that depends on the earlier 
methodological choices, and that is influenced by the expectations of the 
researchers.330 So as to minimize subjectivity of the labeling process; it is often 
recommended to adopt the symbolic labels without any substantive meaning on 
their own, in spite of the awareness that such a labeling would become less 
intuitive for the reader and would complicate the orientation in the presented 
results. This study adopted the more controversial approach of assigning the 
identified components the descriptive labels, while risking that they could have 
different connotations for different people and that they might potentially result in 
adding an unintended surplus meaning. The selected labels reflect the joint 
characteristics of the variables constituting each component. In spite of their 
obvious subjectivity; this choice enables a better communication of the research 
                                                            
330 Comrey, 1978. 
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findings, which was a preferable option for this study given the complexity of the 
JWT.   
4.2.2. Interpretation of the results 
Having discussed the most important methodological decisions, it is possible to 
present the results of the carried out PCA analysis. While the more detailed output 
of the analysis can be found in the technical appendix, this chapter presents just the 
summarizing tables for each of the JWT criterion. Rows in the tables list the input 
manifest variables, and the columns of the tables show the generated components 
or the so called latent variables that explain as much of the variance in the manifest 
variables as possible. The colored cells are the component loadings, which show 
the correlation coefficients between the manifest variables and the retained 
components. There are various arbitrarily set rules for evaluating the importance of 
the manifest variables for the component that vary by the research context. Ideally, 
the goal is to have all the main component loadings greater than 0.70; since such a 
loading threshold corresponds to about half of the variance in the variable being 
explained. However, this rule is generally considered to be too strict when dealing 
with the field of social sciences.  The common social science practice generally uses 
a minimum cut-off loading of 0.30, 0.35 or 0.40, depending on the subject being 
researched.331 This study adopted a relatively strict evaluation framework for the 
social sciences standards, where a loading is considered to be ‘weak’ if being lower 
than 0.4; it is considered to be ‘moderate’ if being in the range between 0.4 and 0.6; 
and is considered to be ‘strong’ if being higher than 0.6. The results of the analysis 
indicate that if evaluated based on the above described scale; out of 47 input 
variables approximating the JWT criteria, 37 load strongly, 10 moderately, and 0 
weakly on the component models. The presented models show very low number 
of cross-loadings above 0.30, none of which exceeds 0.40. 
     Apart from the columns representing individual retained components, the 
below presented tables show also two additional columns indicating communality 
and uniqueness for the each manifest variable row. Communality counts the 
percentage of variance in each manifest variable explained by all the components 
jointly, and may be interpreted as a reliability of the variable in the component 
model.332 Low communality suggests that the component model is not working 
well for the variable and that the variable should be possibly removed from the 
model. Ideally, communality should be higher than 0.3, but lower than 1.0. 
Communality in a range between 0.2 and 0.3 is lower, but it may be still 
meaningful if the variable is contributing to a well-defined factor. Communality 
exceeding 1.0 suggests existence of a spurious solution caused by retaining of too 
                                                            
331 Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998; or Raubenheimer, 2004. 
332 Communality (h2) is computed as a sum of the squared component loadings for the variable row. 
Uniqueness of a variable is calculated as 1-h2. 
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many or too few components. The presented component models for the JWT 
criteria show that no input variable has a communality below 0.2, and just a couple 
of them falls within the lowly performing range of 0.2 - 0.3. Total communality 
percentage presented in the right bottom part of the table shows the joint variance 
in all the variables accounted for by each component.333 The average percentage 
explained by the six component models describing individual JWT criteria is 
60.31%. 
4.2.2.1. Summary tables of the generated components constituting the JWT indexes 
Table 3: Assessment of strength of the generated component loadings  
 
 *** ‘strong’ loadings (|x|> 0,6) 
 ** ‘moderate’ loadings (0,4 ≤ |x| ≤ 0,6 ) 
 * ‘weak’ loadings (|x| < 0,4) 
 
Table 4: PCA output - ‘just cause’ index334 
 
JUST CAUSE  
Variables C1: Just cause index Communality Uniqueness 
battle_deaths_x  ***   0,8597  0,7391 0,2609 
genoc_deaths_x **      0,5870 0,3446 0,6554 
displaced_pop_x    ***   0,6417 0,4118 0,5882 
viol_x  ***   0,9115 0,8308 0,1693 
state_fail_x  ***   0,8039 0,6463 0,3537 
rebel_x  ***   0,7992 0,6387 0,3612 
Total = 60,19%   0,6019   
 
Table 5: PCA output - ‘just intent’ index 
 
JUST INTENT 
Variables 
C1: Hum. 
motivation 
C2: 
Economic 
motivation 
C3: 
Political 
motivation 
I 
C4: 
Political 
motivation 
II 
Communality Uniqueness 
hum_int_x  ***   -0,8016 -0,0969 0,0847 -0,1795 0,6913 0,3087 
util_achb_x  ***    0,6771 -0,0544 0,1587 0,1669 0,5145 0,4855 
joint_hist_x **     0,5900 -0,1737 0,3804 -0,1344 0,5410 0,4590 
alliance_x  ***   -0,8710 0,0239 0,0483 0,1358 0,7800 0,2200 
tot_trade_x -0,0350  ***   0,8312 -0,0479 -0,0840 0,7015 0,2985 
                                                            
333 Total percent of variance is calculated as a sum of communalities for each manifest variable that is 
divided by the number of variables. (Number of variables equals the sum of their variances, since the 
variance of a standardized variable is 1.0.) 
334 ‘Just cause’ index was used to construct the ‘last resort’ index by calculating a yearly change in the ‘just 
cause’ index from the previous to the current year.  
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oil_gas_x -0,0302  ***   0,8078 0,1825 0,0510 0,6894 0,3106 
gemstones_x 0,0633 **     0,4617 -0,1487 -0,0364 0,2406 0,7594 
trade_growth_x 0,0959 **     0,4313 -0,1289 -0,1606 0,2376 0,7624 
pol_int_x -0,1134 -0,0546  ***   0,7867 0,0769 0,6407 0,3593 
territ_int_x 0,1914 0,2632  ***   0,6778 0,0275 0,5661 0,4339 
strat_int_x 0,4212 -0,1099 -0,3293 **     0,5714 0,6244 0,3756 
protect_int_x -0,0588 -0,0112 0,1310  ***   0,8566 0,7545 0,2455 
Total = 58,18%         0,5818   
 
Table 6: PCA output - ‘just authority’ index 
 
JUST AUTHORITY 
Variables 
C1: Legitimacy of 
intervener 
C2: Absence of 
legitimacy of target state 
Communality Uniqueness 
dem_a_x  ***   0,7426 -0,0972 0,5609 0,4391 
io_int_x   ***   0,9404 -0,0383 0,8858 0,1142 
un_int_x   ***   0,9134 -0,0141 0,8345 0,1655 
dem_b_x  0,2635  ***   -0,6577 0,5020 0,4980 
aurocratization_x 0,0674  ***    0,8332 0,6988 0,3012 
Total = 69,64%     0,6964   
 
Table 7: PCA output - ‘last resort’ index 
 
LAST RESORT  
‘Last resort' index is calculated as a yearly change in the 'just cause' index. 
 
Table 8: PCA output - ‘proportionality’ index 
 
PROPORTIONALITY 
Variables 
C1: Security 
threat in 
target state I 
C2: Force used 
by intervener 
C3: Security 
threat in target 
state II 
Communality Uniqueness 
battle_deaths_1x  ***   0,7027 0,0152 -0,1092 0,5059 0,4941 
battle_deaths_2x  ***   0,6234 0,3424 -0,1189 0,5200 0,4800 
battle_deaths_a1x  ***   0,7997 0,0031 -0,0714 0,6446 0,3554 
battle_deaths_a2x  ***   0,6445 0,3745 -0,1194 0,5699 0,4301 
int_strength_x  ***   0,8508 0,1560 0,1431 0,7687 0,2314 
int_freq_x  ***   0,8381 -0,0725 0,1208 0,7223 0,2777 
troop_act_x -0,0770  ***   0,8758 0,0350 0,7742 0,2258 
troop_act_agr_x 0,1769  ***   0,8847 0,0616 0,8178 0,1822 
troop_no_ax 0,2684 **     0,4702 0,1337 0,3110 0,6890 
opp_strength_x -0,0272 -0,0033  ***   -0,7833 0,6143 0,3857 
risk_b_x 0,0192 0,1212  ***    0,7789 0,6217 0,3783 
Total = 62,46%       0,6246   
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Table 9: PCA output - ‘probability of success’ index 
 
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 
Variables 
C1: Strength of the 
target state 
C2: Conflict 
complexity 
Communality Uniqueness 
succ_a_x **     -0,4573 -0,0426 0,2110 0,7890 
risk_b_x **     -0,5384 -0,1359 0,3083 0,6917 
big_power_b_x  ***     0,8498 -0,0147 0,7225 0,2775 
opp_strength_x  ***     0,8821 0,0755 0,7838 0,2162 
viol_cult_x 0,1693  ***   0,7781 0,6340 0,3660 
int_freq_x -0,1614 **     0,4437 0,2229 0,7771 
just_cause_x -0,0202  ***   0,8359 0,6991 0,3009 
Total = 51,17%     0,5117   
 
4.3. Weighting of the components and of the individual JWT criteria 
Having identified how the data quantifying individual JWT criteria are interrelated 
and having simplified their complexity by grouping the input variables with 
similar underlying functions into the labeled components335; the study needed to 
assess a relative theoretical importance of those components within the individual 
JWT criteria to be able to assign them respective weights. Due to the fact that this 
task required many normative decisions; the process of weighting was carried out 
in a way to allow for a ready-made possibility to readjust the weights based on an 
alternative perspective, accepting thus a possibility that the adopted decisions 
could be opposed by different researchers using the data in the future. To enable 
this flexibility, all the generated components are kept both in their unadjusted as 
well as the unadjusted forms in the data compilation that is presented in the last 
chapter of this study, and each change to the data for the distributional purposes is 
described in detail in the technical appendix of this chapter.  
     While attaching particular weights to the components, this study was drawing 
inspiration from the current academic debate about the JWT criteria, looking at 
how the academic texts interpret a relevance of different aspects of the criteria for 
the legitimacy of HMI and what are the existing criticisms of these aspects. After 
selecting the appropriate weights for the components and after transforming the 
scores accordingly; the components constituting individual JWT indexes were 
merged together. The process of merging of the weighted components had to take 
into consideration that not all of the generated components are of a complementary 
nature, that some of the components have legitimizing and some delegitimizing 
effect on the HMI. Therefore, the components increasing the ‘humanitarianism’ 
                                                            
335 Components: “just_cause_x”, “hum_motive_x”, “econ_motive_x”, “pol_motive_1x”, 
“pol_motive_2x”, “legit_a_x”, “legit_b_x”, “last_resort_x”,“threat_1x”, “force_used_x”, “threat_2x”, 
“strength_b_x”, and “conf_compex_x”. 
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behind ‘motives and means’ of the military operations were summed together; 
while the  negative components controlling for the possible side ‘motives’ and 
inappropriate ‘means’ were subtracted from the final scores.336 The resulting 
quantified indexes approximate individual JWT criteria, with 0 indicating the 
lowest possible score of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ that the military 
operation can possibly achieve on each criterion.337 
     After generating indexes for all the JWT criteria, it was necessary to create an 
aggregate JWT index that would be capable of determining an overall 
‘humanitarianism’ behind ‘motives and means’ of each military intervention. 
Therefore, the next stage of weighting required that the quantified JWT criteria 
were also assigned the weights based on their relative importance within the JWT 
as a whole. The Theory itself does not mention much about the differences in 
relevance of the six JWT criteria, not directly indicating which one is more and 
which less crucial for the legitimizing effect. The only indication is that the criteria 
of ‘jus ad bellum’ initially included only the first three criteria of ‘just cause’, ‘just 
intent’ and ‘just authority’, and that the remaining ones were added just later on so 
as to further develop the Theory. This very basic fact allows a reasonable 
assumption that the first three criteria represent the basic stones for provision of 
legitimacy to the military operations.  
     The underlying assumption of a greater relevance of the first three criteria is 
confirmed by the scholarly debate about the applicability of JWT for the evaluation 
of legitimacy of HMI. In fact, most of the existing studies stress the importance of 
the first three criteria. The most privileged position within the Theory is typically 
assigned to the criterion of ‘just intent’. Its primacy follows from a general 
definition of the HMI concept, in which ‘humanitarian intent’ is a decisive aspect 
in distinguishing the HMI from the other types of aggressive military 
interventions. Therefore, it is primarily the ‘just intent’ that is being scrutinized and 
only then the remaining JWT criteria.338 The second position in ranking the three 
basic JWT criteria was assigned to the criterion of ‘just cause’, since the criterion of 
‘just authority’ is sometimes being questioned on the practical grounds of lack of a 
generally acknowledged authority capable of effectively proving and awarding the 
legitimate status to the military operations. Taking all these aspects into 
consideration, the JWT criteria were attached weights in the following order of a 
decreasing importance: ‘just intent’ (30%); ‘just cause’ (25%); ‘just authority’ (15%); 
and then last three criteria of ‘last resort’ (10%), ‘proportionality’ (10%), and a 
reasonable ‘probability of success’ (10%). After recalculating the scores for the 
                                                            
336 Control components with the negative weights: “econ_motive_x”, “pol_motive_1x”, 
“pol_motive_2x”, “force_used_x”, “strength_b_x”, and “conf_compex_x”. 
337 Variables approximating the JWT criteria: “jwt_cause_x”, “jwt_intent_x”, “jwt_auth_x”, “jwt_last_x”, 
“jwt_prop_x” and “jwt_succ_x”.  
338 Coady, 2002. 
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individual JWT criteria based on the adopted weights; the scores were summed 
together to construct the final aggregate index approximating the quantified 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ based on the propositions of the JWT.  
 
Table 10: Quantified JWT in a summary (input variables, generated components, attached 
weights) 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE QUANTIFIED JWT CRITERIA  
INPUT VARIABLES OUTCOME COMPONENTS  
JUST CAUSE INDEX (+25%) 
Battle deaths – target state battle_deaths_x 
Just cause index 
(+100%) 
just_cause_x 
Genocide deaths – target state genoc_deaths_x 
Displaced population – target state displaced_pop_x 
Internal violence – target state viol_x 
State failure – target state state_fail_x 
Rebellion – target state rebel_x 
JUST INTENT INDEX (+30%) 
Humanitarian intervention hum_int_x 
Humanitarian 
motivation 
(+100%) 
hum_motive_x 
Intervener’s utility util_achb_x 
Joint history joint_hist_x 
Alliance alliance_x 
Trade importance – target state tot_trade_x 
Economic 
motivation (-
30%) 
econ_motive_x 
Oil and gas – target state oil_gas_x 
Gemstones – target state gemstones_x 
Trade growth – target state trade_growth_x 
Political intervention pol_int_x Political 
motivation I (-
10%) 
pol_motive_1x 
Territorial intervention territ_int_x 
Strategic intervention strat_int_x Political 
motivation II (-
10%) 
pol_motive_2x 
Protective intervention protect_int_x 
JUST AUTHORITY INDEX (+15%) 
Democracy level - intervener dem_a_x 
Legitimacy of 
intervner (+60%) 
legit_a_x International organization leadership io_int_x  
UN leadership un_int_x  
Democracy level - target state dem_b_x  Lack of 
legitimacy of 
target state 
(+40%) 
legit_b_x 
Autocratization - target state  aurocratization_x 
LAST RESORT INDEX (+10%) 
Battle deaths – target state battle_deaths_x 
Last resort index 
(+100%) 
last_resort_x 
Genocide deaths – target state genoc_deaths_x 
Displaced population – target state displaced_pop_x 
Internal violence – target state viol_x 
State failure – target state state_fail_x 
Rebellion – target state rebel_x 
PROPORTIONALITY INDEX (+10%) 
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Aggregate battle deaths on both sides I battle_deaths_1x 
Security threat 
in target state I 
(+70%) 
threat_1x 
Aggregate battle deaths on both sides II battle_deaths_2x 
Battle deaths - interveners I battle_deaths_a1x 
Battle deaths - interveners II battle_deaths_a2x 
International troops strength – target state int_strength_x 
Intervention frequency – target state int_freq_x 
Most violent troop activity - intervener  troop_act_x 
Force used by 
intervener (-
50%) 
force_used_x 
Aggregate violent troop activity - 
interveners  
troop_act_agr_x 
Troop number - interveners troop_no_ax 
Military strength of opposition – target 
state  
opp_strength_x 
Security threat 
in target state II 
(+30%) 
threat_2x 
Alliance risk score - target state risk_b_x 
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS INDEX (+10%) 
Probability of success - intervener succ_a_x 
Strength of the 
target state (-
60%) 
strength_b_x 
Risk score - target state  risk_b_x 
Big power - target state big_power_b_x 
Military strength of the opposition – target 
state 
opp_strength_x 
Political culture of violence - target state viol_cult_x Conflict 
complexity (-
40%) 
conf_complex_x Intervention frequency – target state  int_freq_x 
Just cause index  just_cause_x 
JUST WAR THEORY INDEX = 100% 
 
Table 11: Statistical description of JWT criteria indexes and the aggregate JWT index   
 
INDEXES APPROXIMATING JWT  
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
jwt_cause_x 1200 6,39 12,77 1,09 99,99 
jwt_intent_x 1695 53,69 24,59 0,00 98,85 
jwt_auth_x 1695 48,77 16,92 3,78 102,23 
jwt_last_x 1200 46,61 3,03 0,01 100,00 
jwt_prop_x 1695 38,73 8,82 0,00 134,14 
jwt_succ_x 1695 41,40 7,22 0,01 51,72 
jwt_x 1965 21,33 8,05 0,06 47,14 
 
4.4. Validity of the quantified JWT 
This chapter has attempted to quantify a highly normative and complex issue of 
‘Just War’. It would be possible to question each single step of this analysis, 
starting with the selection of variables approximating individual JWT criteria, 
continuing with their conceptualization and data adjustments, and ending with the 
choice of method used for assigning these variables with respective weights. This 
study acknowledges that the presented JWT indexes greatly simplify the reality 
and do not manage to encompass all the possible relevant aspects of the Theory. 
Nevertheless, these indexes should be perceived as a mere trail to overcome the 
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multidimensionality and subjectivity of this difficult issue. The main contributions 
of this chapter can thus be summarized in three points. First of all, it has attempted 
to quantify the JWT in a systematic and coherent way. Secondly, it has suppressed 
the subjectivity of how the individual input variables theoretically describing the 
JWT criteria correlate with each other, but has rather classified them based on their 
actual variance. And finally, it has generated the approximated JWT indexes by 
weighting the individual aspects of JWT based on their relevance within the 
Theory. By doing that, the study has provided a tool for approximating a degree of 
‘humanitarianism’ behind ‘motives and means’ of military interventions. This 
daring trail has enabled to expose the controversial doctrines of JWT and HMI to a 
critical empirical evaluation that could bring more light into the question of 
legitimacy of HMI. 
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5. CHAPTER 
LEGITIMACY OF HMI – MIXED CONSEQUENTIALIST AND JWT 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
5.1. Introduction - an empirical assessment of the legitimacy of HMI  
Due to the fact that the issue of legitimacy of HMI traditionally belongs to the field 
of expertise of moralists and lawyers, most of the existing academic debate deals 
with the HMI concept exclusively qualitatively. This study will take an alternative 
approach and will attempt to situate the normative debate about legitimacy of 
HMI into a more quantitative perspective. The aim will be to provide the 
empirically grounded answers to several key questions, which are still pending in 
the vague and confused debate about the concept. This study will evaluate 
legitimacy of HMI by assessing a degree of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘motives 
and means’ and the ‘outcomes’ of military interventions from the post-WWII era. 
‘Motives and means’ of the interveners will be evaluated based on the theoretical 
framework of the classical Just War Theory (JWT) of ‘jus ad bellum’ that was 
quantified for individual cases of military interventions in the previous chapter. 
The identified level of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘motives and means’ will then 
be compared with the existence of the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of these 
interventions in the light of consequentialist ethics. 
     Due to the fact that this attempt to evaluate legitimacy of HMI on such a 
systematic basis is a first of its kind, the study will test the various definitions of 
the concept as well as the significance of individual JWT criteria so as to generate a 
comprehensive picture of the functioning and relationships within the concept 
based on the empirical evidence. The goal will be to draw an empirically sound 
judgment whether the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ tend to be empirically 
associated with the positive ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions and 
under which conditions, how an adequate definition of a legitimate HMI should be 
phrased, and what are the possible candidates for being awarded a label 
‘legitimate HMI’. All these findings should build up a solid basis for making a 
proposition about the legitimacy of HMI at the end of this study. 
5.2. Methodology 
5.2.1. Definition of the ‘HMI’ 
So as to empirically assess the legitimacy of HMI, the first major task is to 
formulate a definition of a ¨legitimate HMI’ and to rephrase it into the measurable 
conceptualizations based on the chosen theoretical frameworks of JWT and 
consequentialism. Due to the fact that there is no agreement on the basic defining 
aspects of the HMI, this study starts by adopting a very basic working definition of 
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a legitimate HMI, which is framed by an attempt to answer a question of what is 
‘humanitarian’ about HMI. Most authors agree that the expression of HMI refers to 
a primary ‘humanitarian motive’ behind the intervention accompanied by a usage 
of the sensitive ‘means’. However, there is also a tendency to understand the 
concept in terms of a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ of these interventions, 
claiming that the outcome of an action rather than rather than its purpose are 
crucial for assigning the legitimacy.339  
     This study will adopt a combined approach. In spite of acknowledging ethical 
strength of the JWT for evaluating legitimacy of any military endeavor, it will not 
identify a ‘legitimate HMI’ merely based on the ‘motives and means’ of the 
intervener as defined by the JWT criteria. Instead of giving a preference to the 
‘motives and means’ over the ‘outcomes’; it will set them on a equal footing as 
being two complementary parts of legitimacy. It will define a working definition of 
a ‘legitimate HMI’ as a use of force by state (or states) against another state for the 
humanitarian purposes that attempts and manages to prevent or to put to halt the gross 
violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. On one hand, this 
definition suggests that a mere reliance on the subjective ‘humanitarian motives 
and means’ is not a sufficient criterion of a ‘legitimate HMI’; on the other hand, it 
states that the society should not blindly legitimize interventions that just 
happened to have ‘humanitarian outcomes’. Based on this definition, a 
legitimization should be reserved only for such military interventions that were 
inspired at least to some degree by the ‘humanitarian’ concerns and that resulted 
in the ‘humanitarian outcomes’. This definition thus represents a balanced 
approach combining the tools of ‘Just War’ ethics and consequentialist ethics that 
successfully overcomes the traditional controversy between the ‘motives and 
means’ and the ‘outcomes’ of any action.  
     Incorporating the less traditional ‘outcomes-oriented’ approach into the 
definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ brings many advantages. First of all, it relieves the 
burden of finding a consensus on the existence of the subjective motivations of the 
interveners, overcoming thus the inherent subjectivity of the ‘motive-oriented’ 
approach. Instead, it allows the researchers to set an empirically measurable 
benchmark for evaluating the improvement or alternatively the worsened 
humanitarian situation in the target state. Moreover, incorporating the ‘outcome-
oriented’ approach provides an incentive for the intervening states to engage in the 
prudential considerations about the applied military strategies and their broader 
impacts on the target state.  
     Another feature of the adopted definition is its purposeful vagueness. Given the 
existing disagreements about the details of the HMI definition in the academic 
                                                            
339 Wheeler, 2000; or Tesón, 2005. 
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literature; this definition does not specifically state anything about the requirement 
of authorization by the UN, neither anything about the requirement that the 
intervention must be waged against the will of the government of the target state, 
neither any other specification that often appears in various definitions of the 
concept. Instead of incorporating various contested criteria into the working 
definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ on an ad hoc basis, this study will first of all test 
how their incorporation influences the existence of a positive association between 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ of the military interventions and their 
‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the target state. Therefore, the exact details of the 
definition of a legitimate HMI will be concretized based on the carried out tests of 
the different adopted operationalizations of the concept.       
 A ‘legitimate HMI’ = f (‘humanitarian motives and means’ behind military 
intervention = Just War ethics; ‘humanitarian outcome’ of intervention on the 
target state = consequentialist ethics) 
5.2.1.1. Conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ ( Xit) 
Conceptualizing a definition of the HMI concept requires a number of difficult 
theoretical and methodological decisions that have significant implications for the 
final assessment of its legitimacy. Coming out of the above presented working 
definition of a legitimate HMI, three types of conceptualizations of ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ of an increasing complexity will be tested regarding their 
‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the target state. Each of these conceptualizations is 
based on an assumption that the higher JWT score a military intervention achieves, 
the more ‘humanitarian motives and means’ the intervention entails. What 
differentiates the individual conceptualizations is their increasing complexity. Each 
successive conceptualization adds an additional criterion that the military 
intervention must fulfill so as to qualify its ‘motives and means’ as being 
‘humanitarian’.  
5.2.1.1.1. The ‘humanitarian motives and means’- control version340 
In order to make whatever propositions about influence of the ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ on the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions 
plausible, the study will begin with testing the impact of all the military 
interventions on the target state in general; and only afterwards, it will proceed 
with testing solely the effects associated with the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’. Therefore, the first tested concept will simply cover all the cases of military 
interventions, which are defined as a movement of regular troops or forces of one 
                                                            
340 This dummy variable will represent a control version of the main tested independent variables 
approximating the ‘humanitarian motives and means’.  It will indicate the occurrence of a military 
intervention based on the identification procedure of the Military Intervention dataset. It will be 
denoted as “mil_int…”. Input data source: Pearson & Baumann, 1992; and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007.  
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country inside another.341 This definition apparently does not distinguish among the 
levels of ‘humanitarianism’ hidden behind individual interventions, but only 
evaluates their presence or absence on a binary scale. Therefore, all cases of 
military interventions will be identified into the sample regardless of how 
‘humanitarian’ their ‘motives or means’ were and will be tested regarding their 
‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the target state, so as to serve as a control in the 
subsequent interpretation of the main tested operationalizations of the 
‘humanitarian motives and means’.  
 Control of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ behind military intervention = f 
(military intervention) 
5.2.1.1.2. The ‘humanitarian motives and means’- first version ( 
X1it)342 
First tested operationalization of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military 
interventions will also cover all the cases of military interventions; this time, 
however, not defined merely by their presence or absence as in case of the previous 
control variable, but rather by a degree of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘motives 
and means’ of the intervener. So as to establish how ‘humanitarian’ the ‘motives 
and means’ of the military interventions are, this study will utilize the quantified 
JWT. Previous two chapters devoted to the JWT not only explained its relevance 
for the concept of HMI, but also quantified how each individual military 
intervention scored on the aggregate JWT index as well as on its constituting 
criteria of ‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, ‘just authority’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportionality’ and a 
reasonable ‘probability of success’.343 The JWT scores will be transformed into the 
positive values, so that they indicate a presence of a military intervention 
expressed as a degree of ‘humanitarianism’ behind its ‘motives and means’. All the 
observations without presence of any military intervention will be assigned a JWT 
score of zero, depicting thus absence of any military efforts for conflict 
management. ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ of military interventions will be 
expressed by using each JWT criterion separately as well as by using the aggregate 
JWT index combining all the weighted criteria together. By doing that it will 
become possible to establish, which of the JWT criteria is and which is not 
                                                            
341 This definition is overtaken from the Military Intervention dataset. See: Pearson & Baumann, 1992; 
and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007.  
342 This will be a first version of the main tested independent variable approximating the ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ behind a military intervention. It will indicate a score of ‘humanitarianism’ entailed 
in the military intervention being waged into the target country, if any, based on the JWT. The variable 
will be denoted as “jwt_...x”. 
343 The quantified JWT scores were created by producing the orthogonally rotated component scores 
from the original input data, and by multiplying them by their relative weights according to the 
mainstream interpretation of the JWT in the academic literature. See the chapter 4 for the details of this 
quantification. 
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associated with a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ of military operations and to 
frame the resulting definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ accordingly.  
 ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ behind military intervention = f (JWT 
index) 
5.2.1.1.3. The ‘humanitarian motives and means’- second version 
(X2it)344 
Second tested conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of 
military interventions will not only be set on the JWT scores as in the previous 
case, but will also include a control requirement that the military intervention is 
‘third-party’. A main rationale behind including this additional conditionality 
arises from the fact that the military interventions as defined in this study cover 
not only the interventions into ongoing conflicts, but also the acts of aggression 
catalyzing completely new conflicts.345 Without eliminating the acts of aggression, 
it would be possible that an aggressive military intervention could still receive a 
relatively high aggregate JWT score by scoring high on all the other JWT criteria 
than the one of ‘just cause’. So as to ensure that the acts of aggression are not 
candidates for a ‘legitimate HMI’, the requirement of being ‘third-party’ will be 
incorporated into the second operationalization of the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’.  
     Requiring that a military intervention should be ‘third-party’ to become 
nominated as potentially ‘humanitarian’ has also another strong theoretical 
rationale. It rests on a general assumption that regardless of its real motives; each 
‘third-party’ military intervention represents some form of a conflict 
management346, having a core motivation to end the hostilities rather than to 
exacerbate them. Even though, the intervener may, for example, prefer its ally to 
prevail; one would think that prevailing at an acceptable human cost is a key 
consideration while making a decision to intervene.347 Therefore, in its essence, 
each ‘third-party’ military intervention should represent an attempt to decrease 
severity of the conflict. 
                                                            
344 This will be a second version of the main tested independent variable approximating the 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ behind a military intervention. It will indicate a degree of 
‘humanitarianism’ entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention being waged into the target 
country, if any; that will be evaluated based on the JWT (‘third-party’ military interventions are those 
being waged into the internal conflicts or those being waged into the ongoing conflicts of any type). It 
will be denoted as “jwt_...x1”. 
345 A sample of military interventions will be drawn from the Military Intervention dataset that codes all 
the military interventions waged by regular armed forces of independent states across the international 
boundaries in the period of 1946-2005. See: Pearson & Baumann, 1992; and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
346 ‘Third-party’ actors: UN, regional organization, state or a coalition of the states. 
347 Regan, 2002. 
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     The study will define a ‘third-party’ military intervention as the one that takes 
place into the target state that suffered at least 25 battle-related deaths in the year previous 
to the intervention or as the one that was waged into internal conflict. Existence of a 
previous conflict or alternatively the intervention into internal conflict are assumed 
to represent scenarios guaranteeing that the intervener is a ‘third-party’ and not a 
‘direct-party’ to the conflict. The newly introduced requirement of being ‘third-
party’ will decrease the sample of military interventions that could become 
candidates for being classified as ‘humanitarian’.348 Only the ‘third-party’ military 
interventions will be assigned the JWT score, while the remaining observations 
without any military intervention at all or the observations capturing the ‘direct-
party’ military interventions will be assigned the zero JWT score.   
 ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ behind military intervention = f (JWT 
index; ‘third-party’ military intervention) 
5.2.1.1.4. The ‘humanitarian motives and means’- third version 
(X3it)349 
Last tested operationalization of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military 
interventions will preserve both of the two previous defining factors – a degree of 
fulfillment of the JWT and a requirement of being ‘third-party’. In addition to that, 
however, the definition will also introduce a condition that the intervention must 
be waged in support of the target state’s government. In spite of the fact that this 
new condition is not directly relevant to the ‘motives or means’ of the intervener; it 
reflects the conclusions of the existing studies about the effects of ‘third-party’ 
military interventions on the target state, which suggest that interventions can be 
successful in achieving their goals if waged in support of the government.350 Due to 
the fact that this characteristic of the ‘third-party’ military interventions has been 
repeatedly confirmed by more researchers, it seems to be a very important for 
understanding of what type of HMI can really bring a humanitarian relief, if any. 
Therefore, this study will include this criterion as a additional condition limiting 
the sample of military interventions that are going to be assigned the JWT score. 
                                                            
348 See the technical appendix for the changes in the number of observations that are awarded the JWT 
score depending on the adopted conceptualization. 
349 This will be a third version of the main tested independent variable approximating the ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ behind a military intervention. It will indicate a degree of ‘humanitarianism’ 
entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention supporting the government of the target state, if any; 
that will be evaluated based on the JWT (‘third-party’ military interventions are those being waged into 
the internal conflicts or those being waged into the ongoing conflicts of any type). It will be denoted as 
“jwt_...x2”. 
350 See the second chapter of the study dealing with the empirical evaluation of HMI in the existing 
literature. The positive effects of the ‘third-party’ military interventions were confirmed by: Elbadawi & 
Sambanis, 2000; Regan, 2000; or Regan, 2002. 
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     Inclusion of this criterion creates, however, also a theoretical controversy related 
to the meaning of the word ‘intervention’. The word ‘intervention’ refers to the 
breach of sovereignty of a state, which literally means that an external military 
operation taking place with the consent of the target state’s government does not 
represent an intervention per se.351 Including the requirement that the military 
intervention must be waged in support of the target state’s government thus 
logically violates the condition of absence of the government‘s consent, since it is 
possible to assume that the government that is to be assisted by the intervention 
has given its consent to the presence of the external troops. In spite of this fact, 
concept of HMI is very often used to refer also to the cases when the intervention 
takes place on the invitation of the target state’s government or in the absence of an 
effective government in the target state. Moreover, it is necessary to take into 
consideration a fact that the consent is not always voluntary or genuine. It requires 
proving whether the authority giving it was really a representative body or what 
exactly the consent constituted. Its presence or absence can often be just a mere 
rhetoric claim, or the initial consent may gradually turn into resentment and 
hostility later on.352 And finally, it would be from the ethical point of view not 
reasonable to require that the military intervention can be carried out only against 
the will of the government to become qualified as a ‘legitimate HMI’. Such a 
requirement would suggest that only the military interventions supporting the 
rebels can be considered ‘legitimate’, which would be counterintuitive to the idea 
of what makes any military intervention ‘humanitarian’. Based on the above 
presented considerations, this study will make a proposition that the existence or 
the absence of the target state’s government consent with the external military 
operation will not be determinative for whether it can be considered an 
intervention or not; since the question of consent is probably more relevant to the 
legality of the intervention and not to the inquiry, whether the military operation 
can be assessed as legitimately ‘humanitarian’.353  
 ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ behind military intervention = f (JWT 
index; ‘third-party’ military intervention; military intervention supporting 
the target state’s government) 
5.2.1.2. Conceptualization of a ‘humanitarian outcome’ (- Yit) 
Estimating a ‘humanitarian outcome’ of military interventions on the local 
population is a complex problem whose results proved to be very much dependent 
on the adopted conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian outcome’. In spite of the 
fact that there has been a couple of studies attempting to quantify the broader 
                                                            
351 Damrosch, 1993. 
352 Hoffmann, 1998. 
353 Voon, 2002. 
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effects of warfare on normal social dynamics and societal systems354, this effort still 
remains an abstract and challenging goal for the scientists. There is a broad 
agreement among the scientists that an optimally designed measure should be 
maximally comprehensive, capturing so wide spectrum of the effects of military 
interventions on the in the target state as possible. The problem with introducing 
such a measure is that there is not only a lack of theory on how to estimate a full 
‘humanitarian’ impact of military interventions, but especially a serious lack of 
cross-national data that would allow estimating and comparing such impacts over 
a longer time period.355 In fact, very few of the indirect effects of warfare have been 
systematically measured or consistently recorded outside the advanced industrial 
OECD countries since the end of WWII. The statistical data for the Third World 
where most of the conflicts in the post-WWII era have taken place are in most cases 
completely missing - particularly for the chaotic periods of ongoing violent 
conflict. As a result of that, it is extremely complicated to empirically assess the 
‘humanitarian outcome’ of military operations in a sufficiently long time frame 
that would encompass enough cases of conflicts to be able to draw the statistically 
valid conclusions. 
     Even if it happened in the future that there would be some precise and 
theoretically comprehensive measure developed and the respective data would be 
systematically recorded in each country, it would be impossible to apply the 
measure retrospectively to the historical cases, in which no measurement was 
taken in an identical coherent manner. Therefore, it would be impossible to 
evaluate the warfare in the long-run using this hypothetical smart measure 
anyway. This leaves the scientific community with very few means how to make 
some generalizable conclusions about the past experience that would allow the 
political decision-makers to learn from the previous mistakes and to correct the 
possibly wrong assumptions about the actual effects of the used conflict 
management measures. The researchers have to find alternative, even if sub-
optimal, ways how to get around the absence of appropriate model and data. They 
have to attempt interpreting the data that are available and to draw at least rough 
conclusions while accepting their theoretical limitations.  
     There are many possible ways how to capture impact of military intervention on 
the humanitarian situation in the country. One possible extreme how to measure 
the ‘humanitarian outcome’ would be by looking merely at the changes of 
mortality in the battle field or alternatively conflict duration, while completely 
ignoring the impact of the interventions on the civilian population. The second 
extreme would be an adoption of the Johan Galtung’s approach that a mere 
cessation of violence without removing the roots of conflict is not a sufficiently 
                                                            
354 Cranna, 1994; or Brown & Rosecrance, 1999.  
355 Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. 
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positive outcome, claiming that a successful intervention should achieve a positive 
peace without presence of any indirect and structural violence.356 
Conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian outcome’ in this study has been influenced 
by the fact that the results of this study could potentially serve as a justification for 
a wider use of force in the international relations, though limited by ‘motives’, 
‘means’ and ‘outcomes’; which is under the existing international law either a 
legality bordering or as more generally considered an illegal activity. Therefore, 
the adopted conceptualization has to provide a clear and persuasive justification 
for the necessity of using military force, which would effectively challenge the 
nonintervention norm that currently governs the behaviour of the states in the 
international system and that serves as a guarantee of international peace and 
stability.  
     This study adopts a position that should the concept of HMI be acknowledged 
as ‘legitimate’, humanitarian relief brought by the military intervention should be 
of a type that the civilian sector would not be able to manage on its own; 
otherwise, a necessity of questioning the nonintervention norm would not be 
morally defendable. Therefore, waging a military intervention for ‘humanitarian’ 
purposes can be from the ethical point of view defendable only in such cases that 
there are immediate lives in danger to be saved, and if directed solely against an 
existing military threat in the target country with the aim to mitigate the 
humanitarian suffering that the violence is causing. It should be credited and thus 
also evaluated merely for its ability to directly decrease severity of this violence, 
which is a goal not reasonable achievable using any softer tools. As a result of this 
theoretical assumption, the other seemingly relevant possible ‘humanitarian’ 
effects of military interventions, such as the longer-term political stability or 
conflict reoccurrence will not be covered by this analysis. Waging a military 
intervention, though for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, cannot be reasonably expected 
to heal the root causes of the conflict by itself. Its mission should be to stop the 
bloodshed and to provide security for the distribution of humanitarian aid. 
Afterwards, however, it should provide a space to the non-military sector to come 
in that is much better trained and equipped for assisting the target country with 
the long-term peace-building efforts. Therefore, if the humanitarian crisis can be 
effectively managed by other means than by breaking a sovereignty of an 
independent state by sending the troops, these means should always be given 
preference. In accordance with these assumptions, this study will evaluate the 
‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions merely by their ability to 
decrease conflict severity. 
                                                            
356 Galtung refers to the necessity of achieving a positive peace with the absence of any indirect or 
structural violence. See: Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000. 
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     Second consideration framing the conceptualization of ‘humanitarian outcome’ 
of military interventions relates to the problem of attribution. Particularly, under 
what conditions can the changed humanitarian situation in the target state be 
attributed to the presence of the intervening troops. It is necessary to be decent in 
the propositions about the actual influence of military interventions on the local 
developments, and to attach to the interventions only the reasonably attachable 
effects. Due to the impossibility of running the controlled experiments in historical 
political events, it is necessary to use the counterfactual reasoning by posing a 
question of how severe the crisis would have been, had the military intervention 
not taken place. This task requires isolating the effects of military interventions 
from the broader internal processes in the target state, as well as from the effects of 
other non-military interventions that might have engined the observed changes in 
the target country.357 To achieve this goal, the study will consistently compare 
country-years with and without any crisis, and with and without any military 
intervention, so as to enable a reliable prediction of the ‘humanitarian’ impacts of 
military interventions on the target state. The counterfactual reasoning in the 
model will not necessitate any enabling counterfactuals, since it is easy to imagine 
a possibility of nonintervention in all the cases of intervention without having to 
change the context of the crises.   
     Another concern of this study is the selection of the most suitable time-spam for 
estimating the effects of military interventions on the target state. The longer time 
period of the changed history is allowed to elapse, the more problematic the 
counterfactual assessments become, since the long-term developments in the target 
country are subjected to many influences going far beyond the control of the 
already left troops.358 As a result of that, the indicators of ‘humanitarian outcome’ 
that are measurable directly as the military intervention is ongoing or shortly 
afterwards are the most attributable ones, and enable making the most plausible 
‘counterfactual judgments’. Logically, it is much more reliable to claim that the 
presence of external armed troops influenced hostilities in the target state in the 
same or in the following year, than trying to assume some deeper societal changes 
that took place in the long-run, long after the intervening troops left the country. 
As Rantner claimed, the long-term failures of stability in the target state should not 
be used as an indicator of success of the military interventions. In his opinion, a 
return to chaos after a longer period of time does not make the earlier intervention 
a failure, since there can be too many new developments that occurred despite of 
the successful earlier intervention.359 Therefore, in spite of the awareness that not 
                                                            
357 A sound counterfactual argument should be explicit about its undertakings; should maintain a 
logical, theoretical, and historical consistency; should avoid using of too many enabling counterfactuals; 
and should rewrite a minimal amount of history. See: Fearon, 1991; or Lebow, 2000. 
358 Seybolt, 2007. 
359 Rantner, 1995. 
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all the humanitarian costs of violence are revealed immediately, and that the 
indirect effects of violence such as dying from wounds, illnesses, famine or poverty 
can continue teasing the local population long after the actual violence stopped; 
this study will evaluate the impacts of military interventions only in the short-run. 
Due to this methodological decision, the other typical problematic feature of 
counterfactual reasoning - interconnectedness should also become unproblematic, 
since even though a theoretical absence of military intervention might lead to a 
different type of compensatory event such as to the imposition of an economic 
embargo; non-military types of interventions do not tend to have direct but rather 
longer-term influence on the fighting and should thus not violate the conclusions 
of the model.  
     The last aspect influencing the conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian 
outcomes’ of military interventions is obviously the availability of the data. 
Capturing the ‘true’ humanitarian costs caused by the intervening troops 
represents a very complex problem that can be expressed in many ways. The most 
straightforward approach is to count the number of fatalities resulting of violence 
either directly in the course of battle, or indirectly as a result of illnesses or famine, 
or both. Nevertheless, there are also other considerable human costs of violence 
than the pure fatalities - such as non-fatal injuries, disability, reduced life 
expectancy, sexual violence, psychological trauma, displacement, loss of property, 
damage to capital and infrastructure, or degradation of environment.360 
Unfortunately, data on most of these indicators are available only for the most 
recent conflicts, which makes it impossible to empirically assess the ‘humanitarian 
outcomes’ of military interventions in its whole complexity in the long-run. Given 
the limited scope of available data, this study will have to adjust its aspirations and 
to use the indicators that that would cover all the countries throughout the whole 
time spam of the study and that would allow at least a rough approximation of the 
changes in humanitarian suffering related to the activities of the intervening forces.  
     The adopted conceptualization will thus approximate the ‘true’ humanitarian 
costs of conflict by counting the lost lives in the short-run. More precisely, 
humanitarian effects of military interventions will be quantified using two types of 
indicators: battle deaths (a number of soldiers and civilians killed in the battle) and 
conflict deaths (an aggregate number of conflict-related fatalities covering both 
battle and non-battle deaths - approximated by a change in crude mortality). These 
two indicators have been selected, since the dying people represent undoubtedly 
the most severe demonstration of an ongoing humanitarian crisis, and prospects of 
saved lives provide in comparison with, for example, loss of property or 
psychological trauma a much more robust justification for breaking the 
sovereignty of an independent state. Another advantage of these indicators is that 
                                                            
360 Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. 
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they constitute a very strict test of legitimacy of HMI, since many people who 
received the humanitarian assistance due to the security established by the 
intervening troops would not have died anyway; while many people that were 
assisted died in spite of this assistance. Counting the number of saved lives thus 
represents the lowest common denominator in the confused debate about 
legitimacy of HMI.  
5.2.1.2.1. A ‘humanitarian outcome’ – battle deaths indicator 
(Y1it)361 
First indicator approximating the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military 
interventions will simply indicate a yearly change in the number of battle-related 
deaths in the target state, covering both soldiers and civilians killed in the course of 
battle. This indicator is limited in its capability to capture the humanitarian 
suffering of local population in its whole complexity; nevertheless, it has an 
advantage of being relatively easily attributable to the presence of the external 
troops. A probably surprising structural decision to merge military and civilian 
battle deaths into one category follows the realities of the modern conflicts, in 
which the distinction between soldiers and civilians is often unclear or even 
entirely fluid if compared to the traditional wars fought formally between the 
organized armies. Therefore, a mere focus on the military battle deaths could 
seriously underestimate the scope of fighting.362 Therefore, in spite of the fact that 
counting the battle deaths represents a rather superficial indicator of the ‘true’ 
humanitarian costs of the conflicts; it is probably the best measure of combat 
intensity and scale, and thus also a theoretically sound approximation of the level 
of war-related hardships that the local population is facing.  
  ‘Humanitarian outcome’= f (yearly change in battle deaths) 
5.2.1.2.2. A ‘humanitarian outcome’ – conflict deaths indicator 
(Y2it)363 
Second indicator approximating the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military 
interventions will be more encompassing. It will not count solely the people who 
died violently in the course of battle as in the case of the first indicator; instead, it 
                                                            
361 This will be the first dependent variable approximating the ‘humanitarian outcome’ of a military 
intervention. It will indicate a yearly change in the number of battle-related fatalities (including both 
civilians and combatants killed in the course of combat) measured from the previous to the current 
target country-year (abs. num.). This indicator will not include the one-sided violence, though it will 
include terrorism. It will be denoted as “b_deaths_ch…”. 
362 Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. 
363 This will be the second dependent variable approximating the ‘humanitarian outcome’ of a military 
intervention. It will indicate a yearly change in the number of deaths per year for both sexes combined 
measured from the current to the following year. It will be expressed as a proportion of the daily dying 
people out of 1.000. Keeping the indicator as a proportion will enable comparability between more and 
less populous countries. It will be denoted as “deaths_ch…”. 
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will also cover the battle-indirect deaths resulting of the conflict-related hardships. 
Precisely, it will indicate a yearly change in the conflict deaths approximated by a 
yearly change in crude mortality that is recognized as one of the three indicators 
that are rated as being the ‘highest’ in terms of their validity as the measures of 
health impact of a humanitarian crisis.364 The second selected indicator has in 
contrast to the first one both some advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it 
covers a greater spectrum of the possible humanitarian costs of violence and is 
thus theoretically a more appropriate; on the other hand however, it brings some 
attribution problems requiring several simplifying assumptions.  
     Theoretical advantage of this indicator arises out of its ability to capture the 
most serious negative externalities of the conflict. It takes into consideration the 
fact that conflicts kill people in less direct ways than just in the battle fields. In fact, 
violent conflicts usually take place in poor countries, in which poorly equipped 
and organized armies have relatively limited capacity to cause a larger number of 
battle deaths. Nevertheless, due to the fact that such countries typically suffer from 
the collapse of society’s economy, bad infrastructure, and limited medical and 
safety public facilities; presence of conflicts has a potential to produce a high 
number of battle indirect deaths resulting from unorganized violence (such as 
rioting), one-sided violence (such as genocide), criminality, displacement, illnesses, 
deprivation and starvation. The number of battle-indirect deaths often even much 
surpasses the number of lives lost in the battle in some conflicts. For example, the 
International Rescue Committee estimated a ratio of battle to non-battle deaths at 
roughly one to six.365  
     Suitability of this indicator is, however, slightly mitigated by the problem of 
attribution that this indicator entails. While attributing the changed number of 
battle deaths to the effects of military intervention sounds unproblematic; a similar 
attribution to the non-battle deaths is more controversial, and needs to be 
interpreted with some underlying assumptions. Even after controlling for the 
characteristics of the target state and of the crisis, attributing all the changes in the 
number of conflict deaths to the effects of an on-going or of a recently left military 
intervention could be questionable due to the presence and activities of the non-
military humanitarian NGOs in the conflict zones. In spite of acknowledging the 
important role of these organizations in mitigating the humanitarian suffering in 
the war torn societies, this study will make a simplifying assumption that no 
matter who brings the humanitarian assistance – whether the NGOs or the 
intervening military forces; security is a prerequisite for its successful delivery. 
Therefore, any possible improvement in humanitarian situation in the war-zones 
                                                            
364 The other two indicators measuring the health impacts of the humanitarian crises are mortality of 
children under five years of age and case fatality rate. See: Roberts & Hofmann, 2004. 
365 Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. 
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with an on-going military intervention is thus attributable to the security 
established by these military forces. This assumption is based on two arguments. 
First of all, the well-intended humanitarian assistance by the NGOs can 
paradoxically encourage and prolong the violence in the unsecured war zones; 
since the humanitarian resources distributed by the NGOs are often appropriated 
by the war lords to feed their militias instead of being delivered to the desiring 
population.366 Secondly, unlike the intervening military forces; humanitarian aid 
organizations maintain a presence in virtually all the conflicts, which allows the 
model to neglect their individual effects. Therefore, in accordance with the adopted 
assumption; if, for example, the incidence of a deadly diarrhea declined in a time 
period when the external troops were present, it will be the military intervention 
that will receive the credit for saving the lives, since it established and safeguarded 
the security on the roads enabling the transport of medicines and fresh water.  
 ‘Humanitarian outcome’ = f (yearly change in conflict deaths) 
 
Table 12: Approximation of the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.3. Common features of both dependent variables (Y1it + Y2it) 
                                                            
366 Seybolt, 2007. 
Battle deaths (Y1it) 
Non-battle deaths 
Soldiers and civilians 
killed in combat  
Soldiers and civilians 
killed in criminal and 
unorganized violence 
Conflict 
deaths (Y2it) 
Non-violent mortality 
increases 
Approximated 
by: crude 
mortality 
Soldiers and civilians 
killed in organized 
genocide or politicide 
APPROXIMATION OF HUMANITARIAN SUFFERING 
 (due to violence) 
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Two selected indicators of ‘humanitarian outcome’ of military interventions will be 
adjusted to correct for a common statistical problem of temporal dependence of the 
units of observations that is generally associated with the panel data.367 Temporal 
dependence implies that a measurement of Yit is correlated with a measurement 
Yit+1, which causes that the resulting correlation (t-value) appears to be artificially 
stronger than it is in reality. Clearly, if the country has a history of zero record of 
the battle-related deaths on its territory over last twenty years, the effect of time on 
the risk of emergence of a bloody conflict appears to be declining monotonically 
until the curve approaches zero.368 So as to prevent a possibility that the results of 
analysis are spoiled by the temporal dependence among the units of observations, 
none of the two dependent variables in the model will be kept in absolute values, 
but both will be rather expressed as yearly changes from the previous to the 
current year.  
     The last common theoretical concern shaping the form of both dependent 
variables has been focused on when to measure the changes in the dependent 
variables. First of all, it is theoretically plausible to assume that the effects of 
military intervention do not reveal immediately, but are much better traceable with 
a one- or two-year delay. The necessity of lagging the dependent variables at least 
by one year is confirmed by the fact that all the input data in the model are 
structured on a yearly basis. Therefore, in case that some military intervention took 
place at the end of the year, the observation actually fully captures a year prior to 
the military intervention and not the effects of the intervention. The theoretical 
necessity for lagging the dependent variables is especially strong in case of the 
dependent variable measuring the conflict deaths. The indirect causes of deaths are 
slower to reveal, since many people die only gradually as a result of wounds, 
starvation, or illnesses. So as to present a fully comprehensive picture, the study 
will first of all test the effects of the control independent variable capturing 
presence or absence of a military intervention on the immediate, one year lagged, 
and two years lagged changes in the two dependent variables; and then also the 
effects of the three definitions of the main independent variables capturing the 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military interventions on the immediate, one 
year lagged, and two years lagged changes in the dependent variables. Based on 
the results of this analysis, it will become possible to reasonably assess, when the 
effects of the military interventions on the target state are the most significant and 
thus best measurable. 
5.2.2. Statistical model 
                                                            
367 Benoit, 1996; Beck & Katz, 1997; or Heagerty, Ward & Gleditsch, 2002. 
368 Bauhaug, 2005. 
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Having completed the conceptualization of the tested concepts and the dependent 
variables, it is necessary to describe the construction of the statistical model that 
will be used in this analysis to evaluate legitimacy of HMI.  
5.2.2.1. Time frame and unit of observation 
The analysis will work with the panel data covering all the country-years in the 
time spam of 1946-2005. Rationale behind choosing particularly this time period is 
a product of several methodological and practical reasons that reflect the goal of 
this study is to establish the empirically grounded generalizations about legitimacy 
of HMI that would hold up across a variety of contexts. For that purpose, it will be 
necessary to make a systematic comparison over a large number of cases covering 
the country-years with and without a conflict, and with and without a presence of 
a military intervention into the conflict. So as to gather a sufficiently large pool of 
cases, data in the model will be structured in a way to cover as long time period as 
the theoretical concerns arising from the data comparability and data availability 
allow for. First major concern limiting the covered time period is an effort to 
compare just comparable. The international arena, its rules, and the meaning of 
different concepts such as democracy have been changing and developing over 
time. So as to guarantee some consistency of the rules within the system and the 
understanding of the concepts being evaluated by the model, this study will follow 
an universal ban on use of force in the international relations codified by the UN 
Charter after the end of WWII that established norms governing the behavior of 
the states in the international arena that have remained valid until now. The 
second time-frame limiting aspect is the data availability constraint for the pre-
WWII period. In fact, a consistently collected high quality data are usually 
available only from the year 1946 onwards.  
     Country identification procedure of the sample of states in the data will also 
reflect an effort to maximize the number of observations by tracing a continuity of 
developments in each country regardless of absence of that state’s sovereignty in 
some of the years. Countries will be identified based on the adjusted Quality of 
Government (QoG) project country list, which covers all the countries in the world 
recognized by the United Nations as of the year 2002 plus an addition of 9 
historical nations. This makes together 200 nations that are included throughout 
the whole time period of 1946-2005.369 Data will thus cover 200 counties and 
nations (n) over 60 time periods (t), which makes a total of 12.000 observations (n*t) 
organized in a long form of the panel data.370 This selected panel data structure has 
                                                            
369 QoG country list is described in: Teorell, Holmberg & Rothstein, 2007. For the adjustments of the 
original version, see the technical appendix of chapter 6 dealing with the country identification 
procedure. 
370 Panel data are also called longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data. 
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a major advantage of enabling to isolate the time constant and potentially also the 
country constant effects during the data analysis. 
5.2.2.2. Statistical method 
To explore the association between the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ and the 
‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions, this study will apply a 
regression method investigating how a change in the predicting independent 
variables affects the dependent variables. Nevertheless, the regression method will 
be adjusted to reflect an extreme complexity of the issue of HMI that makes it 
impossible to successfully include all the relevant independent variables into the 
model. So as to avoid a mistake of appearance of some unknown variable or 
variables that would not be controlled for and that would affect the dependent 
variable, the study will not use an ordinary multiple regression technique that is 
easily subjected to an omitted variable bias and thus also to the wrongly estimated 
coefficients.  
     The study will first of all test the fixed effects regression method that is capable 
to control for the potential omitted variables that differ between the cases but are 
constant over time even without observing them or including them explicitly into 
the model. This method observes changes in the variables over time to consistently 
estimate the effects of independent variables on the dependent ones.371  
Fixed effects: Yit = βXit + βZit +αi + uit 
Yit = dependent variable (i=country, t=year) 
β = coefficient for independent variable 
Xit = main independent variable (i=country, t=year) 
Zit  = control independent variable (i=country, t=year) 
αi = unknown intercept for each country (i=1...n) => includes time-constant 
characteristics of the country 
uit = error term 
     Fixed effects method is always consistent but is not necessarily the most efficient 
one to run. It is possible that there could be not only the omitted variables that are 
constant over time but vary between cases, but also those that are fixed between 
cases but vary over time. It is possible to control for both these types of omitted 
variables by using a random effects regression method.372 Given it is statistically 
                                                            
371 It is a method equivalent to generating dummy variables for each of the cases and including them in 
a standard linear regression to control for these fixed ‘case effects’. 
372 Stata’s random effects estimator is a weighted average of the fixed effects and the in-between effects. 
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consistent, random effects method is a more efficient373 and thus also a preferable 
method to run.  
Random effects: Yit = βXit + βZit + α + uit + εit 
α = includes time-constant and country-constant characteristics 
uit = between-country error 
εit = within-country error 
Assumptions:  
Cov(αi , ui) = 0 
Cov(αi , xi) = 0  
     So as to assist with a decision, which of the two methods – whether the fixed 
effects or random effects - would statistically be more appropriate to test the 
legitimacy of HMI; the study will run the Hausman test, which tests a more 
efficient random effects model against a less efficient but always consistent fixed 
effects model to make sure that the more efficient model would also generate the 
consistent results.  
Hausman test: 
H0: αi┴ Xit, Vi 
Ha: αi± Xit, Vi 
Xit = time-variant independent variable 
Vi = time-invariant independent variable  
αi = unobserved country effect  
Assumptions:  
If H0 is true, both estimates from FE and RE are consistent, but only RE is 
efficient. 
If Ha is true, estimates from FE are consistent and from RE not. 
5.2.2.3. Input control data ( Zit) 
It is impossible to evaluate effects of military interventions without controlling for 
the fact that onset of conflicts, external military interventions, and conflict 
escalations do not happen at random. In fact, if a military intervention for 
‘humanitarian’ purposes is waged, it usually attempts to manage conflicts that are 
the most escalated and perhaps inherently intractable. These conflicts tend to be 
                                                            
373 Random effects method generates better p-values than the fixed effects method. 
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more resistant to the exogenous pressures, since the violence is already deeply 
embedded in the society, and the willingness to use military force is too high. Due 
to the fact that the main goal of this study is to attach the escalatory or de-
escalatory tendencies of an ongoing conflict to the presence or absence of the 
external military troops, it is necessary to isolate all the other conflict driving and 
conflict mitigating factors than the presence of the evaluated military intervention. 
Without controlling for a degree of difficulty that the interveners have to face 
during conflict management in the target state, even the best intended military 
intervention would surely end up as being detrimental to the humanitarian 
situation in the target state.374  
     While selecting the most appropriate control variables, the study has taken into 
consideration that the motives for political violence are very complex, ranging 
from the pure economic motives, struggle for power, persuasiveness and 
persistence of ideological beliefs, and existence of political and other forms of 
inequality.375 After inspecting the existing literature dealing with the issue of 
conflict escalation, it is possible to make a simplified statement that there are two 
main engines behind the conflict escalation: ‘motivation’ and ‘opportunity’. These 
two major factors are reflected in various variations in all the major theories of 
conflict dynamics. Most of the researchers emphasize importance of ‘motivation’; 
however, there is no agreement among them whether the motive-driven escalation 
is pushed more by the ‘grievance’ or the ‘greed’.376 ‘Grievance’ motivated 
escalation of conflicts is formed by the groups’ perceptions of an unbearable extent 
of injustice and the resulting hatred, which is usually framed by the ethnic and 
religious divisions within the society and the related repressions.377 On the other 
hand, ‘greed’ motivated escalation takes place, if some group perceives a 
possibility to gain power or economic advantages by initiating or catalyzing the 
conflict. Apart from the ‘motivation’ of the conflict actors, the second major engine 
of conflict escalation is represented by an ‘opportunity’ of parties to escalate the 
violence. A typical ‘opportunity’ occurs if the government becomes militarily or 
politically weak - such as during the periods of a political change; if the finances or 
lootable resources are available to the warring parties; if some additional actors 
enter the conflict bringing in new weapons and manpower; or if some charismatic 
leader promoting a further violence takes the lead.378 Therefore, so as to control for 
the selection effects; the model will include three groups of control variables 
capturing the most crucial ‘motivation’ and ‘opportunity’ factors. It will not only 
                                                            
374 Betts, 1994; Goertz & Diehl, 1995; Regan, 2000; Regan, 2002.  
375 Herbst, 2000. 
376 Berdal & Malone,2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Mueller, 2000; or Collier, 2001. 
377 Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998b; Ellingsen, 2000; Hegre et.al., 2001; Reynal-Querrol, 2002; or Elbadawi  
& Sambanis, 2002. 
378 Collier & Hoeffler , 2000; Sambanis, 2002; or Fearon & Laitin, 2003. 
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include control variables describing the type of military intervention as such; but 
also the control variables describing the characteristics of the target country, and 
the nature of the conflict. By doing that a degree of difficulty of managing the 
conflict will be controlled for, and that the ‘humanitarian’ effects of military 
interventions on the target state will be much more precisely estimated. 
5.2.2.3.1. Characteristics of the target country (time-constant 
characteristics) (αi)379 
Due to the panel structure of the data, the time-constant characteristics influencing 
a propensity of each individual country for conflict escalation will be automatically 
captured by the adopted fixed effects regression method, without a necessity of 
incorporating them as extra control variables into the model. Among the most 
typical time-constant characteristics of the country influencing the conflict 
dynamics belong, for example: appreciation of the local population for a peaceful 
or reversely coercive conflict resolution, geographical location, lootable natural 
resources endowment for financing the conflict, or dominance of a rough terrain 
facilitating insurgency.  
5.2.2.3.2. Characteristics of the target country (time-variant 
characteristics) (Zit) 
Time-variant characteristics of the target country influencing the escalatory 
tendencies of the conflict will be approximated by four control variables 
corresponding to four main categories of the motive- and opportunity-driven 
factors: economic, political, ethno-religious and cultural. 
5.2.2.3.2.1. Economic factors: GDP per capita level380 and GDP per 
capita change381 
First control variable in this model will indicate the target state’s GDP per capita. 
GDP level refers to both motive- and opportunity-driven factors. Low GDP per 
capita is a strong predictor of conflict, since it proxies the incapacity of the state to 
attract and contain both internal and external violence.382 First of all, countries with 
a low level of economic development tend to suffer from poverty and high 
unemployment. Due to the lack of alternative prospects of supporting their 
families; young unemployed men are motivated to join either the regular army or 
militias, which would provide them with at least some guarantee of food and 
income provision, and with a respectable status. Opportunity cost of fighting is 
                                                            
379 Fixed effects will be denoted as “αi.” 
380 This variable will indicate a GDP per capita in 1000 USD and will be denoted as “gdp_lev”.  
381 This variable will indicate the averaged change in level of GDP per capita (in 1000 USD) over the last 
three years and will be denoted as “gdp_gr”. 
382 Collier & Hoeffler , 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2001; Collier & Sambanis, 2002;or  Fearon, & Laitin, 2003. 
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thus extremely low in such countries.383 Another conflict driving aspect related to 
the GDP level is rather surprising. The conducted research suggests that the 
smaller the economic surplus in the poor countries is, the more intensively the 
leaders compete with each other to control it.384 In addition to that, the lower 
economic position the country has, the higher is the probability that it becomes 
challenged either internally or externally, since a lower GDP level increases the 
opportunity-driven tendencies of the unsatisfied parties to change the status quo 
by resorting to violence. Low GDP level is thus the most salient determinant of 
both insurgency and probability of being intervened into.385  
     Nevertheless, the effects of GDP level on the conflict dynamics are not so 
straightforward as might seem, and could be reflected differently depending on 
the choice of dependent variable. On one hand, economically weak states have 
limited technologies and organizational capacity, which leaves them with a 
minimal military strength and poorly organized combatant groups. As a result of 
that economically weak states are assumed not to produce a larger number of 
battle deaths.386 On the other hand, conflicts in the economically weak states are 
anarchic, disorganized, and are typical with warlordism. Such disorganized 
conflicts usually cause large number of battle indirect deaths and result in severe 
humanitarian crises, which can be assumed to become reflected in the increased 
crude mortality and thus a number of conflict deaths.387  
     Apart from capturing a mere level of economic development, this study will 
also include a control variable indicating an averaged change of GDP per capita 
over the last three years. The main incentive behind adding this control variable is 
to capture an actual change in economic factors strengthening or weakening the 
‘motivation’ and ‘opportunity’ of the actors to drive the conflict depending on 
whether the country currently experiences a period of economic growth or a 
recession. Particularly, the variable will control for how the economic ‘grievance’ 
and ‘greed’ of the local population increased or alternatively how the ‘opportunity’ 
for conflict escalation increased because of the weakened economic position of the 
target state or vice versa.  
5.2.2.3.2.2. Political factors: polity level388 and polity change389 
                                                            
383 Collier & Hoeffler, 2002. 
384 Collier & Hoeffler, 2000. 
385 Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Blomerg & Hess, 2002; or Fearon & Laitin, 2003.  
386 Kalyvas, 2005.  
387 Herbst, 2004. 
388 This variable will show the polity scale evaluating a level of democracy. The score will be indicated 
within a value range of 2-20, with the score 20 reaching the highest quality of the democracy. The 
variable will be denoted as “polity_lev”. 
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Next control variable in the model will be related to the level of democracy in the 
target state, since different regime types have different inherent characteristics that 
either mobilize or inhibit both motive- and opportunity-driven factors driving the 
conflict dynamics. First of all, the theory suggests that some regimes are more and 
some less willing to use the harshest measures or to inflict a great collateral loss of 
lives among civilians, since the institutional structure provides them with 
completely different ‘opportunities’ for conflict escalation. In contrast to the 
autocracies, democracies are better equipped to peacefully contain any rebellion 
and to negotiate with the rebels, and have available institutional settings that make 
the concessions less costly. Similarly, if compared with the autocratic political 
leaders, democratic leaders are much more constrained in a resort to violence by 
the established institutional check and balances, and by the norm of internalization 
that makes them more inclined toward minimizing causalities in an effort to avoid 
being condemned by the public.390 A similar difference appears, if the bottom-up 
approach is adopted. The unsatisfied groups living in the democratic regimes have 
in comparison with those living in the autocratic regimes a possibility to express 
their dissatisfaction peacefully during the regular elections or by using some more 
direct and immediate tools such as protests or referenda, rather than by engaging 
in a violent rebellion. Just oppositely, the unsatisfied groups in the autocracies 
have no other option than using a rebellion instead.391  
     A seemingly transparent theoretical rule that the autocracies are more violent is, 
however, more complicated than it may seem. It is theoretically true that 
democracies do not tend to produce ‘motivation’ for its citizens to escalate the 
conflict, since they have other means how to express their dissatisfaction non-
violently; nevertheless, democracies provide its citizens with a much greater 
‘opportunity’ to rebel due to the developed human rights protection mechanisms. 
Autocracies, on the other hand, produce a ‘motivation’ to rebel, since there is no 
other way how to express a dissatisfaction; however, the repressive regimes do not 
provide much ‘opportunity’ to rebel because of punishing harshly whatever 
expression of dissatisfaction. In addition to that, recent empirical studies suggest 
that the countries in the middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum could be the 
ones most inclined toward conflict escalation, since they are neither autocratic 
enough to control for the ‘opportunity’ of rebellion, nor democratic enough to 
prevent a significant ‘grievance’ and thus a ‘motivation’ for a rebellion from 
happening.392 
                                                                                                                                                          
389 This variable will indicate an average movement on the polity scale over the last three years. A 
positive sign will denote an ongoing democratization, while a negative sign will denote autocratization. 
The variable will be denoted as “polity_gr”. 
390 Harff, 2003; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; or Carey, 2005. 
391 Gurr, 2000; or Gurr & Harff , 2004. 
392 Jaggers & Gurr, 1995; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; or Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates & Gleditsch, 2001. 
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     The complicated influence of the regime type on conflict dynamics leads to the 
contradictory results of the empirical tests of the political ‘grievance’. On one hand, 
there are well acknowledged researchers arguing that the political ‘grievance’ is a 
primary motive driving the civil violence.393 On the other hand, most of the major 
empirical studies on civil war have found no significant relationship between a 
lack of democracy and the conflict escalation; since most of the proxies for political 
‘grievance’ end up as being insignificant or in the best case as having a very low 
explanatory power.394 It is possible to conclude that thus far, there is only mixed 
evidence about the role of regime type on conflict dynamics, and the current 
academic opinion remains divided about the effects of political ‘grievance’ and 
‘opportunity’ indicators on the propensity of countries to resort to the use of 
violence. Therefore, so as to make the controversial political-related ‘grievances’ 
and ‘opportunities’ better interpretable in the model, this study will disentangle 
the political factors into two indicators. As in the case of their economic 
counterpart, the study will include apart from a control variable capturing a level 
of democracy in the target state, also a dynamic version of this variable capturing 
an increased or decreased ‘motivation’ and ‘opportunity’ for conflict escalation 
resulting from the observed change in a political regime over the last three years.395  
5.2.2.3.2.3. Ethno-religious factors: ethnic fractionalization396 and 
excluded population397 
Next two indicators of ‘grievance’ constituting the model will be of an ethno-
religious nature. The first one will evaluate how ethnically fractionated the target 
country is. Ethnic divisions within the society should theoretically make the 
conflicts much bloodier, since they enable mobilization along the collective 
identities that are derived from the fundamental, incontrovertible and non-
negotiable values such as language, history and religion. Identity-related conflicts 
should thus be particularly strong and difficult to resolve, since the parties are 
more willing to bear the costs of violence for achieving a common goal.398 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that ethnic fractionalization is generally assumed 
to have a conflict escalating effect, and is thus a typically used control variable in 
the studies dealing with conflict onset and escalation; the statistical significance of 
                                                            
393 Esty et al., 1995, 1998; Gurr, 2000; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000, 2002; Hegre et al., 2001; or Reynal–
Querrol, 2002. 
394 Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2001. 
395 Most of the existing empirical studies focused on the association of the regime change and the 
escalatory tendencies of the conflicts are concentrated on international wars. See: Mansfield & Snyder, 
1995; Snyder, 2000; Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000. There is no clear evidence yet on the effects of 
democratization and the likelihood of civil war. See: Sambanis, 2001. 
396 This variable will indicate the ethnic fractionalization index based on the ESEG data that covers only 
the ethno-politically relevant groups. It will be denoted as “ethn_fract”. 
397 This variable will indicate the percentage of excluded population. It will be denoted as “excl_pop”. 
398 Huntington, 1997; or Fortna, 2003. 
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this indicator greatly varies across the studies. Results of the recent empirical 
studies suggest a more complicated relationship between ethnic divisions and 
propensity to use violence than assumed by a general discourse. Some studies have 
identified that ethnic dominance, not diversity, is more likely to drive the violence, 
suggesting that countries with very high levels of ethnic diversity may be as safe as 
ethnically homogeneous countries.399 The results of the studies describing the 
effects of ethnic fractionalization are clearly mixed. 
     Another theoretically strong control indicator of ‘grievance’ included into the 
model will indicate a percentage of population excluded from the participation in 
central government of the target country. This indicator will be located among the 
ethno-religious factors, since most of the cases of political and economic 
stratification and discrimination occur along the ethno-religious divisions within 
the society.400 It will cover, first of all, people who have no central power but have 
some influence at the subnational level; then elite representatives who hold no 
political power at the national or regional levels without being explicitly 
discriminated against; and finally, those who are subjected to active, intentional, 
and targeted discrimination with the intent of excluding them from both regional 
and national power. This indicator will accompany the typically used measure of 
ethnic heterogeneity, since existence of a heterogeneous population alone does not 
necessarily suggest existence of a ‘grievance’. Ethnic heterogeneity must be 
accompanied by an oppression to become a potential common ‘grievance’ that 
would join and mobilize the excluded group or groups in fighting for a change of 
power distribution. This indicator will thus describe a percentage of apparently 
dissatisfied and oppressed population locked out of power that is prone to rebel. 
5.2.2.3.2.4. Cultural factors: culture of violence401 
Another added variable controlling for a degree of difficulty of conflict 
management will measure how much is the violence imbedded in the society of the 
target state. The main idea behind including this variable is that once the violence 
is initiated, it tends to follow a path-dependent process, often generating a conflict 
trap. Hatred is accumulated in the society and makes a further violence more 
viable. Culture of violence in the target state is thus another motive-driven factor 
influencing the tendencies of conflict to escalate. This theoretical concept will be 
approximated by making an average of number of battle deaths over the last three 
years.  
5.2.2.3.3. Characteristics of the conflict 
                                                            
399 Horowitz, 1985; Rothschild & Foley, 1988; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000. 
400 Esty et al., 1995, 1998; or Gurr, 2000.  
401 This variable will indicate an averaged number of battle deaths over the last three years (using the 
best guess estimate). The variable will be denoted as “viol_cult”. 
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5.2.2.3.3.1. Existence of a conflict402 
First control variable describing the conflict will merely indicate existence of a 
violent conflict in the target state. This variable should capture the changes in the 
number of battle deaths and conflict deaths, and thus to enable isolating only those 
changes in mortality that are associated with the presence of a military 
intervention, if any takes place.  
5.2.2.3.3.2. Previous conflict403 
Next control variable will indicate existence of a conflict in the previous year. This 
variable will relate to the lagged effect of conflict on the target state, suggesting 
whether the conflict is new or whether the violence is already present in the 
society. This variable partially relates to the timing of military intervention, since it 
is assumed that a conflict management military intervention into the country with 
an already settled violence should be more complicated than settling a short-term 
dispute. The longer the conflict, the more complicated is it for the intervening 
military troops to achieve some conflict mitigating effect. In case that the conflict 
occurred only in particular year, it is still in its beginning stage when a possibility 
of reaching a quick settlement has not yet been prevented by much bloodshed and 
suffering on both sides. Therefore, this variable will control for the difficulty of 
managing the already established conflict, while bringing attention to the effect of 
timing of interventions on their outcome.   
5.2.2.3.3.3. Internal conflict404 
The last control variable in this group will describe type of the conflict, if any; 
particularly, whether the conflict is internal or not. There are two reasons for 
distinguishing between internal and international conflicts. First of all, based on 
the findings of the existing research; conflict management seems to be much more 
difficult for internal than for interstate conflicts. In contrast to the traditional wars 
fought between the sovereign states, belligerents in the internal conflicts cannot 
retreat to the opposite sides of an established cease-fire line and to agree to 
disagree indefinitely with each party staying on its side of the border. In addition 
to that, combatants in the internal conflicts face the problem of disarming and of 
creating a single national army, which makes it much harder for them to reach a 
                                                            
402 This dummy variable will indicate occurrence of a crisis based on the identification threshold of more 
than 25 battle-related deaths per year (using the best guess estimate from the ACD dataset). The 
variable will be denoted as “confl”.   
403 This dummy variable will indicate a presence of conflict in the previous year based on the 
identification threshold of more than 25 battle-related deaths per year (using the best guess estimate 
from the ACD dataset). The variable will be denoted as “prev_confl”.  
404 This dummy variable will indicate whether the conflict was internal. The variable will be denoted as 
“intern_confl”. 
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stable negotiated settlement.405 From this follows that internal conflicts tend to 
have much stronger escalatory tendencies than the international ones. The second 
concern supporting the decision to incorporate the control variable capturing the 
type of conflict is that the processes that influence conflict escalation in internal 
and interstate conflicts do not operate in similar ways. If these two types of 
conflicts were merged together, the explanatory strength of the analysis would be 
weakened. 
5.2.2.3.4. Characteristics of the military intervention  
5.2.2.3.4.1. Previous military intervention406 
First control variable describing the characteristics of the military intervention will 
indicate presence of the external troops in the target state in the previous year. 
Main incentive behind including this variable is to control for the fact, whether the 
evaluated military intervention is already ongoing or whether it is a new event 
radically changing the conflict dynamics. The effects of an ongoing established 
military intervention on the yearly change in battle and conflict deaths are 
expected to be weaker than the effects of the fresh intervention entering the scene.  
5.2.2.3.4.2. ‘Third-party’ military intervention407 
Additional control variable will differentiate between the military interventions 
that are ‘third-party’ and those that are ‘direct-party’. It is assumed that each 
‘third-party’ intervention represents some form of conflict management with a core 
motivation to end the hostilities rather than to escalate them.408 Even though, the 
intervener may have a preference for one of the parties to prevail; intervention at 
an acceptable human costs is assumed to be a key consideration.409 Therefore, in its 
essence, each ‘third-party’ military intervention should represent an attempt to 
decrease severity of the conflict.  
5.2.2.3.4.3. Use of force by the intervener410 
It would be very difficult to evaluate the effects of military interventions on conflict 
dynamics without adequately differentiating between the various mandates 
assigned to the different interventions, or the resource and manpower limitations 
that individual interventions faced. Differently mandated and equipped 
                                                            
405 Fortna, 2003. 
406 This binary variable will indicate a military intervention taking place in the previous year, regardless 
of the degree of ‘humanitarianism’ entailed. The variable will be denoted as “prev_mil_int”.  
407 This binary variable will indicate presence of a ‘third-party’ military intervention. The variable will 
be denoted as “third_party_int”. 
408 ‘Third-party’ actors: UN, regional organization, state or coalition of the states. 
409 Regan, 2002. 
410 This binary variable will indicate presence of an aggressive troop activity by some intervener. The 
variable will be denoted as “viol_mil_int”.  
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interventions are logically able to achieve differently significant results. So as to 
control for this differentiation, this study will include a variable indicating use of 
force by the interveners, which should reflect both the allocated mandate and the 
strength of the operations. Therefore, while evaluating an overall ‘humanitarian’ 
effectiveness of the military interventions, the study will be able to control for the 
use of a forcible military strategy.  
5.2.2.3.4.4. Military intervention targeting: supporting the 
government411, supporting the rebels412, mixed 413 
Next three control variables in the model will indicate a type of targeting of the 
military interventions. Reason for distinguishing between interventions that target 
the rebels and those that target the government is based on the existing research, 
which suggests that interventions in favor of the government appear to make the 
conflicts less severe than the interventions in favor of the rebels.414 This 
phenomenon is interpreted using an argument that external interventions in favor 
of the rebels drive the conflict, since such interventions reduce the cost of 
sustaining a rebellion, facilitate a recruitment of more rebels, and increase the 
willingness of the rebels to proceed with the fighting due to the improved 
prospects of success. Without existence of an intervention in their support, the 
rebellion would highly probably be more quickly crushed by the government.415 
Therefore, the model will, first of all, distinguish among the pro-governmental and 
the pro-rebel military interventions. Additionally, the model will include one more 
control variable indicating existence of a mixed targeting supporting both the 
government and the rebels that is assumed to have the most profound escalatory 
tendencies on the conflict development, since it increases the military strength of 
both parties and thus also their capacity to drive the conflict.   
 
Table 13: Summary of the statistical model empirically assessing the legitimacy of HMI  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
411 This dummy variable will indicate presence of a military intervention supporting the government of 
the target state. The variable will be denoted as “int_supp_gov”.. 
412 This dummy variable will indicate presence of a military intervention supporting the rebels. The 
variable will be denoted as “int_supp_reb”. 
413 This dummy variable will indicate that the targeting of military interventions was mixed – the 
intervention/s targeted both the rebels and the target state’s government. The variable will be denoted 
as “target_mixed”.  
414 Betts, 1994; or Regan, 2000, 2002. 
415 Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; or Regan, 2000, 2002. 
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MODEL SUMMARY 
Dependent 
variables (Yit) 
  
=> 
Main independent variables (Xit) 
=> 
'humanitarian 
outcomes' 
=> 'humanitarian motives and means' 
Battle deaths 
change 
JWT or JWT_1 or JWT_2 
        
Immediate 
=> 'humanitarian motives and means' controls 
 
 Lagged  (1yr)  
 
MIL_INT or MIL_INT_1 or MIL_INT_2 
 Lagged (2yrs)  
Control independent variables (Zit) 
or 
=> characteristics of the target country 
αi + 
GDP 
level 
+ 
GDP 
change 
+ 
Polity 
level 
+ 
Polity 
change 
+ 
Ethnic 
fract. 
+ 
Excl. 
pop. 
+ 
Culture 
of viol. 
Conflict 
deaths change 
=> characteristics of the crisis 
Immediate + Conflict + Previous conflict + Internal conflict 
Lagged (1yr) => characteristics of the military intervention 
Lagged (2yrs) + 
Previous 
mil. int. 
+ 
Third-
party 
+ 
Use 
of 
force 
+ 
Supp. 
gov. 
+ 
Supp. 
rebels 
+ 
Mixed 
target 
 
5.3. Results of the analysis 
The rest of the chapter is going to be devoted to the presentation of the results of 
the analysis. It will present just a summarizing overview of the most important 
features. The detailed output tables covering each step of the analysis and all the 
estimations are to be found in the technical appendix of this chapter.  
5.3.1. Hausman test 
Hausman test was applied to test the hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by 
the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the 
consistent fixed effects estimator. The test was carried for all the possible 
combinations of regression models testing the effects of the three HMI definitions 
and their control version on the variously lagged dependent variables. While 
evaluating the results of the Hausman test, the study used a commonly accepted 
procedure establishing that if the p-value is significant (<0,05), the fixed effects 
method should be used; but if the p-value is insignificant (>0,05), then it is safe to 
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use the random effects method. The output of the Hausman test indicated the 
mixed results. Out of the 36 outputs of the Hausman test, 17 supported the fixed 
effects method and 16 supported the random effects method. In three cases, the 
Hausman test failed, since the data failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions of 
the test. Nevertheless, the results for the most theoretically sound version of 
lagging that captures the effects of military interventions with a one year delay 
indicated that the fixed effects method should be given preference.416 Due to the 
fact that the Hausman test resulted in a very weak trust in usage of the more 
efficient random effects method for testing the model, the study adopted a more 
careful approach of the fixed effects method. First of all, the fixed effects method is 
not constrained by the complicating assumptions, which if violated produce 
invalid results. Moreover, it is necessary to take into consideration that countries 
experiencing a crisis are not a randomly chosen sample, which could again violate 
the results, if the random effects method was applied instead.   
5.3.2. Output of the fixed effects regression method 
Due to the fact that this study has been a very first attempt to systematically 
evaluate the ‘humanitarianism’ behind military interventions, the structure of the 
study has largely been of an exploratory nature. Nevertheless, it has managed to 
discover a number of significant patterns, and to verify or disconfirm some of the 
original hypotheses. First of all, the study tested the correlations of both 
conceptualizations of the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ with all the definitions of 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ based on the aggregate JWT index, so as to 
assess a legitimacy of the HMI concept if defined based on the JWT of ‘jus ad 
bellum’ as a whole. Afterwards, each quantified JWT criterion was also tested 
separately, so as to evaluate which JWT criterion is more and which less relevant 
for the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions. By testing the individual 
aspects of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ separately, it is possible to make an 
empirically sound judgment, which of the JWT criteria is from the consequentialist 
perspective actually crucial for defining a ‘legitimate HMI’ and which not. 
5.3.2.1. Legitimacy of the HMI based on the aggregate JWT 
The two below presented tables show, first of all, the estimated coefficients for all 
the tested control definitions of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ in relation to 
the two adopted conceptualizations of ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military 
interventions; as well as the coefficients for all the tested definitions of 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ based on the aggregate JWT.  
 
                                                            
416 Out of 12 carried out Hausman tests, 8 outputs suggested using the fixed effects method, while only 
2 outputs suggested using the random effects. Two Hausman tests failed. 
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Table 14: Evaluation of the results of empirical analysis 
 
  ***    1% significance level 
  ** 5% significance level 
  * 10% significance level 
 
5.3.2.1.1. Control variables of the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’ 
 
Table 15: Results of the fixed effects analysis – the control variables 
 
JWT INDEX 
Y1: deaths_ch.... 
Y1a: deaths_ch Y1b: deaths_ch_lag Y1c: deaths_ch_lag2 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int 0,001 0,058 0,99 0,004 0,058 0,95 -0,015 0,058 0,80 
mil_int_1 *  0,113 0,064 0,08 **   0,140 0,065 0,03 **   0,150 0,065 0,02 
mil_int_2 0,016 0,093 0,87 -0,027 0,094 0,77 -0,067 0,094 0,47 
Y2: b_deaths_ch.... 
Y2a: b_deaths_ch Y2b: b_deaths_ch_lag Y2c: b_deaths_ch_lag2 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int 307 487 0,53 -187 463 0,69 -141 474 0,77 
mil_int_1 -153 545 0,78    *   -926 519 0,07 494 531 0,35 
mil_int_2 -145 789 0,85 *  -1286 750 0,09 -34 768 0,97 
 
The tested control independent variables (table 14) indicate merely presence of a 
military intervention on a binary scale, without taking into account how the 
intervention is scoring on the JWT. The identification procedure of the control 
variables varies similarly as in case of the main tested variables specifying a degree 
of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the military interventions. While the first control 
variable captures presence of all military interventions,417 the second control 
variable captures only the ‘third-party’ military interventions,418 and the third one 
identified only the ‘third-party’ military interventions supporting the target state’s 
government.419  
                                                            
417 Control variable “mil_int”. 
418 Control variable “mil_int_1”. 
419 Control variable “mil_int_2”. 
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     The effects of military interventions on the target state without taking a degree 
of ‘humanitarianism’ into account are not much significant. As theoretically 
expected, the effects of military interventions are best reveled if the dependent 
variables are lagged by one year, so that the observations really capture the 
situation after the military intervention took place and not beforehand. Similarly, 
the assumption that the effects of military interventions on the indirect conflict 
deaths should be spread more gradually than the effects on the direct battle deaths 
was confirmed by the results of the analysis. As indicated in the table, while the 
effects on the battle deaths are significant only in the short-run, if lagged by one 
year; the effects on the conflict deaths are significant both, if lagged by one and if 
lagged by two years. These results serve as a control for whether the indexes 
approximating the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ are really capturing the 
effects of military interventions, and whether a HMI as defined in this study 
actually achieves a more ‘humanitarian outcome’ if compared with a generally 
defined military intervention.  
     The most important information in the table that should assist with answering 
the key questions of this study are the coefficients describing the effects of the 
generally defined military interventions on the target state and their relative 
strengths. The results support the assumption that each ‘third-party’ military 
intervention represents a sort of crisis management. Nevertheless, this proposition 
was found to be valid only if the crisis management activity is evaluated by the 
changes in the number of battle-related deaths. In that case, both the second and 
the third definition of the control variable covering the military interventions that 
are ‘third-party’, and the interventions that are ‘third-party’ plus supporting the 
government of the target state decrease the severity of the conflict. Nevertheless, 
this assumption seems to fail, if the crisis management activity is being evaluated 
by the overall changes in conflict deaths. The results suggest that no matter 
whether the military intervention was ‘third-party’ or not, the intervention 
increases the number of conflict deaths and thus has a negative ‘humanitarian’ 
impact on the local population. The only possible exception to this rule represents 
the third control definition covering the military interventions that are ‘third-party’ 
and support the government, which seems to result in a positive ‘humanitarian 
outcome’, but has an insignificant coefficient. So as to make a final conclusion 
about the effects of the control variables of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ 
of military interventions; the generally defined military interventions tend to 
produce the most significant positive ‘humanitarian outcomes’, if they are ‘third-
party’ and being waged in support of the government.     
5.3.2.1.2. Variables approximating the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’ 
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Table 16: Results of the fixed effects analysis - the aggregate JWT 
 
JWT INDEX 
Y1: deaths_ch.... 
Y1a: deaths_ch Y1b: deaths_ch_lag Y1c: deaths_ch_lag2 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x 0,004 0,003 0,16 *  0,005 0,003 0,06 *** 0,007 0,003 0,01 
jwt_x1 ** 0,006 0,003 0,02 *** 0,008 0,003 0,00 *** 0,011 0,003 0,00 
jwt_x2 ***-0,012 0,003 0,00 ***-0,015 0,003 0,00 ***-0,015 0,003 0,00 
Y2: b_deaths_ch.... 
Y2a: b_deaths_ch Y2b: b_deaths_ch_lag Y2c: b_deaths_ch_lag2 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x ***119 22 0,00 -28 21 0,17 -16 21 0,44 
jwt_x1 ***   96 22 0,00 *** -65 21 0,00 -1 21 0,95 
jwt_x2 ***   96 27 0,00 *** -67 26 0,01 *  -48 27 0,07 
 
The next presented table (table 15) evaluates the effects of the variously defined 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ behind the military interventions on the two 
possible operationalizations of the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the target state. 
While the first definition captures a presence of all military interventions by a 
degree to which they score on the aggregate JWT,420 the second tested definition 
awards the aggregate JWT score merely to the cases of military interventions that 
are ‘third-party’,421 and the last definition only the cases of military interventions 
that are ‘third-party’ and waged in support of the target state’s government.422 
During interpretation of the results, a major attention is to be devoted to the effects 
that are lagged by one year, and potentially also to those lagged by two years in 
case of the first dependent variable measuring the changes in conflict deaths. 
Appropriateness of this choice of lagging follows not only from the theoretical 
rationale described at the beginning of the analysis, but has also been confirmed by 
the results of the regression analysis using the control variables.  
     When evaluating the directions and significance of the identified effects, the 
results seem to confirm the tendencies that were localized already by the control 
variables, but this time with a much more robust significance. The lagged effects of 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ behind military interventions on conflict deaths 
generally do not tend to improve the humanitarian situation in the target state, but 
rather deteriorate it.423 The only definition that came out of the analysis as 
decreasing the number of conflict deaths and thus the humanitarian suffering of 
the local population in general is the third definition requiring that the 
intervention must score high on the JWT, that it must be ‘third-party’, and must be 
                                                            
420 Main independent variable “jwt_x”. 
421 Main independent variable “jwt_x1”. 
422 Main independent variable “jwt_x2”. 
423 Dependent variable Y1 (“deaths_ch_lag”). 
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waged in a support of the target state’s government. Otherwise, the results suggest 
that regardless of ‘motivations and means”, the interventions end up as being 
harmful for the population of the target state. In contrast to that, the lagged effects 
of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ behind military interventions on the changes 
in battle deaths significantly improve the humanitarian situation in the target 
country regardless of the definition adopted.424 Nevertheless, even here, the 
interventions with the most positive ‘humanitarian outcomes’ are those that are 
‘third-party’, and even more those that are ‘third-party’ and support the 
government of the target state.  
5.3.2.1.3. Resulting effect of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ 
in a summary 
Before drawing any conclusions about a degree of legitimacy of HMI that could be 
derived from the results of this analysis, it is necessary to bring attention to how 
comparable the two dependent variables actually are. While the first dependent 
variable capturing the conflict deaths refers to the change in crude mortality out of 
1000 people,425  the second dependent variable capturing the changes in battle 
deaths relates to the absolute number of fatalities.426 Therefore it is not possible to 
sum them together to get an overall result. Instead, it is very beneficial to think of 
them separately.         
     The above presented results suggest that military interventions no matter how 
well intended tend to increase the amount of conflict deaths and thus tend to have 
a negative ‘humanitarian outcome’ on the population in the target state.427 The only 
exception is represented by the interventions that are at the same time ‘third-party’ 
and being waged in support of the target state’s government, which is the only 
definition with a potential to improve the humanitarian situation in the target 
state. This positive effect of the third tested definition is insignificant for the control 
variable capturing the military interventions in general; however, it is highly 
significant if the interventions are recorded by the achieved JWT score of 
‘humanitarian motives and means’.  
     Effects of military interventions on the second theoretically more limited 
dependent variable capturing the changes in battle deaths present a similar 
story.428 The outcomes have confirmed the anticipated beneficial humanitarian 
effect of the ‘third-party’ military interventions and of the interventions supporting 
                                                            
424 Dependent variable Y2 (“b_deaths_ch_lag”). 
425 Dependent variable Y1 (“deaths_ch_lag”). 
426 Dependent variable Y2 (“b_deaths_ch_lag”). 
427 Dependent variable Y1 (“deaths_ch_lag”). 
428 Dependent variable Y2 (“b_deaths_ch_lag”). 
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the government of the target state.429 A rather surprising conclusion of the analysis 
is that all types of military interventions actually decrease the number of battle 
deaths in the target state. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the above presented 
table, the increasing ‘humanitarian considerations’ of the intervener tend to further 
increase the positive effect of reducing the battle-related fatalities. Moreover, in 
contrast to the control variables indicating merely a presence or absence of the 
military interventions in general, the military interventions defined by the JWT 
score have much more significant effect on the target state, in most of the cases 
reaching a 0.01% significance level. Therefore, if the humanitarian costs were to be 
measured merely by the fatalities on the battle field, any type of ‘third-party’ 
military intervention significantly decreases the humanitarian suffering and the 
increasing JWT considerations make their beneficial ‘humanitarian outcome’ even 
bigger.  
     Should the above presented findings be applied to the existing rules in the 
international system, the confirmed finding that the ‘third-party’ military 
interventions tend to decrease the number of battle-related deaths in general, 
regardless of a degree of ‘humanitarianism’ entailed, should not serve as an 
empirical legitimization for a broader use of violence in the behavior of the states, 
since the ‘third-party’ military interventions - unless being waged in support of the 
local government - tend to have a negative ‘humanitarian impact’ on the local 
population in general. So as to legitimize any military endeavor other than self-
defense - meaning that we talk about an illegal activity under the current 
international law - much more would be needed than an unintended effect of 
decreasing the number of fatalities in the battle field. A ‘legitimate HMI’ would 
have to possess both the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ as well as the 
‘humanitarian outcomes’, with the ‘outcomes’ being preferably measured by both 
tested definitions of battle and conflict deaths. Based on the results of this study, 
such conditions of a ‘legitimate HMI’ can be fulfilled only if the HMI follows the 
rules of JWT, if it is ‘third-party’, and waged in support of the target state’s 
government. 
5.3.2.2. Legitimacy of the HMI based on the individual JWT criteria 
The following two tables decompose the JWT definition of ‘humanitarian motives 
and means’ into individual JWT criteria so as to distinguish, which of the criteria is 
crucial for reaching a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ of military interventions 
and which not. Such a defragmentation should enable a better understanding of 
the JWT index and will assist in framing of the definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ at 
the end of this chapter. Based on the results of the tested control variables 
capturing a presence of the military interventions, the effects of individual JWT 
                                                            
429 The positive effects of the ‘third-party’ military interventions supporting the government have been 
confirmed by some of the studies. See: Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; or Regan, 2000, 2002. 
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criteria on the dependent variables were tested only in a one-year lagged form. As 
suggested from the results testing the aggregate JWT, most of the JWT criteria 
significantly decreased the humanitarian suffering in the target state, if the criteria 
were defined by the third definition requiring the intervention to be ‘third-party’ 
and waged in support of the government.  
 
Table 17: Results of the fixed effects analysis - the individual JWT criteria (Y1) 
 
Y1: 
deaths_ch_la
g 
JWT CRITERIA 
HMI DEFINITION 1: 
jwt_x 
HMI DEFINITION 2: 
jwt_x1 
HMI DEFINITION 3: 
jwt_x2 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_cause... *** 0,005 0,001 0,00 *** 0,005 0,001 0,00 *** -0,013 0,002 0,00 
jwt_intent... 0,000 0,001 0,96 * 0,002 0,001 0,08 **  -0,002 0,001 0,05 
jwt_auth... 0,001 0,001 0,13 *** 0,003 0,001 0,01 0,001 0,002 0,49 
jwt_last... -0,001 0,001 0,38 0,001 0,001 0,27 -0,002 0,002 0,21 
jwt_prop... 0,000 0,001 0,81 ** 0,004 0,001 0,02 0,003 0,002 0,16 
jwt_succ... -0,001 0,001 0,53 0,002 0,002 0,17 -0,002 0,002 0,48 
 
Table 18: Results of the fixed effects analysis - the individual JWT criteria (Y2) 
 
Y2: 
b_deaths_ch_l
ag 
JWT CRITERIA 
HMI DEFINITION 1: 
jwt_x 
HMI DEFINITION 2: 
jwt_x1 
HMI DEFINITION 3: 
jwt_x2 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_cause... 1 11 0,91 -10 11 0,36 -16 14 0,28 
jwt_intent... 5 8 0,49 -8 9 0,38 -7 10 0,47 
jwt_auth... ***  -21 7 0,00 ***  -34 8 0,00 ***  -54 13 0,00 
jwt_last... -12 9 0,20 ***    33 11 0,00 *  -26 15 0,09 
jwt_prop... -15 10 0,13 ***  -43 12 0,00 ***  -83 18 0,00 
jwt_succ... -16 10 0,13 ***  -44 13 0,00 ***  -51 17 0,00 
      
     What is interesting about these results is the striking difference in the relative 
importance of individual JWT criteria within the Theory for guaranteeing a 
positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ of military interventions, depending on the choice 
of the dependent variable. The two dependent variables set almost opposite 
priorities in ranking importance of the criteria. While the first two JWT criteria of 
‘just cause’ and ‘just intent’ are the strongest and the most significant in decreasing 
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the humanitarian suffering in the target state, if measured by the changes in 
conflict deaths;430 the last four JWT criteria of ‘just authority’, ‘last resort’, 
‘proportionality’, and ‘probability of success’ are the most important for achieving a 
positive ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of military interventions if evaluated by the 
changes in battle deaths.431 Improvement of the humanitarian situation in the target 
state thus seems to be driven by different aspects of the JWT in the two dependent 
variables.  
     Therefore, before evaluating the relative importance of individual JWT criteria 
for assessing a legitimacy of HMI, it is necessary to rank the underlying priorities. 
What is more decisive for awarding the HMI with legitimacy? A positive 
‘humanitarian outcome’ that is related to the population of the target state as a 
whole, but which is less attributable to the role of military intervention; or a better 
attributable positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ covering only the battle deaths? This 
study opts to risk a lower attributability and argues for a greater priority of the 
overall conflict deaths. First of all, this indicator is theoretically stronger and casts a 
much greater legitimacy on the concept. Secondly, this decision is supported by the 
results of the analysis, which show that the military interventions ended up as 
decreasing the number of battle deaths in general, no matter of the actual ‘motives 
or means’ of the interveners. Moreover, all the coefficients estimating the effects of 
individual JWT criteria on the changes in battle deaths, though not having the 
same level of significance, have a same negative sign. Therefore, all of them 
contribute to a certain degree to an improvement of the ‘humanitarian outcome’. 
This finding suggests that no matter how the ranking of the key JWT criteria 
constituting a ‘legitimate HMI’ would end up, the military intervention can be 
defined by whatever combination of the criteria and would still most probably end 
up as decreasing the number of the battle deaths. The same cannot be said about 
the coefficients describing the effects of individual JWT criteria on the conflict 
deaths. Due to the fact that two of the criteria ended up as increasing the number 
of conflicts deaths, though insignificantly; it is necessary to differentiate carefully 
in ranking the JWT criteria. It is very crucial to emphasize the importance of the 
first two JWT criteria of ‘just cause’ and ‘just intent’ for the ability of the military 
intervention to decrease the number of conflict deaths and thus to achieve an 
overall positive ‘humanitarian outcome’. Therefore, in spite of acknowledging, that 
the JWT represents a very complex theoretical construct that is difficult to get 
disaggregated into the separate criteria; this study concludes that the criterion of 
                                                            
430Only the third HMI definition is being considered, since it is the only definition resulting in a 
significant positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ if measured by the number of conflict deaths. 
431 All three HMI definitions are taken into consideration, since all of them produce significant results. 
Nevertheless, the second and especially the third HMI definition relating merely to the ‘third-party’ 
military interventions are the more robust. 
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‘just cause’ followed by the criterion of ‘just intent’ are the most crucial in awarding 
a legitimacy of HMI. 
5.3.2.3. Role of the remaining control variables in the legitimacy model 
The first surprising finding regarding the control variables that were added to the 
model to safeguard for the conflict driving and conflict mitigating effects other 
than that of the military interventions concerns a weak significance of the role of 
economic indicators in case of both tested dependent variables. A second feature 
deserving attention is the positive ‘humanitarian’ effect of the use of force by the 
intervener. All the remaining control variables were at least closely significant for 
some of the HMI definition, generally confirming the expected effects.  
 
Table 19: Results of the fixed effects analysis including the control variables 
 
Y1b: 
deaths_ch_la
g 
HMI definition 3 Y2b: 
b_deaths_ch_
lag 
HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t 
jwt_x  -  -  - jwt_x  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - jwt_x1 *** -65 21 0,00  -  -  - 
jwt_x2 *** -0,015 0,003 0,00 jwt_x2  -  -  - *** -67 26 0,01 
polity_lev 0,005 0,003 0,07 polity_lev -16 23 0,49 -15 23 0,50 
polity_gr -0,061 0,013 0,00 polity_gr 140 103 0,17 140 103 0,17 
gdp_lev 0,002 0,002 0,30 gdp_lev -2 17 0,88 -1 17 0,94 
gdp_gr 0,006 0,024 0,81 gdp_gr -24 189 0,90 -17 189 0,93 
excl_pop 0,479 0,080 0,00 excl_pop -1154 641 0,07 -1183 641 0,07 
ethn_fract -0,213 0,143 0,14 ethn_fract -635 1147 0,58 -654 1147 0,57 
viol_cult 0,115 0,041 0,01 viol_cult 280 166 0,01 259 85 0,00 
confl 0,069 0,042 0,10 confl 1088 341 0,00 1060 340 0,00 
prev_confl 0,089 0,078 0,25 prev_confl 3120 621 0,00 3120 627 0,00 
intern_confl 0,220 0,077 0,00 intern_confl 4694 678 0,00 4163 615 0,00 
prev_mil_int 0,107 0,035 0,00 prev_mil_int 566 281 0,05 497 281 0,08 
3rd_party_int -0,001 0,078 0,99 3rd_party_int -2998 610 0,00 -3198 623 0,00 
viol_mil_int -0,117 0,050 0,02 viol_mil_int -141 399 0,72 -273 397 0,49 
int_supp_go 0,066 0,077 0,39 int_supp_go -820 521 0,12 -97 619 0,88 
int_supp_reb 0,242 0,059 0,00 int_supp_reb -390 477 0,41 -884 474 0,06 
mixed_target 0,355 0,103 0,00 mixed_target -340 814 0,68 162 822 0,84 
_cons 0,171 0,070 0,02 _cons 678 561 0,23 693 561 0,22 
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5.3.3. Sample of the candidates for a ‘legitimate HMI’ 
The study has adopted the following methodology to identify a sample of potential 
candidates for being awarded a lable ‘legitimate HMI’. The candidates had to have 
both the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ as well as to have the ‘humanitarian 
outcomes’. They were filtered out of the entire sample of military interventions 
recorded in the time period of 1946-2005 in a way that the interventions had to 
achieve more than half of the maximum awarded aggregate JWT score, and they 
had to result in a decreased number of either the battle deaths, but more preferably 
of the conflict deaths in general. The number of the qualified cases varied 
depending on the adopted HMI definition. The results are presented in the below 
table, while a complete list of the cases fulfilling both of the conditions is to be 
found in the technical appendix of this chapter. 
 
Table 20: Samples of the candidates for being awarded a label ‘legitimate HMI’ 
 
CANDIDATES FOR A 'LEGITIMATE HMI' 
  
Positive 'humanitarian.. 
..motives and means' (X) ..outcomes' (Y1) ..motives and means' + ..outcomes' (Y1) 
JWT 623 148 57 
JWT_1 525 94 49 
JWT_2 275 39 18 
  
Positive 'humanitarian.. 
..motives and means' (X) ..outcomes' (Y2) ..motives and means' + ..outcomes' (Y2) 
JWT 623 287 179 
JWT_1 525 251 162 
JWT_2 275 109 81 
     
      Based on the findings of the empirical model that only the third definition of 
the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ (JWT_2) requiring that the military 
intervention is ‘third-party’ and waged in support of the target states’ government, 
achieved a significant positive ‘humanitarian outcome’, it would be fair to consider 
only the cases identified by this conceptualization of the ‘humanitarian motives 
and means’ as being the potential candidates of a ‘legitimate HMI’. When 
considering just the JWT_2 conceptualization, the analysis identified 18 cases of 
military interventions as fulfilling the above set conditions - subjected that the 
‘humanitarian outcome’ was evaluated using the aggregate conflict deaths, and 81 
cases were identified - subjected that the ‘humanitarian outcome’ was evaluated 
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using only the battle deaths indicator. Obviously, the presented sample of the 
suggested candidates for a ‘legitimate HMI’ is a product of the adopted 
conceptualizations during the quantification process, and the result needs to be 
interpreted with an awareness that it has been generated using a macro approach. 
5.4. Conclusion – an empirical assessment of the legitimacy of HMI 
The findings of this chapter provide a structured overview of the empirical 
findings surrounding the question of HMI legitimacy. The generated model has 
tested variously framed definitions of HMI so as to discover a dynamics behind its 
individual defining criteria and thus to provide a comprehensive picture of their 
empirically validated associations. The outputs of the model should help clarifying 
the logics behind the controversial concept of HMI by shifting the debates about its 
legitimacy into the right direction of what really matters. A detailed interpretation 
of the model in relation to the individual research questions posed at the beginning 
of this study together with the practical implications of these findings will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this study. 
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6. CHAPTER 
CONCLUSION – AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF 
HMI 
 
“In the case of intervention as that of revolution, its essence is illegality, and its 
justification is its success.” 
Sir William V. Harcourt (1863) 432 
 
Military intervention of any kind has been for a long time considered an outlawed 
concept violating the sovereignty of the state. The legally established norm of 
nonintervention is based on the deeper insights of limiting the resort to war and of 
preserving the right of national self-determination. Even though, the formal 
principle of sovereignty remains the basic norm in the international relations, the 
content of the principle has shifted. Over last thirty years, a legacy of state 
sovereignty has occurred under a strong pressure, especially from the side of 
human rights protection.433 There has appeared almost a universal agreement that 
a military intervention for ‘humanitarian’ purposes could be under some extreme 
circumstances of human rights violations - though debated ones - justified. This 
has created a demand for a revision of the outdated concept of HMI.434  
     In spite of these developments, the international community has not managed 
to achieve a consensus neither on the definition of HMI, nor on its legality or 
legitimacy. This means that there is no commonly accepted doctrine regarding 
when and how the HMI should be used, if ever; and the interventions for 
‘humanitarian purposes’ thus continue to take place merely on an ad hoc basis. So 
as to move this controversial debate a step further, this study has set a goal of 
assessing, whether the right of HMI cannot be endowed with such an overarching 
legitimacy that would overweight the majority claims about its illegality. Due to 
the fact that the moral debates about a relative importance of individual arguments 
either supporting or refusing the legitimacy of HMI do not seem to provide any 
concrete results; this study has attempted to approach this controversial issue from 
a different perspective. It has carried out a daring trail to evaluate the legitimacy of 
HMI by employing quantitative methodologies and empirical evidence, which 
should provide the new valuable insights into the problem.  
     While evaluating the legitimacy of HMI, the study has overcome the 
controversy between the ‘motives and means’ versus the ‘outcomes’ of any action 
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by setting them on an equal footing as two complementary parts of legitimacy. The 
main and guiding assumption of the study was that a ‘legitimate HMI’ must entail 
both the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ as well as the ‘humanitarian outcome’ 
on the target state. Existence of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ has been 
evaluated based on the Just War ethics, which stipulates that to be morally 
defensible; HMI should have no hidden self-interest, should be waged for a just 
cause and as a last resort, should receive a proper authorization, should use only 
the minimal violence necessary, and should be waged only with a reasonable 
probability of success. In spite of the ethical strength of the JWT criteria, their 
inherent subjectivity leads to the never-ending disagreements about a degree of 
their fulfillment, and this uncertainty weakens the possibility of a practical usage 
of the JWT as a tool for assessing the legitimacy of HMI. Therefore, the outcomes-
oriented consequentialist approach has been used to complement the more 
traditional motives- and means-oriented approach of the Just War ethics. Existence 
of a ‘humanitarian outcome’ has been evaluated using the consequentialist ethics 
of looking at the impacts of military interventions on the level of humanitarian 
suffering of the local population in the target state by counting the number of 
‘saved lives’. Counter-balancing the subjective JWT criteria with the 
consequentialist approach has enabled to overcome many practical problems of 
relying solely on the subjective JWT criteria, and has resulted into a plausible 
normative framework for addressing the dilemmas involved in the HMI concept. 
The theoretical framework used for the empirical model in this study is thus 
capable of producing results that would greatly substantiate the existing ethical 
discourse of HMI.  
     A daring attempt to quantify the morality behind a complex concept such as the 
HMI is obviously very problematic. This study is aware of it and it would like to 
encourage the readers to understand the results of the adopted empirical approach 
as representing just a very rough approximation of reality. The study explicitly 
acknowledges that it had to carry out many simplifying assumptions and 
approximations in the process of quantifying the concept. First of all, the entire 
study was based on a macro perspective that does not explore the concrete details 
of each individual conflict, and thus omits often very important shades of the 
different humanitarian crises. It has sacrificed precision by aiming for universality. 
It made a systematic comparison over a large sample of cases that allowed it to 
draw the generalized conclusions regarding the legitimacy of the concept and to 
adopt an empirically validated definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’. Second major 
weakness of this study is that any of its assumptions and conceptualizations used 
for the construction of the empirical model for the assessment of legitimacy of HMI 
can be easily declared problematic. This is, however, something that must be 
counted with when quantifying such a normatively loaded concept. Whichever 
methodological approach would have been used for this sensitive topic, 
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subjectivity would always appear as being a difficult issue to be addressed.435 In 
order to minimize this weakness as much as possible, the study clearly described 
and recorded all the methodological and conceptual decisions in its technical 
section to allow for the potential readjustments based on a different conception of 
the problem. This study adopts a position that as long as the presented model 
remains clear about each step being taken and accepts subjectivity of its 
conclusions, the quantitative approach can reasonably represent a significant 
contribution to the current controversial debate about the HMI concept. It claims 
that without existence of similar empirical efforts, the world of policy practitioners 
would continue to rely on the rules-of-thumb, making the decisions for the 
purposes that the used political tool cannot reasonably achieve based on the past 
practical experience. Nevertheless, it also accepts the reality, which discourages 
from being over-optimistic about the potential of the outputs of this study to be 
really utilized by the political decision makers. It is necessary to admit that 
regardless of the conclusions of this study, HMI is most of all a political decision 
that is generally not done based on the empirical evidence of its effectiveness, but 
rather based on the broader political implications of the action. 
6.1. Main findings  
The systematically organized empirical information as presented in the previous 
chapters and the appendices allow us to answer the research questions posed in 
the introductory part of the study. 
•      Are the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military interventions 
associated with their ‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the target state and 
under what conditions?  
Assuming that all the methodological decisions adopted during the construction of 
the model are accepted as being theoretically valid; it is possible to draw an 
empirically validated statement that in contrast to the insignificant ‘humanitarian 
outcomes’ associated with the generally defined military interventions; the military 
interventions defined by the extensiveness of the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’ entailed do achieve the significant positive ‘humanitarian outcomes’ on the 
local population in the target state under certain restricted conditions. 
Nevertheless, the results of the analysis differ for the two tested dependent 
variables. If a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ is measured by a decrease in the 
number of overall conflict deaths including those who died outside the battle fields 
due to the war-related hardships; a military intervention for the ‘humanitarian 
purposes’436 must be: 1) ‘third-party’; and 2) waged in support of the target state’s 
government so as to achieve a significant positive result. This suggests that only 
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‘third-party’ military interventions with the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ 
waged in support of the target state’s government tend to be associated with a 
positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ on the entire population of the target state. If just 
the battle-related fatalities and not the overall conflict fatalities are taken into 
account while evaluating the effects of military interventions; the results of the 
study suggest that any type of a ‘third-party’ military intervention is capable of 
decreasing a number of lives lost in the course of battle in the target state and that 
this positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ is growing by each marginal increase in the 
level of ‘humanitarianism’ behind the ‘motives and means’ of the intervener.437 
This study has concluded that under certain conditions, it is really possible to 
achieve ‘humanitarian ends’ by using ‘military means’. These results are significant 
and represent a valid product of a systematic comparison over many cases. 
     The results of the analysis confirm the conclusions of the already existing 
studies exploring the effects of military interventions. They have confirmed the 
proposition by Regan that each ‘third-party’ military intervention represents some 
form of a conflict management with a core motivation to end the hostilities rather 
than to exacerbate them.438 Regan assumed that any intervener carefully considers 
the potential risks while intervening into ongoing conflict, assessing whether his 
goals are reachable at an acceptable human cost. This assumption has proved to be 
valid, especially if the ‘humanitarian outcome’ of military interventions was 
evaluated by the changes in the number of battle deaths in the target country. 
Similarly, the results of the carried out analysis seem to be consistent with the 
conclusions reached by Regan, and by Elbadawi and Sambanis who also 
discovered a significant effect of targeting on the ‘outcome’ of a military 
intervention in their empirical studies.439 They have discovered that any 
intervention in favor of a rebel movement reduces the cost of sustaining a 
rebellion. It not only increases a likelihood of success of the rebellion, but it also 
lowers the rebels’ costs of fighting, and it facilitates a recruitment of more rebels. 
Without existence of such an intervention, the rebellion would be much more 
quickly suppressed by the government. Therefore, they have in harmony with 
findings of this study concluded that the interventions in favor of the target state’s 
government tend to result in a positive ‘humanitarian outcome’.    
• What should be an appropriate definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ based on 
the empirical evidence? 
The proposed definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ is framed by a guiding assumption 
that in order to receive a label ‘legitimate’, the HMI should have both the 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ as well as it should achieve the ‘humanitarian 
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outcomes’. This assumption must be reflected in the resulting definition, since it 
was adopted during the construction of the theoretical framework for the empirical 
model and it was then used throughout the entire analysis as a leading working 
definition. In addition to that, the resulting shape of the definition is shaped by the 
choice between the two operationalizations of the ‘humanitarian outcome’. The 
study has opted for giving a priority to the broader version that measures the 
‘humanitarian outcome’ as a decrease in the overall conflict fatalities, covering 
both those who died directly in the battle field and those who died indirectly due 
to the conflict-related hardships. This choice seems to have theoretically greater 
weight, since it is more sensitive and more relevant to the general foals of the HMI. 
Moreover, based on the empirical results of individual tests, the chosen dependent 
variable is less generous in awarding the ‘legitimacy’ label and represents thus a 
stricter threshold. And finally, the proposed definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ 
incorporates the findings not only from the tests of the aggregate JWT but also 
from the part of the analysis disaggregating the JWT into the individual JWT 
criteria. The idea is that the JWT criteria with the greatest potential for increasing 
the ‘humanitarian outcomes’ of the military interventions should be explicitly 
listed in the proposed definition, so as to carve it with the highest possible 
precision.  
     As was already indicated, a military intervention for ‘humanitarian’ purposes 
must be ‘third-party’ and waged in support of the target state’s government to 
achieve a significant positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ on the overall population in 
the target state. The more specific tests of the individual JWT criteria suggest that 
the criteria of ‘just cause’ and ‘just intent’ appear to be the most significant ones in 
generating the desired ‘humanitarian outcome’. Based on these results, the study 
proposes a following definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’: a ‘third-party’ military 
intervention by state (or states) for the humanitarian purposes to prevent or to stop the 
gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian law (preferably waged in 
support of the target state’s government) that attempts and manages to decrease the 
suffering for the population in the target state. This definition relates both to the 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ by requiring the existence of the JWT criterion 
of ‘just cause’ (“..gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian 
law..”)  and by requiring the JWT criterion of ‘just intent’ (“..humanitarian 
purposes..”), as well as it relates to the ‘humanitarian outcome’ by requiring that 
the intervention decreases the conflict severity (“..manages to decrease the 
suffering..”). 
     The requirement of targeting (“..preferably waged in support of the target 
state’s government..”) represents the most problematic aspect of the definition. In 
spite of the fact that the interventions for ‘humanitarian’ purposes must be waged 
in support of the target state’s government to be empirically associated with the 
increased ‘humanitarian outcomes’, it is very problematic to include this 
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requirement as a necessary condition into the definition, since such a condition 
would be difficult to be morally defended. It would imply that in case that the 
human rights violations are being conducted by the government itself, the 
international community would have to remain inactive and to ignore the 
humanitarian suffering. Due to these facts, the question of targeting is left in the 
proposed definition only as a recommendation and not as a requirement 
(“..preferably..”). It is left up to the careful consideration of the political decision 
makers, whether the risks entailed in the military intervention waged in support of 
the rebel movement should be taken in a particular situation, given they know that 
there is - based on the empirical evidence - a high probability of an increased net 
humanitarian suffering as a result of such an intervention. This discovered 
condition for the existence of a ‘humanitarian outcome’ represents the greatest 
challenge that the concept of HMI faces, and it should be carefully considered 
before drawing some substantial decisions about the legitimacy of the concept and 
its implications. 
 Legitimate HMI = f (‘humanitarian motives and means’; ‘humanitarian 
outcome’) 
 ‘Humanitarian motives and means’= f (JWT criteria of ‘just 
cause’+‘just intent’; ‘third-party’ military intervention; 
recommended intervention in support of the government) 
 ‘Humanitarian outcome’= f (decrease in battle deaths/decrease in 
conflict deaths) 
• Which cases of military interventions fulfill the adopted definition and 
represent the candidates for a ‘legitimate HMI’? 
The study has identified a sample of potential candidates for being awarded a label 
‘legitimate HMI’ that achieved in the quantified model both the ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’440 as well as the ‘humanitarian outcomes’. Each selected case 
had to achieve more than half of the maximum awarded aggregate JWT score, and 
had to result in a decreased number of battle deaths, but most preferably of the 
overall conflict deaths that were selected as theoretically more appropriate. Out of 
the entire sample of 1114 military interventions recorded in the time period of 
1946-2005, the analysis has identified 18 cases of military interventions as fulfilling 
the above set conditions - subjected that the ‘humanitarian outcome’ is evaluated 
using the aggregate conflict deaths, and 81 cases have been identified - subjected 
that the ‘humanitarian outcome’ is evaluated using only the battle deaths indicator. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the identified cases are the product of a 
systematic comparison, they represent just an output of the simplified 
identification formula and of numerous conceptualizations associated with the 
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selected macro approach that should serve merely as an indication of general 
tendencies and characteristics. As a result of that, the sample needs to be subjected 
to a deeper qualitative investigation before drawing some final conclusion about 
legitimacy of the individual cases of HMI. 
• Does the concept of HMI have legitimacy if evaluated on the basis of the 
theoretical frameworks of ‘Just War’ ethics and consequentialitst ethics?  
The findings of this study suggest that HMI can be claimed to represent a 
legitimate concept, when evaluated based on the theoretical frameworks of the 
‘Just War’ ethics and the consequentialitst ethics, and when all the conditions of the 
proposed definition of a ‘legitimate HMI’ are fulfilled. Having reached a 
conclusion that the empirical evidence confirms the existence of a gap between 
legality and legitimacy of the concept, the question remains whether the evidence 
is persuasive enough to create a pressure on the legality to adjust. Are the results of 
this study strong enough to represent a solid argument for introducing a right of 
HMI as a legal norm? 
     In spite of the fact that the presented results are significant and that the positive 
‘humanitarian outcomes’ have been discovered testing both dependent variables, 
the coefficients indicating the number of ‘saved lives’ were relatively low in the 
tests. Moreover, there is another complicating aspect in a form of the targeting 
condition that has come out of the analysis. It seems that in spite of the fact that the 
conclusions of the study tend to support more the affirmative position toward the 
right of HMI (or the emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ norm) by showing that it is 
possible to achieve humanitarian ends by using military means; the results still 
indicate many hidden risks by demonstrating that bringing new manpower and 
new weapons into the conflict zones can be regardless of  the ‘humanitarian’ 
character of the ‘motives and means’ of the interveners very counterproductive to 
the positive ‘humanitarian outcome’ without a careful targeting of such 
interventions. 
      It means that in spite of the significant positive results of this study, it still does 
not provide a really persuasive answer to the question, whether the effects of the 
HMI’s are worth the potential risks entailed, and whether the right of HMI should 
really be introduced. It is necessary to conclude that even with the pro-affirmative 
conclusions of this study, a resort to the HMI or the decision to take up the 
‘responsibility to protect’ remains to be an extremely dangerous and volatile 
enterprise. It will always require very sensitive political analysis of its potential 
short-run and long-run implications in the context of each newly emerging 
humanitarian crisis.  
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i. TECHNICAL APPENDUM TO CHAPTERS 4 AND 5 
A NEW DATA COMPILATION ON CONFLICTS AND MILITARY 
INTERVENTIONS 
 
The main purpose of this technical appendum is to introduce a new comprehensive 
data compilation on conflicts and military interventions covering the period of 
1946-2005 that served as a source of input data for the analysis presented in the 
previous two chapters. The main motivation behind this initiative is to generate a 
harmonized pool of data that would reduce the amount of work that the 
researchers in the field of conflict studies have to spend on compiling the data from 
many different sources. Moreover, this compilation introduces the quantified Just 
War Theory (JWT) and its constituting criteria, making these new variables 
accessible to the research community, and providing a fresh data basis for starting 
a completely new type of research in the field of conflict management. First of all, 
this section of the study will introduce a rationale behind this compilation 
initiative and why is it needed. Afterwards, it will describe a content of the new 
compilation, it will explain the methodological and theoretical concerns that 
shaped its construction, and will continue by providing a statistical evaluation of 
the ‘consistency’, ‘correctness’ and ‘completeness’ of the merged data. All the 
technical details of the merging process, together with a codebook capturing the 
adjustments applied to the original variables, and the descriptions of the newly 
generated variables will be presented in the attached technical appendix.  
i.1. Rationale behind a new data compilation 
The international community has started to shift normatively away from the 
nonintervention norm that regulates the use of force in the behavior of the states in 
the international arena. The interference in domestic affairs has increasingly started 
to be considered as a legitimate mean for not only the maintenance or 
reestablishment of international peace and stability, but increasingly also for 
stopping the excessive human rights violations or human suffering caused by the 
conflicts abroad.441 This trend of a weakening state sovereignty has been 
demonstrated by a growing number of the UN Security Council resolutions 
regulating the domestic affairs of the states. A growing interventionism, especially 
the military one; has, however, also brought many moral and legal questions that 
need to be deeply researched and evaluated. One of these questions has stood as a 
basic motivation behind the initiative to create this data compilation. Particularly, 
it was a question whether the use of force for ‘humanitarian’ purposes can be 
considered legitimate. If rephrased…whether the negative humanitarian impacts 
of internal conflicts can be decreased by employing the additional military means 
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in a form of military intervention. Finding the answer to this question could 
represent an important factor in assessing the appropriateness of the gradually 
increasing legitimacy of military interventionism for the declared ‘humanitarian’ 
purposes.  
     Even though, some researchers have already tried to explore the potential 
effects of a wide variety of interventions into the conflicts, and have attempted to 
detect the underlying processes; the linkage between interventions and their effects 
on the humanitarian crises is still imperfectly understood.442 It is questionable, 
which theoretical models and what kind of data can actually be used for measuring 
the conflict mitigating effects of military interventions.443 With a lack of theory, the 
econometric models arrive at widely different conclusions, depending on the 
underlying assumptions and a concrete choice of variables.444 Which of these 
conclusions are more accurate is an empirical question that can only be resolved by 
systematically confronting the hypotheses emerging from the different models 
with the actual data. Therefore, so as to move the search for the scientifically 
grounded answer to the above stated question a step further, there is a need for a 
comprehensive and easily manageable data covering the problem of military 
interventionism and the related conflict dynamics in its whole complexity.  
i.2. Need for a new data compilation 
i.2.1. Lack of the comprehensive data  
While analyzing the impacts of military interventions, it is important to treat the 
conflict evolution as a complex and dynamic process. Conflict dynamics is 
composed of more discrete but mutually related stages: conflict onset, escalation, 
and potential military intervention; each of them being influenced by various 
factors, whose causations do not necessarily work in the same directions.445 
Conflict dynamics is outcome of many different structural and event ‘causes’ 
driving its onset, escalation, and shaping a possible decision to intervene; but also 
outcome of many structural and event ‘preventors’ encouraging a peaceful conflict 
resolution and a nonintervention.446 Some of the typical ‘causes’ of violence 
identified by the earlier studies are, for example: ethnic heterogeneity, political or 
economic discrimination, or bad neighborhoods. On the other hand, among the 
typical conflict ‘preventors’ that make the state conflict-aversive belong, for 
example: economic development, full democratization, societal resources, or power 
sharing.447 Nevertheless, it is very difficult to establish that a particular bunch of 
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factors represents the sufficient conditions for a violence onset, escalation, or for a 
decision to intervene. In fact, all these factors are substitutable and work differently 
in the various complex combinations.448 
     Given the fact that conflicts do not occur, escalate, neither are intervened into by 
chance; so as to succeed in evaluating the effects of military interventions, the 
researchers need an access to the data that would be comprehensive enough to 
enable capturing the conflict dynamics in its whole complexity. Optimal data 
should cover all major conflict driving and mitigating factors for each individual 
conflict stage, and where possible these data should be included for both peace and 
conflict periods. Having such data available, the researchers can not only identify 
the most important conflict driving and mitigating determinants other than the 
military intervention; moreover, they can isolate these effects by comparing their 
developments in countries with and without conflicts to control for the conflict 
onset; and having set some controls for a decision to intervene, they can compare 
the evolution of conflicts with and without interventions so as to get the real effects 
of these interventions. Without going through all these steps, the researchers 
would be unable to isolate the effects of military interventions from the other 
factors influencing conflict dynamics, and would face a serious problem of 
attribution. 
     The existing datasets are typically not organized in such a comprehensive way. 
First of all, they are not encompassing enough to enable setting the relevant 
controls for the individual conflict stages without a substantial data merging and 
data transformation efforts. Moreover, the datasets often cover only the time 
periods in which the event of conflict or intervention was identified. A sample of 
non-event cases - meaning a period without any conflict in case of the conflict data 
or a period without any intervention in case of the intervention data - is usually 
omitted. Absence of non-event cases brings a potential risk that restricting the 
empirical inquiries into conflict dynamics exclusively on the events with certain 
high levels of violence or interventions could impose severe limits on 
understanding the conflict development and the related intervention decisions, 
and could result in severe attribution problems and one-dimensional conclusions, 
that could fail to uphold on the theoretical grounds.449 And finally, the datasets 
usually focus solely either on the conflict situation in the target states or on the 
activity of the interveners, and it is often difficult to bridge these two types of 
information.450 Obviously, it is always possible for the researchers to merge all the 
data they need for an effective evaluation of conflicts and military interventions, 
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but it is a much time demanding activity distracting the researchers from their 
actual research focus.  
i.2.2. Differences in conflict operationalization 
Another complicating aspect of the existing datasets results from the divergent 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of conflict in a quantitative research.451 
As is typical for any other type of empirical research, there is a gap between the 
theoretical concepts and the observable phenomena, which forces the researchers 
to form some arbitrary operational definitions of the concepts they are exploring.452 
Existing datasets dealing with conflicts are built based on the various 
operationalizations of the event, measuring the conflict occurrence and 
intermittency differently. A logical consequence of this operationalizational 
heterogeneity is that there is a low overlap of the conflict samples identified by 
individual datasets, and from that resulting low comparability of the results of the 
applied analysis depending on the particular conflict sample being used.453   
     Most of the datasets formulate a definition of the conflict based on some 
arbitrary threshold of the estimated conflict-related fatalities that must be achieved 
so that the event is identified and included into the conflict sample. Nevertheless, 
there is no consensus on the exact level of this threshold, neither on the 
conceptualization of this threshold. First of all, each data collection project 
identifies conflict based on a different threshold level ranging from 25 to even 1000 
of conflict-related fatalities per year or sometimes per entire conflict, which 
logically causes considerable differences in the identified samples. In addition to 
that, individual data collection projects adopt a different operationalization of the 
conflict-related fatalities, meaning that each threshold actually counts something 
slightly different. Thresholds in some data projects cover only the military battle-
related deaths, some add also the civilian battle-related deaths, and some add also 
the fatalities caused by the indirect effects of the conflict. Another complicating 
consequence of the incoherent identification procedures is the same conflicts are 
being assigned different starting and ending dates, depending on the choice of 
applied threshold level and intermittency coding. This logically leads to a problem 
of uncoordinated conflict aggregation and disaggregation; in which the same 
conflict is treated as ongoing in one dataset, but is divided into more separate ones 
in another. This causes additional deviances in the conflict samples, and greatly 
complicates any applied conflict duration analysis on the data.454 Additionally, 
inconsistencies in some conflict samples are partly caused by the unclearly divided 
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lines between the different conflict types in the data collection projects. For 
example, if some internal conflict experienced an external third-party intervention; 
is it still an internal conflict, an internationalized internal conflict, or an 
international conflict? Each dataset approaches this dilemma differently and 
attaches a different conflict sample to each category. And finally, the fatality data 
as well as all the other conflict-related data are inherently imprecise and exposed to 
uncertainty, which is reflected in the existing differences among the records 
describing the same characteristic in the different data collection projects.455 
Therefore, the identified samples can be different even if a perfectly harmonized 
identification procedure would have been adopted by all the data collecting 
projects, depending on the source of fatality data being used for assessing the 
fulfillment of the threshold. 
     A price paid for this operationalizational pluralism is that each dataset depicts a 
different representation of the world of violence.456 For example, a study by 
Eberwein and Chojnacki compared a degree of convergence of some well-known 
datasets dealing with internal and interstate conflicts. While evaluating the 
datasets based on the quantitative thresholds for event identification, the study 
came up with a disappointing result of less than 50% of the overlap. This 
heterogeneity in the identified data samples represents one possible explanation 
behind the conflicting results of the empirical analyses exploring similar issues. 
Therefore, it is important to account for these quantitative effects of definitional 
differences in any empirical research by doing the robustness checks for the 
different operationalizations.457 Nevertheless, proving a validity of the results 
based on the different operationalizations of the event again requires an extra data 
work associated with the new data merging.  
i.3. Academic contribution of the data compilation 
So as to target the above described inconveniences of the existing datasets on 
conflicts and military interventions, this section of the study will introduce a new 
integrated overarching data compilation allowing for a comprehensive analysis of 
these two events. Data in the compilation will be structured in a way to bridge the 
information about crisis dynamics in the target countries with the motivation and 
the strategy of the interveners to be able to analyze the resulting effects of the 
military interventions on the conflict development in the target states. For that 
purpose, the compilation will be constructed in a way to take into account the 
entire complexity of the conflict dynamics. It will combine the data describing all 
the major conflict driving and mitigating factors relevant for each individual 
conflict stage, and for a possible decision to intervene; and there possible, it will 
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include the data describing both peace and conflict periods so as to enable isolation 
of the effects of military interventions from the other conflict driving and 
mitigating factors without having to engage in a complex data manipulation and 
merging. Such a comprehensive data structure will enable both the analysis of each 
individual conflict stage separately, as well as jointly together within a multi-stage 
analysis. In addition to that this data structure will allow to assess the motivations 
behind individual interventions and to compare them with their resulting effects 
on the target state. Another major contribution of this new data compilation will be 
that it will assist the researchers with addressing the operationalizational 
heterogeneity of conflict event within the existing datasets. The compilation will be 
structured in a way to keep an operational definition of conflict as flexible as 
possible. Different conflict thresholds will be kept in the compilation to provide the 
researchers with a possibility to choose the most appropriate one, depending on 
their theoretical assumptions. Joining the conflict samples filtered out based on the 
various definitions within one data compilation will allow the researchers to 
switch their choice of the definition easily so as to double-check the correctness of 
their hypotheses based on the alternative conceptualization, without having to 
undergo the additional obstacles of structuring and merging new data.  
     To sum it up, it is possible to claim that the major contribution of this new data 
compilation will be to help the researchers saving time spent on the routine tasks 
of data manipulation and merging. These tasks are usually cumbersome, forcing 
many researchers to turn into technicians for the substantial periods of time, rather 
than allowing them staying focused on the research design improvements. The 
second major contribution of this data compilation will be that it will introduce the 
newly quantified JWT that evaluates the ‘motives and means’ of the interveners. 
By making the quantified JWT and its constituting criteria accessible to the 
research community, the compilation could open a space for answering a new type 
of research questions using the empirical methods of evaluation. In general, a 
comprehensive structure of the data compilation should enrich and boost the 
empirical analysis in the field of conflict studies and especially of conflict 
management, contributing thus to a broader discussion and further research on 
these critical issues.458 
i.4. Data compilation structure 
i.4.1. Typology of the input data  
Structural division of this data compilation has required many theoretical and 
methodological considerations so that the final output really becomes a flexible 
and versatile instrument broadly usable in the field of conflict studies. The data in 
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the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. 
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the compilation are divided into two general categories. The first data type is 
represented by the so-called ‘event data’ (ED). It covers only such observations, in 
which any or both of the following two events occurred: conflict and/or military 
intervention. The second type of the data is represented by a variety of the so-
called ‘structural data’ (SD). Structural variables represent the typical conflict and 
intervention ‘causes’ and ‘preventors’ that are added into the compilation to enable 
setting controls for the attribution problem. Whenever possible, the structural 
variables cover the whole period of 1946-2005, regardless of the existence of a 
conflict or intervention. In some cases, the compilation includes more structural 
variables with a similar meaning but differently operationalized; allowing the 
researchers to make an optimal choice based on their theoretical model.  
     The input data for this data compilation were not searched from the scratch. 
Instead of engaging in own data collection activity, which would be extremely time 
consuming and financially demanding; the study combines data from the existing 
and freely available datasets with various focus and applicability. Some input 
variables were obtained from the famous existing data collection projects on 
conflicts and interventions, other variables were provided by the different 
international organizations or personally by the researchers. The compilation 
attempts to combine the best possible mix of variables describing the events of 
conflict and military intervention, which come from the reliable data sources, and 
which are available in a longer time-frame. The following table represents a 
complete list of the input datasets constituting this compilation. Apart from the 
original citation of the individual input datasets and the working names attached 
to the datasets to simplify any reference to them; the table indicates the actually 
included time coverage of the data, a description of the general focus of the data, 
and an indication of the data type. 
 
Table 21: Input datasets into the new data compilation459 
 
INPUT DATASETS 
Input dataset name Original citation 
Incl. time 
coverage 
Data focus 
Data 
type 
New dataset 
name 
COW National Military 
Capabilities (NMC v.3.0) 
Singer, Bremer & 
Stuckey, 1972 
1946-2001 
Military 
capabilities 
SV EUGene SV 
COW State System 
Membership List 
(v.2008.1) 
Correlates of War 
Project, 2008 
1946-2005 
State system 
membership 
SV EUGene SV 
                                                            
459 The data compilation was a first prerequisite step of the whole study presented in the previous 
chapters. Due to the fact that it was complied already in years 2007-2008, the age of some datasets may 
already seem slightly outdated. 
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COW National Trade 
(v.2.0) 
Barbieri, Keshk & 
Pollins, 2008 
1946-2005 National trade SV EUGene SV 
COW Colonial Contiguity 
(v.3.0) 
Correlates of War 
Project 
1946-2005 Colonial ties SV EUGene SV 
COW Minimum Distance 
(v.0.97) 
Gleditsch & 
Ward, 2001 
1946-1998 
Geographic 
data 
SV EUGene SV 
COW Alliances (v.3.0) 
Gibler & Sarkees, 
2004 
1946-2000 Alliances SV EUGene SV 
Polity III (v.96) 
Marshall & 
Jaggers, 2002 
1946-2004 
Political 
regimes 
SV EUGene SV 
EUGene (v.3.2) 
Bennett & Stam, 
2000 
1946-2005 
Expected 
utilities 
SV EUGene SV 
UN World Population 
Prospects 
UN World 
Population 
Prospects, 2006 
1946-2005 * 
Demographic 
data 
SV UN Pop 
UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) 
FAOSTAT 1961-2005 
Geographic 
data 
SV UN FAO 
UNSD Demographic 
Statistics 
UN Statistics 
Division 
1995-2005 Demographics SV UN SD 
Forcibly Dislocated 
Populations (FDP v.2006a) 
Marshal, 1999 1946-2005 
Forced 
migration 
SV FDP 
Democratization (v.07) 
Cederman, Hug 
& Krebs, 2007 
1946-2005 
Political 
regimes 
SV DEM 
Minorities at Risk Project 
(MAR) 
Minorities at Risk 
Project, 2005 
1946-2005 * 
Ethno-
politicized 
conflict 
SV/ED MAR 
Quality of Government 
(QoG v.07) 
Teorell, 
Holmberg & 
Rothstein, 2007 
1946-2005 * Government SV QoG 
Major Episodes of 
Political Violence (MEPV 
v.2006) 
Marshall, 1999, 
2002 
1946-2005 
Violent 
conflicts 
ED MEPV 
Political Instability Task 
Force (PITF v.06) 
Bates et al., 2003 1955-2005 State failures ED PITF 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset (ACD 
v.4-2007) 
Gleditsch et al., 
2002 
1946-2005 
Violent 
conflicts 
ED ACD 
Regan - Third Party 
Interventions (v.2002) 
Regan, 2002 1946-1999 Interventions ED Regan 1 
Regan & Aydin - 
Intrastate Conflicts 
(v.2004) 
Regan & Aydin, 
2004 
1946-1999 
Intrastate 
violent conflicts 
ED Regan 2 
Regan - Intrastate 
Conflicts (v.2000) 
Regan, 2000 1946-1999 
Intrastate 
violent conflicts 
ED Regan 3 
COW Military Interstate 
Dispute (MID v.2.1) 
Jones, Bremer & 
Singer, 1996 
1946-1992 
Interstate 
violent conflicts 
ED 
EUGene 
MID 
COW Military Interstate 
Dispute (MID v.3.0) 
Ghosten, Glen & 
Bremer, 2004 
1993-2001 
Interstate 
violent conflicts 
ED 
EUGene 
MID 
139 
 
International Crisis 
Behavior (ICB II v.8) 
Brecher & 
Wilkenfeld, 1997, 
2000 
1946-2005 
Interstate 
violent conflicts 
ED 
ICB II & 
EUGene ICB 
International Crisis 
Behavior (ICB Dyad v.2.0) 
Hewitt, 2003 1946-2001 
Interstate 
violent conflicts 
ED ICB Dyad 
International Military 
Intervention (ICPSR 6035) 
Pearson & 
Baumann, 1992 
1946-1989 
Military 
interventions 
ED Mil Int I 
International Military 
Intervention (ICPSR 
21282) 
Kisangani & 
Pickering, 2007 
1989-2005 
Military 
interventions 
ED Mil Int II 
Peacebuilding (v.2000) 
Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2000 
1946-1999 Interventions ED Peace 
* Different time coverage for individual variables 
 
i.4.2. Data structure of the compilation 
So as to make the data compilation a usable instrument for studying both the 
development of the conflict itself, and the motivations and effects of the 
interventions; the data compilation is constructed using two different units of 
analysis, which are mutually combinable without any undesired data losses. The 
first part of the data compilation is structured in the country-years (CC), where 
each line of the data contains information about a country in a year. This data 
section gathers, first of all, the ‘structural data’ (SD) that can be flexibly attached as 
explanatory or control variables both to the intervening state (side A) and to the 
target state (side B), depending on the research question being asked. The country-
year part of the data compilation also includes the ‘event data’ (ED) that traces the 
development of the conflict or intervention in the target state only (side B).  
     The second part of the data compilation is created based on the directed country 
dyad-year (DD) unit of analysis, where each line of the data contains information 
about a pair of two states in a year, describing the position of a potential or actual 
intervener (side A) vis-à-vis a target state (side B) in individual years.460 The main 
reason for adding the second unit of analysis is an attempt to incorporate the role 
of the intervener into the theoretical framework of the conflict dynamics, and thus 
to broaden a possible scope of the analysis being carried out using the data. The 
dyadic part of the data is composed, fist of all, of the various ‘structural variables’ 
(SD) capturing the mutual relations and ties between the interveners and the target 
states. The dyadic section of the compilation includes also the ‘event data’ (ED) 
that capture different motivations behind the decisions to intervene, and that 
describe a form and structure of these interventions.   
 
                                                            
460 In the directed dyadic data, for example, Britain vs. Somalia in 1994 is treated as distinct from 
Somalia vs. Britain in 1994. 
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Table 22: Data structure of the compilation 
 
DATA STRUCTURE OF THE COMPILATION 
Structural data 
(SD) 
Country-year (CD) 
Conflict onset driving factors (side B, potentially side A) 
Conflict escalation driving factors (side B, potentially side A) 
Conflict severity driving factors (side B, potentially side A) 
Directed dyad-year (DD) 
Decision for intervention driving factors (side A-B) 
Event data (ED) 
Country-year (CD) 
Conflict or state failure development (side B) 
Intervention development (side B) 
Directed dyad-year (DD) 
Intervention strategy (side A-B) 
* Side A = intervener, side B = target state 
 
i.5. Merging process 
Integration of the heterogeneous datasets always represents a problematic task. 
Due to the fact that individual datasets are typically developed, deployed, and 
maintained independently to serve the specific needs; they tend to suffer from a 
huge structural heterogeneity causing various overlaps and contradictions of the 
data in many dimensions. The merging process of such heterogeneous data thus 
requires deeper thoughts about a complexity of the matching process, and many 
important methodological decisions about the coding of individual variables that 
have a substantial influence on the resulting output.461 The most important 
encountered methodological issues will be shortly discussed below; since the 
future users of this data compilation will need to be aware of them, and will have 
to address them when using the data. The process of merging will be described in 
the following three steps: 
• STEP 1: Creation of a common unit of analysis   
• STEP 2: Multiple entries resolution 
• STEP 3: Merging of the adjusted datasets 
i.5.1. Creation of a common unit of analysis 
Taking into account the existing differences in the units of analysis used in the 
individual input dataset, their harmonization was a precondition for being able to 
                                                            
461 Naumann & Häussler, 1999; or International Standards Organization, 1999. 
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proceed with the data merging itself. Such a harmonization requires that the same 
objects/events in each dataset become coded and identified in a same way to make 
the observations in each dataset describing the same story; otherwise, the merging 
could result in the undesired mistakes. Each input dataset introduced some kind of 
obstacle to the data transformation, whose particularities can be traced in the 
technical appendix of this appendum. Nevertheless, there were some common 
issues that will be briefly discussed below.  
i.5.1.1. Time-unit of analysis 
Year was selected as a common time-unit of analysis in both parts of the data 
compilation. This choice seemed to be the most appropriate given the fact that a 
majority of scholars in the field of political sciences rely on the annual data. The 
main advantage of the annual data is that they represent a natural political break 
between the budget and electoral cycles. Therefore, they are commonly used by the 
data collecting institutions, and are thus also widely available. Having assigned the 
year as a preferred time-unit of analysis, it was necessary to select an appropriate 
time-spam. Due to the fact that conflicts and interventions are relatively rare 
events, this data compilation does not focus just on the most recent cases but rather 
on a longer time spam of 1946-2005 to be able to gather a sufficiently large amount 
of cases. Limiting the beginning of the selected time frame by the year 1946 is 
based on two pragmatic reasons. First of all, most of the larger data collection 
projects do not gather data for a period before WWII; and therefore, there are not 
enough existing data available for these years. Secondly, it did not seem to be wise 
comparing the conflicts and interventions that happened before WWII with the 
more recent ones. Not only that the political situation in the international arena has 
changed dramatically, but also the concepts that are measured by the variables 
have gradually changed their meaning and status throughout the years.   
     Harmonization of the time-unit of analysis in individual input datasets differed 
for the ‘structural’ and for the ‘event data’. Transformation of the ‘structural data’ 
into the yearly indicators was a relatively simple task, since most of the data were 
already in their original form recorded in the country-years. Nevertheless, there 
were some ‘structural data’ that were originally country-constant, or recorded in 
the various time intervals. Such data were either expanded into constant yearly 
values, or were interpolated within the original time intervals so as to indicate the 
estimated values for each year.462 Transformation of the ‘event data’ had less of the 
                                                            
462 Smoothing function used for the interval based data took a difference between the nearby known 
values of the five-year measurements and divided it by five. The result was then added to the first 
known value in an additive way for each successive year. It is a natural approach that shows the 
average growth tendencies of the data. The main disadvantage of this approach is its assumption of 
linearity of development throughout the five-year intervals. It causes that the data lack the peaks 
associated with the various shocks such as a conflict or violent intervention within the intervals. The 
effects of such events can be traced only gradually and not anyhow strongly, if the data are smoothed in 
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common traits, since the input datasets applied many different ways of keeping 
track of events in time. While some datasets recorded the developments of the 
event each month or year, the other treated the event as discrete information with 
one record regardless of its duration. So as to harmonize this incoherent time-unit 
of analysis, the monthly data were merged into the yearly data, while event 
constant data have been extended into the constant yearly ones. 
i.5.1.2. Event-unit of analysis 
The most complicated part of the process of unit of analysis harmonization was to 
find a common identification procedure for the ‘event data’, which were in their 
original form based on many different units of analysis. The handiest option how 
to approach the incoherent identification of the events of conflicts and 
interventions in individual datasets seemed to be by tying the events to the place of 
their location. By doing that it is possible to use the transformed data most flexibly 
– both for the studies focusing on the conflict development and for the studies 
evaluating the effects of military interventions on the target state. Therefore, the 
first part of the data compilation was transformed into a homogenous country-year 
unit of analysis (CC), which enables evaluating the developments in countries with 
and without a conflict, and developments with and without various types of third 
party interventions. The second part of the data compilation was structured based 
on the directed country dyad-year unit of analysis (DD), which makes it possible to 
trace the mutual relationships between the intervener and the target. By tying the 
events to their respective countries, the problem of finding a coherent 
identification procedure for conflicts or interventions in both parts of the data 
compilation became solved by itself by shifting it away from the original event 
(conflict and intervention) identification task to the easier task of object (country) 
identification. 
     The obstacles of tying the events to the country of their location were different 
for the country-year data and for the country dyad-year data. The least problematic 
transformation of the ‘event data’ into the country-based observations was when 
the data were structured on the country-event level, such as the MEPV dataset; 
which treat individual countries involved in the conflict/intervention separately, 
while explicitly acknowledging the location of the event. However, some of the 
input datasets were originally recorded at the event level, such as ACD dataset. 
Such a type of data brings all the countries engaged in the conflict/intervention 
under one observation, without describing the development of the event in each 
participating country separately. These data had to be disaggregated into the 
country-event level data by attaching the events to the countries of location based 
                                                                                                                                                          
such a way. Due to these disadvantages, interpolation was used only in cases that there were no 
alternative reliable data covering the entire time period of the data compilation. 
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on the information available in other datasets or based on the information from the 
secondary sources.  
     Transformation of the input data into the country-dyadic form that 
distinguishes between the target state and the intervener represented another 
complicated task. Even though, some input datasets were in their original form 
constructed as dyadic, such as the COW Colonial Contiguity dataset, these 
represented more an exception than a rule. Some datasets were originally available 
in some type of a hybrid from, such as the MID or the ICB datasets, coming 
distributed in more files, which had to be first merged together to create the dyads. 
However, most of the input datasets were originally not created with the intent to 
support a dyadic form, and had to be converted into the dyadic interactions 
manually. The necessary merges and conversions that were carried out while 
transforming the data were not always straightforward; since some of the datasets 
did not provide easily extractable identification of the interveners, or did not 
distinguish among individual parties of the conflict to enable division of the 
intervener from the target state. Due to the fact that it was not always possible to 
identify both sides of the dyad in some of the input datasets, the dyadic data 
represent just a smaller sub-section in this compilation.  
i.5.1.3. Object-unit of analysis 
After tying all the events to the countries of their location, a country has become 
the main object of analysis unifying the both parts of the data compilation. 
Nevertheless, before merging the data together; it was necessary to harmonize the 
coding and identification procedures for the countries in individual datasets. The 
existing inconsistencies are caused by the disagreements among the political 
scientists about the exact procedure of how to code and identify the countries; 
especially those that historically changed their status as a result of either country 
mergers or splits. Due to the lack of the overarching rules regulating the country 
coding and identification procedure, each data collection project applied its own 
method. Therefore, the process of harmonization of the object-unit of analysis 
required an explicit acknowledgement of how the new data compilation 
approached the coding and inclusion of these problematic cases.  
i.5.1.3.1. Object coding 
The system of coding rules for the countries was selected with a main 
consideration to the compilation with the maximum possible flexibility for the 
applied research. For that purpose, both the country-year and the country dyad-
year data were assigned with two identical types of country coding that belong 
among those most frequently used in the existing data collection projects. Such a 
choice of coding procedure made both parts of the data compilation not only 
mutually combinable among themselves without any data losses, but also easily 
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combinable with most of the other existing data collections for the potential 
additional merges. The two adopted coding systems are based on the three-digit 
identification numbers: the one adopted by the Correlates of War Project (COW) - 
the so called COW ccode;463 and the one adopted by the United Nations Statistics 
Division (UNSD) -the so called UN ccode.464 A complete list of country codes 
together with all the adjustments carried out in the process of coding 
harmonization in each individual input dataset are presented in the technical 
appendix of this chapter.  
i.5.1.3.2. Object identification 
While the country coding rules used in both parts of the data compilation are 
identical; each compilation part was constructed based on a different country 
identification procedure. Country identification procedure in the country-year data 
was based on the Quality of Government (QoG) project country list that includes 
all countries in the world recognized by the United Nations as of the year 2002 plus 
an addition of 13 historical nations. This makes together 204 countries included 
throughout the whole time period of 1946-2005.465 The main advantage of the QoG 
country list is that it includes all countries in all years throughout the whole time 
spam of the data compilation, regardless of existence or absence of their 
sovereignty. Such a data structure enables analyzing the situation in the countries 
more consistently, by allowing to assess a relative importance of the observed 
changes in a certain indicator. For example, it is crucial to have the data on crude 
mortality, migration rate, or presence of violence within the society available for a 
period as long as possible; to be able to draw some conclusions about the 
escalatory tendencies of a conflict, and to be able to isolate the effects of a potential 
intervention given a general situation in the target country.  
     Countries in the directed country dyad-year data part of the compilation were, 
on the other hand, identified based on the Correlates of War (COW) state 
membership list, which identifies only such countries that have a population 
greater than 500000, and that are “sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, 
economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and 
                                                            
463 COW country code is a homogenous three-digit identification number for each country adopted by 
the Correlates of War Project (COW). To see a complete list of the COW ccodes, see the last version of the 
COW State System Membership List for years 1816-2008 that is available online at 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/SystemMembership/2008/System2008.html. 
464 UN country code is a three-digit country code defined in ISO 3166-1, part of the ISO 3166 standard, 
which was published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to represent countries, 
dependent territories, and special areas of geographical interest. It is identical to the three-digit country 
code developed and maintained by the United Nations Statistics Divisions. See: 
http://www.iarc.fr/en/publications/pdfs-online/epi/sp95/sp95-app1.pdf. 
465 Teorell, Holmberg & Rothstein, 2007. 
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independence”.466 As follows from the defining criteria, in contrast to the QoG 
country list; the COW state membership omits the smallest countries and the 
countries in the periods without existence of an effective sovereignty. Therefore, 
the COW list identifies a smaller sample of country-years for constructing the 
country dyads than the QoG country list.467 All together, the COW country list 
constitutes 199 countries. A more restricted country identification approach in the 
dyadic part of the data compilation was adopted to provide the researchers with a 
possibility to decide whether existing sovereignty is or is not critical for the 
conclusions of the researched question and to adopt the more appropriate system 
of country identification. So as to prevent occurrence of the possible mistakes that 
could be caused by a manual creation of the individual country dyad-years and by 
a continuous verification that both dyad members are included in the COW 
country list in that particular year; the list of dyad-years was generated by the 
Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene V 3.2).468 
     So as to make the QoG and COW country lists better combinable with each 
other and better usable for the purposes of this data compilation, they had to 
undergo certain adjustments. The coding of the historical nations in the QoG 
country list was slightly simplified and adjusted to the country coding of the COW 
country list. Some modifications were also carried out in the EUGene generated 
COW list of country-dyads. The dyads were expanded to include four artificial 
country codes denoting the different types of multilateral operations. Thanks to 
these plugged in artificial codes, the dyadic data can distinguish among the 
interventions led by the various international organizations dealing with the 
international peacekeeping of a multinational nature, or among the  multilateral 
interventions outside any established institutional structure. A complete list of the 
countries identified by both country lists together with all the carried-out 
adjustments is to be found in the technical appendix of this chapter. 
i.5.1.4. Advantages of the adopted units of analysis 
Creating such a data structure offered several major advantages to the potential 
users of the data compilation. First of all, due to the fact that both the country-year 
and the directed country dyad-year data share the same object- and time-unit of 
analysis; the country-year data can be easily combined with the country dyadic 
ones in a way of being attached interchangeably to both sides of the dyad: to the 
intervener or the target state. The second major advantage of this data structure 
follows from its definitional variability. In the country-based data, it is possible to 
                                                            
466 Small & Singer, 1982: 20. Legal sovereignty is operationalized as a formal recognition by any two 
major states or membership in the United Nations. 
467 In comparison to the country-year data, the dyadic data omit at least one year of existence in case of 
176 countries. 
468 Bennett & Stam, 2000. EUGene V 3.2 is available at http://www.eugenesoftware.org. 
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maintain a flexibility of choosing a preferred event definition that was used by any 
of the input datasets depending on the theoretical assumptions of the users of the 
data compilation. The users of the compilation can utilize the working name of the 
dataset that used the most convenient definition for their research purposes to 
filter out only the country-years or the country-dyad years, for which the event 
was identified. Afterwards, the users can easily add additional explanatory 
variables from the other datasets that are attached to the same country-year or 
country dyad-year so as to enrich a possible scope of the analysis. Therefore, the 
users can run the analysis based on more different operationalizations of the event 
so as to double-check the correctness of their results, and they can do so without 
having to engage into any extra time consuming data work. The list of the event 
definitions included into the compilation is provided below. 
 
Table 23: Event definitions in the data compilation 
 
EVENT IDENTIFICATION 
Dataset 
name  
Event identification definitions + thresholds 
Covered 
time frame 
Number of 
identified events 
MEPV 
Interstate, internal, or communal political violence: 
conflict intensity threshold = at least 500 directly related 
conflict deaths over year. 
1946-2005 
324 episodes of 
armed conflict 
(including 28 of 
ongoing cases) 
PITF 
Ethnic and revolutionary internal conflicts: mobilization 
threshold = each party must mobilize minimum of 1000 
people + conflict intensity threshold = at least 1000 direct 
conflict-related deaths over the full conflict and at least 
one year with an annual conflict-related death toll 
exceeding 100 fatalities. Adverse regime changes: index 
threshold = at least a six point drop in the value of a state's 
POLITY index score over a period of three years or less. 
Genocides and politicides: definition = a coherent action 
by the state or by a dominant social group against the 
unarmed civilians causing a destruction of people’s 
existence, in whole or in part.  
1955-2005 
76 episodes of 
ethnic wars, 64 
episodes of 
revolutionary 
wars, 112 episodes 
of adverse regime 
change, 41 
episodes of 
genocide and 
politicide 
ACD 
Interstate and internal conflicts: conflict intensity threshold 
= at least 25 battle-related deaths over year + conflict type 
threshold = at least one party of the conflict is the 
government. 
1946-2005 
250 episodes of 
armed conflict 
Regan  
Internal conflicts: conflict intensity threshold = at least 200 
fatalities over the entire conflict.  Third party 
interventions: definition = convention breaking military 
and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a 
foreign country targeted at the government with the aim 
of affecting the balance of power between the government 
and the opposition forces.   
1946-1999 
150/138 episodes 
of internal 
conflicts and 101 
interventions 
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MID 
Militarized interstate disputes: conflict intensity threshold = 
use of military force with fewer than 1000 combatant 
deaths per participant per year.  
1946-2001 
2332 episodes of 
militarized 
interstate disputes 
ICB 
International conflicts: definition = a pair of states, where 
at least one of the states directed a hostile action against 
the other.  
1946-2005 
447 episodes of 
international crisis 
and 983 crisis 
actors 
Mil Int  
Military interventions: definition = a purposeful 
movement of regular troops or forces of one country 
inside another because of some political issue or dispute.  
1946-2005 447 interventions 
Peace 
Civil wars: conflict intensity threshold = organized military 
opposition of the rebels against the government of an 
internationally recognized state with at least 1000 battle 
deaths for the entire war as long as the war caused 1000 
deaths in any single year + war type threshold = at least one 
significant settlement or truce or a ‘third-party’ peace 
operation. 
1946-1999 
124 episodes of 
civil wars with 
third-party peace 
operations 
      
     Due to the fact that the event occurrence is identified flexibly depending on the 
adopted definition in this data compilation; some of the variables seem to be 
providing conflicting information about the same characteristic of the same event. 
This is, however, a logical consequence of evaluating a characteristic of the same 
event that is operationalized in more different ways; given the characteristic is 
closely dependent on the definition. A typical example of such an inconsistency is 
represented by the data indicating conflict duration. In case that a softer definition 
of conflict is selected - for example 25 battle-related deaths per year, the conflict 
will be indicated as lasting longer; however, if a stricter definition is selected - for 
example 1000 battle-related deaths per year, the same conflict will be recorded as 
lasting much shorter. Therefore, the users of the compilation should take this fact 
into account when combining the variables vulnerable to the definitional changes. 
i.5.1.5. Multiple entries resolution 
After harmonizing the units of analysis in the input datasets, there appeared the 
cases of multiple information entries related to the same country-year or country-
dyad year. A typical reason for their occurrence was either a simple fact that there 
were more conflicts or more interventions taking place in the same country-year or 
the country dyad-year; or that some countries were treated as two separate ones in 
the original dataset, but are treated as belonging to one country based on the 
country identification procedure applied in this data compilation. Before merging 
the input datasets together, the multiple entries had to be localized and replaced by 
the single entries.469 There are many possible options on how to aggregate the 
                                                            
469 Rahm, Erhard and Hong Hai Do, 2000. ‘Data Cleaning: Problems and Current Approaches’, IEEE 
Bulletin of the Technical Committee on Data Engineering, Vol 23 No. 4. 
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multiple entries, and thus to solve the conflict among more values recorded for one 
observation. To carry out this replacement consistently, this study used the 
declarative aggregation functions by the means of the Structured Query Language 
(SQL) statements.470 This method uses the identifying variables and the SQL 
GROUP BY operator to group the multiple entries according to the assigned 
resolution functions. The country-year data were grouped by the COW ccode of the 
target state and the year; while the directed county dyad-year data were grouped 
by the COW ccode of the target state, the COW ccode of the intervener, and the year.  
     All the chosen resolution functions for each variable together with all the 
adjustments related to the data grouping are carefully recorded in the technical 
appendix, so that the future users get a clear picture of what the data are actually 
telling. There were some common methods applied when selecting the appropriate 
resolution functions for the variables. In general, the aggregate function of 
maximum was used for the binary variables to indicate the occurrence of the 
measured phenomena in a given country-year or a country dyad-year, regardless 
of in which month the event occurred or how many of these events actually took 
place. A typical step complementing in such a way aggregated multiple entries 
was to create an extra variable counting a frequency of occurrence of the event. 
Without plugging in this additional variable, the important information about the 
event’s frequency would get lost in the aggregation process. The variable 
indicating a frequency of the event was usually created either by using an 
aggregation function sum in case of a binary variable to sum the positive records of 
that event occurrence; or by using an aggregation function count in case of a non-
binary variable to count all the cells identifying occurrence of the event.  
     Another often repeated type of data aggregation involved the variables 
indicating duration of the events. The multiple entries were merged in a way to 
code the event as ongoing as long as the country was experiencing it, regardless of 
the frequency of that event occurrence. Therefore, the variables indicating event 
beginning were aggregated by a function minimum to denote a day or a month, in 
which the first conflict or intervention began in particular country-year or country 
dyad-year. Similarly, an aggregate function of maximum was typically used to 
indicate the termination of the last conflict or intervention in particular country-
year or country dyad-year.  
     While aggregating the multiple entries in the ordinal variables, three following 
aggregate functions were typically applied interchangeably depending on the 
characteristics of the concept and a flexibility of its interpretation: maximum, average 
or sum. The most straightforward solution was to use the function maximum or 
average so as to indicate either the most intensive level or the average level of the 
                                                            
470 SQL is a database computer language used for managing data in relations database management 
systems.  
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measured phenomenon as experienced in particular country-year or country dyad-
year. However, in case that the variable was not only ordinal but also ordered 
gradually and proportionally; an alternative function sum was sometimes given 
preference. By summing up all the values recorded for the variable in a given 
country-year or country dyad-year, the resulting value provided a picture about 
the scale of the measured characteristics.  
     In some cases, when a variable was neither binary nor ordinal, and also did not 
indicate event duration; grouping of the multiple entries was rather problematic, 
since there was no straightforward way of how to group them without destroying 
their meaning. Such a variable had to be transformed first so as to maintain some 
sense even after being aggregated. A typical solution to this problem was to 
disaggregate the variable into the logical groups, and then to create the new binary 
variables out of them. To demonstrate this procedure, let’s take an example of one 
variable originally indicating various types of interventions that took place in some 
target country. In this variable, individual values represented different types of 
non-military and military pressure; but a growing degree of the pressure of the 
intervention strategy did not correspond with a growing value in the variable. 
Therefore, the classical aggregation functions were impossible to be applied. There 
were two possible options of how to solve this problem – by transforming the 
variable into either an ordinal or a binary indicator. The individual intervention 
types were thus divided into three groups: no intervention, less aggressive 
intervention, and more aggressive intervention; and were assigned the respective 
values of 0, 1 and 2. Afterwards, one option was to use an aggregation function 
sum to approximate an overall scale of intervention aggressiveness for particular 
country-year or country-dyad year. An alternative solution was to create two 
binary variables; one of which indicates presence or absence of the less aggressive 
intervention, and one indicating presence or absence of the more aggressive 
intervention in particular country-year or country dyad-year.  
i.5.2. Merging of the adjusted datasets  
After resolving the multiple entries, the transformed input datasets were merged 
together with the prepared list of country-years or country-dyad years. The 
merging procedure was a step by step process, carried out by the means of instance 
matching by a standard SQL equi-join on the identifying variables. The first 
identifying variable was utilized for merging of each input dataset without any 
exception. It was a time indicator: year. The second identifying variable that served 
as a country identifier varied by individual input dataset. There were three types 
of variables serving this purpose: either the numeric COW ccode, the 3-letter COW 
ccode, or the numeric UN ccode. In case of the dyadic data, the second country 
identifying variable was needed twice so as to identify both members of the dyad. 
150 
 
To get an overview of the data losses resulting from the merging process of 
individual datasets, see the technical appendix of the chapter. 
i.6. Statistical evaluation  
A quality of the merged data from multiple sources is typically evaluated by 
assessing their ‘consistency’, ‘correctness’, and ‘completeness’.  
i.6.1. ‘Consistency’ of the merged data 
A ‘consistency’ or a degree of data overlap of the merged data in this compilation 
varies depending on the data type being evaluated. ‘Consistency’ of the merged 
‘structural data’ does not represent any major problem, given it is measured within 
the time frame that the variables were originally intended to cover; since tracing 
some characteristic consistently follows from the nature of this data type. In 
contrast to that a ‘consistency’ of the merged ‘event data’ suffered due to their 
definitional heterogeneity. Evaluation of the impacts of definitional differences on 
the identified event samples in the individual merged datasets and a degree of 
their mutual overlap was enabled by the fact that all the input datasets were 
transformed into a homogenous unit of analysis and the time period. The results of 
this evaluation are presented in the two following tables. The first presented table 
(table 23) indicates a number of country-years, in which the event was identified in 
each merged dataset; and also the number of country-years that were identified 
jointly for each given pair of the merged datasets.  
 
Table 24: Event identification overlap in the data compilation (in country-years) 
 
‘CONSISTENCY’ - Event identification overlap (in country-years) 
 
MEPV 
PITF 
123 
PITF 
4 
ACD 
Regan 
123 
EUG 
MID 
EUG 
ICB 
ICB 
Mil 
Int 
Peace 
MEPV 7549 1127 268 1367 1013 6878 5918 452 1663 800 
PITF 123 1127 1152 201 872 748 1059 887 131 535 602 
PITF 4 268 201 269 215 176 264 252 43 147 157 
ACD 1367 872 215 1438 774 1238 1059 239 670 659 
Regan  123 1013 748 176 774 1021 1010 879 126 443 639 
EUG MID 6878 1059 264 1238 1010 7612 6479 483 1581 767 
EUG ICB 5918 887 252 1059 879 6479 6479 444 1395 730 
ICB 452 131 43 239 126 483 444 490 284 134 
Mil Int 1663 535 147 670 443 1581 1395 284 1736 383 
Peace 800 602 157 659 639 767 730 134 383 836 
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The next table (table 24) also represents the event identification overlap between 
the individual pairs of the merged datasets, but this time presented in 
percentages.471 These results serve as a good indication of which datasets are worse 
and which better combinable with each other, and thus from which datasets is it 
more convenient to draw the variables for a joint analysis. On average, the ‘event 
data’ in the compilation achieve a 55% of identification overlap. 
 
Table 25: Event identification overlap in the data compilation (in percentage) 
 
‘CONSISTENCY’ - Event identification overlap (in percentage) 
 
MEPV 
PITF 
123 
PITF 
4 
ACD 
Regan 
123 
EUG 
MID 
EUG 
ICB 
ICB 
Mil 
Int 
Peace 
MEPV 100,0 14,9 3,6 18,1 13,4 91,1 78,4 6,0 22,0 10,6 
PITF 123 97,8 100,0 17,4 75,7 64,9 91,9 77,0 11,4 46,4 52,3 
PITF 4 99,6 74,7 100,0 79,9 65,4 98,1 93,7 16,0 54,6 58,4 
ACD 95,1 60,6 15,0 100,0 53,8 86,1 73,6 16,6 46,6 45,8 
Regan 123 99,2 73,3 17,2 75,8 100,0 98,9 86,1 12,3 43,4 62,6 
EUG MID 90,4 13,9 3,5 16,3 13,3 100,0 85,1 6,3 20,8 10,1 
EUG ICB 91,3 13,7 3,9 16,3 13,6 100,0 100,0 6,9 21,5 11,3 
ICB 92,2 26,7 8,8 48,8 25,7 98,6 90,6 100,0 58,0 27,3 
Mil Int 95,8 30,8 8,5 38,6 25,5 91,1 80,4 16,4 100,0 22,1 
Peace 95,7 72,0 18,8 78,8 76,4 91,7 87,3 16,0 45,8 100,0 
‘Consistency’ = 55% 
 
i.6.2. ‘Correctness’ of the merged data 
A ‘correctness’ of the merged data is ensured, if the merged data are based on a 
coherent unit of analysis, and if there are no multiple entries for any single unit of 
observation. All necessary steps to control for the ‘correctness’ were carried out: 
• STEP 1 - Creation of a common unit of analysis  
• STEP 2 - Multiple entries resolution 
• STEP 3 - Merging of the adjusted datasets 
The below table (table 25) provides a statistical overview of the data adjustments 
carried out in the individual steps of the merging process, and the associated data 
losses. A more detailed description is to be found in the technical appendix. 
                                                            
471 Precisely, it indicates to what degree the datasets listed vertically identify the same events as the 
paired datasets listed horizontally. 
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Extensiveness of the data losses can be derived by comparing the numbers of lost 
observations with the final number of observations in the merged datasets. 
 
Table 26: Overview of the ‘correctness’ of the data compilation 
 
‘CORRECTNESS’ 
 
STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 FINAL 
Dataset 
name 
Adjusted 
ccodes (CD 
& DD) 
Unit of analysis 
transformation 
(CD & DD) 
Removed 
multiple entries 
(CD & DD) 
Lost records 
due to merging 
(CD & DD) 
Final number of 
observations (CD & 
DD) 
EUGene  
SV 
0 & 0 0 & 0 0 & 0 0 & 0 8380 
UN Pop 
1/2/3/4 
112/140/11/0 Ccode_year 1 784/540/198/198 9800/5280/1914/1936 
UN SD 0 Ccode_year 1 451 1417 
FAO 201 0 0 2340 11460 
FDP 94 Ccode_year 7 47 6089 
MAR 0 0 0 0 7937 
QoG 0 0 300 0 12000 
DEM 0 0 0 0 6871 
MEPV 88 Ccode_year 1 45 7549 
PITF 
1/2/3/4 
6/6/6/3 Ccode_year 358 1/1/1/0 1152/1152/1152/269 
ACD 0 Ccode_year 495 2 1438 
Regan 
1/2/3/4 
0 Ccode_year 12004/12199/1259 0 1021/1021/890 
EUGene 
MID 
0 & 0 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
1250172 & 0 0 & 0 7612 
EUGene 
ICB 
0 & 0 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
1250172 & 0 0 & 0 6479 
ICB II 0 & 0 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
536 & 87 0 & 7 490 
ICB 
Dyad 
0 & 0 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
536 & 87 0 & 7 490 
Mil Int 2 & 893 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
1631 & 247 32 & 94 1736 
Peace 54 Ccode_year 92 0 863 
*Ccode in the table refers to the COW ccode. 
 
i.6.3. ‘Completeness’ of the merged data 
After harmonizing the coding of the missing values in each of the input datasets 
and merging them all together; the entire compilation ended up as having 19,5% of 
the missing values. This result was artificially increased by some methodological 
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and structural decisions, which are described together with a complete overview of 
‘completeness’ of individual merged datasets in the technical appendix of this 
chapter. 
 
Table 27: Overview of the ‘completeness’ of the data compilation (percentage of missing 
values) 
 
‘COMPLETENESS’ – Missing values  
(in percentage) 
Structural data (CD) 
Missing variables avg. = 26,1% 
Event data (CD) 
Missing variables avg. = 3,4% 
Dyadic structural and event data (DD) 
Missing variables avg. = 19,5% 
Total compilation average = 19,5% 
 
i.7. Attachment of the newly generated quantified JWT 
The last part of the data compilation is composed of the quantified JWT from the 
previous chapter. The newly generated variables together with their coding 
description are described in the following table (table 27). 
 
Table 28: Coding of the variables quantifying the JWT 
 
QUANTIFIED JWT 
Variable name 
Variable 
description 
Variable coding 
JUST CAUSE INDEX 
JWT_CAUSE_X Just cause index  
Just cause index approximates the JWT criterion of 'just 
cause' that is used as a tool to evaluate a 'justice' of the 
'motives and means' of a military intervention waged into 
the target state in particular year. It is a composite 
indicator evaluating a severity of the crisis in the target 
state (based on the number of battle deaths, genocide 
deaths, displaced population, and internal violence), 
together with a capability and willingness of the target 
state to deal with the crisis on its own (based on the 
existence of a state failure and existence of on ongoing 
rebellion against the target state's government). 
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JWT_CAUSE_X_w25 
Just cause index 
(after weight.) 
This variable represents a recalculated just cause index 
("JWT_CAUSE_X") weighted by a 25% importance within 
the aggregate JWT. 
JUST INTENT INDEX 
JWT_INTENT_X Just intent index 
Just intent index approximates the JWT criterion of 'just 
intent' that is used as a tool to evaluate a 'justice' of the 
'motives and means' of a military intervention waged into 
the target state in particular year. It is composed of four 
weighted components. One group of the components 
evaluates the existence of a 'humanitarian' motivation of 
the intervener (based on the 'humanitarianism' behind the 
intervention, the intervener's utility form the intervention, 
a joint history of the intervener with the target state, and a 
similarity of their alliance portfolios); while the second 
group controls for the other different motivations of the 
intervener by capturing a possible economic motivation 
(based on the trade importance and trade growth of the 
target state, and the natural resources reserves in the 
target state), and by capturing a possible political 
motivation (based on the political, territorial, strategic, and 
protective considerations behind the intervention). 
JWT_INTENT_X_30w 
Just intent index 
(after weight.) 
This variable represents a recalculated just intent index 
("JWT_INTENT_X") weighted by a 30% importance within 
the aggregate JWT. 
JUST AUTHORITY INDEX 
JWT_AUTH_X 
Just authority 
index 
Just authority index approximates the JWT criterion of 
'just authority' that is used as a tool to evaluate a 'justice' 
of the 'motives and means' of a military intervention 
waged into the target state in particular year. It is 
composed of two weighted components. One of the 
components evaluates a legitimacy of the intervener 
(based on the democracy level of the intervener, and the 
type of leadership of the intervention). The second 
component evaluates a lack of legitimacy of the target 
state, which provides the intervention with an increased 
legitimacy (based on the democracy level, and existence of 
the autocratization tendencies in the target state).  
JWT_AUTH_X_15w 
Just authority 
index (after 
weight.) 
This variable represents a recalculated just authority index 
("JWT_AUTH_X") weighted by a 15% importance within 
the aggregate JWT. 
LAST RESORT INDEX 
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JWT_LAST_X Last resort index  
Last resort index approximates the JWT criterion of 'last 
resort' that is used as a tool to evaluate a 'justice' of the 
'motives and means' of a military intervention waged into 
the target state in particular year. It is expressed by an 
urgency for a timely reaction by the intervener that is 
calculated as a yearly change in the just cause index 
("JWT_CAUSE_X") that captures a severity of the crisis in 
the target state and the expected propensity of the country 
to manage the crisis on its own.  
JWT_LAST_X_10w 
Last resort index 
(after weight.) 
This variable represents a recalculated last resort index 
("JWT_LAST_X") weighted by a 10% importance within 
the aggregate JWT. 
PROPORTIONALITY INDEX 
JWT_PROP_X 
Proportionality 
index 
Proportionality index approximates the JWT criterion of 
'proportionality' that is used as a tool to evaluate a 'justice' 
of the 'motives and means' of a military intervention 
waged into the target state in particular year. It is 
composed of two groups of the weighted components. 
One group evaluates the extensiveness of a security threat 
in the target state as perceived by the intervener (based on 
the assessment of a military strength to be encountered by 
the intervener in the target state - both internally and from 
the other external parties, and on the aggregate battle 
deaths on both sides), while the other group evaluates the 
strategies used by the intervener in reaction to the 
anticipated threat (based on the number of the waged 
troops, on the most violent troop activity, and on the 
aggregate troop activity of the intervener). 
JWT_PROP_X_10w 
Proportionality 
index (after 
weight.) 
This variable represents a recalculated proportionality 
index ("JWT_PROP_X") weighted by a 10% importance 
within the aggregate JWT. 
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS INDEX 
156 
 
JWT_SUCC_X 
Probability of 
success index 
Probability of success index approximates the JWT 
criterion of 'probability of success' that is used as a tool to 
evaluate a 'justice' of the 'motives and means' of a military 
intervention waged into the target state in particular year. 
It is composed of two weighted components. One 
component evaluates a military strength of the target state 
(based on the 'big power status' of the target state, on the 
military opposition in the target state, and on the 
probability of success of the intervener based on its 
military capabilities), while the second component 
evaluates a conflict complexity that decreases a probability 
of intervener's success (based on the culture of political  
violence, on the propensity of conflict to draw external 
parties, and on the just cause index). 
JWT_SUCC_X_10w 
Probability of 
success index 
(after weight.) 
This variable represents a recalculated probability of 
success index ("JWT_SUCC_X") weighted by a 10% 
importance within the aggregate JWT. 
AGGREGATE JWT INDEX 
JWT_X JWT index 
JWT index approximates a 'justice'  of the 'motives and 
means' of a military intervention waged into the target 
state in particular year based on the quantified JWT. The 
aggregate JWT index consists of the weighted JWT criteria 
of 'just cause' (25%), 'just intent' (30%), 'just authority' 
(15%), 'last resort' (10%), 'proportionality' (10%), and 
'probability of success' (10%). 
 
i.8. Conclusion 
The main goal of this data compiling initiative was to pool the empirical data about 
political conflicts and military interventions into one comprehensive data 
compilation that would be opened for the influences from the different social 
fields. An aspiration was to create such a data compilation that would allow for a 
holistic approach in researching either the individual phases of the conflict on its 
own, or the conflict dynamics within a multi-staged analysis; while creating a 
possibility to integrate a role of a possible intervener into the conflict. At the same 
time, the structure of the compilation was constructed with an attempt to allow the 
researchers to flexibly switch among the individual conflict definitions so as to 
confirm a validity of their hypotheses using the alternative operationalizations of 
the event. In addition to that the compilation was enriched by introducing a 
completely new set of variables quantifying the JWT that could generate a new 
stream of research exploring this normative concept based on the empirical 
evidence. All together, the aim was to introduce a data pool that would save a 
valuable time to the researchers that is typically spent on the data manipulation 
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and merging. The whole initiative was carried out with a hope that the resulting 
output would make the quantitative approach accessible to a wider spectrum of 
researchers, encouraging thus a further empirical research in the sensitive field of 
conflict studies and conflict management.   
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX – CHAPTER 4 
LIST OF VARIABLES USED FOR THE QUANTIFICATION OF THE JWT 
CRITERIA 
 
The below listed variables used for the construction of the JWT criteria are drawn 
from the data compilation that is described in the last chapter of this study. 
1. ‘Just cause’ index 
‘Just cause’ index is structured based on the QoG country list, which includes all the 
countries throughout the whole time spam of 1946-2005, regardless of the existing 
acknowledgment of their sovereignty by the international community in each 
listed country-year.472 This approach was adopted for the reason of maintaining a 
maximal continuity of information about the developments in the target state, and 
thus for a reason of leaving a flexibility for any future use of the index.  
1.1. Severity of humanitarian crisis 
1.1.1. Battle deaths – target state (“battle_deaths_x”) 
 = total battle-related fatalities (both civilians and combatants) 
killed in the course of combat in particular country-year (scale 1-
7). 
Input variable: 
• Best battle deaths estimate (“b_deaths_best”) from the ACD 
dataset (1946-2005)  (originally labeled “bdeadbes”) - This variable sums 
the best estimates of total battle-related fatalities of all conflicts in 
particular country-year, in which battle fatalities are defined as civilians 
and combatants killed in the course of combat. 
Adjustments:  
Variable (“b_deaths_best”) was transformed into a scaled summed number 
of fatalities related to fighting in particular country-year, which is set on a 
range from 1 to 7 in the following way. Missing values (41 cases) were 
coded as 50 battle-related fatalities. Reason for choosing particularly the 
number 50 comes from the fact that the identification threshold of conflict 
in the ACD dataset starts with at least 25 battle-related deaths over year. 
The observation was identified as fulfilling this minimal threshold, but was 
attached unknown value for some reasons. Therefore, amount of 50 is set 
                                                            
472 The resulting sample had 12000 identified country-years. 
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above this threshold, but not much so that the result remains strict on 
granting the basis for ‘just cause’.   
     After the correction of missing values, the values that originally 
indicated the numbers of battle-related deaths were transformed into the 
below described scale: 
• 1 - 100 = 1 
• 101 - 500 = 2 
• 501 - 1000 = 3 
• 1001 - 5000 = 4 
• 5001 - 10000 = 5 
• 10001 - 50000 = 6 
• 50000 - 500000 = 7 
The cases not identified by the ACD dataset as fulfilling the set threshold 
of existing crisis were attached the value 0.  
1.1.2. Genocide deaths – target state (“genoc_deaths_x”)  
= level of annual deaths resulting from a genocide or politicide 
in particular country-year (scale 0-5). 
Input variable: 
• Level of civilian deaths (“genoc_deaths”) from the PITF 4 dataset 
(1956-2005) (originally coded “deathmag”) - This variable indicates a level 
of annual deaths resulting from a genocide or politicide in particular 
country-year. The scale ranges from 0 to 5. 
Adjustments:  
Country-years not identified by the PITF 4 dataset as experiencing either a 
genocide or a politicide were attached the value 0. 
1.1.3. Displaced population – target state (“refug_x”)  
= number of people both internally and externally displaced in 
particular country-year (scale 0-4). 
Main input variables: 
• Number of refugees (“refug”) from the FDP dataset (1964-2005) 
(originally labeled “source”) - This variable indicates a number of refugees 
(in thousands) originating in the country at the end of a designated year.  
• Number of internally displaced persons (“idp”) from the FDP 
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dataset (1964-2005) (originally labeled “idp”) - This variable indicates a 
number of internally displaced persons (in thousands) in the country at the 
end of the designated year.  
• Interpolated migration (“migr_i”) from the UN pop II dataset 
(1950-1979) (created from the variable originally labeled “Migration, 
international net per year”) - This variable indicates a net migration 
(absolute number), which is interpolated among the original 
measurements taken once in five years.  
Reference variables:  
• Political violence score (“viol”) from the MEPV dataset (1946-
2004) (originally labeled “civtot”) - This variable represents the summed 
magnitudes of all societal major episodes of political violence (MEPVs) in 
particular country-year. This indicator counts the magnitude scores for 
civil violence, civil warfare, ethnic violence, and ethnic warfare; which are 
individually evaluated on the scale ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), 
where 10 = extermination and annihilation, 9 = total warfare, 8 = 
technological warfare, 7 = pervasive warfare, 6 = extensive warfare, 5 = 
substantial and prolonged warfare, 4 = serious warfare, 3 = serious political 
violence, 2 = limited political violence, and 1 = sporadic or expressive 
political violence.  
• Conflict intensity (“intensity”) from the ACD dataset (1946-2005) 
(originally labeled “int”) - This variable indicates a maximum level of 
intensity reached by the most violent conflict in particular country-year. 
The intensity levels are divided into two categories: 1 = minor conflict 
(between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year), and 2 = war (at 
least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year). 
Adjustments:  
Values in the two FDP variables (“refug”) and (“idp”) were summed 
together to jointly indicate the number of people externally and internally 
displaced as a result of the violence. The limited time coverage of these two 
variables covering only years 1964-2005 was increased by combining them 
with the data from the UN pop II variable (“migr_i”) that complemented 
the data for years 1950-1963. So as to make the values in the variable 
“migr_i” compatible with the summed FDP variables, they were divided 
by 1000 to transform them from the values indicating absolute numbers 
into values indicating the numbers of migrants in thousands as indicated 
in the FDP variables. Afterwards, all the positive values in the “migr_i” 
variable were set to 0, since the aim was to approximate only amount of 
refugees fleeing out of the country. In the next step, the estimated number 
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of refugees across border from the “migr_i” variable was multiplied by 
two to approximate also the people displaced within the borders of the 
country due to the existing violence. 
So as to fill in the missing values in the summed (“refug”) and (“idp”) 
or in the variable (“migr_i”), the study utilized two additional reference 
variables: (“viol”) and (“intensity”). The missing values were filled in 
based on the following methodology. To fill in the missing values for years 
1950-2005, the study estimated the amount of forcibly displaced people 
based on the level of violence in the country. For this purpose, two 
reference variables were utilized: “viol” (MEPV dataset) and “intensity” 
(ACD dataset), while the preference was always given to the variable that 
indicated a stronger impulse for a potential forced displacement of 
population in particular country-year. The 10-point scale of violence 
magnitude in the variable “viol” was transformed into the estimated 
attached number of displaced people: 1 = 10, 2 = 100, 3 = 300, 4 = 500, 5 = 
1000, and 6-10 = 5000. Similarly, the 2-point scale in the variable “intensity” 
was transformed into two types of estimates of the displaced people: 1 = 
300, and 2 = 1000. If both reference variables were coded as 0, the number 
of forcibly displaced people was set to 0. If one of the values in the 
reference variables was missing, the existing one was applied. The values 
for years 1946-1949 that were not covered by any of the above listed main 
input variables were left constant as indicated in year 1950, unless there 
was some change in the level of violence recorded in some country-years 
1946-1949 in comparison to the country-year 1950 recorded in the reference 
variables (“viol”) and (“intensity”). In case that there was a record of 
change, the same method of data transformation was used as the one 
applied when filling in the missing values for years 1950-2005. 
And finally, the values representing a number of people internally and 
externally displaced (in thousands) in particular country-year were 
transformed into the following scale: 
• 0 = 0 
• 1 = 1-50 
• 2 = 51-500 
• 3 = 501-1000 
• 4 = 1001-10000 
1.1.4. Internal violence – target state (“viol_x”) 
 = summed magnitude of all the societal major episodes of 
political violence in particular country-year (scale 0-10).  
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Main input variables: 
• Political violence score (“viol”) from the MEPV dataset (1946-
2004) (originally labeled “civtot”) - This variable represents the summed 
magnitudes of all the societal major episodes of political violence (MEPVs) 
in particular country-year. It counts the magnitude scores for civil violence, 
civil warfare, ethnic violence, and ethnic warfare, which are individually 
evaluated on the scale ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest); where 10 = 
extermination and annihilation, 9 = total warfare, 8 = technological warfare, 
7 = pervasive warfare, 6 = extensive warfare, 5 = substantial and prolonged 
warfare, 4 = serious warfare, 3 = serious political violence, 2 = limited 
political violence, 1 = sporadic or expressive political violence, 0 = no 
violence.  
Reference variable:  
• Conflict intensity (“intensity”) from the ACD dataset (1946-2005) 
(originally labeled “int”) - This variable indicates a maximum level of 
intensity reached by the most violent conflict in particular country-year. 
The intensity levels are divided into two categories: 1 = minor conflict 
(between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year), and 2 = war (at 
least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year). 
Adjustments:  
Due to the fact that “viol” variable does not cover year 2005, the values for 
this missing year were filled in based on the information provided in the 
reference variable “intensity”. If “intensity” was coded 1, “viol” was 
assigned the value 3; if “intensity” was coded 2, the value 6 was attached. 
The same approach as applied for the year 2005 was used for filling in the 
missing values that appeared in the time period covered by the main input 
variable. 
1.2. Necessity of external assistance controls  
1.2.1. State failure – target state (“state_fail_x”) 
 = degree of a state failure (failure of state authority, collapse of 
democratic institutions, violent regime transition) in particular 
country-year (scale 0-12). 
Input variable: 
• PITF magnitude sum (“pitf_magn_sum”) from the PITF dataset 
(1948-2005) (created from the original variable “avemag”) - This variable 
indicates an averaged magnitude of the following three scores for 
particular country-year: a scaled failure of state authority (“pitf_scale”); a 
187 
 
scaled collapse of democratic institutions defined as a six or more points 
drop in the value of a state's POLITY index score over a period of three 
years or less (“dem_collapse_scale”); and a scaled violence associated with 
regime transition (“violence_scale”). Each of these three magnitude scores 
is set on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. The final variable thus indicates a 
degree of state failure on the scale of 0-12. 
Reference variable:  
• State failure dummy (“state_failure”) from the QoG dataset (1946-
2004) (originally labeled “p_sf”) - This dummy variable indicates whether 
the country is in a condition of a complete collapse of central authority 
(sate failure) or disintegrates. 
Adjustments:  
The reference QoG variable “state_failure” was used to fill in the missing 
values for the period of 1946-1948 not covered by the PITF variable 
“pitf_magn_sum”. In case that the QoG data identified presence of a state 
failure in particular country-year, the missing value was coded 1; 
otherwise 0. In case that the QoG reference variable also indicated a 
missing value; such values were coded 0, since coding of the reference 
variable is set to indicate a missing value in cases that the country did not 
possess an internationally accepted sovereignty in particular year. 
Assigning the 0 value to these cases is based on an assumption that there 
can be no state failure, if there is no functioning government that could fail.  
1.2.2. Rebellion – target state (“rebel_x”) 
 = the most serious manifestation of the rebellion in particular 
country-year (scale 0-7). 
Main input variable: 
• Rebellion index (“rebellion_x”) from the MAR dataset  (1946-
2003) (created from variables originally labeled “rebel_mean” and 
“reb_mean”) – This variable records the most serious manifestation of a 
rebellion that is coded as follows: 0 = none reported, 1 = political banditry 
or sporadic terrorism, 2 = campaigns of terrorism, 3 = local armed 
rebellions, 4 = small-scale guerrilla activity (conditions: fewer than 1000 
armed fighters, less than six reported attacks per year, attacks in a small 
part of the area), 5 = intermediate guerrilla activity, 6 = large-scale guerrilla 
activity (conditions: more than 1000 armed fighters, more than 6 attacks 
per year, attacks affecting a large part of the area), and 7 = protracted civil 
war (condition: fought by rebel military units with base areas). 
Reference variable:  
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• Political violence score (“viol”) from the MEPV dataset (1946-
2004) (originally labeled “civtot”) - This variable represents the summed 
magnitudes of all the societal major episodes of political violence (MEPVs) 
in particular country-year. This indicator counts the magnitude scores for 
civil violence, civil warfare, ethnic violence, and ethnic warfare, which are 
individually evaluated on the scale ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest); 
where 10 = extermination and annihilation, 9 = total warfare, 8 = 
technological warfare, 7 = pervasive warfare, 6 = extensive warfare, 5 = 
substantial and prolonged warfare, 4 = serious warfare, 3 = serious political 
violence, 2 = limited political violence, and 1 = sporadic or expressive 
political violence.  
Adjustments:  
Variable “rebellion_x” has a higher number of missing values, which had 
to be substituted. The missing values were replaced based on data from the 
reference variable “viol”, adopting the following procedure:  
• 0 (MEPV) = 0 (MAR) 
• 1 (MEPV) = 1 (MAR) 
• 2 (MEPV) = 2 (MAR) 
• 3 (MEPV) = 3 (MAR) 
• 4 (MEPV) = 4 (MAR) 
• 5 (MEPV) = 5 (MAR) 
• 6 (MEPV) = 6 (MAR) 
• 7-10 (MEPV) = 7 (MAR) 
2. ‘Just intent’ index 
Construction of the ‘just intent’ index required capturing the dyadic relationships 
between the intervener and the target states. Therefore, all the data composing the 
index were structured based on the EUGene dyadic country list covering all the 
country dyads in years 1946-2005. Nevertheless, since the study overtook a 
definition of military intervention from the Mil Int dataset, the justice of the intent 
could have been evaluated only for the country dyad-years, in which the military 
intervention was identified based on this definition. The filtered out country dyad-
years with the identified interventions were then merged by the ccode of the target 
country and the year, while simultaneously counting the number of interveners in 
a given target country-year.473 If the same intervener intervened more than once 
                                                            
473 Grouping the dyadic Mil Int data by target country-year resulted in identification of 1695 country-
years. (Original Mil Int data in the  dyadic form identify 3057 dyadic country-years.) 
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into the same country-year, the intervener was counted just once. While merging 
the data, the values of all the variables indicating the intent of the intervener were 
summed (using the SUM operator) and then divided by number of interveners in 
particular country-year, so as to get the averaged value of intent of all the 
interveners in particular target country-year.  
Missing values in the variables were removed based on the various simplifying 
assumptions that are described individually in the overview of each input variable. 
Nevertheless, there was one common formula applied for the binary variables that 
served as controls for the possible side-motivations of the intervener. Majority of 
missing values in this type of binary variables concerned the multilateral 
operations. Therefore, this study adopted an approach that if the operation was 
multilateral; geographical, historical or other ties are considered to be of a lower 
importance, and that the intervention was less probably waged just for the narrow 
national interests of the intervener. As a result of that, all the missing values in 
these binary variables were set to 0. Due to this permissive and optimistic 
approach in case of the variables controlling the ‘humanitarian intent’ of 
multilateral operations; a much stricter approach was adopted in case of missing 
observations in the variables supporting the existence of the ‘humanitarian intent’ 
in such a type of operations. The exceptional adjustments of the missing variables 
are listed below.  
2.1. Humanitarian motivation 
2.1.1. Humanitarian intervention (“hum_int_x”) 
= existence of an ongoing humanitarian intervention in particular 
target country-year (range 0-1). 
• Humanitarian intervention dummy (“hum_int”) from the Mil Int 
dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created from variable originally labeled 
“Humanitarian Intervention” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, and “Humanitarian 
Intervention” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This dummy variable codes whether 
some military intervention attempts to save lives, to relieve suffering, or to 
distribute foodstuffs so as to prevent starvation in the target state in 
particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 = no, 1 = yes.   
Adjustments: 
The missing values were coded 0, so as to be strict on awarding the explicit 
humanitarian intent, due to the permissive approach to the missing values 
in case of the control variables. 
2.1.2. Intervener’s utility (“util_achb_x”) 
= average utility of the interveners from waging an intervention 
into the target state (range -1-2) 
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• Utility A of changing B Tau-b (“util_achb_t”) from the EUGene 
dyad dataset (1946-2000) (originally labeled “wrTu1v2”) - This variable 
indicates a state A’s utility from the state B’s desired outcome. It is a sum of 
the bilateral and multilateral expected utility components using Tau-b 
(without risk attitude) that is calculated based on the COW composite 
capability scores adjusted for distance (as is operationalized in The War Trap 
War and Reason), and based on the perceptions of probability of success. The 
utility ranges from –1 to +2.   
Adjustments: 
The values of the variable were multiplied by -1, so that the higher the 
number, the higher utility was perceived by the intervener.  
2.1.3. Joint history (“joint_hist_x”)  
= a strongest historical relationship of the interveners with the 
target state (range 0-3).  
• Joint history (“joint_hist_type”) from the Mil Int dyad 
dataset (1946-2005) (created from variable originally labeled “Colonial 
history”) - This variable indicates the strongest shared historical 
relationship of the target state with any intervener in particular year. The 
variable is divided into following categories: 0 = no relationship, 1 = colony 
(since 1648), 2 = protectorate (since 1648), 3 = previously unified country or 
empire (since 1648).  
2.1.4. Alliance (“alliance_x”)  
= a similarity of the alliance portfolio between the interveners 
and the target state in particular country-year (range -1-1). 
• Global alliance portfolio II (“alliance_glob”) from the 
EUGene dyad dataset (1946-2000) (originally labeled “s_un_glo”) - This 
variable evaluates the unweighted S-score of the global alliance portfolios 
of state A vs. state B by using all the countries in the system. It ranks an 
order correlation for two states’ alliance portfolios: 1 = defense pact, 2 = 
neutrality pact, 3 = entente and 4 = no alliance. The ranking is then 
recalculated into the range starting with -1 (representing a totally opposite 
alliance agreements) going till +1 (representing a complete agreement in the 
alliances formed), while taking into account both the presence and the 
absence of an alliance in the correlation calculation. 
Adjustments: 
The values of the variable “alliance_x” were multiplied by -1; so that the 
higher the number, the more security-strategic side motives were possibly 
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associated with the intervention and not the other way round. The missing 
values were set to 0; since 0 represents a middle value and thus seemed to 
be the most appropriate. 
2.2. Economic side motivations 
2.2.1. Trade importance – target state (“tot_trade_x”)  
= a total trade (both imports and exports) of the target country in 
particular country-year (mil. USD). 
Main input variable:  
• Total trade (“tot_trade”) from the QoG dataset (1948-
2000) (originally labeled “gle_trade”) - This variable sums all the dyadic 
import and export figures of the country in millions of current USD. 
Reference variables:  
• Imports (“imports”) from the EUGene SV dataset (1946-
2005) (originally labeled “imports”) - This variable indicates imports in 1000 
USD.  
• Exports (“exports”) from the EUGene SV dataset (1946-
2005) (originally labeled “exports”) - This variable indicates exports in 1000 
USD.   
Adjustments: 
Variable “tot_trade” is not focused on the existing mutual relationship 
between the intervener and the target state as such, but rather evaluates the 
economic importance of the target state as a whole. Total trade variable 
(QoG) has less missing observations than the two EUGene SV reference 
variables. Therefore, each missing observation in the QoG variable was 
substituted by the summed value of Imports and Exports from the EUGene 
data for particular country-year, multiplied by 1000. In case that the value 
was missing in both datasets, the amount of total trade was left constant as 
in the last recorded year. Afterwards, the values were transformed into the 
following scale: 
• 0-1000 = 1 
• 1001-5000 = 2 
• 5001-15000 = 3 
• 15001-50000 = 4 
• 50001-100000 = 5 
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• 10001-500000 = 6 
2.2.2. Trade growth – target state (“trade_growth_x”)  
= a growth in trade performance of the target state over last three 
years (mil. USD). 
Main input variable:  
• Total trade (“tot_trade”) from the QoG dataset (1948-
2000) (originally labeled “gle_trade”) - This variable sums all the dyadic 
import and export figures of the country in millions of current USD. 
Reference variables:  
• Imports (“imports”) from the EUGene SV dataset (1946-
2005) (originally labeled “imports”) - This variable indicates imports of the 
country in 1000 USD.  
• Exports (“exports”) from the EUGene SV dataset (1946-
2005) (originally labeled “exports”) - This variable indicates exports of the 
country in 1000 USD.   
Adjustments: 
In case that there were missing values in the variable “tot_trade”, they were 
replaced by the summed value of “imports” and “exports” from the 
reference variables for particular country-year and multiplied by 1000. In 
case that there were missing values both in the main and the reference 
variables, the amount of total trade was left constant as in the last available 
recorded year. After having all the missing values filled-in, the yearly 
change was counted. The calculated yearly changes were always summed 
for the three previous years to indicate whether the economic performance 
of the target state has an increasing or a decreasing trend. For year 1946, the 
trade growth was set to 0; for year 1947, the trade change was expressed by 
a yearly change between the year 1946 and 1947; and for year 1948 by 
summing the yearly change for years 1947 and 1948. Further on, the trade 
change was always calculated by summing the three last years.   
2.2.3. Gemstones – target state (“gemstones_x”)  
= existence of the known gemstone or diamond sites in the target 
state (scale 0, 1, 2) 
Main input variables:  
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• Gemstones presence dummies (“gemstones”) from the 
Gemstone dataset474 (1946-2005) (originally coded “Gemstone 12”….-32”) - 
These 11 variables represent separate dummies for existence of a specific 
gemstone type in particular country. The following gemstones are 
recorded: ruby, sapphire, emerald, aquamarine, heliodor, moganite, 
goshenite, nephrite, jadeite, lapis lazuli, opal, tourmaline, periodit, topaz, 
pearl, garnet, zircon, spinel, amber, and quartz. This variable excludes the 
diamonds.  
• Diamonds presence dummy (“diamonds”) from the 
Diamond dataset475 (1946-2005) (originally labeled “RES”) - This dummy 
variable indicates presence of the diamond deposits in particular country.  
Adjustments: 
Binary variables from the Gemstone dataset that indicate a presence of the 
different types of gemstones were grouped into a single dummy variable 
indicating a presence of at least one gemstone type in particular country. A 
similar procedure was then carried out with the variable from the Diamond 
dataset indicating a presence of the diamond sites in different countries. 
The two resulting binary variables were transformed into the scale of 0-2; 
where 0 indicates an absence of whatever sites with precious stones in the 
country, 1 = a presence of gemstones excluding the diamonds, 2 = a 
presence of the diamond sites in the country. The resulting scale thus 
indicates an increasing resource-strategic attractiveness of the country for 
any intervener: 
• 0 = no gemstones 
• 1 = gemstones other than diamonds 
• 2 = diamonds 
2.2.4. Oil and gas – target state (“oil_gas_x”)  
= existence of known oil or gas reserves in the target state (scale 
0, 1, 2, 3). 
Input variable:  
• Oil and/or gas presence (“oil_gas”) from the Petroleum 
Dataset v. 1.2476 (1945-2005) (originally labeled “RESINFO”) - This variable 
indicates a presence of the oil and gas reserves in the country. It is divided 
                                                            
474 Flöter, Lujala & Rød, 2007. 
475 Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala & Rød, 2005. 
476 Lujala, Rød & Thieme, 2007. 
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into two parts, separately tracing the oil and gas reserves located both 
offshore and onshore.  
Adjustments: 
First of all, the information contained in the variable “RESINFO” were 
transformed into the numerical values by weighting the economic 
importance of the sites in the following way: “gas”=1, “oil”=2, “oil and 
gas”=3. Afterwards, the data were grouped by the target country ccode to 
indicate the highest graded offshore and onshore hydrocarbon site in each 
country. Finally, values for both types of sites were joined together, 
choosing always the higher indicated value.  
• 0 = no oil or gas 
• 1 = only gas 
• 2 = only oil 
• 3 = both gas and oil 
2.3. Political side motivations  
2.3.1. Political intervention (“pol_int_x”) 
 = existence of an ongoing political intervention in the target 
country-year (range 0-1). 
• Political protective intervention dummy (“pol_int”) from 
the Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created from variable originally 
labeled “Affect policies or conditions in target” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, 
and “Affect policies or conditions in target” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This dummy variable indicates whether some international military 
intervention attempts to affect the domestic policies or conditions in 
the target state in particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as 
follows: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
2.3.2. Territorial intervention (“territ_int_x”)  
= existence of an ongoing territorial intervention in the target 
country-year (range 0-1). 
• Territorial intervention dummy (“territ_int”) from the Mil 
Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created from variable originally labeled 
“Territorial Intervention” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, and “Territorial 
Intervention” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This dummy variable codes 
whether there was an intervention with the main aim of acquisition or 
retention of the territory, delineation of frontiers, or specification of 
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sovereign status in particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded: 0 
= no, 1 = yes. 
2.3.3. Strategic intervention (“strat_int_x”)  
= existence of an ongoing strategic intervention in particular 
target country-year (range 0-1). 
• Strategic intervention dummy (“strat_int”) from the Mil 
Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created from variable originally labeled 
“Strategic Intervention” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, and “Strategic 
Intervention” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This dummy variable codes 
whether some military intervention attempts to restore a regional 
balance of powers or stability; or is led by the ideological motives in 
particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 = no, 1 = 
yes.   
2.3.4. Protective intervention (“protect_int_x”) 
 = existence of an ongoing protective intervention in particular 
target country-year (range 0-1). 
• Military/diplomatic protective intervention dummy 
(“protect_int”) from the Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created 
from variable originally labeled “Military/Diplomatic Protective 
Intervention” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, and “Military/Diplomatic Protective 
Intervention” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This dummy variable codes 
whether some military intervention attempted to protect own military 
and/or diplomatic interests and property inside or outside the target 
state in particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 
= no, 1 = yes.   
3. ‘Just authority’ index 
As in the case of ‘just intent’ index, ‘just authority’ index required information about 
characteristics of both the intervener and the target state. Therefore, the index was 
constructed based on the EUGene list of country dyads, while filtering out only the 
cases identified by the Mil Int dataset.  
3.1. Legitimacy of the intervener 
3.1.1. Democracy level - intervener (“dem_a_x”)  
= an averaged level of democracy in the countries intervening into 
the target state in particular year (range 2-20). 
• Polity IV score (“polity_IV”) from the DEM dataset (1946-2004) 
(originally labeled “polity”) - This variable indicates the Polity IV score 
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(without PARREG) that is adjusted to create a positive value ranging from 
2 to 20. 
Adjustments:  
The missing values were replaced with a middle value between the last 
known and the next known value in the time row for a particular country. 
In case that the identified middle value was not a natural number, the 
number was rounded down. In case that there was no observation for the 
country prior to the missing value, such as in the case that the missing 
value was caused by the fact that the country was still not identified as 
recognized by the DEM dataset, the value was left constant as in the first 
year available. If the country was not covered by the DEM dataset at all, 
the middle value 10 was attached so that the country is placed in the 
middle of the scale, demonstrating no extremes to either side. The only 
exceptions to this rule represent the multilateral interventions and the 
interventions led by some international organization. These were attached 
the value 20, since such interventions required a support from domestic 
constituencies in more countries to be waged. After removing all the 
missing values, the polity scores of all intervening countries were summed 
together and divided by the number of interveners so as to get the 
averaged level of democracy in the countries intervening into the target 
state in particular year. 
3.1.2. International organization leadership (“io_int_x”)  
= presence of an intervention led by the international 
organization in particular target country-year (range 0-1). 
Input variable: 
• International organization leadership dummy (“io_int”) from the 
Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (newly created from the variables 
originally labeled “Source of intervention” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, and 
“Source of intervention” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This dummy variable 
indicates a presence of some intervention led by the international 
organization in particular directed country dyad-year.       
Adjustments: 
The values were grouped into the target country-year observations using 
the MAXIMUM operator so as to indicate a presence of some intervention 
that was backed up by some international organization. 
3.1.3. UN leadership (“un_int_x”) 
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= presence of an intervention led by the UN in particular target 
country-year (range 0-1). 
Input variable: 
• COW ccode of the intervener (“ccode_a”)  
Adjustments: 
This variable was created by filtering out all the interventions led by the 
UN, which means the ones that were assigned the ccode for the intervener 
1000. UN interventions were coded with the value 1; all the remaining 
observations were denoted by 0. Afterwards, the values were grouped into 
the target country-year observations using the MAXIMUM operator so as 
to indicate a presence of the UN leadership in any military intervention in 
particular target country-year. 
3.2. Absence of legitimacy of the target state 
3.2.1. Democracy level - target state (“dem_b_x”)  
= level of democracy in particular target country-year (range 2-
20). 
• Polity IV score (“polity_IV”) from the DEM dataset (1946-2004) 
(originally labeled “polity”) - This variable indicates the Polity IV score 
(without PARREG) that is adjusted to create a positive value ranging from 
2 to 20. 
Adjustments:  
The missing values were removed according to the procedure described in 
the previous variable.  
3.2.2. Autocratization - target state (“autocratiz_b_x”)  
= existing autocratization in the target state in particular year 
(scale 1, 0, -1). 
Main input variables: 
• Autocratization dummy (“autoc_0”) from the DEM dataset (1946-
2004) (originally labeled “caut”) - This dummy variable indicates whether 
the country-year experiences an autocratization period. 
• Democratization dummy (“dem_0”) from the DEM dataset (1946-
2004) (originally labeled “cdem”) - This dummy variable indicates, 
whether the country-year experiences a democratization period. 
Reference variable: 
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• Polity IV score (“polity_IV”) from the DEM dataset (1946-2004) 
(originally labeled “polity”) - This variable indicates the Polity IV score 
(without PARREG) that is adjusted to create a positive value ranging from 
2 to 20. 
Adjustments:  
The variable “autocratiz_b_x” was created by merging the information 
from variables “autoc_0” and “dem_0”. The missing values were filled in 
by referring to the movement on the Polity scale in the reference variable 
“polity_IV” that has been already cleaned of the missing values in the 
previous steps. The variable “autocratiz_b_x” was coded in a way that the 
higher the autocratization of the regime is, the higher is the legitimacy of 
the intervention: 
• -1 = democratization 
• 0 = no regime change 
• 1 = autocratization 
4. ‘Last resort’ index 
‘Last resort’ index was constructed by calculating a percentage change in the ‘just 
cause’ index from the previous to the current year. It means that it is composed of 
the following input variables: 
• Battle deaths (“b_deaths_best_x”)  
• Genocide deaths (“genoc_deaths_x”)  
• Displaced population (“refug_x”)  
• Internal violence (“viol_x”)  
• State failure (“pitf_magn_sum_x”)  
• Rebellion (“rebel_x”)  
5. ‘Proportionality’ index 
‘Proportionality’ index was built on the EUGene list of country dyads, again 
filtering out only the cases when an ongoing intervention was identified based on 
the definition adopted by the Mil Int dataset. The dyadic data were grouped by the 
ccode of the target country and the year using the SUM operator, while 
simultaneously counting the number of interveners in each target country-year. In 
some variables, the summed values were then divided by the number of 
interveners so as to get the averaged value for the interveners. However, in some 
cases; the information for the whole conflict was more relevant and the summed 
value was left without being averaged.  
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5.1. Security threat 
5.1.1. Aggregate battle deaths on both sides (“battle_deaths_1x” + 
“battle_deaths_2x”) 
= a total number of the battle-related fatalities suffered by the 
interveners and the target state in particular target country-year 
(abs. no.; scale 1, 2, 3-8).  
Main input variables:  
• Best battle deaths estimate (“b_deaths_best”) from the ACD 
dataset (1946-2005) (originally labeled “bdeadbes”) - This variable sums the 
best estimates of the total battle-related fatalities resulting of all conflicts in 
particular country-year. Battle fatalities are defined as civilians and 
combatants killed in the course of combat. 
• Battle casualties of the target II (“b_deaths_bsum”) from the Mil 
Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (originally labeled “Number of battle casualties 
to the target” 1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Number of battle casualties to the 
target” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This variable indicates a total number of 
battle-related fatalities suffered by the target state associated with 
interventions of the intervener in particular directed country dyad-year. 
Whenever possible, the number includes both people killed and those being 
wounded, if the targets are camps or villages. It is coded: 0 = none, XXX = 
number of casualties (at least), 1000 = at least 1000 casualties. 
• Battle casualties of the intervener II (“b_deaths_asum”) from the 
Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (originally labeled “Number of battle 
casualties to the intervener” 1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Number of battle 
casualties to the intervener” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This variable indicates a 
total number of battle-related fatalities suffered by the intervener in 
particular directed country dyad-year. It sums the levels of casualties 
suffered by the intervener that are evaluated as follows: 0 = none, XXX = 
number of casualties (at least), 1000 = at least 1000 casualties.                    
Adjustments:  
First of all, the missing values in the input variables were corrected. The 
missing values in the main input variable “b_deaths_best” were replaced by 
a value of 25 battle-related fatalities. Rationale behind this value is the fact 
that the identification threshold of conflict in the ACD dataset is a minimum 
of 25 battle-related deaths over year. The cases not identified by the ACD 
dataset as fulfilling the threshold of an existing crisis were attached the 
value 0. The missing values in the Mil Int variables “b_deaths_bsum” and 
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“b_deaths_asum” were set to 0, since Mil Int dataset does not set any 
identification threshold based on fatalities.  
While estimating the aggregate number of battle-related deaths, it was 
important to take into consideration that the ACD variable indicates 
something slightly different than the Mil Int variables. ACD variable 
provides an aggregate total of the battle-related deaths associated with all 
the interveners in particular target country-year. On the other hand, Mil Int 
variables are constructed based on a dyadic structure, referring to each 
intervener separately. Therefore, they had to be treated differently during 
the merging process. While the ACD variable was just grouped by the 
MAXIMUM operator, values in the Mil Int variables were summed together 
and then grouped using the SUM operator into the target country-years. As 
a result of this restructuring, they started to indicate the same thing. While 
choosing the preferred value between the ACD and the summed Mil Int 
variables, the higher estimate for each country-year was selected. The 
resulting output indicates a total amount of battle-related causalities of all 
conflict participants in the target country-year, indicating thus the overall 
conflict severity. 
The input variable was constructed in two versions, one in absolute numbers 
and one scaled. The reason for keeping both of them is that the number of 
battle-related fatalities in the Mil Int dyad variables is not fully coherent. In 
fact, the indicated values are kept in absolute numbers only till the number 
999; since then, they indicate just a level over 1000 fatalities. Therefore, so as 
to harmonize the coding, apart from keeping the value in the absolute 
numbers, the second version of this variable was transformed into the below 
described scale.  
• 1 - 100 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 1 
• 101 - 500 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 2 
• 501 - 999 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 3 (number 999 is set as a border 
value) 
• 1000 - 5000 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 4 
• 5001 - 10000 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 5 
• 10001 - 50000 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 6 
• 50001 - 500000 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 7 
• 500001 – 1000000 (ACD or Mil Int dyad) = 8 
5.1.2. Battle deaths - interveners (“battle_deaths_a1x” + 
“battle_deaths_a2x”)  
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= a number of battle-related fatalities suffered by all interveners 
in particular target country-year (abs. no.; scale 1, 2, 3-8).  
• Battle casualties of the intervener II (“b_deaths_asum”) from the 
Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (originally labeled “Number of battle 
casualties to the intervener” 1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Number of battle 
casualties to the intervener” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This variable indicates 
a total number of battle-related suffered by the interveners in particular 
directed country dyad-year. It sums the levels of casualties suffered by the 
interveners that are evaluated as follows: 0 = none, XXX = number of 
casualties (at least), 1000 = at least 1000 casualties.                    
Adjustments: 
The missing values were set to 0. Afterwards, the casualties suffered by 
individual interveners in particular target country-year were summed but 
not divided by the number of interveners, so as to show a total number of 
lives lost and thus to depict how dangerous the conflict is to be intervened 
into. As in case of the previous variable, there were two versions of this 
variable created - one in absolute numbers and one scaled, using exactly 
the identical procedure a scale.  
5.1.3. International troops strength – target state (“int_strength_x”)  
= a total number of foreign soldiers being present in the target 
country-year (scale 0, 1, 2-51). 
Main input variable:  
• Troop number sum (“troop_no_sum”) from the Mil Int dyad 
dataset (1946-2005) (originally labeled “Amount of Troop Incursion” 1946-
1988 – Mil Int I, and “Amount of Troop Incursion” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This variable sums the levels of troop incursion initiated by the intervener 
in particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 = none, 1 
= 1-1000, 2 = 1001-5000, 3 = 5001-10000, 4 = 10000+.  
Adjustments: 
Before grouping the data, the missing values in the variable were replaced 
by the middle value on the scale, which is the value 2. After summing the 
levels for all interveners, the resulting values were not divided by the 
number of interveners. Rather they were left as aggregates, indicating the 
total number of foreign soldiers being present in the target country-year. 
The summed scales do not represent equal ranges, but disadvantage the 
stronger international presence in relation to the weaker one. 
5.1.4. Intervention frequency – target state (“int_freq_x”)  
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= a number of interventions in particular target country-year 
(abs. no.). 
Main input variable:  
• Number of interventions (“int_freq”) from the Mil Int dyad 
dataset (1946-2005) - This variable counts interventions in particular directed 
country dyad-year. 
Adjustments: 
The number of interventions repeatedly counts the same intervener, if he 
intervened more than once in particular target country-year, so as to depict 
the complexity of the conflict and its potential for drawing others, situation 
complicating interventions.   
5.1.5. Military strength of opposition – target state (“opp_strength_x”)  
= an average strength of opposition faced by the intervener in 
particular target country-year (range 0-4). 
Main input variable:  
• Military capability B (“mil_cap_b”) from the EUGene dyad 
dataset (1946-2001) (originally labeled “cap_2”) - This variable represents a 
COW Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) index for the 
country that is composed of six capability indicators: military personnel, 
military expenditures, energy production, iron/steel production, nominal 
urban population, and nominal total population.  
Reference variables:  
• Intervention supporting government dummy (“int_supp_gov”) 
from the Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created from variables originally 
labeled “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, 
and “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This 
dummy variable indicates a presence of an intervention supporting the 
government in particular country-year.    
• Intervention supporting rebels dummy (“int_supp_reb”) from the 
Mil Int dyad dataset (1946-2005) (created from variables originally labeled 
“Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 - Mil Int I, and 
“Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This 
dummy variable indicates a presence of an intervention supporting the 
opposition in particular country-year. 
Adjustments: 
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The missing values in the variable “mil_cap_b” were left constant as in the 
last available observation for a particular country. For example, the missing 
values for years 2002-2005 that fall out of the time coverage of the dataset 
were made constant as indicated in year 2001. The resulting values were 
grouped by the ccode of the target country and the year using the SUM 
operator. 
Variable “mil_cap_b” was not sufficient on its own to capture the 
expected strength of the opposition that the intervener could face.  For that 
purpose, the study utilized the reference dummy variables that indicate 
whether all interventions in particular target country-year supported just the 
government, supported just the rebels, or were mixed in their targeting. 
Different type of targeting was assigned a different multiplier effect that was 
used to adjust the military capability index: 
• Supporting rebels = 0,5*military capability of the target state index 
• Supporting government = 1*military capability of the target state 
index 
• Mixed target = 1,5*military capability of the target state index  
And finally, the multiplied values were divided by the number of 
interveners in particular target country-year, so as to get the average 
strength of opposition that the interveners faced. 
5.1.6. Alliance risk score - target state (“risk_b_x”)  
= a risk score indicating how vulnerable is the target state to a 
possible intervention by other states based on its alliance 
portfolio (range -1-1).  
Main input variable: 
• Tau-b risk score B (“risk_b_t”) from the EUGene dyad dataset 
(1946-2000) (originally labeled “riskT2”) - This variable indicates a risk score 
(measured in Tau-b) for the target state in a relevant region based on the 
sum of other states’ utilities toward the country. It shows whether the target 
state chooses to form an alliance portfolio that leaves it relatively vulnerable 
or relatively invulnerable to other states. The score ranges from –1 to +1; 
with –1 indicating a highly risk-averse actor, and a +1 indicating a highly 
risk-acceptant actor. An optimal security level is associated with the 
hypothetical alliance pattern that would leave the target state least 
vulnerable to defeat, i.e. in the best possible security position.  
Adjustments: 
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The missing values outside the time coverage of the variable were set 
constant as in the last recorded year.  
5.2. Force used 
5.2.1. Most violent troop activity - intervener (“troop_act_x”)  
= an averaged level of violence employed by the interveners in 
particular target country-year (range 0-5). 
Input variables:  
• Type of troop activity (“troop_act”) from the Mil Int dyad dataset 
(1946-2005) (originally labeled “Type of Troop Activity” 1946-1988 – Mil Int 
I, and “Type of Troop Activity” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This variable 
indicates the most violent type of troop activity applied by the intervening 
forces in particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 = 
none, 1 = evacuation of troops or personnel (any nationality), 2 = transport or 
negotiate-observe, 3 = patrol, guard, defend, 4 = intimidation, 5 = combat.  
• Intervention force type (“force_type_max”) from the Regan 1 
dataset (1946-1999) (originally labeled “clash”) - This variable records the 
most intensive type of force employed by the intervening country in 
particular target country-year.  It is coded as follows: 1 = single incident 
border clash, 2 = air attack and 3 = more general use of force beyond that of a 
single incident. 
Adjustments: 
The two input variables indicate slightly different things. The variable 
“troop_act” indicates the most violent type of troop activity carried out by a 
particular intervener in a given country-year; while the variable 
“force_type_max” groups the most violent activity of all interveners, 
depicting the most violent one. Therefore, they had to be treated differently 
in the grouping process into the target country-years. Variable “troop_act” 
was grouped using the SUM operator, while MAXIMUM operator was used 
for the variable “force_type_max”. Afterwards, the structure of the variables 
needed to be harmonized. The scale of the variable “force_type_max” was 
adjusted to become better combinable with the variable “troop_act” 
classification: 
• 0 (Regan 1) = 0 (Mil  Int) 
• 1 (Regan 1) =  1 (Mil  Int) 
• 2 (Regan 1) =  3 (Mil  Int) 
• 3 (Regan 1) =  5 (Mil  Int) 
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     After finishing the harmonization of the two variables, the higher 
estimated level of troop activity from the two variables was always selected 
as a preferred value for each country-year. In case that some value was 
indicated as missing, the value from the second variable was used. The 
remaining missing values not covered by any of the two datasets were 
attached a value that indicates the most common type of a military 
intervention, which is the value 2. Finally, the values were divided by the 
number of interveners so as to get the average of the most violent troop 
activity employed by all the interveners in particular target country-year.  
5.2.2. Aggregate violent troop activity - interveners (“troop_act_agr_x”) 
 = a sum of the most aggressive level of troop activity employed 
by all the interveners in particular target country-year (range 0-
12). 
Input variables:  
• Type of troop activity (“troop_act”) from the Mil Int dyad dataset 
(1946-2005) (originally labeled “Type of Troop Activity” 1946-1988 – Mil Int 
I, and “Type of Troop Activity” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This variable 
indicates the most violent type of troop activity applied by the intervening 
forces in particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 = 
none, 1 = evacuation of troops or personnel (any nationality), 2 = transport or 
negotiate-observe, 3 =patrol, guard, defend, 4 = intimidation, 5 = combat.  
• Intervention force type (“force_type_max”) from the Regan 1 
dataset (1946-1999) (originally labeled “clash”) - This variable records the 
most intensive type of force employed by the intervening country in 
particular target country-year.  It is coded as follows: 1 = single incident 
border clash, 2 = air attack and 3 = more general use of force beyond that of a 
single incident. 
Adjustments: 
In contrast to the previous indicator “troop_act_x”; the indicator 
“troop_act_agr_x” was generated using the MAXIMUM operator in the 
grouping process for both variables, and the resulting values were not 
divided by the number of interveners. Otherwise, the carried out 
replacement of the missing variables, and the selection of the higher 
resulting value was identical.  
5.2.3. Troop number – interveners (“troop_no_ax”)  
= an average number of troops sent by the interveners to the 
target state in particular year (range 0-6). 
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Main variable:  
• Troop number sum (“troop_no_sum”) from the Mil Int dyad 
dataset (1946-2005) (originally labeled “Amount of Troop Incursion” 1946-
1988 – Mil Int I, and “Amount of Troop Incursion” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This variable sums the level of troop incursion initiated by the intervener in 
particular directed country dyad-year. It is coded as follows: 0 = none, 1 = 1-
1000, 2 = 1001-5.000, 3 = 5001-10000, 4 = 10000+.  
Adjustments: 
This variable is similar to the “int_strength_x” indicator that describes the 
security threat in the first part of this index. However, this one is not 
capturing the total amount of foreign troops in the target country-year; but 
rather an average number of troops sent by the interveners. The variable was 
constructed by summing the amounts of external troops in particular target 
country-year, while not taking into to the consideration which country 
actually sent them. The resulting number was then divided by the number of 
interveners. As a result of this procedure, if one intervener sent troops more 
than once in a given year, the resulting value could reach a higher value 
than 4 (= the maximum level indicated in the coding of the input variable). 
Allowing the inflated impact of the repeated military actions by one actor 
reflects a concern that the repeatedly deployed troops suggest a major 
military devotion to the conflict or the target state and thus an intensified 
security threat. The missing values were again set to the middle value of the 
range of 0-4, which is the value 2.  
6. ‘Probability of success’ index 
‘Probability of success’ index was built on the EUGene list of country dyads. It is 
composed only of two control groups of variables, one indicating the probability of 
success based on the military strength of the target state and the other based on the 
complexity of the ongoing conflict. 
6.1. Probability of success based on the military strength of the target state 
6.1.1. Probability of success - intervener (“succ_a_x”)  
= an average probability of success of a military intervention 
waged by the interveners to the target state in particular year 
(range 0-1). 
• Probability of success A vs. B (Tau) (“succ_a_t”) from the EUGene 
dyad dataset (1946-2000) (originally labeled “wrTp1win”) - This variable 
represents a state A’s perception of the probability of success vs. state B. It 
is computed by combining the Tau-b scores, distance data, national 
capability data, and regional risk attitude scores to produce the estimates 
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of probability of success for state A in a military conflict against B, while 
taking into account the likely behavior of possible interveners.  
Adjustments: 
The values falling out of the time coverage of the input variable were left 
constant as in the last recorded year. The probability of success of the 
interventions led by some international organization or the multilateral 
interventions was set to the middle value of 50%, as well as the probability 
of success of the recently established countries, which fall out of the time 
spam of the dataset and which thus have no recorded observations. The 
probabilities associated with individual interveners in particular target 
country-year were summed and then divided by the number of interveners 
so as to represent an averaged probability of success of the actual 
interveners.  
6.1.2. Military strength of opposition – target state (“opp_strength_x”) 
= an average strength of the opposition faced by the intervener in 
particular target country-year (range 0-4). 
Input variable and adjustments:  
The variable “opp_strength_x” is constructed in a same way as the 
identically labeled variable in the section ‘proportionality’ index (5.1.5). 
6.1.3. Big power target state (“big_pow_b_x”)  
= target state is a major power (binary 0, 1). 
Input variable: 
• Major power B (“big_pow_b”) from the EUGene dyad dataset (1946-
2005) (originally labeled “majpow2”) - This dummy variable assigns a 
major power status to the target state. 
6.1.4. Risk score of the target state (“risk_b_x”)  
= risk score of the target state indicating how vulnerable its 
alliance portfolio leaves it to a possible intervention by other 
states (range -1-1).  
Input variable and adjustments:  
The variable “risk_b_x” is constructed in a same way as the identically 
labeled variable in the section ‘proportionality’ index (5.1.6). 
6.2. Probability of success based on the conflict complexity  
6.2.1. Political violence culture in the target state (“viol_cult_x”)  
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= a number of violent years relative to those peaceful ones in the 
target state since the year 1946 till the year of concern (range 0-1). 
Input variable: 
This variable counts the number of country-years identified by the ACD 
dataset as crossing the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. The counting 
is done in a cumulative way, starting with the year 1946 till the year of 
concern. Afterwards, the number is divided by the number of years that 
passed since 1946 till the intervention year that is being evaluated. The 
resulting value ranges on the scale form 0-1, where 0 means no occurrence 
of violence in any year, while 1 means that the violence was identified in 
each year previous to the year of concern. 
6.2.2. Just cause index (“just_cause_x”)  
= severity of the crisis in particular target country-year (range -
0.4-7.3). 
Input variable: 
This variable is a product of factor analysis applied to the JWT criterion of 
‘just cause’. 
6.2.3. Intervention frequency – target state (“int_freq_x”) 
 = a number of interventions in particular target country-year 
(abs. no.). 
Input variable and adjustments:  
The variable “int_freq_x” is constructed in a same way as the identically 
labeled variable in the section ‘proportionality’ index (5.1.4). 
 
RESULTS OF THE FACTOR ANALYSIS 
1. Construction of the components 
1.1. ‘Just cause’ index 
 
. describe battle_deaths_x genoc_deaths_x refug_x viol_x state_fail_x 
rebel_x 
                 storage  display      
variable name      type   format        variable label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
battle_deaths_x   byte   %8.0g    Battle deaths - target state 
genoc_deaths_x    float  %9.0g    Genocide deaths - target state 
refug_x           float  %9.0g    Displaced population - target state                                        
viol_x            byte   %8.0g    Internal violence - target state 
state_fail_x      float  %9.0g    State failure - target state 
rebel_x           float  %9.0g    Rebellion - target state 
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. summarize battle_deaths_x genoc_deaths_x refug_x viol_x state_fail_x 
rebel_x 
 
    Variable    |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
battle_deaths_x |     12000    .3744167    1.168693          0          7 
genoc_deatths_x |     12000    .0550417    .4134273          0          5 
        refug_x |     12000    .5312183     .992765          0          4 
         viol_x |     12000    .4505833    1.407322          0         10 
   state_fail_x |     12000    .2985417    1.111997          0         12 
        rebel_x |     12000    .4174361    1.135828          0          7 
 
• Sample is large enough to yield reliable estimates of the correlations 
among the variables: n = 12000. 
• There are no outliers among the cases, because the values are located 
within a limited scale: see the low standard deviations and the moderate 
minimal and maximal values. 
 
. corr  battle_deaths_x genoc_deaths_x refug_x viol_x state_fail_x rebel_x 
(obs=12000) 
 
             | battle~x genoc_~x  refug_x   viol_x state_~x  rebel_x 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
battle_dea~x |   1.0000 
genoc_deat~x |   0.3931   1.0000 
     refug_x |   0.4619   0.2741   1.0000 
      viol_x |   0.7748   0.5118   0.4805   1.0000 
state_fail_x |   0.6299   0.3585   0.4409   0.6776   1.0000 
     rebel_x |   0.6324   0.3295   0.4070   0.7014   0.5595   1.0000 
 
• Data seem convenient for PCA, since there is some visible degree of 
collinearity among the variables so as to generate the components, and this 
degree is also not extreme. Variables that correlate with each other do so 
because they are - as expected based on the theory - measuring related 
characteristics. 
 
. factor battle_deaths_x genoc_deaths_x refug_x viol_x state_fail_x rebel_x, 
pcf 
(obs=12000) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                    Number of obs    =    12000 
    Method: principal-component factors        Retained factors =        1 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                      Number of params =        6 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Factor1  |      3.61144      2.85798            0.6019       0.6019 
      Factor2  |      0.75346      0.10047            0.1256       0.7275 
      Factor3  |      0.65299      0.21494            0.1088       0.8363 
      Factor4  |      0.43805      0.08816            0.0730       0.9093 
      Factor5  |      0.34989      0.15573            0.0583       0.9676 
      Factor6  |      0.19417            .            0.0324       1.0000 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(15) = 3.5e+04  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
  
• 6 components were extracted, the same as the number of variables 
factored. 
• Kaiser test of component retention = retain 1 component: 
o Only one component accounts for more than 1.0 unit of variance 
(have an eigenvalue λ > 1.0) and was retained (Kaiser test).  
o 1st component has an eigenvalue = 3.61. Since this is greater than 
1.0, it explains more variance than a single variable, in fact 3.61 
times as much. This component explains 3.61/6*100 = 60.19% of 
variance. 
o The remaining 5 components have eigenvalues lower than 1.0. 
Since they explain less variance than a single variable, they were 
dropped prior to rotation. 
. screeplot 
 
• Cattell screeplot test of component retention = retain 1 component (same 
result as Kaiser test). 
o Components are retained till the point where the plot begins to 
level off, the additional components explain less variance than a 
single variable.  
• Final decision: 1 retained component.  
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• Cumulative variance explained: 60.19%. 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    -------------------------------------------- 
           Variable |  Factor1 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------------------------------------- 
    battle_deaths_x |   0.8598 |      0.2608   
    genoc_deathts_x |   0.5867 |      0.6558   
            refug_x |   0.6417 |      0.5882   
             viol_x |   0.9115 |      0.1692   
       state_fail_x |   0.8040 |      0.3535   
            rebel_x |   0.7993 |      0.3611   
    ------------------------------------------- 
 
• The component matrix indicates the correlation of each variable with the 
retained component: products are component loadings. 
• Loadings of variables in the pattern and component label: 
o 1st component = ‘Just cause index’ (just_cause_x) 
 battle_deaths_ x  - component loading = 0.8598 (‘strong’) 
 genoc_deaths_x - component loading = 0.5867 (‘moderate’) 
 refug_x - component loading = 0.6417 (‘strong’) 
 viol_x - component loading = 0.9115 (‘strong’) 
 state_fail_x - component loading = 0.7993 (‘strong’) 
• Component interpretation:  
o 1st component = ‘Just cause index’  
 All variables provide complementary information about 
the increasing complexity of the ongoing crisis.  
• The retained component is stable, since it has mostly strong loadings and it 
was calculated based on a large amount of observations and variables. 
 
. rotate & rotate, promax 
 
• Orthogonal and oblique rotations with just one retained component 
produce exactly the same component loadings as unrotated component 
solution. Therefore, rotations are not necessary. 
 
. predict just_cause_x 
 
(regression scoring assumed) 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression; based on varimax rotated factors) 
 
    ---------------------------- 
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         Variable   |  Factor1  
    ---------------------------- 
    battle_deaths_x |  0.23807  
     genoc_deaths_x |  0.16245  
            refug_x |  0.17769  
             viol_x |  0.25238  
       state_fail_x |  0.22264  
            rebel_x |  0.22134  
    --------------------------- 
 
• A new latent variable representing the ‘just cause’ index: just_cause_x was 
created based on the above stated component scores.  
 
1.2. ‘Just intent’ index 
 
. describe hum_int_x util_achb_x joint_hist_x alliance_x strat_int_x 
pol_int_x territ_int_x protect_int_x tot_trade_x oil_gas_x gemstones_x 
trade_growth_x 
 
                 storage  display     
variable name      type   format        variable label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
hum_int_x          float  %9.0g       Humanitarian intervention 
util_achb_x        float  %9.0g       Intervener's utility 
joint_hist_x       float  %9.0g       Joint history 
alliance_x         float  %9.0g       Alliance 
strat_int_x        float  %9.0g       Strategic intervention 
pol_int_x          float  %9.0g       Political intervention 
territ_int_x       float  %9.0g       Territorial intervention 
protect_int_x      float  %9.0g       Protective intervention 
tot_trade_x        float  %9.0g       Trade importance – target state 
oil_gas_x          float  %9.0g       Oil and gas – target state 
gemstones_x        float  %9.0g       Gemstones – target state 
trade_growth_x     double %10.0g      Trade growth – target state 
 
. summarize hum_int_x util_achb_x joint_hist_x alliance_x strat_int_x 
pol_int_x territ_int_x protect_int_x tot_trade_x oil_gas_x gemstones_x 
trade_growth_x 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   hum_int_x |      1695    .2646819    .3921225          0          1 
 util_achb_x |      1695    .5127566    .5268714   -.995054   1.880163 
joint_hist_x |      1695    .8749737    1.099483          0          3 
alliance_x |      1695    -.557479     .372723         -1   .0580525 
 strat_int_x |      1695    .6608029    .4266632          0          1 
   pol_int_x |      1695    .5932676    .4658745          0          1 
territ_int_x |      1695    .3682534    .4495082          0          1 
protect_in~x |      1695     .146334    .3120802          0          1 
 tot_trade_x |      1695    1.605327    1.193494          0          6 
   oil_gas_x |      1695    1.496238    1.240954          0          3 
 gemstones_x |      1695    .5429985    .6449638          0          2 
trade_grow~x |      1695     1204.22    9220.458  -77092.39   217601.8 
 
• Sample is large enough to yield reliable estimates of the correlations 
among the variables: n = 1695. 
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• There are no outliers among the cases, because the values are mainly 
located within limited scales: see the low standard deviations and the 
moderate minimal and maximal values. 
o The only higher standard deviation is visible in case of trade 
growth, which is not scaled but kept in absolute values. However, 
the reported deviations are defendable based on theory. 
• Many of the variables were originally binary, which is not the most 
appropriate data structure for the PCA. However, during the data merging 
from the dyadic country-year data into target country-year data, the values 
assigned to individual interveners were summed and then divided by 
number of interveners in particular target country-year, so as to get the 
average intent of intervener. Therefore, even though the variables were 
originally binary, averaging set the value somewhere on the range of 0-1. 
 
. corr hum_int_x util_achb_x joint_hist_x alliance_x strat_int_x pol_int_x 
territ_int_x protect_int_x tot_trade_x oil_gas_x gemstones_x trade_growth_x 
(obs=1695) 
 
             | hum_in~x util_a~x joint_~x allian~x strat_~x pol_in~x 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
   hum_int_x |   1.0000 
 util_achb_x |  -0.4079   1.0000 
joint_hist_x |  -0.2748   0.2906   1.0000 
  alliance_x |   0.6304  -0.4943  -0.4246   1.0000 
 strat_int_x |  -0.3859   0.2454   0.1364  -0.2120   1.0000 
   pol_int_x |   0.1178   0.0856   0.1687   0.1285  -0.1239   1.0000 
territ_int_x |  -0.1721   0.1080   0.1976  -0.1096  -0.1330   0.2422 
protect_in~x |  -0.0572   0.0854   0.0029   0.0793   0.1901   0.0676 
 tot_trade_x |  -0.0443  -0.0868  -0.1058   0.0350  -0.1174  -0.0306 
   oil_gas_x |  -0.0369   0.0109  -0.0921   0.0604  -0.0817   0.0824 
 gemstones_x |  -0.0193  -0.0139  -0.0431  -0.0797  -0.0339  -0.0766 
trade_grow~x |  -0.0200  -0.0023   0.0416  -0.0362  -0.0302  -0.0844 
 
             | territ~x protec~x tot_tr~x oil_ga~x gemsto~x trade_~x 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
territ_int_x |   1.0000 
protect_in~x |   0.0801   1.0000 
 tot_trade_x |   0.0736  -0.0800   1.0000 
   oil_gas_x |   0.2389  -0.0423   0.5628   1.0000 
 gemstones_x |   0.0348  -0.0229   0.1932   0.2222   1.0000 
trade_grow~x |   0.0431  -0.0289   0.2954   0.1192   0.0636   1.0000 
 
• Data seem convenient for PCA, since there is some visible degree of 
collinearity among the variables to facilitate calculation of the components. 
Also these correlations are not extreme. Variables that correlate with each 
other do so because they - as expected based on the theory - measure 
related characteristics. 
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. factor hum_int_x util_achb_x joint_hist_x alliance_x strat_int_x pol_int_x 
territ_int_x protect_int_x tot_trade_x oil_gas_x gemstones_x trade_growth_x, 
pcf 
(obs=1695) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                 Number of obs    =     1695 
    Method: principal-component factors     Retained factors =        4 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                   Number of params =       42 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Factor |    Eigenvalue    Difference       Proportion   Cumulative 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Factor1  |      2.51071      0.60991            0.2092       0.2092 
   Factor2  |      1.90080      0.46435            0.1584       0.3676 
   Factor3  |      1.43645      0.30290            0.1197       0.4873 
   Factor4  |      1.13354      0.16284            0.0945       0.5818 
   Factor5  |      0.97071      0.11311            0.0809       0.6627 
   Factor6  |      0.85760      0.07852            0.0715       0.7342 
   Factor7  |      0.77908      0.10480            0.0649       0.7991 
   Factor8  |      0.67427      0.07738            0.0562       0.8553 
   Factor9  |      0.59689      0.09089            0.0497       0.9050 
   Factor10 |      0.50601      0.15086            0.0422       0.9472 
   Factor11 |      0.35515      0.07634            0.0296       0.9768 
   Factor12 |      0.27880            .            0.0232       1.0000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(66) = 3864.50  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
• 12 components were extracted, the same as the number of variables 
factored. 
• Kaiser test of component retention = retain 4 components: 
o 4 components account for more than 1.0 unit of variance (have an 
eigenvalue λ > 1.0) and were thus retained (Kaiser test).  
o 1st component has an eigenvalue = 2.51071. Since this is greater 
than 1.0, it explains more variance than a single variable, in fact 
2.51 times as much. This component explains 2.51/12*100 = 20.92% 
of variance. 
o 2nd component has an eigenvalue = 1.90080. This component 
explains 1.9/12*100 = 15.84% of variance. 
o 3rd component has an eigenvalue = 1.43645. This component 
explains 1.44/12*100 = 11.97% of variance. 
o 4th component has an eigenvalue = 1.13354. This component 
explains 1.13/12*100 = 9.45% of variance. 
o The remaining 5 components have eigenvalues lower than 1.0. Due 
to the fact that they explain less variance than a single variable, 
they were dropped prior to rotation. 
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. screeplot 
 
 
• Cattell screeplot test of component retention: 
o Result is unclear. The curve is flattening gradually and it is 
difficult to determine from the graph, where the plot begins to 
level off. Retaining 4 components suggested by the Kaiser test are 
nevertheless a plausible possibility based on the graph = retain 4 
components.  
• Final decision: 4 retained components.  
• Cumulative variance explained: 58.18%. 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable    |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4 |  Uniqueness  
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    hum_int_x   |  -0.7950   -0.1550    0.1757   -0.0664 |     0.3087   
  util_achb_x   |   0.7081    0.0387    0.1000    0.0398 |     0.4855   
 joint_hist_x   |   0.5989    0.0002    0.3340   -0.2661 |     0.4589   
   alliance_x   |  -0.8213   -0.1046    0.1400    0.2737 |     0.2201   
  strat_int_x   |   0.5025   -0.2002   -0.3269    0.4742 |     0.3756   
    pol_int_x   |  -0.0289    0.0614    0.7951    0.0630 |     0.3593   
 territ_int_x   |   0.2128    0.3955    0.6029    0.0285 |     0.4340   
 protect_int_x  |   0.1123   -0.1313    0.1698    0.8342 |     0.2455   
  tot_trade_x   |  -0.1505    0.7997   -0.1812    0.0806 |     0.2985   
    oil_gas_x   |  -0.1004    0.7976    0.0532    0.2006 |     0.3107   
  gemstones_x   |  -0.0106    0.4315   -0.2286    0.0446 |     0.7594   
 trade_growth_x |   0.0033    0.4299   -0.2126   -0.0872 |     0.7624   
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
• Unrotated patterns were rotated to clarify the component patterns: 
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. rotate 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                  Number of obs    =    1695 
   Method: principal-component factors       Retained factors =       4 
   Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)  Number of params =      42 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Factor1  |      2.45339      0.58320            0.2044       0.2044 
   Factor2  |      1.87019      0.41259            0.1558       0.3603 
   Factor3  |      1.45761      0.25729            0.1215       0.4818 
   Factor4  |      1.20031            .            0.1000       0.5818 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(66) = 3864.50  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4 |   Uniqueness  
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hum_int_x |  -0.8016   -0.0969    0.0847   -0.1795 |      0.3087   
   util_achb_x |   0.6771   -0.0544    0.1587    0.1669 |      0.4855   
  joint_hist_x |   0.5900   -0.1737    0.3804   -0.1344 |      0.4589   
    alliance_x |  -0.8710    0.0239    0.0483    0.1358 |      0.2201   
   strat_int_x |   0.4212   -0.1099   -0.3293    0.5714 |      0.3756   
     pol_int_x |  -0.1134   -0.0546    0.7867    0.0769 |      0.3593   
  territ_int_x |   0.1914    0.2632    0.6778    0.0275 |      0.4340   
  protect_in~x |  -0.0588   -0.0112    0.1310    0.8566 |      0.2455   
   tot_trade_x |  -0.0350    0.8312   -0.0479   -0.0840 |      0.2985   
     oil_gas_x |  -0.0302    0.8078    0.1825    0.0510 |      0.3107   
   gemstones_x |   0.0633    0.4617   -0.1487   -0.0364 |      0.7594   
  trade_grow~x |   0.0959    0.4313   -0.1289   -0.1606 |      0.7624   
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  
    -------------+------------------------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.9728  -0.1170   0.0772   0.1845  
         Factor2 |  0.1316   0.9619   0.1793  -0.1592  
         Factor3 | -0.1047  -0.1620   0.9804   0.0390  
         Factor4 | -0.1594   0.1868  -0.0248   0.9691  
    -------------------------------------------------- 
 
• The pattern matrix indicates the correlation of each variable with the 
retained components: products are component loadings. 
• Assignment of variables to individual patterns, loadings of variables in the 
pattern and the respective component labels: 
o 1st component = ‘Humanitarian motivation’ (hum_motive_x) 
 hum_int_x  - component loading = -0.8016 (‘strong’) 
 util_achb_x  - component loading = 0.6771 (‘strong’) 
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 joint_hist_ x - component loading = 0.5900 (‘moderate’) 
 alliance_x - component loading = -0.8710 (‘strong’) 
o 2nd component = ‘Economic motivation’ (econ_motive_x) 
 tot_trade_x - component loading = 0.8312 (‘strong’) 
 oil_gas_x - component loading = 0.8078 (‘strong’) 
 gemstones_x - component loading = 0.4617 (‘moderate’) 
 trade_growth_x - component loading = 0.4313 (‘moderate’) 
o 3rd component = ‘Political motivation I’ (pol_motive_1x) 
 pol_int_x - component loading = 0.7867 (‘strong’) 
 territ_int_x - component loading = 0.6778 (‘strong’) 
o 4th component = ‘Political motivation II’ (pol_motive_2x) 
 protect_int_x - component loading =  0.8566 (‘strong’) 
 strat_int_x - component loading =  0.5714 (‘moderate’) 
• Interpretation of the components: 
o 1st component interpretation = ‘Humanitarian motivation’: 
 Variables building the component relate to directly to 
humanitarian motives and mutual ties that encourage 
feelings of humanitarianism. 
• The higher the utility the intervener has from 
changing the situation in the target state, the less 
humanitarian the motivation of the intervener is.   
• If the target state shared the common history with 
the intervening state, the motives behind 
intervention do not tend to be humanitarian. 
• The greater similarity of alliance portfolio between 
the intervener and the target state, the greater 
humanitarianism does the intervener show. 
o 2nd component interpretation = ‘Economic motivation’ (control 
group of ‘humanitarian motivation’): 
 The component represents economic side motives of the 
interveners. The more economic importance the target 
country has the less humanitarian the motivations behind 
interventions tend to be. 
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o 3rd and 4th component interpretation= ‘Political motivation I’ and 
‘Political motivation II’ (control groups of ‘humanitarian 
motivation’): 
 These two components represent political side motives the 
intervener, which go against the humanitarian motivation.   
• There is just one cross-loading variable: strat_int_x, but the second variable 
in the component is strong enough to make the component stable. The 
correctness of the assignment of the variable will be tested by oblique 
rotation yet. 
• A component with fewer than three variables could be weak and unstable. 
Theoretically, the minimum of three strongly loading variables is indicated 
as being desirable to indicate a solid component. However, the number of 
variables can be reduced while still maintaining a strong component, if 
there is a large data set behind the calculation, which is the case. 
• The retained components are stable, since they have mostly strong 
loadings and were calculated based on a large amount of observations and 
many variables. 
 
. rotate, promax 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                    Number of obs    =     1695 
    Method: principal-component factors        Retained factors =        4 
    Rotation: oblique promax (Horst off)       Number of params =       42 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Factor  |     Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Factor1  |      2.47921       0.2066 
  Factor2  |      1.87965       0.1566 
  Factor3  |      1.45873       0.1216 
  Factor4  |      1.27084       0.1059 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(66) = 3864.50  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+----------------------------------------+-------------- 
       hum_int_x |   0.7938   -0.1065    0.0894   -0.1367 |      0.3087   
     util_achb_x |  -0.6638   -0.0413    0.1520    0.1292 |      0.4855   
    joint_hist_x |  -0.5973   -0.1764    0.3601   -0.1727 |      0.4589   
      alliance_x |   0.8906    0.0352    0.0705    0.1931 |      0.2201   
     strat_int_x |  -0.3818   -0.0800   -0.3176    0.5422 |      0.3756   
       pol_int_x |   0.1397   -0.0334    0.7922    0.0995 |      0.3593   
    territ_int_x |  -0.1742    0.2801    0.6845    0.0442 |      0.4340   
    protect_in~x |   0.1378    0.0483    0.1670    0.8761 |      0.2455   
     tot_trade_x |   0.0270    0.8291   -0.0270   -0.0429 |      0.2985   
       oil_gas_x |   0.0396    0.8193    0.2086    0.0978 |      0.3107   
     gemstones_x |  -0.0704    0.4586   -0.1385   -0.0210 |      0.7594   
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    trade_grow~x |  -0.1137    0.4202   -0.1252   -0.1503 |      0.7624   
    --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Factor4  
    -------------+------------------------------------ 
         Factor1 | -0.9835  -0.1323   0.0972   0.2717  
         Factor2 | -0.1220   0.9627   0.1667  -0.2156  
         Factor3 |  0.0863  -0.1892   0.9799   0.0039  
         Factor4 |  0.1024   0.1408  -0.0504   0.9379  
    -------------------------------------------------- 
 
• Oblique rotation confirmed attaching the variable strategic intervention 
into the 4th rather than 1st component. Otherwise, the results of both types 
of rotations produce more or less the same results.  
 
. predict hum_motive_x econ_motive_x pol_motive_1x pol_motive_2x 
(regression scoring assumed) 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression; based on varimax rotated 
factors) 
  ------------------------------------------------------ 
     Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3   Factor4  
     -------------------------------------------------------- 
       hum_int_x | -0.32222  -0.07213   0.08230  -0.09744  
     util_achb_x |  0.26417  -0.01815   0.09283   0.08550  
    joint_hist_x |  0.24511  -0.10931   0.25226  -0.17442  
      alliance_x | -0.37413   0.01466   0.05443   0.18620  
         strat_x |  0.13801  -0.00973  -0.23690   0.45024  
       pol_int_x | -0.07378  -0.04686   0.54619   0.06816  
    territ_int_x |  0.06188   0.12694   0.45474   0.02328  
    protect_in~x | -0.09524   0.04660   0.08875   0.73700  
     tot_trade_x | -0.00107   0.44541  -0.05462  -0.01404  
       oil_gas_x | -0.01576   0.43535   0.10408   0.09877  
     gemstones_x |  0.03617   0.25200  -0.11663  -0.00501  
    trade_grow~x |  0.05879   0.22701  -0.10254  -0.11605  
    ------------------------------------------------------ 
 
• Four new latent variables composing the ‘just intent’ index: hum_motive_x, 
econ_motive_x, pol_motive_1x and pol_motive_2x were created based on 
the above calculated component scores.  
 
1.3. ‘Just authority’ index 
 
. describe dem_a_x dem_b_x aurocratiz_b_x io_int_x un_int_x 
 
               storage  display      
variable name    type   format         variable label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dem_a_x          float  %9.0g     Democracy level - intervener                                     
dem_b_x          byte   %8.0g     Democracy level - target state                                                
aurocratiz_b_x   byte   %8.0g     Autocratization - target state                                                
io_int_x         byte   %8.0g     International organization leadership                                                
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un_int_x         byte   %8.0g     UN leadership  
 
. summarize dem_a_x dem_b_x aurocratiz_b_x io_int_x un_int_x 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     dem_a_x |      1695    13.44874    6.153513          2         20 
     dem_b_x |      1695    8.880236    5.617096          2         20 
aurocratiz~x |      1695   -.0076696    .1926946         -1          1 
    io_int_x |      1695    .3952802    .4890551          0          1 
    un_int_x |      1695    .3374631    .4729839          0          1 
 
• Sample is large enough to yield reliable estimates of the correlations 
among the variables: n = 1695. 
• There are no outliers among the cases, because the values are located 
within limited ranges: see the low standard deviations and the moderate 
minimal and maximal values. 
• Two of the variables were originally binary, which is not the most 
appropriate data structure for the PCA. However, during the data merging 
from the dyadic country-year data into target country-year data, the values 
assigned to individual interveners were summed and then divided by 
number of interveners in particular target country-year, so as to get the 
average authority behind the intervention. Therefore, even though the 
variables were originally binary, averaging set the value somewhere on the 
range of 0-1. 
 
. corr dem_a_x dem_b_x aurocratiz_b_x io_int_x un_int_x 
(obs=1695) 
 
             |  dem_a_x  dem_b_x aurocr~x io_int_x un_int_x 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
     dem_a_x |   1.0000 
     dem_b_x |   0.2233   1.0000 
aurocratiz~x |  -0.0185  -0.1454   1.0000 
    io_int_x |   0.5539   0.2173  -0.0242   1.0000 
    un_int_x |   0.4849   0.1648  -0.0364   0.8827   1.0000 
 
• There is some degree of collinearity among the variables to facilitate 
calculation of the components. In most of the cases, these correlations are 
not extreme. The only exception is correlation between variables io_int_x 
and un_int_x, which is rather high. This is caused by partially by a similar 
data structure division, but especially by the fact that one is a subset of the 
other and thus the correlation makes sense theoretically as well.477  
 
                                                            
477 When one of the correlated variables was dropped, the patterns identified by the PCA were very 
similar. Both variables were thus retained due to their theoretical significance in the model.  
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. factor dem_a_x dem_b_x aurocratiz_b_x io_int_x un_int_x, pcf 
(obs=1695) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs    =     1695 
    Method: principal-component factors    Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                  Number of params =        9 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference   Proportion   Cumulative 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Factor1  |      2.38960      1.29706   0.4779       0.4779 
        Factor2  |      1.09254      0.26111   0.2185       0.6964 
        Factor3  |      0.83144      0.25704   0.1663       0.8627 
        Factor4  |      0.57439      0.46237   0.1149       0.9776 
        Factor5  |      0.11203            .   0.0224       1.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(10) = 3331.56  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
• 5 components were extracted, the same as the number of variables 
factored. 
• Kaiser test of component retention = retain 2 components: 
o 2 components account for more than 1.0 unit of variance (have an 
eigenvalue λ > 1.0) and were thus retained (Kaiser test).  
o 1st component has an eigenvalue = 2.38960. Since this is greater 
than 1.0, it explains more variance than a single variable, in fact 
2.39 times as much. This component explains 2.39/5*100 = 47.79% 
of variance. 
o 2nd component has an eigenvalue = 1.09254. This component 
explains 1.09/5*100 = 21.85% of variance. 
o The remaining 3 components have eigenvalues lower than 1.0. Due 
to the fact that they explain less variance than a single variable, 
they were dropped prior to rotation. 
 
. screeplot 
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• Cattell screeplot test of component retention = retain 1 component (Kaiser 
test suggests 2). 
o The data were run both with 1 and 2 components retained. After 
rotation, the data with 2 components had a cleaner structure and 
were better reflecting the theory. Therefore, two components were 
retained.  
• Final decision: 2 retained components.  
• Cumulative variance explained: 69.64%. 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
         dem_a_x |   0.7477    0.0434 |      0.4390   
         dem_b_x |   0.3818   -0.5968 |      0.4980   
    aurocratiz~x |  -0.0897    0.8311 |      0.3012   
        io_int_x |   0.9310    0.1382 |      0.1141   
        un_int_x |   0.8999    0.1570 |      0.1655   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
• Unrotated patterns were rotated to clarify the factor (component) patterns: 
 
. rotate 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                 Number of obs    =     1695 
  Method: principal-component factors       Retained factors =        2 
  Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)  Number of params =        9 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference    Proportion   Cumulative 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Factor1  |      2.34423      1.20632     0.4688       0.4688 
        Factor2  |      1.13791            .     0.2276       0.6964 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(10) = 3331.56  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
         dem_a_x |   0.7426   -0.0972 |      0.4390   
         dem_b_x |   0.2635   -0.6577 |      0.4980   
    aurocratiz~x |   0.0674    0.8332 |      0.3012   
        io_int_x |   0.9404   -0.0383 |      0.1141   
        un_int_x |   0.9134   -0.0141 |      0.1655   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  
    -------------+------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.9824  -0.1870  
         Factor2 |  0.1870   0.9824  
    -------------------------------- 
 
• The pattern matrix indicates the correlation of each variable with the 
retained components: products are component loadings. 
• Assignment of variables to individual patterns, loadings of variables in the 
pattern and the respective component labels: 
o 1st component = ‘Legitimacy of the intervener’ (‘legit_a_x’) 
 dem_a_x  - component loading = 0.7426 (‘strong’) 
 io_int_x  - component loading = 0.9404 (‘strong’) 
 un_int_x - component loading = 0.9134 (‘strong’) 
o 2nd component = ‘Absence of legitimacy of the target state’ 
(‘legit_b_x’) 
 dem_b_x - component loading = -0.6577 (‘strong’) 
 autocratiz_b_x - component loading = 0.8332 (‘strong’) 
• Interpretation of the components: 
o 1st component interpretation = ‘Legitimacy of the intervener’: 
 Variables building the component describe legitimacy of 
the intervener. They thus indicate, whether the intervener 
had authority to make a ‘just’ decision to intervene.  
 The higher degree of democracy and presence of 
international intervention increase legitimacy = authority 
of the intervener. 
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o 2nd component interpretation = ‘Absence of legitimacy of the 
target state’: 
 The two variables describe lack of legitimacy of the 
government of the target state. It reflects, whether the 
sovereignty of the country can be justly questioned.  
 The two variables logically go into opposite directions. 
The lower level of democracy of the target state increases 
authorization of some third party to intervene into 
domestic affairs of such a state. In contrast to that presence 
of regime autocratization in the target country increases 
the authority of any third-party intervention. 
• There is no cross-loading variable with loading higher than 0.3. 
• 2nd component is based just on two observed variables, but their loadings 
are strong and calculated based on a large dataset. Therefore, component 
should be stable. 
 
. rotate, promax 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                  Number of obs   =    1695 
    Method: principal-component factors      Retained factors =      2 
    Rotation: oblique promax (Horst off)     Number of params =      9 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Proportion    Factors are correlated 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Factor1  |      2.37315       0.4746 
        Factor2  |      1.19840       0.2397 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(10) = 3331.56  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
         dem_a_x |   0.7405   -0.0417 |      0.4390   
         dem_b_x |   0.1985   -0.6461 |      0.4980   
    aurocratiz~x |   0.1539    0.8492 |      0.3012   
        io_int_x |   0.9465    0.0330 |      0.1141   
        un_int_x |   0.9217    0.0555 |      0.1655   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  
    -------------+------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.9936  -0.2857  
         Factor2 |  0.1126   0.9583  
    -------------------------------- 
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• Both orthogonal and oblique rotations produce similar results. As 
component correlation matrix suggests, there is just a little mutual 
correlation between the two components.  
 
. predict legit_a_x legit_b_x 
(regression scoring assumed) 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression; based on varimax rotated factors) 
    ---------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2  
    -------------+-------------------- 
         dem_a_x |  0.31481  -0.01950  
         dem_b_x |  0.05481  -0.56651  
    aurocratiz~x |  0.10541   0.75429  
        io_int_x |  0.40640   0.05143  
        un_int_x |  0.39683   0.07069  
    ---------------------------------- 
 
• Two new latent variables: legit_a_x and legit_b_x composing the ‘just 
authority’ index were created based on the above calculated component 
scores.  
 
1.4. ‘Last resort’ index 
‘Last resort’ index was calculated by counting a yearly change in the ‘just cause’ 
index (newly generated factor just_cause_x) from the previous to the current year. 
 
1.5. ‘Proportionality’ index 
 
. describe opp_strength_x battle_deaths_1x battle_deaths_2x 
battle_deaths_b1x battle_deaths_b2x int_strength_x int_freq_x risk_b_x 
troop_act_x troop_act_agr_x troop_no_ax 
 
variable        storage  display   
name            type     format         variable label 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                     
opp_strength_x    float  %9.0g  Strength of opposition – target state                                              
battle_deaths_1x  long   %12.0g Aggregate battle deaths – both(abs.no.)                                              
battle_deaths_2x  byte   %8.0g  Aggregate battle deaths – both(scaled)                                                
battle_deaths_a1x int    %8.0g  Battle deaths – interveners(abs.no.)                                                 
battle_deaths_a2x byte   %8.0g  Battle deaths – interveners(scaled)                                                
int_strength_x    byte   %8.0g  Int. troops strength - target state 
int_freq_x        byte   %8.0g  Intervention frequency – target state 
risk_b_x          float  %9.0g  Alliance risk score – target state                                                
troop_act_x       float  %9.0g  Most violent troop act - intervener                                                 
troop_act_agr_x   byte   %8.0g  Aggr. violent troop act - intervener                                                
troop_no_ax      float   %9.0g  Troop number - intervener 
 
. summarize opp_strength_x battle_deaths_1x battle_deaths_2x 
battle_deaths_b1x battle_deaths_b2x int_strength_x int_freq_x risk_b_x 
troop_act_x troop_act_agr_x troop_no_ax 
 
 Variable        |   Obs       Mean    Std. Dev.       Min       Max 
----------------------------------------------------------------------    
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opp_streng~x  (1)|   1695    .0072785    .0233198   3.50e-06    .363988 
battle_de~1x  (2)|   1695    14439.41    87081.64          0    1505776 
battle_de~2x  (3)|   1695    2.093805    2.154056          0          8 
battle_d~a1x  (4)|   1695       218.2    1192.709          0      23557 
battle_d~a2x  (5)|   1695    .8660767    1.205703          0          6 
int_streng~x  (6)|   1695    3.515044    4.326913          0         51 
  int_freq_x  (7)|   1695     1.80354    2.110241          1         37 
    risk_b_x  (8)|   1695    .5416336    .2647924   -.622892          1 
 troop_act_x  (9)|   1695     3.19176    1.505224          0          5 
troop_ac~r_x (10)|   1695    3.700885    1.644164          0         12 
 troop_no_ax (11)|   1695    1.870722    1.106529          0          7 
 
• Sample is large enough to yield reliable estimates of the correlations 
among the variables: n = 1695. 
• In most of the variables, there are no outliers among the cases, since the 
values are located within limited ranges: see the low standard deviations 
and the moderate minimal and maximal values. 
o The only possible candidates for outliers are variables: 
battle_deaths_1x and battle_deaths_a1x that indicate fatalities in 
absolute values. For that reason, to limit possibility of outliers and 
consequences of imprecise information from the war zones, both 
variables were kept also as scales, depreciating the higher 
values.478  
 
. corr opp_strength_x battle_deaths_1x battle_deaths_2x battle_deaths_b1x 
battle_deaths_b2x int_strength_x int_freq_x risk_b_x troop_act_x 
troop_act_agr_x troop_no_ax 
(obs=1695) 
 
      (1)     (2)    (3)     (4)     (5)   (6)     (7)    (8)    (9)   (10)   (11) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1) | 1.0000 
(2) | 0.0092  1.0000 
(3) | 0.0096  0.3951 1.0000 
(4) | 0.0009  0.5828 0.3597  1.0000 
(5) |-0.0034  0.3642 0.6344  0.5246 1.0000 
(6) |-0.0498  0.4604 0.4689  0.5174 0.4614 1.0000 
(7) |-0.0257  0.4333 0.3581  0.6129 0.3221 0.8671  1.0000 
(8) |-0.2921 -0.0302 0.0162 -0.0173 0.0128 0.0802  0.0645 1.0000 
(9) |-0.0462  0.0661 0.1006  0.0567 0.1469 0.0672 -0.0339 0.1068 1.0000 
(10)|-0.0476  0.1240 0.3530  0.1432 0.3440 0.3196  0.2081 0.1417 0.7547 1.0000 
(11)|-0.0778  0.1110 0.2658  0.1232 0.3448 0.4376  0.0605 0.0860 0.2188 0.2739 1.0   
 
• There is some degree of collinearity among the variables to facilitate 
calculation of the components. In most of the cases, these correlations are 
not extreme. The only exception is correlation between variables 
int_strength_x and int_freq_x, which is rather high. This is caused 
correlation is, however, from the theoretical point of view very 
                                                            
478 PCA was run also without the two problematic variables indicating the absolute numbers of battle 
deaths. The discovered pattern and related loadings remained very similar in the data. Therefore, the 
values were kept in the model, having the scaled variables as controls. 
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understandable, since the more interventions there are, the more 
international soldiers are present in the country.  
• Many of the input variables were form divided data into similarly 
structured scales in their original. This could have provided artificial 
correlations. However, due to the fact that the scales were sometimes 
summed to provide a total value and sometimes divided by number of 
interveners to create an averaged value, the resulting data structure is 
different. 
 
. factor opp_strength_x battle_deaths_1x battle_deaths_2x battle_deaths_b1x 
battle_deaths_b2x int_strength_x int_freq_x risk_b_x troop_act_x 
troop_act_agr_x troop_no_ax, pcf 
(obs=1695) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                 Number of obs    =     1695 
    Method: principal-component factors     Retained factors =        3 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                   Number of params =       30 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------             
Factor         Eigenvalue    Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Factor1  |      3.80814      2.01893            0.3462       0.3462 
Factor2  |      1.78921      0.51624            0.1627       0.5088 
Factor3  |      1.27297      0.29587            0.1157       0.6246 
Factor4  |      0.97710      0.14218            0.0888       0.7134 
Factor5  |      0.83492      0.11757            0.0759       0.7893 
Factor6  |      0.71736      0.07922            0.0652       0.8545 
Factor7  |      0.63814      0.14494            0.0580       0.9125 
Factor8  |      0.49319      0.23389            0.0448       0.9574 
Factor9  |      0.25931      0.08799            0.0236       0.9809 
Factor10 |      0.17132      0.13297            0.0156       0.9965 
Factor11 |      0.03835            .            0.0035       1.0000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(55) = 9985.01  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
• 11 components were extracted, the same as the number of variables 
factored. 
• Kaiser test of component retention = retain 3 components: 
o 3 components account for more than 1.0 unit of variance (have an 
eigenvalue λ > 1.0) and were thus retained (Kaiser test).  
o 1st component has an eigenvalue = 3.80814. Since this is greater 
than 1.0, it explains more variance than a single variable, in fact 
2.39 times as much. This component explains 3.81/11*100 = 34.62% 
of variance. 
o 2nd component has an eigenvalue = 1.78921. This component 
explains 1.79/11*100 = 16.27% of variance. 
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o 3rd component has an eigenvalue = 1.27297. This component 
explains 1.27/11*100 = 11.57% of variance. 
o The remaining 8 components have eigenvalues lower than 1.0. Due 
to the fact that they explain less variance than a single variable, 
they were dropped prior to rotation. 
 
. screeplot 
 
 
• Cattell screeplot test of component retention = retain 3 components (same 
result as Kaiser test). 
o Components are retained till the point where the plot begins to 
level off, the additional components explain less variance than a 
single variable.  
• Final decision: 4 retained components.  
• Cumulative variance explained: 62.46%. 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------+-------------- 
    opp_streng~x |  -0.0532   -0.2299    0.7474 |      0.3857   
    battle_de~1x |   0.6451   -0.2965    0.0436 |      0.4941   
    battle_de~2x |   0.7040    0.0157    0.1554 |      0.4800   
    battle_d~a1x |   0.7302   -0.3337   -0.0049 |      0.3554   
    battle_d~a2x |   0.7362    0.0351    0.1633 |      0.4301   
    int_streng~x |   0.8459   -0.1560   -0.1694 |      0.2314   
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      int_freq_x |   0.7416   -0.3561   -0.2135 |      0.2777   
        risk_b_x |   0.0932    0.3341   -0.7081 |      0.3783   
     troop_act_x |   0.2835    0.8009    0.2288 |      0.2258   
    troop_ac~r_x |   0.5203    0.7168    0.1827 |      0.1822   
     troop_no_ax |   0.4395    0.3430   -0.0151 |      0.6890   
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
• Unrotated patterns were rotated to clarify the component patterns: 
 
. rotate 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                   Number of obs    =   1695 
Method: principal-component factors           Retained factors =      3 
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off)      Number of params =     30 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Factor1  |      3.47387      1.40101            0.3158       0.3158 
Factor2  |      2.07286      0.74929            0.1884       0.5042 
Factor3  |      1.32357            .            0.1203       0.6246 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(55) = 9985.01  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------+-------------- 
    opp_streng~x |  -0.0272   -0.0033   -0.7833 |      0.3857   
    battle_de~1x |   0.7027    0.0152   -0.1092 |      0.4941   
    battle_de~2x |   0.6234    0.3424   -0.1189 |      0.4800   
    battle_d~a1x |   0.7997    0.0031   -0.0714 |      0.3554   
    battle_d~a2x |   0.6445    0.3745   -0.1194 |      0.4301   
    int_streng~x |   0.8508    0.1560    0.1431 |      0.2314   
      int_freq_x |   0.8381   -0.0725    0.1208 |      0.2777   
        risk_b_x |   0.0192    0.1212    0.7789 |      0.3783   
     troop_act_x |  -0.0770    0.8758    0.0350 |      0.2258   
    troop_ac~r_x |   0.1769    0.8847    0.0616 |      0.1822   
     troop_no_ax |   0.2684    0.4702    0.1337 |      0.6890   
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    ----------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  
    -------------+--------------------------- 
         Factor1 |  0.9147   0.4027   0.0345  
         Factor2 | -0.3935   0.8677   0.3036  
         Factor3 | -0.0923   0.2913  -0.9522  
    ----------------------------------------- 
 
• The pattern matrix indicates the correlation of each variable with the 
retained components: products are component loadings. 
• Assignment of variables to individual patterns, loadings of variables in the 
pattern and the respective component labels: 
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o 1st component = ‘Security threat in the target state I’ (threat_1x) 
 battle_deaths_1x - component loading = 0.7027 (‘strong’) 
 battle_deaths_2x - component loading = 0.6234 (‘strong’) 
 battle_deaths_a1x - component loading = 0.7997 (‘strong’) 
 battle_deaths_a2x - component loading = 0.6445 (‘strong’) 
 int_strength_x - component loading = 0.8508 (‘strong’) 
 int_freq_x - component loading = 0.8381 (‘strong’) 
o 2nd component = ‘Force used by the intervener’ (force_used_x) 
 troop_act_x - component loading = 0.8758 (‘strong’) 
 troop_act_agr_x - component loading = 0.8847 (‘strong’) 
 troop_no_ax - component loading = 0.4702 (‘moderate’) 
o 3rd component = ‘Security threat in the target state II’ (threat_2x) 
 opp_srength_x - component loading = -0.7833 (‘strong’) 
 risk_b_x - component loading = 0.7789 (‘strong’) 
• Interpretation of the components: 
o 1st component interpretation = ‘Security threat in the target state 
I’ 
 Variables building the component describe the increasing 
security threat in the target state as it could be perceived 
by the interveners. The higher the threat, the more violent 
means can be justifiably used by the interveners.  
o 2nd component interpretation = ‘Force used by the intervener’ 
 Variables building the component describe the 
increasingly violent type of military strategies employed 
by the interveners in the target state.   
o 3rd component = ‘Security threat in the target state II’ 
 Same as in the 1st component, variables building the factor 
describe the increasing security threat in the target state as 
it could be perceived by the interveners. Components 1 
and 2 are complementary.  
 The two variables in the component go in the opposite 
directions. The reason for that is clear, since variable 
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opp_srength_x is partially calculated based on the military 
strength of the target state. The stronger the target state is, 
the stronger opposition the intervener can expect. Military 
strength of the target state is also related to the risk of 
potential intervention. The stronger the state, the less 
probable it is that it will be intervened into.  
• There are just a couple of cross-loading variables with the loadings higher 
than 0.3, however, their loading on the assigned components are strong. 
• 3rd component is based just on two observed variables, but their loadings 
are strong and calculated based on a large dataset. Therefore, the 
component should be stable. 
 
. rotate, promax 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                  Number of obs    =    1695 
Method: principal-component factors          Retained factors =       3 
Rotation: oblique promax (Horst off)         Number of params =      30 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Factor  |     Variance   Proportion    Factors are correlated 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Factor1  |      3.66141       0.3329 
Factor2  |      2.35414       0.2140 
Factor3  |      1.33788       0.1216 
----------------------------------------------------------------------    
test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(55) = 9985.01  
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------+-------------- 
    opp_streng~x |  -0.0610    0.0381   -0.7863 |      0.3857   
    battle_de~1x |   0.7206   -0.0867   -0.0997 |      0.4941   
    battle_de~2x |   0.5835    0.2659   -0.1230 |      0.4800   
    battle_d~a1x |   0.8247   -0.1160   -0.0599 |      0.3554   
    battle_d~a2x |   0.6000    0.2961   -0.1244 |      0.4301   
    int_streng~x |   0.8613    0.0248    0.1504 |      0.2314   
      int_freq_x |   0.8854   -0.2097    0.1364 |      0.2777   
        risk_b_x |   0.0328    0.0860    0.7773 |      0.3783   
     troop_act_x |  -0.2244    0.9204    0.0010 |      0.2258   
    troop_ac~r_x |   0.0383    0.8895    0.0312 |      0.1822   
     troop_no_ax |   0.2053    0.4412    0.1205 |      0.6890   
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    ----------------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  
    -------------+--------------------------- 
         Factor1 |  0.9632   0.5427   0.0192  
         Factor2 | -0.2658   0.8049   0.3520  
         Factor3 | -0.0402   0.2399  -0.9358  
    ----------------------------------------- 
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• Oblique and orthogonal rotations produce same data pattern with similar 
loadings.  
 
. predict threat_1x force_used_x threat_2x 
(regression scoring assumed) 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression; based on varimax rotated factors) 
 
    -------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3  
    -------------------------------------------- 
    opp_streng~x | -0.01640   0.05387  -0.59854  
    battle_d~1x  |  0.21698  -0.06559  -0.07703  
    battle_d~2x  |  0.15436   0.11762  -0.10722  
    battle_~a1x  |  0.24914  -0.08572  -0.04632  
    battle_~a2x  |  0.15726   0.13226  -0.10953  
    int_streng~x |  0.24978  -0.02496   0.10790  
      int_freq_x |  0.27192  -0.14313   0.10602  
        risk_b_x |  0.00025   0.00986   0.58717  
     troop_act_x | -0.12467   0.47076  -0.03271  
    troop_ac~r_x | -0.04594   0.44446  -0.01029  
    troop_no_sum |  0.03122   0.20935   0.07350  
    -------------------------------------------- 
 
• Three new latent variables composing the ‘proportionality’ index: 
threat_1x, force_used_x and threat_2x were created based on the above 
calculated component scores.  
 
1.6. ‘Probability of success’ index 
 
. describe succ_a_x risk_b_x viol_cult_x big_pow_b_x opp_strength_x  
int_freq_x just_cause_x 
 
              storage  display    
variable name   type   format       variable label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
succ_a_x        float  %9.0g    Possibility of success - intervener                                
risk_b_x        float  %9.0g    Risk score - target state 
viol_cult_x     float  %9.0g    Political violence culture – target state                                             
big_pow_b_x     byte   %8.0g    Big power - target state 
opp_strength_x  float  %9.0g    Strength of opposition – target state                                             
int_freq_x      byte   %8.0g    Intervention frequency – target state                                         
just_cause_x    float  %9.0g    Just cause index 
 
. summarize succ_a_x risk_b_x viol_cult_x big_pow_b_x opp_strength_x  
int_freq_x just_cause_x 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    succ_a_x |      1695    .5559308    .1998042    .000076     .99991 
    risk_b_x |      1695    .5416336    .2647924   -.622892          1 
 viol_cult_x |      1695    .2591283    .2698527          0          1 
 big_pow_b_x |      1695    .0306785    .1724959          0          1 
opp_streng~x |      1695    .0072785    .0233198   3.50e-06    .363988 
  int_freq_x |      1695     1.80354    2.110241          1         37 
just_cause_x |      1695    .9096468    1.698837  -.4149025   7.327132 
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• Sample is large enough to yield reliable estimates of the correlations 
among the variables: n = 1695. 
• There are no outliers among the cases, since the values are located within 
limited ranges: see the low standard deviations and the moderate minimal 
and maximal values. 
 
. corr succ_a_x risk_b_x viol_cult_x big_pow_b_x opp_strength_x  int_freq_x 
just_cause_x 
(obs=1695) 
 
            |succ_a_x risk_b_x viol_~x big_p~x opp_s~x int_f~x just_c~x 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    succ_a_x|  1.0000 
    risk_b_x|  0.2030   1.0000 
 viol_cult_x| -0.0794  -0.1893  1.0000 
 big_pow_b_x| -0.1797  -0.2368  0.0613   1.0000 
opp_streng~x| -0.2391  -0.2921  0.1773   0.7586   1.0000 
  int_freq_x|  0.0268   0.0645  0.0713  -0.0288  -0.0257 1.0000 
just_cause_x| -0.0197  -0.0335  0.4415   0.0259   0.0504 0.1904 1.0000 
 
• There is some degree of collinearity among the variables to facilitate 
calculation of the components. In most of the cases, these correlations are 
not extreme.  
 
. factor succ_a_x risk_b_x viol_cult_x big_pow_b_x opp_strength_x  
int_freq_x just_cause_x, pcf 
(obs=1695) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs    =     1695 
    Method: principal-component factors    Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                  Number of params =       13 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Factor1  |      2.11571      0.64988            0.3022       0.3022 
    Factor2  |      1.46583      0.46703            0.2094       0.5116 
    Factor3  |      0.99880      0.10556            0.1427       0.6543 
    Factor4  |      0.89324      0.12279            0.1276       0.7819 
    Factor5  |      0.77045      0.24309            0.1101       0.8920 
    Factor6  |      0.52736      0.29875            0.0753       0.9673 
    Factor7  |      0.22861            .            0.0327       1.0000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------    
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) = 2298.68  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
• 7 components were extracted, the same as the number of variables 
factored. 
• Kaiser test of component retention = retain 2 component: 
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o 2 components account for more than 1.0 unit of variance (have an 
eigenvalue λ > 1.0) and was thus retained (Kaiser test).  
o 1st component has an eigenvalue = 2.11571. Since this is greater 
than 1.0, it explains more variance than a single variable, in fact 
2.12 times as much. This component explains 2.12/7*100 = 30.22% 
of variance. 
o 2nd component has an eigenvalue = 1.46583. This component 
explains 1.47/7*100 = 20.94% of variance. 
o The remaining 5 components have eigenvalues lower than 1.0. Due 
to the fact that they explain less variance than a single variable, 
they were dropped prior to rotation. 
 
. screeplot 
 
 
• Cattell screeplot test of component retention = retain 2 components (same 
result as Kaiser test). 
o Components are retained till the point where the plot begins to 
level off, the additional components explain less variance than a 
single variable.  
• Final decision: 2 retained components.  
• Cumulative variance explained: 51.16%. 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
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    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
        succ_a_x |  -0.4483    0.0999 |      0.7890   
        risk_b_x |  -0.5541    0.0360 |      0.6917   
     viol_cult_x |   0.4000    0.6885 |      0.3660   
     big_pow_b_x |   0.8043   -0.2750 |      0.2775   
  opp_strength_x |   0.8626   -0.1990 |      0.2162   
      int_freq_x |  -0.0174    0.4718 |      0.7771   
    just_cause_x |   0.2375    0.8017 |      0.3009   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
• Unrotated patterns were rotated to clarify the component patterns: 
 
. rotate 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs    =     1695 
  Method: principal-component factors      Retained factors =        2 
  Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Horst off) Number of params =       13 
 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------        
Factor1  |      2.05443      0.52731            0.2935       0.2935 
Factor2  |      1.52712            .            0.2182       0.5116 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------    
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) = 2298.68  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
        succ_a_x |  -0.4573   -0.0426 |      0.7890   
        risk_b_x |  -0.5384   -0.1359 |      0.6917   
     viol_cult_x |   0.1693    0.7781 |      0.3660   
     big_pow_b_x |   0.8498   -0.0147 |      0.2775   
  opp_strength_x |   0.8821    0.0755 |      0.2162   
      int_freq_x |  -0.1614    0.4437 |      0.7771   
    just_cause_x |  -0.0202    0.8359 |      0.3009   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  
    -------------+------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.9517   0.3071  
         Factor2 | -0.3071   0.9517  
    -------------------------------- 
 
• The pattern matrix indicates the correlation of each variable with the 
retained component: products are component loadings. 
• Loadings of variables in the pattern and the respective component label: 
o 1st component = ‘Strength of the target state’ (strength_b_x) 
236 
 
 succ_a_x - component loading = -0.4573 (‘moderate’) 
 risk_b_x - component loading = -0.5384 (‘moderate’) 
 big_power_b_x - component loading = 0.8498 (‘strong’) 
 opp_strength_x - component loading = 0.8821 (‘strong’) 
o 2nd component = ‘Conflict complexity’ (conf_complex_x) 
 viol_cult_x - component loading = 0.7781 (‘strong’) 
 int_freq_x - component loading = 0.4437 (‘moderate’) 
 just_cause_x - component loading = 0.8359 (‘strong’) 
• Interpretation of the component: 
o 1st component interpretation = ‘Military strength of the target 
state’ 
 Perceptions of the intervener about the military strength of 
the target state and thus about its expectations of success 
during the military operations waged into such country 
are influenced into both directions. High success of a 
mutual military confrontation is dependent on the fact 
whether the target state has alliance portfolio that leaves it 
vulnerable to external interventions. High success is on the 
other hand negatively correlated with the expected 
military strength of the opposition adjusted by the 
existence of the joint- or mixed-target intervention. And 
finally, the success is higher if the target state is not 
considered to be a big power.   
o 2nd component interpretation = ‘Conflict complexity’ 
 All variables describing the conflict complexity go into one 
direction. The higher the conflict complexity, the lower is 
the possible success of the intervention. 
• There are no cross-loading variables with the loadings higher than 0.3. 
• Both components have at least two strongly loaded variables and 
accompanying moderate ones. The components were calculated based on a 
large data sample and should be stable. 
 
. rotate, promax 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                Number of obs    =     1695 
    Method: principal-component factors    Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: oblique promax (Horst off)   Number of params =       13 
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 ----------------------------------------------------------------------               
Factor   |     Variance   Proportion    Rotated factors are correlated 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Factor1  |      2.07090       0.2958 
Factor2  |      1.54730       0.2210 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------    
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) = 2298.68  
    Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
        succ_a_x |  -0.4567   -0.0214 |      0.7890   
        risk_b_x |  -0.5334   -0.1113 |      0.6917   
     viol_cult_x |   0.1310    0.7729 |      0.3660   
     big_pow_b_x |   0.8535   -0.0544 |      0.2775   
  opp_strength_x |   0.8813    0.0346 |      0.2162   
      int_freq_x |  -0.1842    0.4528 |      0.7771   
    just_cause_x |  -0.0620    0.8398 |      0.3009   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
Factor rotation matrix 
 
    -------------------------------- 
                 | Factor1  Factor2  
    -------------+------------------ 
         Factor1 |  0.9649   0.3541  
         Factor2 | -0.2626   0.9352  
    -------------------------------- 
 
• Orthogonal and oblique rotations produced similar results. 
 
. predict strength_b_x conf_complex_x 
(regression scoring assumed) 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression; based on varimax rotated factors) 
 
    ---------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2  
    -------------+-------------------- 
        succ_a_x | -0.22258  -0.00021  
        risk_b_x | -0.25678  -0.05705  
     viol_cult_x |  0.03571   0.50505  
     big_pow_b_x |  0.41938  -0.06181  
    opp_streng~x |  0.42973  -0.00402  
      int_freq_x | -0.10666   0.30380  
    just_cause_x | -0.06111   0.55496  
    ---------------------------------- 
 
• Two new latent variables composing the ‘probability of success’ index were 
created based on the above calculated component scores: strength_b_x and 
conf_complex_x. 
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2. Statistical description, adjustments and weighting of the components 
 
2.1. Description of the generated components 
The below presented variables are the output components from the PCA analysis 
that served as a starting point for the quantification of the JWT criteria. 
 
. summarize just_cause_x hum_motive_x econ_motive_x pol_motive_1x 
pol_motive_2x legit_a_x legit_b_x last_resort_x threat_1x force_used_x 
threat_2x strength_b_x conf_complex_x  
 
    Variable   |     Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 just_cause_x  |   12000   -8.56e-09       1       -.4149025   7.327132 
 hum_motive_x  |    1695   -3.52e-10       1       -2.125517   1.989052 
econ_motive_x  |    1695    3.56e-10       1       -1.872808   7.990421 
pol_motive_1x  |    1695   -5.22e-10       1       -3.597034   2.113276 
pol_motive_2x  |    1695   -1.06e-09       1       -3.848562   2.963233 
    legit_a_x  |    1695   -3.80e-09       1       -1.717106   1.936192 
    legit_b_x  |    1695   -1.49e-09       1       -4.970283   4.697333 
last_resort_x  |   12000      .00287    .3870606   -5.947042   6.817963 
    threat_1x  |    1695    5.79e-10       1       -.8900204   15.32858 
 force_used_x  |    1695   -3.57e-10       1       -4.11881    2.829428 
    threat_2x  |    1695   -2.23e-10       1       -8.601045    2.48785 
 strength_b_x  |    1695    3.64e-10       1       -2.112912   9.183849 
conf_complex_x |    1695   -5.51e-10       1       -1.528818   6.642991 
 
Due to the fact that they are components, their standard deviations are equal to 1. 
The only exception represents the last_resort_x component, which is not a 
component by itself, but a calculated yearly change of the component just_cause_x. 
 
2.2. Adjustment of the components to the positive values 
Each of the generated components was then transformed into a wholly positive 
range starting with 0, meaning that the lowest possible value achieved by the 
component was 0. 
 
. summarize just_cause_x_adj hum_motive_x_adj econ_motive_x_adj 
pol_motive_1x_adj pol_motive_2x_adj legit_a_x_adj legit_b_x_adj 
last_resort_adj threat_1x_adj force_used_x_adj threat_2x_adj 
strength_b_x_adj conf_complex_x_adj 
 
   Variable       |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 just_cause_x_adj |    12000          .5           1   .0850975    7.827132 
 hum_motive_x_adj |     1695       2.126           1   .0004826    4.115052 
econ_motive_x_adj |     1695       1.873           1   .0001925     9.86342 
 pol_motive_1x_adj|     1695       3.598           1   .0009665    5.711276 
 pol_motive_2x_adj|     1695       3.849           1    .000438    6.812232 
    legit_a_x_adj |     1695       1.718           1   .0008939    3.654192 
    legit_b_x_adj |     1695       4.971           1    .000717    9.668333 
  last_resort_adj |    12000     5.95087    .3870606   .0009584    12.76596 
    threat_1x_adj |     1695        .891           1   .0009796    16.21958 
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 force_used_x_adj |     1695       4.119           1   .0001903    6.948428 
    threat_2x_adj |     1695       8.602           1   .0009553    11.08985 
   strength_b_adj |     1695       2.113           1   .0000883    11.29685 
 conf_complex_adj |     1695       1.529           1   .0001816    8.171991 
 
Even after the data transformation into a positive range, the standard deviations 
remain unchanged for the components. No value in the data has now a negative 
number.  
 
2.3. Weighting of the adjusted components 
In case that the quantified JWT criterion was composed of more components; the 
components were weighted according to their relative importnace within the 
criterion, and the values were recalculated accordingly. The attached weights are 
indicated in the labels of the variables.  
 
. summarize hum_motive_x_100w econ_motive_x_30w pol_motive_1x_10w 
pol_motive_2x_10w legit_a_x_60w legit_b_x_40w   threat_1x_70w 
force_used_x_50w threat_2x_30w strength_b_x_60w conf_complex_x_40w 
 
    Variable        |    Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  hum_motive_x_100w |   1695    51.65209    24.29543   .0117257   99.97697 
  econ_motive_x_30w |   1695    5.696472    3.041363   .0005855   29.99824 
  pol_motive_1x_10w |   1695     6.29902      1.7507   .0016921   9.998733 
  pol_motive_2x_10w |   1695    5.649494    1.467782   .0006429   9.998874 
      legit_a_x_60w |   1695    28.20246    16.41587   .0146741   59.98674 
      legit_b_x_40w |   1695    20.56469    4.136932   .0029661   39.99724 
      threat_1x_70w |   1695    3.845253     4.31566   .0042277   69.99818 
   force_used_x_50w |   1695    29.63736     7.19528   .0013693   49.99588 
      threat_2x_30w |   1695    23.26961     2.70514   .0025843    29.9996 
     strength_b_60w |   1695    11.22245    5.311145    .000469    59.9992 
   conf_complex_40w |   1695    7.474945     4.88878    .000888   39.95107 
 
2.4. Construction of the quantified JWT criteria out of the adjusted and 
weighted components 
The weighted components were combined together to create the quantified JWT 
criteria. In most of the criteria, the components were just summed, since their 
weights had the mutually complementing positive signs of increasing the 
‘humanitarianism’ behind the military intervention. Nevertheless, some JWT 
criteria were constructed also of the control components, which had to be 
subtracted from the joint score, since they decreased the ‘humanitarianism’ behind 
the intervention. In the cases that the control components had a higher combined 
value that the summed positive ones within the JWT criterion, the resulting value 
for the criterion could have been negative. For those reasons, the newly generated 
JWT criteria including the control components had to be again re-adjusted into a 
positive scale starting with 0. One exception is represented by the quantified JWT 
criterion of ‘probability of success’. What makes this criterion different from the 
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others is the fact that the criterion is built exclusively with control components and 
not the components increasing the possible success. Therefore, after summing the 
negative weighted values together, they were subtracted from the value 100 to 
become reversed and to show an increasing probability of success instead of a 
decreasing one. Only afterwards, the scale was adjusted into a distribution starting 
with 0.  
     All the JWT criteria that needed any type of such an adjustment are kept 
recorded in their original form as well as in all stages of the adjustments, so that 
the next users of the data can make their own informed choices. All the combined 
JWT criteria that still needed some adjustment are presented in italics in the below 
summary together with the final quantified JWT criteria. 
 
. summarize  jwt_cause_x jwt_intent_bef_adj jwt_intent_x jwt_auth_x 
jwt_last_x jwt_prop_bef_adj jwt_prop_x jwt_succ_bef_adj jwt_succ_x 
 
         Variable  |    Obs      Mean       Std. Dev.     Min        Max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       jwt_cause_x |  12000    6.387327    12.77466   1.087091   99.98891 
jwt_intent_bef_adj |   1695     34.0071    24.59141  -19.68492   82.54643 
      jwt_intent_x |   1695     53.6921    24.59141   .0000786   102.2314 
        jwt_auth_x |   1695    48.76715    16.92912   3.779543   98.85175 
        jwt_last_x |  12000    46.61499    3.031965   .0075072   99.99971 
  jwt_prop_bef_adj |   1695   -2.522493    8.815597  -41.25367   92.88819 
        jwt_prop_x |   1695    38.73151    8.815597   .0003291   134.1422 
jwt_succ_bef_adj_1 |   1695    18.69739    7.218617    8.38438   60.09357 
jwt_succ_bef_adj_2 |   1695    81.30261    7.218617   39.90643   91.61562 
        jwt_succ_x |   1695    41.40261    7.218617   .0064325   51.71562 
         
2.5. Weighting of the JWT criteria 
Individual JWT criteria were weighted according to their relative relevance within 
the JWT as a whole. All the weights are complementary, contributing to the 
increased ‘humanitarian’ effect of military interventions. 
 
. summarize jwt_cause_x_w25 jwt_intent_x_30w jwt_auth_x_15w jwt_last_x_10w 
jwt_prop_x_10w jwt_succ_x_10w 
 
        Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 jwt_cause_x_25w |     12000    1.597008    3.194015   .2718027   24.99998 
jwt_intent_x_30w |      1695    15.75596    7.216353   .0000231   29.99983 
  jwt_auth_x_15w |      1695    7.400025    2.568858   .5735154   14.99996 
  jwt_last_x_10w |     12000    4.661499    .3031965   .0007507   9.999971 
  jwt_prop_x_10w |      1695     2.88733    .6571791   .0000245    9.99994 
  jwt_succ_x_10w |      1695    8.005144    1.395711   .0012437   9.999153 
 
2.6. Aggregate JWT index 
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The aggregate index summs the values of the individual weighted JWT criteria. 
The distribution of the values was adjusted so that the minimal value started close 
to 0. 
 
. summarize  jwt_x_bef_adj jwt_x_adj 
 
     Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
jwt_x_bef_adj |      1695    43.22836    8.046749   21.95946   69.03569 
        jwt_x |      1695    21.32836    8.046749   .0594588   47.13569 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX – CHAPTER 5 
REGRESSION MODEL INPUT VARIABLES: DESCRIPTION AND 
ADJUSTMENTS  
 
1. Dependent variables 
1.1. Dependent variable – battle deaths 
1.1.1. Immediate battle deaths change (“b_deaths_ch”)  
= a yearly change in the number of battle-related fatalities (including 
both civilians and combatants killed in the course of combat) 
measured from the previous to the current target country-year (abs. 
num.). 
Input variable: 
• Best battle deaths estimate (“b_deaths_best”) from the ACD 
dataset479 (1946-2005) (originally labeled “bdeadbes”) - This variable sums 
the best estimates of total battle-related fatalities of all conflicts in 
particular country-year. Battle fatalities are defined as civilians and 
combatants killed in the course of combat. 
Adjustments:  
Missing values in the variable “b_deaths_best” (41 cases) were assigned 
the value 50. Reason for choosing particularly number 50 comes from the 
fact that the identification threshold of conflict in the ACD dataset starts 
with at least 25 battle-related deaths over year. The observation was 
identified as fulfilling this minimal threshold, but was attached unknown 
value for some reasons. Amount of 50 battle-related fatalities was thus set 
reasonably above this threshold. The cases not identified by the ACD 
dataset as fulfilling the set threshold of an existing crisis were attached the 
value 0. After removing all the missing values, a yearly difference from the 
previous to the current year was calculated, assuming that there was a 0 
change in year 1946.  
1.1.2. Lagged battle deaths change (“b_deaths_ch_lag”) 
 = a yearly change in the number of battle-related fatalities (including 
both civilians and combatants killed in the course of combat lagged by 
one target country-year (abs. num.). 
Input variable: 
                                                            
479 Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005. 
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• Intermediate battle deaths change (“b_deaths_ch”) ↑ 
Adjustments:  
2nd dependent variable “b_deaths_ch” was lagged by one year, moving the 
values one year forward in the time frame, while keeping the year 2005 
constant as in year 2004. By doing that, it is possible to test, whether the 
effects of independent variables on the dependent variable are not lagged. 
1.1.1. Lagged battle deaths change (“b_deaths_ch_lag2”) 
 = a yearly change in the number of battle-related fatalities (including 
both civilians and combatants killed in the course of combat lagged by 
two target country-years (abs. num.). 
Input variable: 
• Intermediate battle deaths change (“b_deaths_ch”) ↑ 
Adjustments:  
2nd dependent variable “b_deaths_ch” was lagged by two years, moving 
the values one year forward in the time frame, while keeping the year 2005 
and 2004 constant as in year 2003. By doing that, it is possible to test, 
whether the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable are 
not lagged in the longer run. 
1.2. Dependent variable – conflict deaths 
1.2.1. Immediate crude mortality change (“deaths_ch”)  
= a yearly change in the number of deaths per year for both sexes 
combined measured from the current to the following target country-
year (in thousands). 
Input variable: 
• Interpolated deaths (“deaths_i”) from the UN pop I dataset480 
(1950-2005) (newly created from the variable originally labeled "Deaths per 
year, both sexes combined in thousands) - This variable indicates a number 
of deaths for both sexes combined (in thousands), which is interpolated 
among the original measurements taken in the 5-year periods. 
Adjustments:  
Missing values in the input variable for years 1946-1949 were left constant 
as in the last available measurement in the year 1950. In case that no 
measurement was taken for a particular country at all, the value 
                                                            
480 UN Population Division, 2006. 
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corresponding to the average crude mortality of 69,57 was adopted and 
kept constant throughout the whole time spam. This value was calculated 
by averaging all the available measurements. After removing all the 
missing values, a yearly difference from the previous to the current year 
was calculated, assuming that there was a 0 change in year 1946.  
1.2.2. Lagged crude mortality change (“deaths_ch_lag”)  
= a yearly change in the number of deaths per year for both sexes 
combined lagged by one target country-year (in thousands). 
Input variable: 
• Immediate crude mortality change (“deaths_ch”) ↑ 
Adjustments:  
 1st dependent variable “deaths_ch” was lagged by one year, moving the 
values one year forward in the time frame, while keeping the year 2005 
constant as in year 2004. By doing that, it is possible to test, whether the 
effects of independent variables on the dependent variable are not lagged. 
1.1.1. Lagged crude mortality change 2 (“deaths_ch_lag2”) 
= a yearly change in the number of deaths per year for both sexes 
combined lagged by two target country-years (in thousands). 
Input variable: 
• Immediate crude mortality change (“deaths_ch”) ↑ 
Adjustments:  
1st dependent variable “deaths_ch” was lagged by two years, moving the 
values two years forward in the time frame, while keeping the year 2005 
and 2004 constant as in year 2003. By doing that, it is possible to test, 
whether the effects on the dependent variable are not lagged in the longer 
run. 
 
2. Independent variables 
2.1. Control variables for the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ 
2.1.1. Military intervention (“mil_int”) 
 = an ongoing military intervention in the target country-year regardless 
of the degree of humanitarianism entailed (binary variable).  
Input variable and adjustments:  
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Country-years identified by the Mil Int dataset481 as experiencing a military 
intervention were coded 1; the remaining observations were assigned the 
value 0. 
2.1.2. Military intervention 1 (“mil_int_1”) 
= an ongoing ‘third-party’ military intervention in the target country-year 
regardless of the degree of humanitarianism entailed (binary variable).  
Main input variable: 
• Military intervention (“mil_int”) ↑ 
Reference variables: 
• Domestic dispute dummy (“intern_c”) from the Mil Int dataset482 
(1946-2005) (newly created from the original variables “Domestic Dispute” 
1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Domestic Dispute” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) – This 
dummy variable indicates presence of a domestic dispute in particular 
country-year.  
• Conflict frequency (“c_freq”) from the ACD dataset483 (1946-2005) 
(newly created from the original variable “incomp”) = This variable 
denotes a number of crises that occurred in particular country-year based 
on the UCDP-PRIO conflict definition. 
Adjustments:  
Control variable “mil_int” was taken and only the cases of  the ‘third-
party’ military interventions were filtered out from the sample of military 
interventions using the two above listed reference variables. ‘Third-party’ 
interventions were identified as those taking place into the internal 
conflicts or into the conflicts, where the violence was already present in the 
year previous to the intervention. Nevertheless, the reference variables had 
to be adjusted first. The missing values in the reference variable “intern_c” 
(197 cases) were assumed to be a mixture of internal and international 
conflicts, where it was impossible to assign a simple yes or no label. These 
missing observations were coded as internal, since the violence was not 
perpetuated solely by the intervener. The second reference variable 
“c_freq” was converted from the variable indicating frequency of conflicts 
into a binary variable merely identifying existence of a violent conflict. 
Afterwards, the value was lagged by one year, indicating whether there 
                                                            
481 Pearson & Baumann, 1992; and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
482 Pearson & Baumann, 1992; and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
483 Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2002. 
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was violence in the year previous to the military intervention. If there was 
a conflict identified in the year 1946, it was assumed that the conflict was 
ongoing also in the year 1945. After adjusting the reference variables, the 
military intervention was coded as being a ‘third-party’, if any of the two 
reference variables indicated a positive value. 
2.1.3. Military intervention 2 (“mil_int_2”) 
= an ongoing ‘third-party’ military intervention supporting the 
government of the target country-year regardless of the degree of 
humanitarianism entailed (binary variable).  
Main input variable: 
• Military intervention 1 (“mil_int_1”) ↑ 
Reference variable: 
• Intervention supporting government dummy (“int_supp_gov”) 
from the Mil Int dataset484 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original 
variables “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 – Mil Int 
I, and “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This dummy variable indicates a presence of some intervention supporting 
the government in particular country-year.       
Adjustments:  
This variable was built on the previous variable “mil_int_1”. Nevertheless, 
one additional reference variable was taken into consideration, which is 
the targeting of the intervention. In case that the observed intervention was 
third party and the reference variables “int_supp_gov” was coded 1, the 
observation was coded 1; othervise, it was set to 0.  
 
2.2. Variables approximating the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ 
Key independent variables approximating the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’ were structured based on three possible definitions of the term. Each 
definition rests on a different identification procedure and results in a different 
sample of military interventions that are selected and awarded the JWT score 
(converted into merely positive numbers).485 All the remaining cases of military 
interventions not being covered by the appropriate definition are awarded JWT 
score of 0. Therefore, if no crisis management happens, indicated 0 is less 
                                                            
484 Pearson & Baumann, 1992;  and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
485 See the fourth chapter of this study for the description of the quantified JWT and its individual 
criteria. The JWT scores are used as the input data for approximating the ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’ of military interventions in this chapter.  
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humanitarian than whatever positive value accorded to the identified sample of 
military interventions with the JWT scores of ‘humanitarian motives and 
means’. 
2.2.1. ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ of a military intervention 
(“jwt_...x”) 
= a score of humanitarianism entailed in the military intervention being 
waged into the target country, if any, based on the JWT.  
(= approximation of the existence of crisis management based on the 1st 
definition) 
Input variables: 
• Quantified JWT criteria and the aggregate JWT score generated in 
the fourth chapter of this study: individual JWT criteria indexes 
(“jwt_cause_x”, “jwt_intent_x”, “jwt_auth_x”, “jwt_last_x”, 
“jwt_prop_x”, and “jwt_succ_x”) and the aggregate JWT index (“jwt_x”).  
Adjustments:  
First definition of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ is the most simplistic 
of the three. It takes all the cases of military interventions that took place in 
the selected time period and awards them with the respective JWT scores, 
not distinguishing whether the intervener was a third- or a direct-party to 
the conflict, and not distinguishing among the types of targeting. A 
separate dependent variable was created for each individual JWT criterion 
as well as for the aggregate JWT index.  
• ‘Just cause’ index (“jwt_cause_x”) = a degree of ‘just cause’ (1st JWT 
criterion) entailed in the military intervention. 
• ‘Just intent’ index (“jwt_intent_x”) = a degree of ‘just intent’ (2nd 
JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention. 
• ‘Just authority’ index (“jwt_auth_x”) = a degree of ‘just authority’ (3rd 
JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention.  
• ‘Last resort’ index (“jwt_last_x”) = a degree of ‘last resort’ (4th JWT 
criterion) entailed in the military intervention.  
• ‘Proportionality’ index (“jwt_prop_x”) = a degree of ‘proportionality’ 
(5th JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention. 
• ‘Probability of success’ index (“jwt_succ_x”) = a degree of ‘probability 
of success’ (6th JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention. 
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• JWT index (“jwt_x”) = an aggregate degree of ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ entailed in the military intervention based on the JWT. 
2.2.2. ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ of a military intervention 1 
(“jwt_....x1”) 
= a degree of humanitarianism entailed in the ‘third-party’ military 
intervention being waged into the target country, if any; based on the 
JWT (‘third-party’ interventions are those being waged into the internal 
conflicts or those being waged into the ongoing conflicts of any type). 
(= approximation of the existence of crisis management based on the 2nd 
definition) 
Main input variables: 
• Quantified JWT criteria and the aggregate JWT score generated in 
the fourth chapter of this study: individual JWT criteria indexes 
(“jwt_cause_x”, “jwt _intent_x”, “jwt _auth_x”, “jwt _last_x”, “jwt 
_prop_x”, and “jwt _succ_x”) and the aggregate JWT index (“jwt _x”).  
Reference variables: 
• Domestic dispute dummy (“intern_c”) from the Mil Int dataset486 
(1946-2005) (newly created from the original variables “Domestic Dispute” 
1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Domestic Dispute” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) – This 
dummy variable indicates presence of a domestic dispute in particular 
country-year.  
• Conflict frequency (“c_freq”) from the ACD dataset487 (1946-2005) 
(newly created from the original variable “incomp”) = This variable 
denotes a number of crises that occurred in particular country-year based 
on the UCDP-PRIO conflict definition. 
Adjustments:  
Second definition of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ is more complex. It 
requires that the military intervention was a third party before assigning 
the JWT scores. ‘third-party’ interventions are identified as those taking 
place into the internal conflicts or into the conflicts, where the violence was 
already present in the year previous to the intervention, so as to ensure 
that the intervention was not an act of aggression initiating the crisis in the 
target state.  
                                                            
486 Pearson & Baumann, 1992;  and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
487 Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2002. 
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So as to filter out the ‘third-party’ military interventions from the sample 
of all military nterventions, the two reference variables were utilized in a 
same way as in case of the control variable on the effects of ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ – the variable “mil_int_1”. If the intervention was 
identified as being ‘third-party’ based on the information in the reference 
variables, it was assigned the JWT score. 
• ‘Just cause’ index (“jwt_cause_x1”) = a degree of ‘just cause’ (1st JWT 
criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention. 
• ‘Just intent’ index (“jwt _intent_x1”) = a degree of ‘just intent’ (2nd 
JWT criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention. 
• ‘Just authority’ index (“jwt_auth_x1”) = a degree of ‘just authority’ 
(3rd JWT criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention.  
• ‘Last resort’ index (“jwt_last_x1”) = a degree of ‘last resort’ (4th JWT 
criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention.  
• ‘Proportionality’ index (“jwt_prop_x1”) = a degree of ‘proportionality’ 
(5th JWT criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention. 
• ‘Probability of success’ index (“jwt_succ_x1”) = a degree of 
‘probability of success’ (6th JWT criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military 
intervention. 
• JWT index (“jwt_x1”) = an aggregate degree of ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention 
based on the JWT. 
2.2.3. ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ of a military intervention 2 
(“jwt_....x2”) 
= a degree of humanitarianism entailed in the ‘third-party’ military 
intervention supporting the government of the target state, if any; 
that is evaluated based on the JWT (‘third-party’ interventions are 
those being waged into the internal conflicts or those being waged 
into the ongoing conflicts of any type). 
Main input variables: 
• Quantified JWT criteria and the aggregate JWT score generated in 
the fourth chapter of this study: individual JWT criteria indexes 
(“jwt_cause_x1”, “jwt _intent_x1”, “jwt _auth_x1”, “jwt _last_x1”, “jwt 
_prop_x1”, and “jwt _succ_x1”) and the aggregate JWT index (“jwt _x1”).  
Reference variable: 
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• Intervention supporting government dummy (“int_supp_gov”) 
from the Mil Int dataset488 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original 
variables “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 – Mil Int 
I, and “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This dummy variable indicates a presence of some intervention supporting 
the government in particular country-year.       
Adjustments:  
Last definition of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ is the most complex. 
It includes not only the requirement that a military intervention must be 
‘third-party’, but also that it must support the government of the target 
state. ‘third-party’ interventions were filtered out of the sample of military 
interventions by the same procedure as in the previous variable 
“jwt_....x1”. Nevertheless, one additional reference variable had to be taken 
into consideration, which is the targeting of the intervention. In case that 
the observed intervention was third party and the reference variables 
“int_supp_gov” was coded 1, the JWT score was assigned. Otherwise, the 
JWT score was set to 0. 
•  ‘Just cause’ index (“jwt_cause_x2”) = a degree of ‘just cause’ (1st JWT 
criterion) entailed in the ‘third-party’ military intervention supporting the 
government of the target state. 
• ‘Just intent’ index (“jwt _intent_x2”) = a degree of ‘just intent’ (2nd 
JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention supporting the 
government of the target state. 
• ‘Just authority’ index (“jwt_auth_x2”) = a degree of ‘just authority’ 
(3rd JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention supporting the 
government of the target state.  
• ‘Last resort’ index (“jwt_last_x2”) = a degree of ‘last resort’ (4th JWT 
criterion) entailed in the military intervention supporting the government 
of the target state. 
• ‘Proportionality’ index (“jwt_prop_x2”) = a degree of ‘proportionality’ 
(5th JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention supporting the 
government of the target state.  
• ‘Probability of success’ index (“jwt_succ_x2”) = a degree of 
‘probability of success’ (6th JWT criterion) entailed in the military intervention 
supporting the government of the target state. 
                                                            
488 Pearson & Baumann, 1992;  and Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
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• JWT index (“jwt_x2”) = an aggregate degree of ‘humanitarian 
motives and means’ of a military intervention based on the JWT. 
 
2.3. Control independent variables - characteristics of the target country 
2.3.1. Economic grievance level (“gdp_lev”)  
= target state GDP per capita (in 1000 USD).  
Input variable: 
• GDP per capita (1946-2005) from the Ethnic Politics Armed 
Conflict replication dataset489 (originally labeled “gdpcap”) - This variable 
indicates GDP per capita in 1000 USD.  
Adjustments: 
Missing values in the input variable were identified and estimated based 
on a simplifying assumption that economies tend to grow by 3% per 
annum. Therefore, if there were missing values at the beginning or at the 
end of the time frame for some country, missing values were extrapolated 
based on the assumed 3% GDP growth from the last available 
measurement. In case that there were missing values in-between the 
existing observations, the missing values were interpolated in-between the 
last two available observations. In case that there was none measurement 
for a given country at all, the web-pages of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) were consulted to find the country’s GDP level for year 2009.490 Due 
to the fact that the IMF figure was calculated based on a different 
methodology than the ones recorded in the input variable, it was not 
possible just to incorporate the found IMF value into the input variable and 
to extrapolate it till the year 1946 based on the assumed 3% growth. 
Instead, it was necessary to find another country in the IMF database that 
has a comparable level of GDP to the one that was missing in the input 
dataset, but that was available in the input dataset. Having identified such 
a similar country, its value indicated for year 2005 in the input dataset was 
taken as a basis for extrapolation of the missing GDP level values for the 
country absent in the input dataset and extrapolated by the assumed 3% 
GDP growth from the year 2005 backwards.  
2.3.2. Economic grievance growth (“gdp_ch”)  
                                                            
489 ‘Replication data and publications’, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/13825UNF:5:SmiRXYaARiznnVH0DtoDoQ== V1 [Version]. 
490 International Monetary Fund data for year 2009 are available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita. 
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= an average growth of GDP per capita in the target state over the 
last three years (in 1000 USD). 
Input variable: 
• GDP per capita (1946-2005) from the Ethnic Politics Armed 
Conflict replication dataset491 (originally labeled “gdpcap”) - This variable 
indicates GDP per capita in 1000 USD.  
Adjustments: 
The missing values in the input variable “gdpcap” were removed as in the 
case of the above described adjustments of the variable indicating 
economic grievance level (“gdp_lev”). Afterwards, the variable was 
transformed to indicate the averaged growth of economic grievance over 
the last three years. The resulting values always represent an averaged 
economic growth over last three years with the exception of years 1946 and 
1947. Year 1946 indicates just a one year change, and year 1947 indicates an 
averaged change over the last two years. Since the year 1948, however, the 
indicated value always reports a three-year average.  
2.3.3. Political grievance level (“polity_lev”)  
= a polity scale evaluating the level of democracy in the target state 
(indicated on the scale of 2-20, with the score 20 reaching the highest 
quality of the democracy). 
Input variable:  
• Polity IV score (“polity_IV”) from the DEM dataset492 (1946-2004) 
– (originally labeled “polity”) - This variable indicates a Polity IV score 
(without PARREG) that is adjusted to create a positive value range of 2-20. 
Adjustments:  
First of all, the missing values from the input variable had to be removed. 
In case of the missing values at the very beginning of the time frame, 
which was usually the case since the country officially did not exist yet; the 
missing observations were assigned a value that was three points lower 
than the polity scale recorded in the first year of its existence, and this 
value was kept constant throughout its whole pre-sovereignty period. The 
upward jump in the polity scale then reflects a political change associated 
with the regime transition that follows from an assumption that the newly 
established regime represents an improvement in how citizens in the 
                                                            
491 ‘Replication data and publications’, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/13825UNF:5:SmiRXYaARiznnVH0DtoDoQ== V1 [Version]. 
492 Cederman, Hug & Krebs, 2007. 
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country are represented by their government. In case that the missing 
values were located in the middle of the time frame having the existing 
observations both at the beginning and at the end of the missing time 
period, the polity scale was interpolated between the last existing and the 
first existing observations. In case that the missing values appeared only at 
the end of the time frame, the polity scale was left constant as in the last 
available measurement. And finally, in case that the country had none 
existing measurement throughout the whole time period at all, a middle 
polity value of 10 points was assigned to such country on a constant basis. 
2.3.4. Political grievance growth (“polity_ch”)  
= an average movement on the polity scale in the target state over the last 
three years (a positive sign denoting democratization, a negative sign 
denoting autocratization). 
Input variable:  
• Polity IV score (“polity_IV”) from the DEM dataset493 (1946-2004) 
– (originally labeled “polity”) - This variable indicates a Polity IV score 
(without PARREG) that is adjusted to create a positive value range of 2-20. 
Adjustments:  
The missing values in the input variable “polity” were removed as in the 
case of the above described adjustments of the variable indicating political 
grievance level (“polity_lev”). Afterwards, the variable was transformed to 
show the averaged political regime change over the last three years, and 
thus an overall trend of political democratization or autocratization within 
the target country. The resulting values always represent an average over 
last three years with the exception of years 1946 and 1947. Year 1946 
indicates just a one year change, and year 1947 indicates an averaged 
change over the last two years. Since the year 1948, however, the indicated 
value always reports a three-year average.  
2.3.5. Ethnic fractionalization (“ethn_fract”) 
Input variable:  
• Ethnic fractionalization index from the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR) dataset494 (1946-2005) (originally labeled “elf”) – This variable 
indicates ethnic fractionalization index based on the ESEG data (i.e. only 
ethno-politically relevant groups). 
                                                            
493 Cederman, Hug & Krebs, 2007. 
494 Cederman, Min & Wimmer, 2009. 
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Adjustments: 
The missing values had to be removed. In case that there was some existent 
measurement in the particular country, the measurement was kept 
constant as in the closest available year. If there were missing values in-
between the existing measurements, the values were interpolated. If no 
measurement was recorded for particular country at all, the average value 
of excluded population for all countries was added on a constant basis. 
2.3.6. Excluded population (“excl_pop”)  
= a percentage of population excluded from the participation in central 
government of the target state.  
Input variable:  
• Excluded population (“excl_pop”) from the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) dataset495 (1946-2005) (originally labeled “exclpop”) – This 
variable indicates a percentage of the excluded population from the 
political participation. 
Adjustments:  
The missing values had to be removed. In case that there was some existent 
measurement in the particular country, the measurement was kept 
constant as in the closest available year. If there were missing values in-
between the existing measurements, the values were interpolated. If no 
measurement was recorded for particular country at all, the average value 
of excluded population for all countries was added on a constant basis. 
2.3.7. Culture of violence (“viol_cult”)  
= an average number of battle deaths over the last three years in the 
target state (using the best guess estimate).  
Input variable: 
• Best battle deaths estimate (“b_deaths_best”) from the ACD 
dataset496 (1946-2005) (originally labeled “bdeadbes”) - This variable sums 
the best estimates of the total battle-related fatalities of all conflicts in 
particular country-year. Battle fatalities are defined as civilians and 
combatants killed in the course of combat. 
Adjustments:  
                                                            
495 Cederman, Min & Wimmer, 2009. 
496 Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005.  
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Missing values in the variable “b_deaths_best” (41 cases) were assigned 
the value 50. Reason for choosing particularly number 50 comes from the 
fact that the identification threshold of conflict in the ACD dataset starts 
with at least 25 battle-related deaths over year. The observation was 
identified as fulfilling this minimal threshold, but was attached unknown 
value for some reasons. Amount of 50 battle-related fatalities was thus set 
reasonably above this threshold. The cases not identified by the ACD 
dataset as fulfilling the set threshold of an existing crisis were attached the 
value 0. After removing all the missing values, the variable was 
transformed to indicate the average number of battle deaths over the last 
three years. For year 1946, the indicated value is just one year average, year 
1947 is indicated as an average over two previous years; and since year 
1948 forward, the generated values are always three-year averages. 
 
2.4. Control independent variables - characteristics of the conflict 
2.4.1. Existence of a conflict (“confl”)  
= existence of a violent conflict based on the identification threshold of 
more than 25 battle-related deaths per year in the target country-year 
(binary). 
Input variable:  
• Conflict frequency (“c_freq”) from the ACD dataset497 (1946-2005) 
(newly created variable from the original variable “incomp”) = This 
variable denotes a number of crises that occurred in particular country-
year (based on the UCDP-PRIO conflict definition). 
Adjustments:  
Conflict frequency denoting variable was converted into a dummy variable 
identifying existence of a violent conflict.  
2.4.2. Previous violence (“prev_confl”)  
= existence of a violent conflict in the previous target country-year based 
on the identification threshold of more than 25 battle-related deaths per 
year (binary). 
Input variable:  
• Conflict frequency (“c_freq”) from the ACD dataset498 (1946-2005) 
(newly created variable from the original variable “incomp”) = This 
                                                            
497 Ibid.  
498 Ibid.  
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variable denotes a number of crises that occurred in particular country-
year (based on the UCDP-PRIO conflict definition). 
Adjustments:  
Conflict frequency denoting variable was converted into a dummy variable 
identifying existence of a violent conflict. Afterwards, the variable was 
lagged by one year to indicate whether the conflict was already ongoing in 
previous year. 
2.4.3. Internal conflict (“intern_confl”)  
= existence of an internal conflict in particular target country-year 
(binary). 
Input variable:  
• Domestic dispute dummy (“intern_c”) from the Mil Int dataset499 
(1946-2005) (newly created from original variables “Domestic Dispute” 
1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Domestic Dispute” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) – This 
dummy variable indicates presence of a domestic dispute in particular 
country-year. 
Adjustments:  
The missing values (197 cases) were assumed to be of mixed type, where 
the distinction between internal and international conflict was blurred. 
These missing observations were assigned the value 1, since the violence 
was not perpetuated solely by the intervener.  
 
2.5. Control independent variables - characteristics of the military 
intervention 
2.5.1. Previous military intervention (“prev_mil_int”) 
 = a military intervention taking place in the previous target country-year 
regardless of the degree of humanitarianism entailed (binary variable).  
Adjustments:  
If the previous target country-year was identified by the Mil Int dataset500 
as experiencing a military intervention, the observations were coded 1; 
otherwise, the observations were assigned the value 0.  
2.5.2. ‘Third-party’ military intervention (“third_party_int”) 
                                                            
499 Pearson & Baumann, 1992;  Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
500 Pearson & Baumann, 1992; Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
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= a presence of a ‘third-party’ military intervention in particular target 
country-year (binary variable). 
Input variable and adjustments:  
Country-years identified by the Mil Int dataset501 as experiencing a military 
intervention were coded 1; the remaining observations were assigned the 
value 0. 
Reference variables: 
• Domestic dispute dummy (“intern_c”) from the Mil Int dataset502 
(1946-2005) (newly created from the original variables “Domestic Dispute” 
1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Domestic Dispute” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) – This 
dummy variable indicates presence of a domestic dispute in particular 
country-year.  
• Conflict frequency (“c_freq”) from the ACD dataset503 (1946-2005) 
(newly created from the original variable “incomp”) = This variable 
denotes a number of crises that occurred in particular country-year based 
on the UCDP-PRIO conflict definition. 
Adjustments:  
‘Third-party’ military interventions were filtered out from the sample of 
military interventions using the two above listed reference variables. 
‘Third-party’ interventions were identified as those taking place into the 
internal conflicts or into the conflicts, where the violence was already 
present in the year previous to the intervention. Nevertheless, the reference 
variables had to be adjusted first. The missing values in the reference 
variable “intern_c” (197 cases) were assumed to be a mixture of internal 
and international conflicts, where it was impossible to assign a simple yes 
or no label. These missing observations were coded as internal, since the 
violence was not perpetuated solely by the intervener. The second 
reference variable “c_freq” was converted from the variable indicating 
frequency of conflicts into a binary variable merely identifying existence of 
a violent conflict. Afterwards, the value was lagged by one year, indicating 
whether there was violence in the year previous to the military 
intervention. If there was a conflict identified in the year 1946, it was 
assumed that the conflict was ongoing also in the year 1945. After 
adjusting the reference variables, the military intervention was coded as 
                                                            
501 Ibid. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2002.  
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being a ‘third-party’, if any of the two reference variables indicated a 
positive value. 
2.5.3. Use of force by the intervener (“viol_mil_int”) 
= a presence of an aggressive troop activity by some intervener in 
particular target country-year (binary). 
Input variable: 
• Aggressive troop activity dummy (“agress_act”) from the Mil Int 
dataset504 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original variables “Type of 
Troop Activity” 1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and “Type of Troop Activity” 1989-
2005 - Mil Int II) - This dummy variable indicates a presence of an 
aggressive troop activity by some intervener in particular country-year. 
2.5.4. Military intervention supporting the government (“int_supp_gov”)  
= a presence of a military intervention supporting the government of the 
target state in particular year (binary). 
Input variable:  
• Intervention supporting government dummy (“int_supp_gov”) 
from the Mil Int dataset505 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original 
variables “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 – Mil Int 
I, and “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This dummy variable indicates a presence of some intervention supporting 
the government in particular country-year.       
2.5.5. Military intervention supporting the rebels (“int_supp_reb”)  
= a presence of a military intervention supporting the rebels in the target 
country-year (binary). 
Input variable:  
• Intervention supporting rebels dummy (“int_supp_reb”) from the 
Mil Int dataset506 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original variables 
“Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and 
“Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This 
dummy variable indicates a presence of some intervention supporting the 
opposition in particular country-year.       
2.5.6. Mixed targeting of military intervention (“mixed_target”)  
                                                            
504 Ibid. 
505 Pearson & Baumann, 1992;  Kisangani & Pickering, 2007. 
506 Ibid. 
259 
 
= a presence of the mixed targeting of military interventions was mixed – 
targeting both rebels and government (binary). 
Input variables:  
• Intervention supporting government dummy (“int_supp_gov”) 
from the Mil Int dataset507 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original 
variables “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 – Mil Int 
I, and “Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - 
This dummy variable indicates a presence of some intervention supporting 
the government in particular country-year.       
• Intervention supporting rebels dummy (“int_supp_reb”) from the 
Mil Int dataset508 (1946-2005) (newly created from the original variables 
“Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1946-1988 – Mil Int I, and 
“Direction of Intervener Supporting Action” 1989-2005 - Mil Int II) - This 
dummy variable indicates a presence of some intervention supporting the 
opposition in particular country-year.       
Adjustments: 
In case that there was an intervention supporting the government of the 
target state and the rebels in the same target country-year, the variable was 
assigned the value 1; otherwise, it was assigned the value 0. 
 
3. Statistical description of the input variables  
3.1. Main variables of concern 
 
. summarize deaths_ch deaths_ch_lag deaths_ch_lag2 b_deaths_ch 
b_deaths_ch_lag b_deaths_ch_lag2 jwt_cause_x jwt_intent_x jwt_auth_x 
jwt_last_x jwt_prop_x jwt_succ_x jwt_x jwt_cause_x1 jwt_intent_x1 
jwt_auth_x1 jwt_last_x1 jwt_prop_x1 jwt_succ_x1 jwt_x1 jwt_cause_x2 
jwt_intent_x2 jwt_auth_x2 jwt_last_x2 jwt_prop_x2 jwt_succ_x2 jwt_x2 
 
    Variable     |   Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       deaths_ch |   12000    .2535234    .9583299  -20.01196    17.6132 
   deaths_ch_lag |   12000    .2572033    .9684151  -20.01196    17.6132 
  deaths_ch_lag2 |   12000    .2608832    .9783825  -20.01196    17.6132 
     b_deaths_ch |   12000    -13.4282    7411.582  -388991.6   376393.6 
 b_deaths_ch_lag |   12000   -14.02803    7411.654  -388991.6   376393.6 
b_deaths_ch_lag2 |   12000   -22.89984    7353.634  -388991.6   376393.6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     jwt_cause_x |   12000    2.543595    10.28737          0   99.98891 
    jwt_intent_x |   12000     7.58401    20.85879          0   102.2314 
      jwt_auth_x |   12000     6.88836    18.13729          0   98.85175 
      jwt_last_x |   12000    6.606926    16.44788          0   99.99971 
                                                            
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
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      jwt_prop_x |   12000    5.470825    13.89065          0   134.1422 
      jwt_succ_x |   12000    5.848118    14.67313          0   51.71562 
           jwt_x |   12000    3.012631    8.020253          0   47.13569 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    jwt_cause_x1 |   12000    2.171711    9.986077          0   99.98891 
   jwt_intent_x1 |   12000    5.066024    17.78411          0   102.2314 
     jwt_auth_x1 |   12000    4.046422     13.9584          0    98.5947 
     jwt_last_x1 |   12000    4.015425    13.22487          0   99.99971 
     jwt_prop_x1 |   12000     3.32427    11.12133          0   134.1422 
     jwt_succ_x1 |   12000    3.471216    11.47254          0   51.71562 
          jwt_x1 |   12000    2.073439    7.129816          0   47.13569 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    jwt_cause_x2 |   12000     1.04467    7.298367          0    92.6641 
   jwt_intent_x2 |   12000    2.583385    13.02358          0   97.80616 
     jwt_auth_x2 |   12000    1.891138    9.585511          0    98.5947 
     jwt_last_x2 |   12000    1.926458    9.388785          0   78.72822 
     jwt_prop_x2 |   12000    1.603368    7.890948          0   75.22523 
     jwt_succ_x2 |   12000    1.717201    8.369769          0   51.71562 
          jwt_x2 |   12000    1.048897    5.294889          0   47.13569 
 
3.2. Control variables 
 
. summarize mil_int prev_mil_int polity_lev polity_gr gdp_lev gdp_gr 
excl_pop ethn_fract viol_cult confl prev_confl intern_confl third_party_int 
viol_mil_int int_supp_gov int_supp_reb mixed_target 
    
       Variable |    Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------   
     polity_lev |   12000    10.41529    5.796502          1         20 
      polity_gr |   12000    .0565694    .6830917  -5.333333   5.333333 
        gdp_lev |   12000     5.59136    7.553927   .0278672   110.3153 
         gdp_gr |   12000    .1225041    .3888547  -8.202377   11.31875 
       excl_pop |   12000    .1543356    .1921297          0        .98 
     ethn_fract |   12000    .4090667    .2694655          0      .9996 
      viol_cult |   12000    865.3349    8684.617          0   334266.7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          confl |   12000    .1198333    .3247801          0          1 
     prev_confl |   12000    .1190833       .3239          0          1 
   intern_confl |   12000        .062    .2411656          0          1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        mil_int |   12000    .1446667    .3517791          0          1 
   prev_mil_int |   12000    .1429167    .3500024          0          1 
third_party_int |   12000    .1541667    .3611235          0          1 
   viol_mil_int |   12000        .104    .3052733          0          1 
   int_supp_gov |   12000    .0553333    .2286393          0          1 
   int_supp_reb |   12000    .0614167     .240103          0          1 
   mixed_target |   12000        .015    .1215575          0          1 
 
3.3. Number of examined events  
 
• Mil Int dyad data – 1736 country dyad-years with military intervention 
• Target country-year grouped Mil Int dyad data – 1695 country-years (41 
lost observations) 
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• 1st definition of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ (“jwt_...x”) - 1695 
country-years 
• 2nd definition of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ (“jwt_...1x”) - 1036 
country-years (41+659 lost observations due to the changes in the 
definition) 
• 3rd definition of ‘humanitarian motives and means’ (“jwt_...2x”) - 494 
country-years (41+659+542 lost observations due to the changes in the 
definition) 
 
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Panel id variables were established: 
. sort cow_ccode year 
. tsset cow_ccode year 
       panel variable:  cow_ccode, 2 to 990 
        time variable:  year, 1946 to 2005 
All the theoretially relevant variables were put into the regression model 
regardless of their final significance. Each model was built with the same variables 
so as to make the models mutually comparable.   
 
1. Hausman test 
The appropriate regression method was selected by testing all the definitions of 
‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military interventions, including the control 
definition, on both dependent variables using the Hausman test. The tests were 
carried out using the following sequence of stata orders: 
. xtreg Y X1…Xn, fe 
. estimates store fixed 
. xtreg Y X1…Xn, re 
. estimates store random 
. hausman fixed random 
If the resulting p-value was significant (≤ 0,05), the Hausman test suggested that 
the fixed effects method should be used; if insignificant (>0,5), the random effects 
method should be used. 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
Y1: 
deaths_ch.... 
Y1a: deaths_ch Y1b: deaths_ch_lag Y1c: deaths_ch_lag2 
Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result 
jwt_x -24,9 ? Failed* -0,2 ? Failed* 12,4 0,72 RE 
jwt_x1 70,1 0,00 FE 82,2 0,00 FE 103,0 0,00 FE 
jwt_x2 43,8 0,00 FE 48,3 0,00 FE 51,6 0,00 FE 
Y2: 
b_deaths_ch..
. 
Y2a: b_deaths_ch Y2b: b_deaths_ch_lag 
Y2c: 
b_deaths_ch_lag2 
Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result 
jwt_x 8,2 0,94 RE 45,9 0,00 FE 15,5 0,56 RE 
jwt_x1 6,5 0,98 RE 51,0 0,00 FE 17,5 0,35 RE 
jwt_x2 6,1 0,99 RE 55,9 0,00 FE 19,1 0,26 RE 
Y1: 
deaths_ch.... 
Y1a: deaths_ch Y1b: deaths_ch_lag Y1c: deaths_ch_lag2 
Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result 
mil_int 58,9 0,00 FE -46,5 ? Failed* 15,3 0,50 RE 
mil_int_1 226,1 0,00 FE 17,2 0,38 RE 29,6 0,02 FE 
mil_int_2 57,9 0,00 FE 4,5 0,99 RE 25,9 0,05 FE 
Y2: 
b_deaths_ch.. 
Y2a: b_deaths_ch 
Y2b: 
b_deaths_ch_lag 
Y2c: b_deaths_ch_lag2 
Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result Chi 2 P>|t| Result 
mil_int 6,0 0,99 RE 44,0 0,00 FE 13,9 0,61 RE 
mil_int_1 6,7 0,98 RE 44,9 0,00 FE 14,5 0,57 RE 
mil_int_2 6,6 0,98 RE 50,6 0,00 FE 15,6 0,48 RE 
*Chi2<0 => data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test => Hausman test failed 
FE = fixed effects, RE = random effects 
 
2. Regression results for all the definitions (using the aggregate JWT indexes) 
 
The significance level is indicated by the following marking: 
 
        *** 1% significance level 
        ** 5% significance level 
        *  10% significance level 
 
2.1. Control definition of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military 
intervention 
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2.1.1. Dependent variable (Y1) – conflict deaths 
 
Y1a: deaths_ch 
Control definition 
1 
Control definition 2 Control definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int 0,001 0,058 0,99  -  -  -  -  -  - 
mil_int_1  -  -  - * 0,113 0,064 0,08  -  -  - 
mil_int_2  -  -  -  -  -  - 0,016 0,093 0,87 
polity_lev 0,003 0,003 0,26 0,003 0,003 0,28 0,003 0,003 0,26 
polity_gr -0,056 0,013 0,00 -0,056 0,013 0,00 -0,056 0,013 0,00 
gdp_lev 0,003 0,002 0,17 0,003 0,002 0,17 0,003 0,002 0,17 
gdp_gr 0,001 0,023 0,97 0,001 0,023 0,96 0,001 0,023 0,97 
excl_pop 0,432 0,080 0,00 0,432 0,080 0,00 0,432 0,080 0,00 
ethn_fract -0,193 0,143 0,18 -0,199 0,143 0,16 -0,194 0,143 0,17 
viol_cult 0,112 0,031 0,01 0,114 0,040 0,01 0,061 0,042 0,15 
confl 0,105 0,042 0,01 0,108 0,042 0,01 0,105 0,042 0,01 
prev_confl -0,131 0,076 0,08 -0,134 0,076 0,08 -0,132 0,076 0,08 
intern_confl -0,078 0,069 0,26 -0,138 0,077 0,07 -0,082 0,073 0,26 
prev_mil_int 0,114 0,040 0,01 0,104 0,035 0,00 0,114 0,035 0,00 
third_party_int 0,226 0,076 0,00 0,200 0,077 0,01 0,226 0,076 0,00 
viol_mil_int -0,131 0,054 0,02 -0,139 0,050 0,01 -0,131 0,049 0,01 
int_supp_gov -0,088 0,067 0,19 -0,098 0,065 0,13 -0,096 0,083 0,24 
int_supp_reb 0,246 0,061 0,00 0,229 0,059 0,00 0,248 0,059 0,00 
mixed_target 0,311 0,103 0,00 0,325 0,101 0,00 0,309 0,101 0,00 
_cons 0,183 0,070 0,01 0,188 0,070 0,01 0,184 0,070 0,01 
 
Y1b: deaths_ch_lag 
Control definition 1 Control definition 2 Control definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int 0,004 0,058 0,95  -  -  -  -  -  - 
mil_int_1  -  -  - ** 0,140 0,065 0,03  -  -  - 
mil_int_2  -  -  -  -  -  - -0,027 0,094 0,77 
polity_lev 0,005 0,003 0,06 0,005 0,003 0,06 0,005 0,003 0,06 
polity_gr -0,060 0,013 0,00 -0,060 0,013 0,00 -0,060 0,013 0,00 
gdp_lev 0,002 0,002 0,37 0,002 0,002 0,37 0,002 0,002 0,36 
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gdp_gr 0,004 0,024 0,86 0,004 0,024 0,85 0,004 0,024 0,86 
excl_pop 0,470 0,080 0,00 0,470 0,080 0,00 0,470 0,080 0,00 
ethn_fract -0,219 0,143 0,13 -0,226 0,143 0,12 -0,217 0,143 0,13 
viol_cult 0,185 0,052 0,00 0,175 0,070 0,01 0,183 0,069 0,01 
confl 0,061 0,042 0,15 0,065 0,042 0,12 0,061 0,042 0,15 
prev_confl 0,007 0,076 0,93 0,004 0,076 0,96 0,009 0,076 0,91 
intern_confl 0,066 0,069 0,34 -0,008 0,077 0,92 0,074 0,073 0,32 
prev_mil_int 0,105 0,040 0,01 0,095 0,035 0,01 0,107 0,035 0,00 
third_party_int 0,074 0,076 0,33 0,043 0,077 0,58 0,074 0,076 0,33 
viol_mil_int -0,115 0,054 0,03 -0,124 0,050 0,01 -0,114 0,050 0,02 
int_supp_gov -0,125 0,067 0,06 -0,136 0,065 0,04 -0,109 0,083 0,19 
int_supp_reb 0,285 0,062 0,00 0,265 0,059 0,00 0,284 0,059 0,00 
mixed_target 0,284 0,104 0,01 0,300 0,102 0,00 0,285 0,102 0,01 
_cons 0,175 0,070 0,01 0,182 0,070 0,01 0,175 0,070 0,01 
 
Y1c: deaths_ch_lag2 
Control definition 1 Control definition 2 Control definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int -0,015 0,058 0,80  -  -  -  -  -  - 
mil_int_1  -  -  - ** 0,150 0,065 0,02  -  -  - 
mil_int_2  -  -  -  -  -  - -0,067 0,094 0,47 
polity_lev 0,007 0,003 0,01 0,007 0,003 0,01 0,007 0,003 0,01 
polity_gr -0,065 0,013 0,00 -0,065 0,013 0,00 -0,065 0,013 0,00 
gdp_lev 0,001 0,002 0,67 0,001 0,002 0,68 0,001 0,002 0,64 
gdp_gr 0,004 0,024 0,87 0,004 0,024 0,86 0,004 0,024 0,88 
excl_pop 0,464 0,080 0,00 0,464 0,080 0,00 0,465 0,080 0,00 
ethn_fract -0,263 0,144 0,07 -0,272 0,144 0,06 -0,261 0,144 0,07 
viol_cult 0,112 0,031 0,01 0,114 0,040 0,01 0,061 0,042 0,15 
confl 0,046 0,043 0,28 0,050 0,043 0,24 0,045 0,043 0,29 
prev_confl 0,083 0,077 0,28 0,081 0,076 0,29 0,089 0,077 0,25 
intern_confl 0,183 0,069 0,01 0,103 0,077 0,18 0,201 0,074 0,01 
prev_mil_int 0,114 0,040 0,01 0,097 0,036 0,01 0,109 0,035 0,00 
third_party_int -0,022 0,076 0,78 -0,057 0,078 0,47 -0,024 0,076 0,76 
viol_mil_int -0,136 0,054 0,01 -0,152 0,050 0,00 -0,143 0,050 0,00 
int_supp_gov -0,135 0,067 0,05 -0,152 0,065 0,02 -0,102 0,083 0,22 
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int_supp_reb 0,339 0,062 0,00 0,310 0,059 0,00 0,328 0,059 0,00 
mixed_target 0,228 0,104 0,03 0,252 0,102 0,01 0,241 0,102 0,02 
_cons 0,183 0,070 0,01 0,191 0,070 0,01 0,182 0,070 0,01 
 
2.1.2. Dependent variable (Y2) – battle deaths 
 
Y2a: b_deaths_ch 
Control definition 1 Control definition 2 Control definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t Coef. 
St. 
Err. 
P>t 
mil_int 307 487 0,53  -  -  -  -  -  - 
mil_int_1  -  -  - -153 545 0,78  -  -  - 
mil_int_2  -  -  -  -  -  - -145 789 0,85 
polity_lev -10 24 0,69 -9 24 0,71 -9 24 0,70 
polity_gr 100 108 0,36 100 108 0,36 99 108 0,36 
gdp_lev 6 17 0,75 5 17 0,76 6 17 0,75 
gdp_gr -17 198 0,93 -18 198 0,93 -18 198 0,93 
excl_pop -699 673 0,30 -696 673 0,30 -694 673 0,30 
ethn_fract -2 1208 1,00 40 1207 0,97 38 1207 0,98 
viol_cult 138 91 0,13 289 160 0,07 182 68 0,01 
confl 2697 358 0,00 2703 358 0,00 2707 357 0,00 
prev_confl -1159 642 0,07 -1185 641 0,07 -1179 643 0,07 
intern_confl 845 580 0,15 937 648 0,15 895 619 0,15 
prev_mil_int -911 340 0,01 -793 298 0,01 -804 295 0,01 
third_party_int -798 641 0,21 -741 652 0,26 -778 640 0,22 
viol_mil_int 692 456 0,13 818 419 0,05 804 418 0,05 
int_supp_gov -148 566 0,79 -42 549 0,94 24 698 0,97 
int_supp_reb -498 518 0,34 -372 499 0,46 -409 497 0,41 
mixed_target 2630 874 0,00 2492 856 0,00 2528 858 0,00 
_cons 162 590 0,78 142 590 0,81 145 590 0,81 
 
Y2b: b_deaths_ch_lag 
Control definition 1 Control definition 2 Control definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int -187 463 0,69  -  -  -  -  -  - 
mil_int_1  -  -  - * -926 519 0,07  -  -  - 
266 
 
mil_int_2  -  -  -  -  -  - * -1286 750 0,09 
polity_lev -14 23 0,54 -13 23 0,56 -14 23 0,52 
polity_gr 146 103 0,16 146 103 0,16 144 103 0,16 
gdp_lev -3 17 0,87 -3 17 0,88 -1 17 0,95 
gdp_gr -25 189 0,89 -27 189 0,89 -29 189 0,88 
excl_pop -1221 641 0,06 -1223 641 0,06 -1208 641 0,06 
ethn_fract -658 1149 0,57 -629 1148 0,58 -624 1148 0,59 
viol_cult 289 160 0,07 263 88 0,00 182 68 0,01 
confl 1029 340 0,00 996 340 0,00 1016 340 0,00 
prev_confl 2727 611 0,00 2766 610 0,00 2832 612 0,00 
intern_confl 3470 552 0,00 3956 617 0,00 3815 589 0,00 
prev_mil_int 560 323 0,08 573 284 0,04 505 281 0,07 
third_party_int -2843 610 0,00 -2648 620 0,00 -2873 609 0,00 
viol_mil_int -185 434 0,67 -189 399 0,64 -284 397 0,48 
int_supp_gov -902 538 0,09 -875 522 0,09 -249 664 0,71 
int_supp_reb -620 493 0,21 -537 475 0,26 -803 473 0,09 
mixed_target -242 832 0,77 -288 815 0,72 -23 816 0,98 
_cons 705 561 0,21 671 561 0,23 676 561 0,23 
 
Y2c: b_deaths_ch_lag2 
Control definition 1 Control definition 2 Control definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
mil_int -141 474 0,77  -  -  -  -  -  - 
mil_int_1  -  -  - 494 531 0,35  -  -  - 
mil_int_2  -  -  -  -  -  - -34 768 0,97 
polity_lev -7 23 0,78 -7 23 0,76 -7 23 0,77 
polity_gr -7 105 0,95 -7 105 0,95 -7 105 0,95 
gdp_lev -1 17 0,97 -1 17 0,97 0 17 0,98 
gdp_gr -23 193 0,91 -21 193 0,91 -22 193 0,91 
excl_pop 304 656 0,64 303 656 0,65 303 656 0,64 
ethn_fract -156 1176 0,90 -198 1176 0,87 -170 1176 0,89 
viol_cult 138 91 0,13 182 68 0,01 289 160 0,07 
confl 243 349 0,49 252 349 0,47 238 348 0,50 
prev_confl 1149 626 0,07 1151 624 0,07 1165 626 0,06 
intern_confl 1721 565 0,00 1453 632 0,02 1725 603 0,00 
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prev_mil_int 2 331 1,00 -88 291 0,76 -46 287 0,87 
third_party_int -1507 624 0,02 -1629 635 0,01 -1518 623 0,02 
viol_mil_int 51 444 0,91 -37 408 0,93 -3 407 1,00 
int_supp_gov -169 551 0,76 -256 534 0,63 -193 680 0,78 
int_supp_reb 208 505 0,68 83 486 0,86 158 485 0,75 
mixed_target -836 852 0,33 -718 834 0,39 -777 836 0,35 
_cons 238 575 0,68 266 575 0,64 243 575 0,67 
 
2.2. Definitions of the ‘humanitarian motives and means’ of military 
intervention 
2.2.1. Dependent variable (Y1) – conflict deaths 
 
Y1a: deaths_ch 
HMI definition 1 HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x 0,004 0,003 0,16  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - ** 0,006 0,003 0,024  -  -  - 
jwt_x2  -  -  -  -  -  - *** -0,012 0,003 0,00 
polity_lev 0,003 0,003 0,25 0,003 0,003 0,24 0,003 0,003 0,30 
polity_gr -0,056 0,013 0,00 -0,056 0,013 0,00 -0,057 0,013 0,00 
gdp_lev 0,003 0,002 0,16 0,003 0,002 0,17 0,003 0,002 0,13 
gdp_gr 0,001 0,023 0,98 0,001 0,023 0,98 0,002 0,023 0,93 
excl_pop 0,431 0,080 0,00 0,426 0,080 0,00 0,440 0,080 0,00 
ethn_fract -0,199 0,143 0,16 -0,197 0,143 0,17 -0,189 0,143 0,19 
viol_cult 0,061 0,042 0,15 0,114 0,040 0,01 0,111 0,031 0,01 
confl 0,096 0,043 0,03 0,099 0,042 0,02 0,112 0,043 0,01 
prev_confl -0,143 0,076 0,06 -0,165 0,077 0,03 -0,065 0,078 0,40 
intern_confl -0,111 0,072 0,13 -0,188 0,084 0,03 0,046 0,076 0,55 
prev_mil_int 0,097 0,037 0,01 0,108 0,035 0,00 0,114 0,035 0,00 
third_party_int 0,242 0,077 0,00 0,239 0,076 0,00 0,166 0,077 0,03 
viol_mil_int -0,160 0,053 0,00 -0,141 0,050 0,00 -0,134 0,049 0,01 
int_supp_gov -0,110 0,067 0,10 -0,100 0,065 0,12 0,065 0,077 0,40 
int_supp_reb 0,216 0,062 0,00 0,220 0,059 0,00 0,211 0,059 0,00 
mixed_target 0,335 0,102 0,00 0,326 0,101 0,00 0,369 0,102 0,00 
_cons 0,184 0,070 0,01 0,186 0,070 0,01 0,180 0,070 0,01 
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Y1b: deaths_ch_lag 
HMI definition 1 HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x * 0,005 0,003 0,06  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - *** 0,008 0,003 0,00  -  -  - 
jwt_x2  -  -  -  -  -  - *** -0,015 0,003 0,00 
polity_lev 0,006 0,003 0,05 0,006 0,003 0,05 0,005 0,003 0,07 
polity_gr -0,059 0,013 0,00 -0,059 0,013 0,00 -0,061 0,013 0,00 
gdp_lev 0,002 0,002 0,36 0,002 0,002 0,37 0,002 0,002 0,30 
gdp_gr 0,004 0,024 0,86 0,004 0,024 0,86 0,006 0,024 0,81 
excl_pop 0,468 0,080 0,00 0,462 0,080 0,00 0,479 0,080 0,00 
ethn_fract -0,226 0,143 0,12 -0,224 0,143 0,12 -0,213 0,143 0,14 
viol_cult 0,183 0,069 0,01 0,286 0,063 0,00 0,115 0,041 0,01 
confl 0,048 0,043 0,26 0,053 0,043 0,21 0,069 0,042 0,10 
prev_confl -0,009 0,077 0,91 -0,038 0,078 0,62 0,089 0,078 0,25 
intern_confl 0,021 0,073 0,77 -0,081 0,085 0,34 0,220 0,077 0,00 
prev_mil_int 0,084 0,037 0,02 0,098 0,035 0,01 0,107 0,035 0,00 
third_party_int 0,097 0,077 0,21 0,091 0,076 0,23 -0,001 0,078 0,99 
viol_mil_int -0,153 0,054 0,00 -0,127 0,050 0,01 -0,117 0,050 0,02 
int_supp_gov -0,154 0,067 0,02 -0,140 0,065 0,03 0,066 0,077 0,39 
int_supp_reb 0,245 0,062 0,00 0,252 0,060 0,00 0,242 0,059 0,00 
mixed_target 0,315 0,103 0,00 0,303 0,102 0,00 0,355 0,103 0,00 
_cons 0,176 0,070 0,01 0,179 0,070 0,01 0,171 0,070 0,02 
 
Y1c: deaths_ch_lag2 
HMI definition 1 HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x *** 0,007 0,003 0,01  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - *** 0,011 0,003 0,00  -  -  - 
jwt_x2  -  -  -  -  -  - *** -0,015 0,003 0,00 
polity_lev 0,008 0,003 0,01 0,008 0,003 0,01 0,007 0,003 0,01 
polity_gr -0,064 0,013 0,00 -0,064 0,013 0,00 -0,066 0,013 0,00 
gdp_lev 0,001 0,002 0,65 0,001 0,002 0,68 0,001 0,002 0,56 
gdp_gr 0,004 0,024 0,88 0,004 0,024 0,88 0,006 0,024 0,82 
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excl_pop 0,461 0,080 0,00 0,453 0,080 0,00 0,473 0,080 0,00 
ethn_fract -0,275 0,144 0,06 -0,271 0,144 0,06 -0,259 0,144 0,07 
viol_cult 0,116 0,033 0,01 0,291 0,065 0,00 0,185 0,071 0,01 
confl 0,028 0,043 0,52 0,035 0,043 0,41 0,054 0,043 0,20 
prev_confl 0,062 0,077 0,42 0,023 0,078 0,76 0,171 0,078 0,03 
intern_confl 0,119 0,073 0,10 -0,018 0,085 0,83 0,344 0,077 0,00 
prev_mil_int 0,076 0,037 0,04 0,098 0,035 0,01 0,109 0,035 0,00 
third_party_int 0,009 0,077 0,91 0,000 0,076 1,00 -0,101 0,078 0,19 
viol_mil_int -0,197 0,054 0,00 -0,160 0,050 0,00 -0,146 0,050 0,00 
int_supp_gov -0,182 0,067 0,01 -0,161 0,065 0,01 0,060 0,077 0,44 
int_supp_reb 0,275 0,063 0,00 0,286 0,060 0,00 0,287 0,059 0,00 
mixed_target 0,280 0,103 0,01 0,261 0,102 0,01 0,310 0,103 0,00 
_cons 0,185 0,070 0,01 0,190 0,070 0,01 0,179 0,070 0,01 
 
2.2.2. Dependent variable (Y2) – battle deaths 
 
Y2a: b_deaths_ch 
HMI definition 1 HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x *** 119 22 0,00  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - *** 96 22 0,00  -  -  - 
jwt_x2  -  -  -  -  -  - *** 96 27 0,00 
polity_lev -6 24 0,82 -7 24 0,77 -7 24 0,77 
polity_gr 108 108 0,32 108 108 0,32 107 108 0,32 
gdp_lev 6 17 0,72 5 17 0,77 3 17 0,84 
gdp_gr -20 198 0,92 -20 198 0,92 -29 198 0,89 
excl_pop -743 673 0,27 -797 673 0,24 -753 673 0,26 
ethn_fract -152 1205 0,90 -33 1206 0,98 -3 1206 1,00 
viol_cult 292 163 0,07 285 112 0,01 184 69 0,01 
confl 2398 361 0,00 2612 358 0,00 2655 358 0,00 
prev_confl -1572 644 0,02 -1738 653 0,01 -1724 659 0,01 
intern_confl -231 612 0,71 -948 712 0,18 -144 647 0,82 
prev_mil_int -1367 312 0,00 -908 296 0,00 -808 295 0,01 
third_party_int -235 646 0,72 -569 641 0,38 -289 655 0,66 
viol_mil_int -138 451 0,76 639 419 0,13 831 417 0,05 
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int_supp_gov -794 562 0,16 -258 548 0,64 -1288 650 0,05 
int_supp_reb -1414 525 0,01 -824 501 0,10 -106 499 0,83 
mixed_target 3311 865 0,00 2762 855 0,00 2038 864 0,02 
_cons 170 589 0,77 200 589 0,74 177 589 0,76 
 
Y2b: b_deaths_ch_lag 
HMI definition 1 HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x -28 21 0,17  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - *** -65 21 0,00  -  -  - 
jwt_x2  -  -  -  -  -  - *** -67 26 0,01 
polity_lev -15 23 0,51 -16 23 0,49 -15 23 0,50 
polity_gr 144 103 0,16 140 103 0,17 140 103 0,17 
gdp_lev -3 17 0,86 -2 17 0,88 -1 17 0,94 
gdp_gr -24 189 0,90 -24 189 0,90 -17 189 0,93 
excl_pop -1212 641 0,06 -1154 641 0,07 -1183 641 0,07 
ethn_fract -635 1148 0,58 -635 1147 0,58 -654 1147 0,57 
viol_cult 260 178 0,14 280 166 0,01 259 85 0,00 
confl 1097 344 0,00 1088 341 0,00 1060 340 0,00 
prev_confl 2837 613 0,00 3120 621 0,00 3120 627 0,00 
intern_confl 3722 583 0,00 4694 678 0,00 4163 615 0,00 
prev_mil_int 630 297 0,03 566 281 0,05 497 281 0,08 
third_party_int -2986 616 0,00 -2998 610 0,00 -3198 623 0,00 
viol_mil_int -30 429 0,94 -141 399 0,72 -273 397 0,49 
int_supp_gov -782 535 0,14 -820 521 0,12 -97 619 0,88 
int_supp_reb -439 500 0,38 -390 477 0,41 -884 474 0,06 
mixed_target -360 824 0,66 -340 814 0,68 162 822 0,84 
_cons 708 561 0,21 678 561 0,23 693 561 0,22 
 
Y2c: b_deaths_ch_lag2 
HMI definition 1 HMI definition 2 HMI definition 3 
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t Coef. St. Err. P>t 
jwt_x -16 21 0,44  -  -  -  -  -  - 
jwt_x1  -  -  - -1 21 0,95  -  -  - 
jwt_x2  -  -  -  -  -  - *  -48 27 0,07 
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polity_lev -7 23 0,75 -7 23 0,77 -8 23 0,74 
polity_gr -8 105 0,94 -7 105 0,95 -11 105 0,92 
gdp_lev -1 17 0,97 -1 17 0,98 0 17 0,98 
gdp_gr -22 193 0,91 -22 193 0,91 -17 193 0,93 
excl_pop 309 656 0,64 304 656 0,64 331 656 0,61 
ethn_fract -146 1176 0,90 -170 1175 0,89 -153 1175 0,90 
viol_cult 251 186 0,15 278 159 0,07 220 118 0,05 
confl 280 353 0,43 239 349 0,49 264 349 0,45 
prev_confl 1214 628 0,05 1171 636 0,07 1431 642 0,03 
intern_confl 1863 597 0,00 1743 694 0,01 2216 630 0,00 
prev_mil_int 29 304 0,92 -45 288 0,88 -45 287 0,87 
third_party_int -1591 631 0,01 -1521 625 0,02 -1762 638 0,01 
viol_mil_int 126 440 0,77 1 408 1,00 -14 407 0,97 
int_supp_gov -112 548 0,84 -209 534 0,70 405 634 0,52 
int_supp_reb 299 512 0,56 167 489 0,73 16 486 0,97 
mixed_target -889 843 0,29 -785 833 0,35 -544 842 0,52 
_cons 241 574 0,68 243 574 0,67 229 574 0,69 
 
3. Regression results for all the definitions (distinguishing among individual 
JWT criteria) 
 
The significance level is indicated by the following marking: 
 
       ***  1% significance level 
       **  5% significance level 
       *  10% significance level 
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4. Sample of military interventions selected as candidates for being awarded 
the label ‘humanitarian’  
 
Selection procedure: 
• ‘Humanitarian motives and means’ = jwt_x.. > 23,57 (since the maximum 
achieved JWT score equals 47,14) 
• ‘Humanitarian outcomes’ = b_deaths_ch_lag < 0 ᴜ deaths_ch_lag < 0 
Sample of the cases fulfilling both conditions (using the additional criteria 
associated with the individual HMI definitions): 
 
 
SAMPLE OF THE CANDIDATES FOR A 'LEGITIMATE HMI' 
CONFLICT DEATHS (Y1) 
Name COW ccode Year JWT_X JWT_X1 JWT_X2 
El Salvador 92 1982 -0,02 -0,02  - 
El Salvador 92 1983 -0,02 -0,02  - 
Moldova 359 1992 -0,06 -0,06  - 
Liberia 450 1990 -1,05 -1,05 -1,05 
Sierra Leone 451 1991 -0,33  -  - 
Congo 484 1997 -0,69  -  - 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 490 1993 -0,37  -  - 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 490 1996 -0,59  -  - 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 490 1997 -0,59 -0,59  - 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 490 1998 -0,59 -0,59 -0,59 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 490 1999 -0,59 -0,59 -0,59 
Uganda 500 1976 -0,13  -  - 
Uganda 500 1978 -0,13 -0,13  - 
Uganda 500 1979 -0,13 -0,13 -0,13 
Uganda 500 1980 -0,10 -0,10  - 
Uganda 500 1981 -0,10 -0,10  - 
Uganda 500 1994 -0,54  -  - 
Uganda 500 1996 -0,85 -0,85  - 
Uganda 500 1998 -0,85 -0,85  - 
Rwanda 517 1990 -4,08 -4,08 -4,08 
Rwanda 517 1991 -4,08 -4,08 -4,08 
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Rwanda 517 1993 -4,08 -4,08 -4,08 
Rwanda 517 1994 -4,08 -4,08 -4,08 
Somalia 520 1992 -0,97 -0,97  - 
Somalia 520 1993 -0,97 -0,97  - 
Somalia 520 1994 -0,97 -0,97  - 
Zambia 551 1987 -0,20 -0,20  - 
Iraq 645 1991 -1,12 -1,12  - 
Iraq 645 1992 -1,12 -1,12  - 
Iraq 645 1993 -1,12 -1,12  - 
Iraq 645 1994 -1,12 -1,12  - 
Iraq 645 1996 -0,13 -0,13  - 
Iraq 645 1997 -0,13 -0,13  - 
Iraq 645 2003 -0,35  -  - 
Iraq 645 2005 -0,35 -0,35  - 
Afghanistan 700 1979 -0,92 -0,92 -0,92 
Afghanistan 700 1980 -5,86 -5,86 -5,86 
Afghanistan 700 1981 -5,86 -5,86 -5,86 
Afghanistan 700 1982 -5,86 -5,86 -5,86 
Afghanistan 700 1983 -5,86 -5,86 -5,86 
Afghanistan 700 1984 -5,86 -5,86 -5,86 
Afghanistan 700 1985 -5,10 -5,10 -5,10 
Afghanistan 700 1986 -5,10 -5,10 -5,10 
Afghanistan 700 1987 -5,10 -5,10 -5,10 
Afghanistan 700 1988 -5,10 -5,10 -5,10 
Afghanistan 700 1989 -5,10 -5,10  - 
Tajikistan 702 1992 -0,05  -  - 
Cambodia 811 1970 -1,02 -1,02  - 
Cambodia 811 1971 -1,02 -1,02  - 
Cambodia 811 1972 -1,02 -1,02  - 
Cambodia 811 1973 -1,02 -1,02  - 
Cambodia 811 1974 -1,02 -1,02  - 
Cambodia 811 1975 -1,82 -1,82  - 
Cambodia 811 1976 -1,82 -1,82  - 
Cambodia 811 1977 -1,82 -1,82  - 
Cambodia 811 1978 -1,82 -1,82  - 
Cambodia 811 1979 -1,82 -1,82  - 
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BATTLE DEATHS (Y2) 
Name COW ccode Year JWT_X  JWT_X1 JWT_X2  
Cuba 40 1958 -4500 -4500 -4500 
Dominican Republic 42 1965 -3276 -3276 -3276 
Guatemala 90 1987 -500 -500 -500 
Guatemala 90 1992 -1200 -1200  - 
El Salvador 92 1983 -3000 -3000  - 
El Salvador 92 1989 -4800 -4800  - 
Nicaragua 93 1979 -7000 -7000  - 
Nicaragua 93 1985 -1000 -1000  - 
Nicaragua 93 1987 -3300 -3300  - 
Nicaragua 93 1988 -2900 -2900  - 
Costa Rica 94 1948 -2000 -2000 -2000 
Peru 135 1995 -395 -395  - 
Peru 135 1997 -62 -62  - 
Bolivia 145 1967 -82 -82  - 
United Kingdom 200 1979 -41 -41 -41 
Hungary 310 1956 -2854 -2854 -2854 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 346 1993 -23575 -23575 -23575 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 346 1994 -950 -950 -950 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 346 1995 -1250 -1250 -1250 
Greece 350 1949 -38500 -38500  - 
Cyprus 352 1974 -4350 -4350  - 
Moldova 359 1992 -650 -650  - 
Georgia 372 1993 -2049 -2049 -2049 
Azerbaijan 373 1993 -60 -60 -60 
Azerbaijan 373 1994 -6320 -6320  - 
Guinea-Bissau 404 1998 -150  -  - 
Equatorial Guinea 411 1979 -185 -185 -185 
Mali 432 1985 -5  -  - 
Sierra Leone 451 2000 -400 -400 -400 
Nigeria 475 1969 -26612 -26612 -26612 
Nigeria 475 1970 -2420 -2420 -2420 
Chad 483 1983 -185 -185 -185 
Chad 483 1987 -4250 -4250 -4250 
Chad 483 1988 -1920 -1920  - 
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Chad 483 1992 -400 -400 -400 
Congo 484 1997 -5383  -  - 
Congo, Dem. Re. 490 1961 -423 -423  - 
Congo, Dem. Re. 490 1965 -14983 -14983 -14983 
Congo, Dem. Re. 490 1967 -778 -778 -778 
Congo, Dem. Re. 490 1978 -593 -593 -593 
Congo, Dem. Re. 490 2000 -47134 -47134 -47134 
Congo, Dem. Re. 490 2001 -900 -900 -900 
Uganda 500 1979 -3098 -3098 -3098 
Uganda 500 1989 -300 -300  - 
Uganda 500 1996 -250 -250  - 
Uganda 500 1998 -300 -300  - 
Rwanda 517 1993 -200 -200 -200 
Rwanda 517 1994 -700 -700 -700 
Rwanda 517 1998 -1400 -1400 -1400 
Somalia 520 1964 -350  -  - 
Somalia 520 1978 -520  -  - 
Somalia 520 1983 -376 -376  - 
Somalia 520 1992 -3050 -3050  - 
Somalia 520 1993 -350 -350  - 
Ethiopia (-1992) 530 1964 -349 -349  - 
Ethiopia (-1992) 530 1978 -18300 -18300 -18300 
Ethiopia (-1992) 530 1983 -376 -376 -376 
Angola 540 1976 -2967 -2967 -2967 
Angola 540 1991 -2559 -2559  - 
Angola 540 1994 -19300 -19300  - 
Angola 540 1995 -725 -725 -725 
Angola 540 2000 -2250 -2250 -2250 
Mozambique 541 1988 -17500 -17500 -17500 
Mozambique 541 1992 -1000 -1000  - 
Zimbabwe 552 1978 -610 -610 -610 
Zimbabwe 552 1979 -9397 -9397 -9397 
Comoros 581 1989 -27 -27  - 
Morocco 600 1976 -150 -150 -150 
Morocco 600 1977 -50 -50 -50 
Sudan 625 1971 -38 -38 -38 
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Sudan 625 1997 -3500 -3500  - 
Sudan 625 1998 -1500 -1500  - 
Sudan 625 2004 -2753 -2753  - 
Iran 630 1982 -5000 -5000  - 
Iran 630 1983 -15550 -15550  - 
Iran 630 1984 -750 -750  - 
Iran 630 1988 -34225 -34225  - 
Turkey 640 1974 -1450 -1450  - 
Iraq 645 1969 -500 -500  - 
Iraq 645 1974 -217 -217 -217 
Iraq 645 1975 -8075 -8075 -8075 
Iraq 645 1983 -15615 -15615  - 
Iraq 645 1984 -25 -25  - 
Iraq 645 1987 -36 -36  - 
Iraq 645 1988 -32225 -32225  - 
Iraq 645 1991 -39322 -39322  - 
Iraq 645 1992 -400 -400  - 
Iraq 645 1996 -1500 -1500  - 
Iraq 645 2003 -500  -  - 
Iraq 645 2005 -1400 -1400  - 
Egypt 651 1948 -6970  -  - 
Egypt 651 1967 -2703  -  - 
Egypt 651 1970 -2130 -2130 -2130 
Egypt 651 1973 -5225  -  - 
Syria 652 1966 -300  -  - 
Lebanon 660 1976 -54500 -54500 -54500 
Lebanon 660 1978 -3500 -3500 -3500 
Lebanon 660 1982 -23000 -23000 -23000 
Lebanon 660 1986 -5700 -5700 -5700 
Jordan 663 1948 -6970  -  - 
Israel 666 1948 -6804 -6804  - 
Israel 666 1949 -33 -33  - 
Israel 666 1967 -1153 -1153  - 
Israel 666 1973 -2317 -2317  - 
Israel 666 1974 -398 -398  - 
Yemen, North 678 1964 -7034 -7034 -7034 
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Yemen, North 678 1968 -7033 -7033 -7033 
Yemen, North 678 1970 -867 -867 -867 
Yemen, North 678 1979 -63 -63  - 
Yemen, South 680 1979 -163 -163  - 
Kuwait 690 1991 -8474 -8474 -8474 
Oman 698 1975 -500 -500 -500 
Afghanistan 700 1980 -5000 -5000 -5000 
Afghanistan 700 1984 -15000 -15000 -15000 
Afghanistan 700 1985 -5000 -5000 -5000 
Afghanistan 700 1986 -15000 -15000 -15000 
Afghanistan 700 1987 -15000 -15000 -15000 
Afghanistan 700 1988 -15000 -15000 -15000 
Afghanistan 700 1989 -8000 -8000  - 
Afghanistan 700 1992 -4000 -4000  - 
Afghanistan 700 1994 -5000 -5000  - 
Afghanistan 700 1996 -2000 -2000  - 
Afghanistan 700 1998 -5000 -5000  - 
Afghanistan 700 2001 -1000 -1000 -1000 
China 710 1950 -5180 -5180  - 
China 710 1959 -67000 -67000  - 
China 710 1967 -13  -  - 
China 710 1969 -62  -  - 
Taiwan 713 1950 -720 -720  - 
Korea, North 731 1951 -388992 -388992 -388992 
Korea, North 731 1952 -25096 -25096 -25096 
Korea, North 731 1953 -25096 -25096 -25096 
Korea, South 732 1950 -251962 -251962 -251962 
Korea, South 732 1952 -37645  -  - 
Korea, South 732 1953 -37644 -37644 -37644 
India 750 1948 -3700 -3700  - 
India 750 1971 -5612 -5612  - 
India 750 1991 -1434 -1434  - 
India 750 1993 -2229 -2229  - 
Pakistan (1972-) 770 1948 -3750  -  - 
Pakistan (1972-) 770 1971 -55612 -55612  - 
Pakistan (1972-) 770 1984 -38  -  - 
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Pakistan (1972-) 770 1987 -50  -  - 
Myanmar 775 1969 -243 -243  - 
Myanmar 775 1970 -1000 -1000  - 
Thailand 800 1976 -414 -414 -414 
Thailand 800 1978 -667 -667 -667 
Thailand 800 1979 -48 -48 -48 
Thailand 800 1980 -507 -507 -507 
Cambodia 811 1975 -60000 -60000  - 
Cambodia 811 1978 -37 -37  - 
Cambodia 811 1979 -29079 -29079  - 
Cambodia 811 1986 -2472 -2472  - 
Cambodia 811 1987 -750 -750  - 
Laos 812 1961 -1667 -1667 -1667 
Laos 812 1973 -1682 -1682 -1682 
Laos 812 1988 -168 -168 -168 
Vietnam 816 1968 -29933 -29933  - 
Vietnam 816 1969 -29744 -29744  - 
Vietnam 816 1970 -7594 -7594  - 
Vietnam 816 1974 -75476 -75476  - 
Vietnam 816 1975 -10690 -10690  - 
Vietnam 816 1977 -878 -878  - 
Vietnam 816 1979 -31360 -31360  - 
Vietnam 816 1987 -1890 -1890  - 
Vietnam, South 817 1964 -4770 -4770 -4770 
Vietnam, South 817 1968 -29933 -29933 -29933 
Vietnam, South 817 1969 -29744 -29744 -29744 
Vietnam, South 817 1970 -7594 -7594 -7594 
Vietnam, South 817 1974 -75643 -75643  - 
Vietnam, South 817 1975 -10690 -10690  - 
Malaysia 820 1957 -107 -107 -107 
Malaysia 820 1958 -141 -141 -141 
Malaysia 820 1959 -12 -12 -12 
Malaysia 820 1960 -13 -13 -13 
Malaysia 820 1966 -61 -61 -61 
Malaysia 820 1975 -100 -100 -100 
Philippines 840 1989 -600 -600 -600 
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Indonesia 850 1969 -750 -750 -750 
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX – TECHNICAL APPENDUM 
TECHNICALITIES OF THE DATA COMPILATION 
 
1. Variables included into the data compilation 
There are 587 variables included in the data compilation. Out of this amount, 163 
variables were newly created by transforming the coding of the origina input 
variables. 
The variables can be divided into the following four categories: 
• Country-year data (CD) - structural data (SD) => 74 variables 
• Country-year data (CD) - conflict event data (ED) => 89 variables 
• Country-year data (CD) – intervention event data (ED) => 204 variables 
• Directed dyad-year data (DD) – structural, conflict event and intervention 
event data (SD & ED) => 220 variables 
 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INCLUDED VARIABLES 
Original dataset 
name 
Number of variables (CD & 
DD) 
Number of new variables 
(CD & DD) 
Data type 
EUGene SV 18 & 37 0 & 0 SV (CD & DD) 
UN Pop 12 7 SV (CD) 
UN SD 2 1 SV (CD) 
UN FAO 1 0 SV (CD) 
FDP 3 0 SV (CD) 
DEM 14 0 SV (CD) 
MAR  7 3 SV/ED (CD) 
QoG  17 0 SV (CD) 
MEPV 3 0 ED (CD) 
PITF 23 16 ED (CD) 
ACD 14 7 ED (CD) 
Regan  50 9 ED (CD) 
EUGene MID 27 & 54 3 & 0 ED (CD & DD) 
EUGene ICB 22 & 40 0 & 0 ED (CD & DD) 
ICB II 31 & 30 19 & 18 ED (CD & DD) 
ICB Dyad 21 & 20 6 & 5 ED (CD & DD) 
Mil Int 39 & 39 34 & 34 ED (CD & DD) 
Peace 64 1 ED (CD) 
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TOTAL 358 & 220 106 & 57  
 
2. Common identification procedure 
2.1. Country coding  
The main country coding system applied in this data compilation is based on the 
Correlates of War (COW) country code (COW ccode) which has been developed by 
the COW Project to represent the world countries, the dependent territories, and 
the special areas of geographical interest. A precise description of this coding 
system is to be found in the COW State System Membership List (Version 2008.1) 
that is available online at: http://correlatesofwar.org. The COW ccode was selected 
as a key identification code for countries in this data compilation. Nevertheless, 
due to the extensive variety of country coding systems applied in the individual 
input datasets, one supplementary coding system was added aside the COW ccode 
system so as to ensure a greater flexibility of the data for the other potential 
enlargements of the compilation in the future. The additionally included country 
code system is the so-called UN country code (UN ccode) that was introduced by 
the United Nations Statistics Division. This system is almost identical with the 
three-digit and 3-letter country codes published by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO-3166-1 numeric, ISO-3166-1 alpha3). Nevertheless, the UN 
ccode includes five extra ‘non-ISO’ ccodes: Tibet (UN ccode 994), Zanzibar (UN ccode 
995), pre-1971 Pakistan (UN ccode 997), Vietnam North (UN ccode 998), and Vietnam 
South (UN ccode 999).  
2.2.  Country identification  
2.2.1. Country-year data  
Sample of countries in the country-year part of the data was identified based on 
the Quality of Government (QoG) project country list.1 The original QoG country 
list covers all countries in the world recognized by the United Nations as of the 
year 2002 plus an addition of 13 historical nations. Among the historical nations belong: 
Taiwan, Tibet, Zanzibar, pre-1972 Pakistan (including Bangladesh), North and 
South Yemen, East and West Germany, pre-1992 Yugoslavia, the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia pre-1993 (including Eritrea). Problematic 
identification of the countries that experienced some type of a territorial 
transformation was governed by the following two principles. First of all, 
whenever two countries merged into one; this newly created country was 
considered to represent a new case. There were just two exceptions to this rule: 
                                                            
1 Teorell, Holmberg & Rothstein, 2007. 
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Tanzania and Zanzibar, and China and Tibet (since they were not considered as 
being the separate countries before their occupation). Secondly, whenever a 
country splited up; all the new countries were considered to represent new cases. 
The only exception to this rule constituted Indonesia and East Timor.  
     Nevertheless, the QoG country list had to be slightly adjusted to simplify and 
unify the coding of the historical nations in the QoG country list, making it thus 
better combinable with the COW country list. As a result of these adjustments, the 
QoG country list that originally covered 204 countries ended up as covering a 
sample of only 200 countries. See an overview of the carried out adjustments: 
• While Ethiopia is throughout the whole period of 1946-2005 coded as one 
country in the COW country list (COW ccode 530), it is divided into pre-
1992 Ethiopia (UN ccode 230, COW ccode 530) and post-1993 Ethiopia (UN 
ccode 231, COW ccode 530) in the QoG country list. So as to unify this 
distortion, Ethiopia was attached COW ccode 530 and UN ccode 230 for the 
entire period of its existence.  
• Similarly, Pakistan is throughout the whole period of 1946-2005 coded as 
one country (COW ccode 770) in the COW country list, but it is treated as 
two countries in the QoG country list: pre-1971 Pakistan (UN ccode 997) 
and post-1972 Pakistan (UN ccode 586). The QoG country list was thus 
again adjusted according to the COW coding, by assigning to Pakistan a 
homogenous coding (COW ccode of 770, UN ccode 586).  
• Additionally, while the QoG country list distinguishes between Serbia and 
Montenegro (UN ccode 891), and Yugoslavia (UN ccode 890); the COW 
country list codes the country under a common COW ccode 345. Here 
again, coding of the both countries was unified by a single code (COW 
ccode 345, UN ccode 890).  
• The final adjustment of the QoG country list concerned the USSR (UN 
ccode 810). The USSR that is originally included in the QoG country list was 
omitted from the country sample, since it is not treated as a country in 
most of the input datasets. Just Russia (COW ccode 365) was kept in both 
country lists.  
2.2.2. Directed country dyad-year data  
Country sample identification process in the directed country dyad-year part of the 
data compilation was based on the COW country list,2 which sets two criteria for 
identifying a country. First of all, the country has to have a population greater than 
                                                            
2 Small & Singer, 1982. 
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500000; and must be sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or 
political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence. The 
second COW criterion is operationalized as a formal recognition of the country by 
any two major states or its membership in the United Nations. So as to avoid a 
possible mistake, the individual country dyads were generated by the Expected 
Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene v.3.2).3 This software 
serves mainly as a computational tool for the creation of the expected utility data 
that enables application of the rational choice theory to the study of international 
conflict. Its ability to combine a number of original quantitative datasets and to 
transform them into various levels of analysis was repeatedly utilized during 
building of this data compilation. It can be downloaded from the following 
webpage: http://www.eugenesoftware.org.  
     Also the EUGene generated list of country dyads had to undergo certain 
adjustments. The sample of the dyads was expanded by including four artificial 
ccodes for interveners that did not intervene as single countries but formed the 
various types of multilateral operations. As a result of these modifications, instead 
of the EUGene generated sample of 199 countries composing 1258552 dyad-years, 
the country sample was increased to cover 203 entities composed into 1291832 
dyads. See the list of the carried out adjustments: 
• A new artificial ccode 1000 (UN) was added to represent the United 
Nations as the intervener. 
• Next artificial ccode 2000 (NATO) was added to represent the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization as the intervener. 
• Other artificial ccode 3000 (IO) was included to represent the interventions 
led by the international organizations dealing with international 
peacekeeping of a multinational nature other than the UN and the NATO. 
These institutions are, for example, ECOWAS, CEMAC, EU, COMESA, 
OAU, AU, ECOMOG, CIS, SADC, OAS, or Arab League. 
• The last created artificial ccode was created to denote the multilateral 
operations carried out outside any established institutional structure. 
Interveners in such types of operations were assigned the ccode 4000 
(Multilat).  
2.3. Country coding lists and their time coverage of the data compilation 
The following table represents the harmonized QoG and COW country lists 
together with their respective time coverage, which were used as a basis for 
                                                            
3 Bennett & Stam, 2000.  
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country identification in both parts of the new data compilation. The table 
indicates individual country codes in both the COW and the UN versions, which 
were applied coherently in the whole data compilation. 
 
COUNTRY LISTS 
Country-year 
data 
Country dyad-
year data 
Country name 
COW 
Ccode  
COW 
Ccode  
UN 
Ccode  
UN 
Ccode  
QoG - year 
coverage  
COW - year 
coverage 
Albania 339 ALB 8 ALB 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Algeria 615 ALG 12 DZA 1946-2005 1962-2005 
Andorra 232 AND 20 AND 1946-2005 1993-2005 
Angola 540 ANG 24 AGO 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Antigua and Barbuda 58 AAB 28 ATG 1946-2005 1981-2005 
Argentina 160 ARG 32 ARG 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Armenia 371 ARM 51 ARM 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Australia 900 AUL 36 AUS 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Austria 305 AUS 40 AUT 1946-2005 1955-2005 
Azerbaijan 373 AZE 31 AZE 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Bahamas 31 BHM 44 BHS 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Bahrain 692 BAH 48 BHR 1946-2005 1971-2005 
Bangladesh 771 BNG 50 BGD 1946-2005 1971-2005 
Barbados 53 BAR 52 BRB 1946-2005 1966-2005 
Belarus 370 BLR 112 BLR 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Belgium 211 BEL 56 BEL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Belize 80 BLZ 84 BLZ 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Benin 434 BEN 204 BEN 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Bhutan 760 BHU 64 BTN 1946-2005 1971-2005 
Bolivia 145 BOL 68 BOL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 346 BOS 70 BIH 1946-2005 1992-2005 
Botswana 571 BOT 72 BWA 1946-2005 1966-2005 
Brazil 140 BRA 76 BRA 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Brunei Darussalam 835 BRU 96 BRN 1946-2005 1984-2005 
Bulgaria 355 BUL 100 BGR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Burkina Faso 439 BFO 854 BFA 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Burundi 516 BUI 108 BDI 1946-2005 1962-2005 
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Cambodia 811 CAM 116 KHM 1946-2005 1953-2005 
Cameroon 471 CAO 120 CMR 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Canada 20 CAN 124 CAN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Cape Verde 402 CAP 132 CPV 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Central African Rep. 482 CEN 140 CAF 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Colombia 100 COL 170 COL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Comoros 581 COM 174 COM 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Congo 484 CON 178 COG 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Congo, Democratic Rep. 490 DRC 180 COD 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Costa Rica 94 COS 188 CRI 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Cote d'Ivoire 437 CDI 384 CIV 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Croatia 344 CRO 191 HRV 1946-2005 1992-2005 
Cuba 40 CUB 192 CUB 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Cyprus 352 CYP 196 CYP 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Czech Republic 316 CZR 203 CZE 1946-2005 1993-2005 
Czechoslovakia 315 CZE 200 CSK 1946-2005 1946-1992 
Denmark 390 DEN 208 DNK 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Djibouti 522 DJI 262 DJI 1946-2005 1977-2005 
Dominica 54 DMA 212 DMA 1946-2005 1978-2005 
Dominican Republic 42 DOM 214 DOM 1946-2005 1946-2005 
East Timor 860 ETM 626 TLS 1946-2005 2002-2005 
Ecuador 130 ECU 218 ECU 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Egypt 651 EGY 818 EGY 1946-2005 1946-2005 
El Salvador 92 SAL 222 SLV 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Equatorial Guinea 411 EQG 226 GNQ 1946-2005 1968-2005 
Eritrea 531 ERI 232 ERI 1946-2005 1993-2005 
Estonia 366 EST 233 EST 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Ethiopia (-1992) 530 ETH 230 ETH 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Ethiopia* 530 ETH 231 ETH 1946-2005  - 
Fiji 950 FIJ 242 FJI 1946-2005 1970-2005 
Finland 375 FIN 246 FIN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
France 220 FRN 250 FRA 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Gabon 481 GAB 266 GAB 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Gambia 420 GAM 270 GMB 1946-2005 1965-2005 
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Georgia 372 GRG 268 GEO 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Germany 255 GMY 276 DEU 1946-2005 1990-2005 
Germany, East 265 GDR 278 DDR 1946-2005 1954-1990 
Germany, West 260 GFR 280 DEU 1946-2005 1955-1990 
Ghana 452 GHA 288 GHA 1946-2005 1957-2005 
Greece 350 GRC 300 GRC 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Grenada 55 GRN 308 GRD 1946-2005 1974-2005 
Guatemala 90 GUA 320 GTM 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Guinea 438 GUI 324 GIN 1946-2005 1958-2005 
Guinea-Bissau 404 GNB 624 GNB 1946-2005 1974-2005 
Guyana 110 GUY 328 GUY 1946-2005 1966-2005 
Haiti 41 HAI 332 HTI 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Honduras 91 HON 340 HND 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Hungary 310 HUN 348 HUN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Chad 483 CHA 148 TCD 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Chile 155 CHL 152 CHL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
China 710 CHN 156 CHN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Iceland 395 ICE 352 ISL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
India 750 IND 356 IND 1946-2005 1947-2005 
Indonesia 850 INS 360 IDN 1946-2005 1949-2005 
Iran 630 IRN 364 IRN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Iraq 645 IRQ 368 IRQ 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Ireland 205 IRE 372 IRL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Israel 666 ISR 376 ISR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Italy 325 ITA 380 ITA 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Jamaica 51 JAM 388 JAM 1946-2005 1962-2005 
Japan 740 JPN 392 JPN 1946-2005 1952-2005 
Jordan 663 JOR 400 JOR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Kazakhstan 705 KZK 398 KAZ 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Kenya 501 KEN 404 KEN 1946-2005 1963-2005 
Kiribati 946 KIR 296 KIR 1946-2005 1999-2005 
Korea, North 731 PRK 408 PRK 1946-2005 1948-2005 
Korea, South 732 ROK 410 KOR 1946-2005 1949-2005 
Kuwait 690 KUW 414 KWT 1946-2005 1961-2005 
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Kyrgyzstan 703 KYR 417 KGZ 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Laos 812 LAO 418 LAO 1946-2005 1953-2005 
Latvia 367 LAT 428 LVA 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Lebanon 660 LEB 422 LBN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Lesotho 570 LES 426 LSO 1946-2005 1966-2005 
Liberia 450 LBR 430 LBR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Libya 620 LIB 434 LBY 1946-2005 1951-2005 
Liechtenstein 223 LIE 438 LIE 1946-2005 1990-2005 
Lithuania 368 LIT 440 LTU 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Luxembourg 212 LUX 442 LUX 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Macedonia 343 MAC 807 MKD 1946-2005 1993-2005 
Madagascar 580 MAG 450 MDG 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Malawi 553 MAW 454 MWI 1946-2005 1964-2005 
Malaysia 820 MAL 458 MYS 1946-2005 1957-2005 
Maldives 781 MAD 462 MDV 1946-2005 1965-2005 
Mali 432 MLI 466 MLI 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Malta 338 MLT 470 MLT 1946-2005 1964-2005 
Marshall Islands 983 MSI 584 MHL 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Mauritania 435 MAA 478 MRT 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Mauritius 590 MAS 480 MUS 1946-2005 1968-2005 
Mexico 70 MEX 484 MEX 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Micronesia 987 FSM 583 FSM 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Moldova 359 MLD 498 MDA 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Monaco 221 MNC 492 MCO 1946-2005 1993-2005 
Mongolia 712 MON 496 MNG 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Morocco 600 MOR 504 MAR 1946-2005 1956-2005 
Mozambique 541 MZM 508 MOZ 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Myanmar 775 MYA 104 MMR 1946-2005 1948-2005 
Namibia 565 NAM 516 NAM 1946-2005 1990-2005 
Nauru 970 NAU 520 NRU 1946-2005 1999-2005 
Nepal 790 NEP 524 NPL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Netherlands 210 NTH 528 NLD 1946-2005 1946-2005 
New Zealand 920 NEW 554 NZL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Nicaragua 93 NIC 558 NIC 1946-2005 1946-2005 
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Niger 436 NIR 562 NER 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Nigeria 475 NIG 566 NGA 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Norway 385 NOR 578 NOR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Oman 698 OMA 512 OMN 1946-2005 1971-2005 
Pakistan (-1971)* 770 PAK 997 PAK 1946-2005  - 
Pakistan (1972-) 770 PAK 586 PAK 1946-2005 1947-2005 
Palau 986 PAL 585 PLW 1946-2005 1994-2005 
Panama 95 PAN 591 PAN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Papua New Guinea 910 PNG 598 PNG 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Paraguay 150 PAR 600 PRY 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Peru 135 PER 604 PER 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Philippines 840 PHI 608 PHL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Poland 290 POL 616 POL 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Portugal 235 POR 620 PRT 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Qatar 694 QAT 634 QAT 1946-2005 1971-2005 
Romania 360 ROM 642 ROU 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Russia iii 365 RUS 643 RUS 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Rwanda 517 RWA 646 RWA 1946-2005 1962-2005 
Samoa 990 WSM 882 WSM 1946-2005 1976-2005 
San Marino 331 SNM 674 SMR 1946-2005 1992-2005 
Sao Tome and Principe 403 STP 678 STP 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Saudi Arabia 670 SAU 682 SAU 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Senegal 433 SEN 686 SEN 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Serbia and Montenegro* 345 SCG 981 YUG 1946-2005  -  
Seychelles 591 SEY 690 SYC 1946-2005 1976-2005 
Sierra Leone 451 SIE 694 SLE 1946-2005 1961-2005 
Singapore 830 SIN 702 SGP 1946-2005 1965-2005 
Slovakia 317 SLO 703 SVK 1946-2005 1993-2005 
Slovenia 349 SLV 705 SVN 1946-2005 1992-2005 
Solomon Islands 940 SOL 90 SLB 1946-2005 1978-2005 
Somalia 520 SOM 706 SOM 1946-2005 1960-2005 
South Africa 560 SAF 710 ZAF 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Spain 230 SPN 724 ESP 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Sri Lanka 780 SRI 144 LKA 1946-2005 1948-2005 
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St Kitts and Nevis 60 SKN 659 KNA 1946-2005 1983-2005 
St Lucia 56 SLU 662 LCA 1946-2005 1979-2005 
St Vincent & 
Grenadines 
57 SVG 670 VCT 1946-2005 1979-2005 
Sudan 625 SUD 736 SDN 1946-2005 1956-2005 
Suriname 115 SUR 740 SUR 1946-2005 1975-2005 
Swaziland 572 SWA 748 SWZ 1946-2005 1968-2005 
Sweden 380 SWD 752 SWE 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Switzerland 225 SWZ 756 CHE 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Syria 652 SYR 760 SYR 1946-2005 
1946-1958; 
1961-2005 
Taiwan 713 TAW 158 TWN 1946-2005 1949-2005 
Tajikistan 702 TAJ 762 TJK 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Tanzania 510 TAZ 834 TZA 1946-2005 1961-2005 
Thailand 800 THI 764 THA 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Tibet 711 n.a. 994 XTI 1946-2005  - 
Togo 461 TOG 768 TGO 1946-2005 1960-2005 
Tonga 955 TON 776 TON 1946-2005 1999-2005 
Trinidad and Tobago 52 TRI 780 TTO 1946-2005 1962-2005 
Tunisia 616 TUN 788 TUN 1946-2005 1956-2005 
Turkey 640 TUR 792 TUR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Turkmenistan 701 TKM 795 TKM 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Tuvalu 947 TUV 798 TUV 1946-2005 2000-2005 
Uganda 500 UGA 800 UGA 1946-2005 1962-2005 
Ukraine 369 UKR 804 UKR 1946-2005 1991-2005 
United Arab Emirates 696 UAE 784 ARE 1946-2005 1971-2005 
United Kingdom 200 UKG 826 GBR 1946-2005 1946-2005 
United States of 
America 
2 USA 840 USA 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Uruguay 165 URU 858 URY 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Uzbekistan 704 UZB 860 UZB 1946-2005 1991-2005 
Vanuatu 935 VAN 548 VUT 1946-2005 1981-2005 
Venezuela 101 VEN 862 VEN 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Vietnam 816 DRV 704 VNM 1946-2005 1954-2005 
Vietnam, South 817 RVN 999 VDR 1946-2005 1954-1975 
Yemen 679 YEM 887 YEM 1946-2005 1990-2005 
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Yemen, North 678 YAR 886 YEM 1946-2005 1946-1990 
Yemen, South 680 YPR 720 YMD 1946-2005 1967-1990 
Yugoslavia 345 YUG 890 YUG 1946-2005 1946-2005 
Zambia 551 ZAM 894 ZMB 1946-2005 1964-2005 
Zanzibar 511 ZAN 995 EAZ 1946-2005 1963-1964 
Zimbabwe 552 ZIM 716 ZWE 1946-2005 1965-2005 
United Nations* 1000 UN 1000 UN  -  1946-2005 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization* 
2000 NATO 2000 NATO  - 1946-2005 
Other international 
organizations* 
3000 IO 3000 IO  - 1946-2005 
Multilateral operations* 4000 Multilat 4000 Multilat  - 1946-2005 
* Adjustment to the original country code 
 
2.4. Country coding adjustments 
The below table identifies the extensiveness of the carried out ccode adjustments. 
 
COUNTRY CODING ADJUSTMENTS 
ORIGINAL DATA STRUCTURE NEW DATA COMPILATION STRUCTURE 
Original dataset 
name 
Original identifying 
variable 
Ccode adjustments 
(CD & DD) 
Saved records by ccode 
adjustments (CD & 
DD) 
EUGene SV COW ccode 0 & 0 0 & 0 
UN Pop 1/2/3/4 UN ccode 2/2/2/0 112/140/11/0 
UN SD UN ccode 0 0 
UN FAO UN ccode 4 201 
FDP COW ccode 5 94 
DEM COW ccode 0 0 
MAR  COW ccode 0 0 
QoG  COW ccode 0 0 
MEPV COW ccode 5 88 
PITF 1/2/3/4 COW ccode 3/3/3/2 6/6/6/3 
ACD COW ccode 0 0 
Regan  COW ccode 0 0 
EUGene MID COW ccode 0 & 0 0 & 0 
EUGene ICB COW ccode 0 & 0 0 & 0 
ICB II COW ccode 0 & 0 0 & 0 
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ICB Dyad COW ccode 0 & 0 0 & 0 
Mil Int COW ccode 2 & 14 2 & 893 
Peace Country abbreviation 5 54 
* CD = country-year data; DD = directed country dyad-year data  
 
2.4.1. Detailed description of the country coding adjustments in individual 
input datasets 
Most of the input datasets required some ccode adjustments to become compatible 
with the QoG and COW country lists used for the data compilation. In general, if 
some input dataset used a ccode for a certain territory with a limited sovereignty, 
and this ccode did not exist in the QoG or COW country list; it was changed in to 
the ccode of the country that possessed official sovereignty over particular part of 
the territory in that time.  Otherwise, the carried out depended on the 
circumstances, and they are described below: 
EUGene SV (CD & DD) 
None 
& 
None - unifying ccode for the dyadic data 
UN Pop (CD) 
Instead of two keeping two different countries: Montenegro (UN ccode 499) and 
Serbia (UN ccode 688), which do not exist in COW system membership list, the 
averaged values of these two countries were applied under a joint label Serbia and 
Montenegro (UN ccode 891).  
UN SD (CD) 
Instead of two keeping two different countries: Montenegro (UN ccode 499) and 
Serbia (UN ccode 688), which do not exist in COW system membership list, the 
summed values for these two countries were used under a joint label Serbia and 
Montenegro (UN ccode 891). 
UN FAO (CD) 
The missing years for Korea (UN ccode 408), Korea (UN ccode 410), and Micronesia 
(UN ccode 583), which were lost due to the wrong setting of the data download 
setting, were recovered. Montenegro (UN ccode 499) and Serbia (UN ccode 688) 
were again transformed under a joint label Serbia and Montenegro (UN ccode 891) 
by summing the values for individual countries. 
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FDP (CD) 
COW ccodes for three countries were corrected: Bulgaria (COW ccode 335) was 
corrected to (COW ccode 355), Namibia (COW ccode 561) was corrected to (COW 
ccode 565), and Pakistan (COW ccode 769) was corrected to (COW ccode 770). Former 
Yugoslavia not covered in the original COW country list was attached COW ccode 
345. A missing ccode for one year in case of East Timor (COW ccode 860) was added. 
DEM (CD) 
None 
MAR (CD) 
None 
QoG (CD) 
None - unifying ccode for the country-year data 
MEPV (CD) 
COW ccodes for five countries were corrected: Yugoslavia (COW ccode 347) was 
corrected to (COW ccode 345), Serbia and Montenegro from (COW ccode 347) to 
(COW ccode 345), Ethiopia from (COW ccode 529) to (COW ccode 530), Pakistan from 
(COW ccode 769) to (COW ccode 770), and Vietnam from (COW ccode 818) to (COW 
ccode 816). 
PITF (CD) 
COW ccodes for three countries were corrected: Yugoslavia (COW ccode 347) was 
corrected to (COW ccode 345), Ethiopia from (COW ccode 529) to (COW ccode 530), 
and Pakistan from (COW ccode 769) to (COW ccode 770). 
ACD (CD) 
None 
Regan (CD) 
None 
EUGene MID (CD & DD) 
None 
& 
None 
EUGene ICB (CD & DD) 
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None 
& 
None 
ICB II (CD & DD) 
None 
& 
None 
ICB Dyad (CD & DD) 
None 
& 
None 
Mil Int (CD & DD) 
COW ccodes of the Mil Int I and Mil Int II datastes were unified. An artificial COW 
ccode for the UN was set to 1000 (originally coded 1 in Mil Int I and 1014 in Mil Int 
II dataset). COW ccode of Sikkim (part of India) was changed from 761 to 760 
(India). A missing time indication in case of the Dhofar Rebellion (COW ccode 680) 
was added.  
& 
COW ccodes of the Mil Int I and Mil Int II datasets were unified. First of all, the 
artificial ccodes for the cases, when the intervener was a non-state actor were 
created. When the intervener was the UN, the ccode was set to 1000 (originally 
coded 1 in the Mil Int I, and 1014 in the Mil Int II dataset). Interventions led by the 
NATO were coded with an artificial ccode 2000 (originally coded 1060 in the Mil Int 
II). The remaining types of non-state interventions were grouped into two 
additional categories. Interventions led by the organizations dealing with 
international peacekeeping of a multinational nature other than the UN and the 
NATO were coded with an artificial ccode 3000. Such organizations are, for 
example: ECOWAS, CEMAC, EU, COMESA, OAU, AU, ECOMOG, CIS, SADC, 
OAS, Arab League (originally coded with a four-digit ccode starting with a number 
2 in the Mil Int II dataset). And finally, multilateral operations carried out outside 
the institutional structure were attached an artificial ccode 4000 (originally coded 
with a four-digit code starting with a number 3 in Mil Int II dataset). Afterwards, 
COW ccodes for some target countries were also adjusted. COW ccode for Sikkim 
 301 
 
was changed from 761 (part of India) to 750 (India), for Bangladesh from 749 to 
771, for Anguilla from 61 to 200 (British oversee territory), for Tibet from 709 to 710 
(China), for the United Arab Emirates from 695 to 696, for the Commonwealth 
from 204 to 200 (Great Britain), for Hyderabad from 755 (part of India) to 750 
(India), for Junagadh from 753 (part of India) to 750 (India), for Western Sahara 
from 601 (part of Morocco) to 600 (Morocco), for Kashmir from 754 to 770 (Pakistan 
- since India was intervener and Pakistan the target state in that particular case). 
And finally, a missing year in case of the Dhofar Rebellion (COW ccode 680 - target, 
and COW ccode 40 -intervener) was added. 
Peace (CD) 
Peacebuilding dataset did not have any numerical ccodes in its original version. 
Therefore, identification of the actors was carried out based on the comparison of 
the provided alphabetical state abbreviations with the abbreviations from the 
Quality of Government (QoG) dataset. Differences in the state abbreviations were 
corrected. Burma BRM was changed to MMR, Cambodia CAM was changed to 
KHM, Guatemala GUA was changed to GTM, Romania ROM was changed to 
ROU, and Sri Lanka SRI was changed to LKA.  
3. Unit of analysis transformation 
After transforming the input datasets into a homogenous country coding rules, 
there appeared to be the multiple information entries. These were replaced by 
applying the declarative aggregation functions in a form of SQL GROUP BY 
operators. SQL can be applied both to numerical types of the data as well as to the 
non-numeric ones, and it allows for implementing a wide range of the data 
transformations and the query processing tasks. The ANSI/ISO SQL99 standard 
defines five types of aggregate functions for the GROUP BY approach: average, 
maximum, minimum, sum and count. In addition to that, typical database systems 
supply three supplementary built-in aggregate functions: first, standard deviation 
and variance.4 The concrete choices of operator used for individual variables are 
listed in the coding table at the end of this technical appendix.  
     The following table provides an overview of the original unit of analysis, which 
variables were used to group the data in the desired unit of analysis, and the 
number of removed multiple entries due to the carried out grouping. 
 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS TRANSFORMATION 
ORIGINAL DATA STRUCTURE NEW DATA STRUCTURE 
                                                            
4 International Standards Organization, 1999; Naumann & Häussler, 2002. 
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Dataset name 
Original unit of 
analysis (CD & DD) 
Desired unit of 
analysis 
Unit of analysis 
transformation 
(CD & DD) 
Removed 
multiple entries 
(CD & DD) 
EUGene  SV 
Country-year & 
directed country 
dyad-year 
CD & DD 0 & 0 0 & 0 
UN Pop 
Country-
5year/country-year 
CD Ccode_year 1 
UN SD Country-year CD Ccode_year 1 
UN FAO Country constant CD 0 0 
FDP Country-year CD Ccode_year 7 
DEM Country-year CD 0 0 
MAR  
Communal group-
various time periods 
CD 0 0 
QoG  Country-year CD 0 0 
MEPV Country-year CD Ccode_year 1 
PITF State failure-year CD Ccode_year 358 
ACD Conflict-year CD Ccode_year 495 
Regan 1/2/3/4 
Conflict-
month/conflict 
constant 
CD Ccode_year 12004/12199/1259 
EUGene MID 
Directed country 
dyad-year 
CD & DD 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
1250172 & 0 
EUGene ICB 
Directed country 
dyad-year 
CD & DD 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
1250172 & 0 
ICB II Actor-year CD & DD 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
536 & 87 
ICB Dyad Crisis dyad-year CD & DD 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
536 & 87 
Mil Int Intervention constant CD & DD 
Ccode_year & 
ccode_ccode_year 
1631 & 247 
Peace 
Peacebuilding 
constant 
CD Ccode_year 92 
 
3.1. Detailed description of the unit of analysis transformation in the 
individual input datasets  
 
EUGene SV (CD & DD) 
EUGene software was set to download the data already in the country-year format 
that covers all the existing countries in a desired time spam according to the COW 
country list. Therefore, no additional changes were needed.  
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& 
Similarly, EUGene software was set to download the dyadic data directly in a 
proper country dyad-year format including all the existing countries in the desired 
time spam according to the COW country list. After carrying out some alterations 
of adding the relevant non-state actors to the list (artificial ccodes 1000, 2000, 3000, 
and 4000), the adjusted EUGene generated country-dyad list was used as a 
merging muster for the dyadic part of the data compilation. 
UN Pop (CD) 
UN Pop variables were downloaded individually. Most of them included values 
that were in their original form captured in the 5-year intervals. They were 
transformed either into the 5-year constant values or interpolated into the yearly 
values. The original variables were kept in the compilation as well so as to enable 
the future users applying some alternative adjustments. One variable was grouped 
by COW ccode_year to remove a multiple entry for one country-year. 
UN SD (CD) 
The included variable was originally recorded in the 5-year intervals. It was 
transformed into the 5-year constant values, while keeping the original variable in 
the compilation to allow the future users applying an alternative adjustment.  
UN FAO (CD) 
The FAO variable originally covered a shorter time period. Due to the fact that the 
variable was time constant (area of the countries does not change much), it was 
extended in the time-constant values to cover the whole time frame of the data 
compilation. 
FDP (CD) 
Observations were grouped by COW ccode_year to remove the multiple entries. 
DEM (CD) 
-  
QoG (CD) 
Observations were grouped by COW ccode_year to remove the multiple entries. The 
dataset was used as a merging muster for the first part of the data compilation that 
is based on the country-year data structure.  
MEPV (CD) 
A multiple entry was corrected by grouping the records by COW ccode_year.  
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PITF (CD)  
Each of the PITF datasets (PITF 1, 2, 3 and 4) originally gathered information about 
four different types of state failure. Since the number of events identified by the 
individual datasets was low, and most of the variables included in PITF 1, 2 and 3 
datasets traced the similar characteristics describing some type of a state failure, 
these three datasets were joined together, and grouped by COW ccode_year. 
Bringing the three datasets together required the following steps. If the country 
experienced at least one of the PITFs events (PITF 1, 2, or 3) in some year; the given 
country-year observation was added into the identified sample by grouping the 
information about all the identified PITF events for that country-year into one 
record. Nevertheless, so as not to lose the information about the types of the PITF 
event that took place in each country-year; new dummy variables were created 
indicating occurrence of each type of PITF in individual country-years. Moreover, 
due to the fact that there were cases when two or more state failures of the same 
type occurred simultaneously in one country-year, variables indicating a frequency 
of occurrence of the different types of PITF were added, so that this information 
was not lost by the grouping of the data. The last of the PITF datasets (PITF 4) 
dealing with the genocides and the politicides was treated individually, since such 
types of event require from the theoretical point of view a different methodological 
approach during the conflict analysis. PITF 4 was again grouped by COW 
ccode_year. 
ACD (CD) 
Data in this dataset were originally organized into the conflict-year data structure, 
which means that the individual values described the situation of all countries 
involved in the conflict jointly together. Due to the fact that the ACD dataset was 
intended to be included only in the country-year part and not the dyadic part of 
the data compilation; the focus was put only on the countries hosting the conflicts 
and not on the external interveners. Therefore, so as to transfer this type of data 
into the target country-year unit of analysis, a following procedure was applied.  
     In case that just one country was listed as a conflict participant in some conflict-
year observation, it was a simple internal conflict taking place within the country’s 
territory, and no adjustment was necessary. In case that there were more countries 
involved as participants in some conflict; the Mil Int dyad dataset was consulted to 
distinguish the country hosting the conflict from the intervening country, and just 
the target country of the conflict was kept for the purpose of this data compilation. 
Nevertheless, before removing the information about the intervener from the data 
compilation, number of its casualties had to be identified and subtracted from the 
number of casualties that was originally attached to the whole conflict. This final 
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decreased number was then attached to the identified target. If there were more 
countries in the conflict, and the Mil Int dyad dataset indicated existence of mutual 
dyads, it meant that the participating countries both intervened into each other’s 
territory in the same year; all these countries were kept in the compilation and the 
casualties were attached to them based on the proportions indicated in the Mil Int 
dataset. 
     In case that the conflict dyad was not listed in the Mil Int dataset, the carried out 
adjustments had to be based on several simplifying assumptions that were 
formulated according to the typical behavior of the countries in the international 
arena. A first assumption is that the weak developing states do not usually 
challenge the strong developed ones on their home territory. Therefore, such 
disproportional conflicts usually take place just within the territories of those 
developing ones. A second assumption is that the developing countries tend to 
have much less developed armies, strategies and weapons than the developed ones 
do; and thus tend to suffer much more casualties. Therefore, if there were two 
types of countries participating in the conflict - a developed and a developing one, 
the casualties were assigned to the developing country only. To put it into an 
example, if two developing countries and one developed country were listed 
together as the participants in some conflict, and the Mil Int dataset did not keep 
record of this conflict dyads composed of these participants; the developed country 
was neglected and not included as a target, and the causalities were divided 
equally only among the two developing ones. The actual proportions attached to 
individual conflict actors in the above described process are presented in the 
following table. After transforming all the ACD data in this way, the data were 
grouped by COW ccode_year. 
 
ADJUSTMENTS OF THE ACD DATASET  
Participating countries in the conflict COW ccode Year 
Proportion of 
causalities 
France, Thailand 220, 800 1946 0-90 
Albania, United Kingdom 339, 200 1946 90-0 
Hyderabad, India 755, 750 1948 90-0 
Egypt, United Kingdom 651, 200 1951 90-0 
Egypt, United Kingdom 651, 200 1952 90-0 
Hungary, Russia (Soviet Union) 310, 365 1956 90-0 
Egypt, France, Israel, United Kingdom 651, 220, 66,200 1956 80-0-0-0 
China, Myanmar 710, 775 1969 0-90 
France, Tunisia 220, 616 1961 0-90 
Indonesia, Netherlands 850, 210 1962 90-0 
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Panama, United States of America 95, 2 1989 90-0 
Argentina, United Kingdom 160, 200 1982 90-0 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1948 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1964 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1965 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1971 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1984 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1987 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1989 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1990 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1991 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1992 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1996 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1997 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1998 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 1999 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 2000 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 2001 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 2002 50-50 
India, Pakistan 750, 770 2003 50-50 
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria 
651, 645, 666, 663, 660, 
652 
1948 33-33-33 
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria 
651, 645, 666, 663, 660, 
652 
1949 33-33-33 
China, Taiwan 710, 713 1949 20-80 
China, Taiwan 710, 713 1950 20-80 
China, Taiwan 710, 713 1954 20-80 
China, Taiwan 710, 713 1958 20-80 
Peoples Republic of Korea , Republic of Korea 731, 732 1949 60-40 
Peoples Republic of Korea , Republic of Korea 731, 732 1950 60-40 
Peoples Republic of Korea , Republic of Korea 731, 732 1951 60-40 
Peoples Republic of Korea , Republic of Korea 731, 732 1952 60-40 
Peoples Republic of Korea , Republic of Korea 731, 732 1953 60-40 
Honduras, Nicaragua 91, 93 1957 90-0 
Egypt, Israel 651, 666 1967 90-0 
Egypt, Israel 651, 666 1969 90-0 
Egypt, Israel 651, 666 1970 90-0 
Egypt, Israel 651, 666 1973 90-0 
Israel, Jordan 666, 663 1967 50-0 
Israel, Syria 666, 652 1967 66-0 
Israel, Syria 666, 652 1973 50-0 
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Cameroon, Nigeria 471, 475 1996 33-0 
China, Russia (Soviet Union) 710, 365 1969 20-80 
El Salvador, Honduras 92, 91 1969 95-5 
Ethiopia, Somalia 530, 520 1960 50-50 
Ethiopia, Somalia 530, 520 1964 50-50 
Ethiopia, Somalia 530, 520 1973 50-50 
Ethiopia, Somalia 530, 520 1983 50-50 
Ethiopia, Somalia 530, 520 1987 50-50 
China, India 710, 750 1962 50-50 
China, India 710, 750 1967 50-50 
Algeria, Morocco 615, 600 1963 90-10 
Indonesia, Malaysia 850, 820 1963 33-0 
Indonesia, Malaysia 850, 820 1964 33-0 
Indonesia, Malaysia 850, 820 1965 33-0 
Indonesia, Malaysia 850, 820 1966 33-0 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1965 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1966 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1967 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1968 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1969 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1970 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1971 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1972 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1973 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1974 50-50 
Democratic Rep. of Vietnam, Rep. of Vietnam 816, 817 1975 50-50 
Cambodia, Thailand 811, 800 1966 50-50 
Cambodia, Thailand 811, 800 1977 50-50 
Cambodia, Thailand 811, 800 1978 50-50 
Peoples Republic of Yemen, Yemen (Arab Rep. 
of Yemen) 
678, 680 1972 50-50 
Peoples Republic of Yemen, Yemen (Arab Rep. 
of Yemen) 
678, 680 1978 50-50 
Peoples Republic of Yemen, Yemen (Arab Rep. 
of Yemen) 
678, 680 1979 50-50 
Cyprus, Turkey/Ottoman Empire 352, 640 1974 75-25 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1974 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1980 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1981 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1982 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1983 50-50 
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Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1984 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1985 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1986 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1987 50-50 
Iran, Iraq 630, 645 1988 50-50 
Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam  811,816 1975 50-50 
Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam  811,816 1976 50-50 
Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam  811,816 1977 50-50 
Burkina Faso, Mali 439, 432 1985 95-5 
Laos, Thailand 812, 800 1986 66-33 
Laos, Thailand 812, 800 1987 66-33 
Laos, Thailand 812, 800 1988 66-33 
Chad, Libya 483, 620 1987 50-50 
Iraq, Kuwait 645, 690 1990 30-70 
Iraq, Kuwait 645, 690 1991 70-30 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1978 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1979 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1980 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1981 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1983 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1984 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1986 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1987 30-70 
China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam 710, 816 1988 30-70 
Chad, Nigeria 483, 475 1983 50-50 
Ecuador, Peru 130, 135 1995 75-25 
Eritrea, Ethiopia 531, 530 1998 50-50 
Eritrea, Ethiopia 531, 530 1999 50-50 
Eritrea, Ethiopia 531, 530 2000 50-50 
 
Regan (CD) 
The original structure of the Regan datasets (Regan 1, 2, and 3) was incoherent. 
They were not only structured based on the different units of analysis, but the 
datasets also used different identifying variables. It was impossible to merge the 
Regan datasets individually with the prepared country-year list structuring the 
data compilation. First of all, all three Regan datasets had to be merged together. 
Regan 1 and Regan 2 datasets were originally based on the country-event-month 
unit of analysis and both included the Regan conflict identification number as an 
event identifying variable. Nevertheless, only Regan 1 dataset included also the 
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COW ccode that serves as a target country identifying variable in the data 
compilation. Therefore, so as to identify the COW ccodes also in the Regan 2 
dataset; Regan 1 and Regan 2 datasets were merged using the “Regan conflict 
number” & “Months since the beginning of the conflict” as identifying variables. 
Unfortunately, there were some inconsistencies in the Regan’s coding and 
identification of the events, which were reflected by a higher frequency of 
interventions identified by the Regan 2 dataset in comparison to those identified in 
the Regan 1 dataset for the same conflicts. As a result of the merging process, 347 
observations (in conflict-months) were lost from the Regan 2 dataset. The lost 
observations concerned conflicts with the following Regan identification numbers: 
600, 610, 615, 630, 784, 786, 787, 793, 799, 805, 826, 827, 835, 838, 840, 841, 845, 847, 
850, 853, 857, 858, 859, 863, 864, 865, 870, 872, 874, 881, 882, 887, 888, 889, 892, 894, 
896, 901, 903, 904, 907, 908, 910, 913, 919, 930, 934, 936, 937, 947, 949, 952, 953, 964, 
966, 967, 977, 979, 982, 984, 986, 987, 991, 992, and 993. Afterwards, the merged 
Regan 1+2 data were grouped by COW ccode_year to adjust the monthly time-unit 
of analysis into the yearly one. The final step was to attach the originally conflict-
constant data in the Regan 3 dataset. Regan 3 data were extended into the country-
year unit of analysis, grouped by COW ccode_year, and when merged with the 
Regan 1+2 data. Even though, some Regan data also provided information about 
the identity of the intervener; the data were not transformed into a dyadic form, 
since the intervener identifying variable contained too many missing values.  
MID EUGene (CD & DD) 
MID data were generated by the EUGene software with the directed country dyad-
year unit of analysis. The software was set to generate all dyads from all countries 
without dyads i versus i without using any sampling. While identifying the conflict 
events, no exclusions in the sample were applied in case of a both-way conflict 
(target versus initiator and initiator versus target). In the sample, state A was 
coded as a conflict initiator rather than as a revisionist state. Joiners on the 
initiating side of the conflict were coded as initiators, while joiners on the target 
side were coded as targets. In case that more MIDs occurred in particular country 
dyad-year, the output was set to include the most serious MID (measured by the 
highest hostility level). In such a way created dyadic data were then transformed 
also into the target country-year unit of analysis so as to have MID data flexibly 
available for both parts of the data compilation. During the process of grouping the 
dyadic data by COW ccode_year, an extra variable counting the frequency of the 
dyadic conflict occurrence was generated. 
ICB EUGene (CD & DD) 
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ICB data were again generated by the EUGene software. This time, the data were 
downloaded in the crisis dyad-year unit of analysis. The software was set to 
generate a sample covering all the dyads from all existing countries without dyads 
i versus i, while not applying any sampling option. The conflict events were 
identified based on the ICB Dyad dataset in a way that all dyad-years with an 
ongoing conflict as well as all the joiners were kept in the conflict event sample. 
The originators and joiners of the interventions (regardless of side they took in the 
conflict) were coded as initiators. After generating the ICB data in the dyadic form, 
the data were transformed also to the country-year unit of analysis. As in the case 
of MID EUGene data; while grouping the data by COW ccode_year, a new variable 
counting the number of dyadic events in each year was created.  
ICB (CD & DD) 
ICB data were included in two versions into this data compilation. Even though, 
EUGene software allows for generating the ICB data in the preferred unit of 
analysis; the time coverage of the ICB data available in the EUGene data store is 
limited, because the software does not allow downloading the most recent version 
of the data. While the EUGene gathers ICB II data for years 1946-2001, and ICB 
Dyad data for years 1946-1995; the last updated existing version of the ICB data 
covers the period 1946-2005 in case of the ICB II data and 1946-2001 in case of the 
ICB Dyad data. Moreover, while merging the data manually, the most preferred 
version of the data grouping can be selected and applied. As a result of that the 
second version of the data provides an alternative option for the researchers to 
choose a better version depending on their theoretical assumptions.     
     The most recent ICB data were adjusted in a following way. The originally 
conflict-constant observations in the ICB II dataset were extended into country-
year units of analysis. Due to the fact that ICB II dataset in its original form did not 
distinguish between the intervener and the target state in the conflicts, the data had 
to be merged with the ICB Dyad dataset to be able to identify the roles of 
individual conflict participants. This merging process was not straightforward and 
had to be divided into two steps. In the first step, two linking pairs of the 
identifying variables had to be selected: “actnuma” from the ICB Dyad dataset that 
identifies an actor-level sequence ICB number for state A (it is set to the value 9999 
if the state A was not considered a crisis-actor), and an identical variable “cracno” 
from the actor-level ICB II dataset. Second selected linking pair was the variable 
“statea” from the ICB Dyad dataset that indicates the COW ccode of the actor, and 
an identical variable “cracid” from the ICB II dataset. Therefore, the two datasets 
were merged together by linking the variable “actnuma” (ICB Dyad) with “cracno” 
(ICB II), and the variable “statea” (ICB Dyad) with “cracid” (ICB II). There were 
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825 matches, and 393 records were not joined. Out of these 393 not joined records, 
373 records showed the value 9999 in the variable “actnuma”, since the state A was 
not considered to be a crisis actor. 
     In the second step of the merging process, 393 “cracno” records from the ICB II 
dataset that failed to be linked with the variable “actnuma” from the ICB Dyad 
dataset in the first step of the merging process were linked to the complementary 
variable “actnumb” from the ICB Dyad dataset in the second step of the merging 
process. Variable “actnumb” from the ICB Dyad dataset indicates an actor-level 
sequence ICB number for state B that is again identical with the variable “cracno” 
from the actor-level ICB II dataset. Similarly as in the first step, the second linking 
pair for the purposes of merging was composed of the variable “stateb” from the 
ICB Dyad dataset, and an identical variable “cracid" from the ICB II dataset. 
Therefore, the second part of the merging process was based on pairing the 
variable “actnumb” (ICB Dyad) with “cracno” (ICB II), and the variable “stateb” 
(ICB Dyad) with “cracid” (ICB II). There were 373 matches out of 393. All together, 
20 records from the ICB II dataset were lost due to this merging process. These 
losses concerned the last records in the ICB II dataset that were no more covered 
by the ICB Dyad dataset that has a shorter time coverage (ICB II covers period 
1946-2005, ICB Dyad covers period 1946-2001). The lost records included conflicts 
with the following ICB numbers: 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, and 434.  
     Thanks to all these adjustments, both datasets were restructured into a dyadic 
form. So as to transform the data into the final directed country dyad-year unit of 
analysis, the data were grouped by COW ccode_ccode_year. So as to generate also 
the country-year unit of analysis version of the ICB data, the dyadic data were 
grouped using COW ccode_year, while creating a variable counting a frequency of 
the merged dyads in each country-year.  
Mil Int (CD & DD) 
The Mil Int dataset covering the period 1946-1988 and the Mil Int dataset covering 
the period 1989-2005 were joined together, since both these datasets traced the 
development of the same variables (with a couple of exceptions) and followed the 
same coding. Due to the fact that Mil Int data are country-event-constant, they had 
to be extended into the country-event-year observations. After doing that, the data 
were merged by COW ccode_year to get the country-year unit of analysis, and by 
COW ccode_ccode_year to get the directed country dyad-year unit of analysis.  
Peacebuilding (CD) 
Peacebuilding data did not have any numerical ccodes. Therefore, the alphabetical 
country abbreviations from the QoG dataset had to be used to attach the 
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peacebuilding data with the numerical ccodes. Afterwards, the data were grouped 
by COW ccode_year to remove the multiple observations for a single country-year.  
3.2. Lost records in the process of merging 
The below described data losses include observations that failed to be matched 
with the prepared QoG or COW country lists. These failures do not include cases 
of multiple entries for a single country-year or country dyad year that were 
removed by grouping the entries by some function into one record. Instead, they 
include lost cases that occurred because of one of the two following reasons: 
• Differences in the country identification procedure applied by individual 
input datasets (Most of these discrepancies occurred, because a country 
that was identified as existing in some input dataset, has not qualified to 
become included into the QoG or COW country lists.) 
• Merging of the sub-parts of input datasets (Some datasets – e.g.: PITF 
1+2+3, ICB II+ICB Dyad – had to be merged together to gain the necessary 
identifying variables to attach the data to the QoG or COW country list.)  
3.2.1. Lost records in a summary 
 
LOST RECORDS IN THE MERGING PROCESS 
Original dataset name Lost records by merging (CD & DD) 
EUGene SV 0 & 0 
UN Pop 1/2/3/4 784/540/198/198 
UN SD 451 
FAO 2340 
FDP 47 
DEM 0 
MAR  0 
QoG  0 
MEPV 45 
PITF 1/2/3 1/1/1/0 
ACD 2 
Regan  0 
EUGene MID 0 & 0 
EUGene ICB 0 & 0 
ICB II 0 & 7 
ICB Dyad 0 & 7 
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Mil Int 32 & 94 
Peace 0 
 
3.2.2. Detailed description of the data losses in individual datasets 
EUGene (CD & DD) 
0 lost cases  
& 
0 lost cases  
UN Pop (CD) 
UN Pop I - 784 lost cases - UN ccode notation: 254 French Guiana, 312 Guadeloupe, 
316 Guam, 344 Hong Kong, 474 Martinique, 530 Netherlands Antilles, 533 Aruba, 
540 New Caledonia, 630 Puerto Rico, 638 Reunion, 830 Channel Island, 850 Virgin 
Islands 
UN Pop II - 540 lost cases - UN ccode notation: 254 French Guiana, 258 French 
Polynesia, 275 Occupied Palestinian Territories, 312 Guadeloupe, 316 Guam, 344 
Hong Kong, 446 Macao, 474 Martinique, 499 Montenegro, 530 Netherlands 
Antilles, 533 Aruba, 540 New Caledonia, 630 Puerto Rico, 638 Reunion, 688 Serbia, 
732 Western Sahara, 830 Channel Island, 850 Virgin Islands 
UN Pop III - 198 lost cases - UN ccode notation: 533 Aruba, 254 French Guiana, 258 
French Polynesia, 312 Guadeloupe, 316 Guam, 830 Channel Islands, 312 
Guadeloupe, 316 Guam, 344 Hong Kong, 446 Macao, 474 Martinique, 530 
Netherlands Antilles, 540 New Caledonia, 275 Occupied Territories of Palestine, 
630 Puerto Rico, 638 Reunion, 732 Western Sahara, 850 Virgin Islands 
UN Pop VI - 198 lost cases - UN ccode notation: 533 Aruba, 254 French Guiana, 258 
French Polynesia, 312 Guadeloupe, 316 Guam, 830 Channel Islands, 312 
Guadeloupe, 344 Hong Kong, 446 Macao, 474 Martinique, 530 Netherlands 
Antilles, 540 New Caledonia, 275 Occupied Territories of Palestine, 630 Puerto 
Rico, 638 Reunion, 732 Western Sahara, 850 Virgin Islands 
UN SD (CD) 
451 lost cases - UN ccode notation: 16 American Samoa, 660 Anguilla, 533 Aruba, 60 
Bermuda, 92 British Virgin Islands, 136 Cayman Islands, 184 Cook Islands, 254 
French Guiana, 258 French Polynesia, 184  Faeroe Islands, 238  Falkland Islands, 
292 Gibraltar, 304 Greenland, 316 Guam, 336 Holy See, 830 Channel Islands, 344 
Hong Kong, 446 Macao, 833 Isle of Man, 474 Martinique, 500 Montserrat, 530 
 314 
 
Netherlands Antilles, 540 New Caledonia, 570 Niue, 574 Norfolk Island, 612 
Pitcairn, 630 Puerto Rico, 638 Reunion, 653+656 Saint Helena, 666 Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon, 796 Turks Caicos Islands, 850 Virgin Islands, 876 Wallis and Futuna 
Islands 
 FAO (CD) 
2340 lost cases  - UN ccode notation: 16 American Samoa, 58 Belgium-Luxembourg, 
60 Bermuda, 86 British Indian Ocean Territory, 92 British Virgin islands, 136 
Cayman Islands, 162 Christmas Islands, 166 Cocos Islands, 75 Mayotte, 184 Cook 
Islands, 234 Faeroe Islands, 238 Falkland Islands, 254 French Guiana, 258 French 
Polynesia, 275 Occupied Palestinian Territories, 292 Gibraltar, 304 Greenland, 312  
Guadeloupe, 316 Guam, 474 Martinique, 500 Montserrat, 530 Netherlands, Antilles, 
533 Aruba, 540 New Caledonia, 570  Niue, 574 Norfolk Island, 580 Northern 
Mariana Islands, 582 Pacific Islands, 612 Pitcairn, 630 Puerto Rico, 638 Reunion, 654 
Saint Helena, 660 Anguilla, 666 Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 732 Western Sahara, 772 
Tokelau, 796 Turks and Caicos Islands, 830 Channel Islands, 833 Isle of Man, 850 
United States of Virgin Islands, 876 Wallis and Futuna Islands 
FDP (CD) 
47 lost cases - COW ccode notation: 667 Palestine, and missing ccode for Former 
USSR 
DEM (CD) 
0 lost cases  
MAR (CD) 
0 lost cases  
QoG (CD) 
0 lost cases - unifying ccode for structural variables and country-year data 
MEPV (CD) 
45 lost cases - COW ccode notation: 364 SSSR 
PITF (CD) 
0 lost cases (during the merge of PITF 1+2+3); 1 lost case - COW ccode notation: 364 
SSSR (in the process of merging with the QoG country list) 
ACD (CD) 
2 lost cases - COW ccode notation: 755 Hyderabad  
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Regan (CD) 
Regan 1 - 0 lost cases 
Regan 2 - 347 lost cases (during the merge of Regan 1+2+3) – Regan event 
identification number notation: 600, 610, 615, 630, 784, 786, 787, 793, 799, 805, 826, 
827, 835, 838, 840, 841, 845, 847, 850, 853, 857, 858, 859, 863, 864, 865, 870, 872, 874, 
881, 882, 887, 888, 889, 892, 894, 896, 901, 903, 904, 907, 908, 910, 913, 919, 930, 934, 
936, 937, 947, 949, 952, 953, 964, 966, 967, 977, 979, 982, 984, 986, 987, 991, 992, and 
993; 0 lost cases (merge with the QoG country list) 
Regan 3 - 165 lost cases (during the merge of Regan 1+2+3) – Regan event 
identification number notation: 818, 830, 838, 840, 844, 847, 849, 872, 878, 884, 885, 
893, 910, 919, 933, 947, 953, 954, 957, 972, 973, 974, 985, 988, 989, and 990; 0 lost cases 
(merge with the QoG country list) 
EUGene MID (CD & DD) 
0 lost cases  
& 
0 lost cases  
EUGene ICB (CD & DD) 
0 lost cases  
& 
0 lost cases  
ICB (CD & DD) 
20 lost cases (during the merge of ICB II+ICB Dyad) - ICB conflict number notation: 
428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, and 434; 0 lost cases (merge with the QoG country list) 
Mil Int (CD & DD) 
32 lost cases - COW ccode notation: 1000 UN (the UN as a target state does not make a 
sense)  
& 
94 lost cases – COW ccode notation in country dyads: 812 with 220, 750 with 750, 
651 with 652, 761 with 750, 710 with 710, 698 with 200, 265 with 365, 835 with 200, 
200 with 200, 935 with 200, 935 with 900, 935 with 910, 255 with 315, 670 with 316, 
and 344 with 345 + 32 cases with the UN as a target state (COW ccode 1000)  
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Peace (CD) 
0 lost cases 
 
4. ‘Completeness’ 
The coding of the missing observations in individual input datasets was 
harmonized by designating all the missing values with -999. An overview of the 
completeness of the merged input datasets is presented in the three following three 
tables that were divided according to the data type being described. 
 
CD/SD – ‘COMPLETENESS’ 
Dataset Variables Country-years Observations Missing observations Missing observations (%) 
EUGene SV 18 8380 150840 34417 22,8 
UN Pop I 6 9800 58800 15400 26,2 
UN Pop II 3 5280 15840 4224 26,7 
UN Pop III 2 1914 3828 1392 36,4 
UN Pop IV 2 1936 3872 1408 36,4 
UN SD 1 1417 1417 0 0,0 
FAO 1 11460 11460 0 0,0 
FDP 3 6089 18267 1397 7,6 
MAR 7 7937 55559 26074 46,9 
QoG 17 12000 204000 71919 35,3 
DEM 14 6871 96194 5574 5,8 
TOTAL 74 73084 620077 161805   
Missing observations avg. = 26,1% (measured proportionally) 
 
CD/ED – ‘COMPLETENESS’ 
Dataset Variables Country-years Observations Missing observations  
Missing observations 
(%) 
MEPV 3 7549 22647 352 1,6 
PITF 123 23 1152 26496 3032 11,4 
PITF 4 3 269 807 0 0,0 
ACD 14 1438 20132 41 0,2 
Regan 1 41 1021 41861 389 0,9 
Regan 2 3 1021 3063 0 0,0 
Regan 3 6 890 5340 0 0,0 
EUGene MID 27 7612 205524 0 0,0 
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EUGene ICB 22 6479 142538 164 0,1 
ICB II  31 490 15190 175 1,2 
ICB Dyad  21 490 10290 648 6,3 
Mil Int 39 1736 67704 11821 17,5 
Peace 64 836 53504 4091 7,6 
TOTAL 297 30983 615096 20713   
Missing observations avg. = 3,4% (measured proportionally) 
 
DD – ‘COMPLETENESS’ 
Dataset Variables 
Country-dyad 
years 
Observations 
Missing 
observations 
Missing 
observations (%) 
EUGene SV dyad 37 1258552 46566424 9925276 21,3 
EUGene MID dyad 54 1258552 67961808 7921152 11,7 
EUGene ICB dyad 40 1258552 50342080 14380960 28,6 
ICB dyad 50 754 37700 1142 3,0 
Mil Int dyad 39 3057 119223 25939 21,8 
TOTAL 220 3779467 165027235 32254469   
Missing observations avg. = 19,5% (measured proportionally) 
 
Based on the records in the above tables, some input datasets seem to have a 
relatively high proportion of the missing values. Nevertheless, the higher 
proportions of the missing values were not caused by a bad quality of the data 
itself, but rather by some of the methodological and structural decisions. First of 
all, the number of missing observations in the UN Pop 1/2/3 and UN SD datasets 
was artificially increased, since the datasets contained some variables with the 
measurements recorded only in the 5-year intervals. Even though, there were new 
variables created that interpolated the middle values or alternatively that kept the 
values within the five-year intervals constant; the original variables with the 
missing middle values were still left in the data compilation, so as to allow the 
future users applying a different methodological approach. This artificially 
increased the percentage of the missing observations in theses datasets.   
     Secondly, a higher number of the missing observations in the MAR, QoG, and 
partially in the Mil Int datasets was influenced by the fact that these datasets were 
originally created as data compilations in themselves; and therefore, individual 
variables within these datasets covered a different time spam. Regardless of this 
fact, each of these input datasets was treated as one block for the purposes of this 
data compilation. Therefore, in case that some variable covered a shorter time 
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frame than the rest of the input dataset, the years not covered by the variable were 
denoted as missing. Similarly, data downloaded by the EUGene software (EUGene 
SV, EUGene SV dyad, EUGene ICB dyad and EUGene MID dyad) report an 
artificially higher amount of the missing observations, since each of these input 
datasets was downloaded in the time frame of 1946-2005, regardless of their actual 
time coverage of these datasets.  
     For this reason, while considering the completeness of the merged datasets; it is 
necessary to treat the variables individually. It is always better to check the number 
of the missing observations in each variable alone, and then to consult the coding 
table, which it to be found at the end of this technical appendix, so as to gain the 
information about the structure and the real original time coverage of the variable. 
The following table provides a complete list of the missing values in the individual 
variables. The list is divided by the data types and by the input datasets, with the 
yellow fields providing the information about a total number of missing variables 
in each merged dataset. 
 
MISSING OBSERVATIONS  
Variable name No. of obs. Variable name No. of obs. Variable name No. of obs. 
STRUCTURAL DATA (SD-CD) Tot_MID 0 Risk_A_t 465925 
EUGene SV 34417 Peace_yrs_B 0 Risk_B_t 465925 
Mil_cap 768 Peace_dys_B 0 Risk_A_s 184006 
Mil_personal 856 B_init 0 Risk_B_s 184006 
Mil_exp 1217 EUGene ICB 164 Uncert_t 463498 
Energy_consum 802 ICB_c 0 Uncert_s 182978 
Iron_steel 769 ICB_c_freq 0 Util_AchB_t 466064 
Urb_pop 769 New_ICB_c 0 Util_Asq_t 466064 
Tot_pop 769 C_beg_yr_AB 0 Succ_A_t 468346 
Major_power 0 C_beg_mth_AB 0 Util_BchB_t 466064 
Region 0 C_end_yr_AB 0 Util_Bsq_t 466064 
Polity_III 2766 C_end_mth_AB 0 Succ_B_t 468346 
Polity_III_lg 2867 C_dur_dys_AB 0 Util_AchB_s 184145 
Polity_III_adj 1026 C_dur_yrs_AB 0 Util_Asq_s 184145 
Dem_score 1276 C_beg_yr_B 82 Succ_A_s 185034 
Autoc_score 1276 C_beg_mth_B 82 Util_BchB_s 184145 
Democratiz 2946 C_end_yr_B 0 Util_Bsq_s 184145 
Regime_dur 988 C_end_mth_B 0 Succ_B_s 185034 
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Imports 7661 ICB_B_no 0 EUGene MID dyad 7921152 
Exports 7661 Stability_B_I 0 MID_ongo 146688 
UN Pop 22424 Stability_B_II 0 MID_ongo_no 146688 
Deaths_5yr_o 7700 Internal_c_B 0 MID_init 146688 
Deaths_5yr_c 0 B_c_joiner 0 MID_init_no 146688 
Deaths_i 0 New_ICB_freq 0 MID_ref_no 146688 
Life_exp_5yr_o 7700 ICB_freq 0 Host_A 146688 
Life_exp_5y_c 0 Peace_yrs 0 Host_B 146688 
Life_exp_i 0 Peace_dys 0 Host_MID 146688 
Migr_5yr_o 4224 ICB II 75 Ref_no_kMID 146688 
Migr_5yr_c 0 Trig_type 0 A_init_kMID 146688 
Migr_i 0 C_freq 0 B_init_kMID 146688 
Migr_rate_o 1392 Ext_trigent 0 Join_A_init 146688 
Migr_rate_c 0 Int_trigent 0 Join_A_targ 146688 
Deaths_1yr 0 C_manage 0 Join_kMID_A_init 146688 
Migr_5yr000_o 1408 Mil_manage 0 Join_kMID_A_targ 146688 
UN SD 0 Viol_centr 0 Beg_A_mth 146688 
Migr_5yr000_c 0 Viol_use 0 Beg_A_dy 146688 
FAO 0 Viol_intens 0 Beg_A_yr 146688 
Land_area 0 Glob_org_act 0 Beg_B_mth 146688 
FDP 1397 Reg_org_act 0 Beg_B_dy 146688 
Refug 548 Satisf_A 0 Beg_B_yr 146688 
IDP 426 Satisf_B 0 End_A_mth 146688 
Refug_hosted 423 Satisf_AB 0 End_A_dy 146688 
MAR 26074 Dissatisf_AB 0 End_A_yr 146688 
Group_ident 4615 C_escal 0 End_B_mth 146688 
Ethn_diff_x 2980 C_deescal 0 End_B_dy 146688 
Aggr_diff_x 3611 Distance 0 End_B_yr 146688 
Advant_lost 6238 Actors_no 1 A_supp_i_kMID 146688 
Com_conflict_x 3207 Int_syst 0 A_supp_t_kMID 146688 
Protest_x 2753 C_scale 0 A_revis_kMID 146688 
Rebellion_x 2670 Protracted_c 0 B_revis_kMID 146688 
QoG 71919 Viol_actor 0 Revis_type_A 146688 
Region_1 57 Power_dif 2 Revis_type_A2 146688 
Colonial_origin 57 C_mil_sec 0 Revis_type_B 146688 
Pop_000 5355 C_pol_dipl 0 Revis_type_B2 146688 
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Urban_pop_1 5355 C_econ_dev 0 Fatal_level_A 146688 
Literacy_i 5205 C_cult_status 0 Fatal_exact_A 146688 
Ethn_fract 720 C_gravity 0 Fatal_level_B 146688 
Relig_fract 540 Econ_actor 72 Fatal_exact_B 146688 
Cult_diversity 2713 ICB Dyad 648 Top_act_A 146688 
Power_res_x 5205 Mutual_c 0 Top_act_B 146688 
GDP_pc 3736 A_side_c 0 Top_act_MID 146688 
Tot_trade 4367 B_side_c 0 Outcome 146688 
Gini_mean 9892 Stab_A 0 Settle 146688 
Gini_x 11317 Stab_B 0 Fatal_MID 146688 
State_failure 4533 Beg_yr_A 102 Mutual_MID 146688 
Dem_x 3770 Beg_mth_A 102 Allies_A 146688 
Polity_IV_score 4534 End_yr_A 61 Allies_B 146688 
Regime_dur_pIV 4563 End_mth_A 61 New_MID 146688 
DEM 5574 Beg_yr_B 88 Tot_MID 146688 
Pop_log 84 Beg_mth_B 88 Peace_yrs 146688 
GDP_log 147 End_yr_B 73 Peace_dys 146688 
Onset_COW 1490 End_mth_B 73 MID_role_A 146688 
Peace_COW 716 Beg_yr_AB 0 MID_role_B 146688 
Onset_ADC 910 Beg_mth_AB 0 EUGene ICB dyad 14380960 
Peace_ACD 0 End_yr_AB 0 ICB_c 359524 
Onset_type_ADC 913 End_mth_AB 0 ICB_ref_no 359524 
Dem_0 0 Dur_dys_AB 0 New_ICB_c 359524 
Autoc_0 0 Dur_yrs_AB 0 New_ICB_no 359524 
Dem_0-3after 387 Ongo_AB 0 ICB_dyad_no 359524 
Autoc_0-3after 387 Mil Int 11821 One_side 359524 
Anoc 180 Int_descr 0 Beg_yr_AB 359524 
Polity_IV 180 Int_beg 0 Beg_mth_AB 359524 
Polity_IV_sq 180 Int_end 80 Beg_dy_AB 359524 
EVENT DATA (ED-CD) Int_no 0 End_yr_AB 359524 
MEPV 352 Prev_int 490 End_mth_AB 359524 
Viol 115 Align_B 490 End_dy_AB 359524 
Viol_neighb 118 Power_size_A 490 Dur_dys_AB 359524 
Viol_reg 119 Power_size_B 490 Dur_yrs_AB 359524 
PITF 123 3032 Joint_hist_type 0 Beg_yr_A 359524 
PITF_1 0 Joint_hist 0 Beg_mth_A 359524 
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PITF_2 0 IO_int 0 Beg_dy_A 359524 
PITF_3 0 Neutral_int 0 Beg_yr_B 359524 
PITF_1_freq 0 Int_supp_gov 0 Beg_mth_B 359524 
PITF_2_freq 0 Int_supp_reb 0 Beg_dy_B 359524 
PITF_3_freq 0 Troop_act_type 108 End_yr_A 359524 
PITF_123_freq 0 Agress_act 0 End_mth_A 359524 
PITF_beg_mth 0 Troop_no_max 211 End_dy_A 359524 
PITF_beg_yr 0 Troop_no_sum 211 End_yr_B 359524 
PITF_end_mth 0 Air_incurs 352 End_mth_B 359524 
PITF_end_yr 0 Naval_incurs 474 End_dy_B 359524 
Opp_force 149 Navy_size 1360 A_ref_no 359524 
Fatalites 147 Outside_firing 265 B_ref_no 359524 
Area_affected 132 Intern_c 197 Stab_A_I 359524 
PITF_magn_avg 2 Pol_int 8 Stab_B_I 359524 
PITF_magn_sum 2 Social_int 430 Stab_A_II 359524 
PITF_magn_max 2 Pursuit_int 151 Stab_B_II 359524 
PITF_scale 866 Econ_int 470 Intern_c_A 359524 
Dem_collapse 866 Strat_int 182 Intern_c_B 359524 
Viol_scale 866 Hum_int 214 A_joiner 359524 
PITF 4 0 Territ_int 240 B_joiner 359524 
PITF_4 0 Protect_int 673 New_ICB_freq 359524 
Genoc_deaths 0 Contiguity 148 ICB_freq 359524 
ACD 41 Contiq_int 33 Peace_yrs 359524 
C_freq 0 C_deaths_max 943 Peace_dys 359524 
C_issue_ter 0 C_deaths_sum 943 ICB dyad 1142 
C_issue_gov 0 B_deaths_ Amax 514 Mutual_c 0 
Extrasyst_c 0 B_deaths_ Asum 514 A_side_c 0 
Interst_c 0 B_deaths_Bmax 570 B_side_c 0 
Intern_c 0 B_deaths_Bsum 570 Stab_A 0 
Spread_c 0 Peace 4091 Stab_B 0 
Intensity 0 C_beg_yr 0 Beg_yr_A 191 
Cum_intensity 0 C_end_yr 84 Beg_mth_A 191 
1st_b_death 0 C_beg_dec 0 End_yr_A 187 
1st25_b_deaths 0 C_reoc_2 0 End_mth_A 187 
B_deaths_low 0 C_reoc_5 57 Beg_yr_B 106 
B_deaths_high 0 C_reoc_10 366 Beg_mth_B 106 
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B_deaths_best 41 Viol_reoc_2 0 End_yr_B 0 
Regan 1 389 Viol_reoc_5 57 End_mth_B 0 
C_beg_date 0 Viol_reoc_10 362 Beg_yr_AB 0 
C_end_date 0 War_10bef 0 Beg_mth_AB 0 
C_end 0 Democr_2aft 123 End_yr_AB 0 
C_dur_mths 0 Democr_5aft 189 End_mth_AB 0 
C_int 0 Democr_10aft 515 C_dur_dys 0 
Bef_int 0 Democr_5bef 0 C_dur_yrs 0 
Int_mth 0 Democr_10bef 0 Ongo_c 0 
Int_freq 0 Polity_2aft 0 Trig_type 0 
Int 0 Polity_5aft 53 Trigent 0 
Force_type_max 0 Polity_10aft 395 Extern_trig 0 
Force_type_sum 0 Peacebuild 0 Intern_trig 0 
Force_freq 0 Rebel_vict 0 Manage 0 
Force 0 Gov_vict 0 Mil_manage 0 
Bef_force 0 Treaty 0 Viol_centr 0 
IO_int 0  Truce 0 Viol_use 0 
Target_clash 0 C_dur_mths 0 Viol_intens 0 
Int_neut 0 UN_int_0 0 Glob_org_act 0 
Int_opp 0 UN_int_1 0 Reg_org_act 0 
Int_gov 0 UN_int_01 0 Satisf_A 0 
Mil_int 0 UN_int_2 0 Satisf_B 0 
Bef_mil_int 0 UN_int_3 0 Satisf_AB 0 
Mil_int_freq 0 UN_int_4 0 Dissatisf_AB 0 
Mil_int_gov 0 UN_int_type 0 C_escal 0 
Mil_int_opp 0 NonUN_int_type 0 C_deescal 0 
Mil_int_neut 0 All_int_type 0 Distance 0 
Mil_int_type 0 Many_patries 0 Actors_no 1 
Econ_int 0 Parties_no 0 Syst_pol 0 
Econ_int_gov 0 1_party 0 Protract_c_sc 0 
Econ_int_neut 0 2_parties 0 Protract_c 0 
Econ_int_pos 0 Size_gov_army 3 Viol_actor 0 
Econ_pos_freq 0 Battle_deaths 199 Pow_dif 2 
Econ_int_neg 0 War_deaths 5 C_pol_dipl 0 
Econ_neg_freq 0 War_deaths_l 5 C_econ_dev 0 
Relig_c 0 Refug_idp 0 C_cult_stat 0 
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Ethn_c 0 Hum_cost 5 C_mil_sec 0 
Ideol_c 0 Hum_cost_l 5 Issue_grav 0 
Ethn_relig_c 0 Life_exp_bef 0 Econ_actor 171 
Size_opp 370 Life_exp_aft 0 Mil Int dyad 25939 
War_deaths 0 GDPpc_bef 16 Int_descr 0 
War_deaths_avg 0 GDPr_bef 44 Beg_date_int 0 
Largest_ethn 19 GDPr_aft 64 End_date_int 168 
Regan 2 0 GDPr_PPP 18 Int_freq 0 
GDP 0 Peace_gini 158 Prev_int 985 
Gemstones 0 Transfers 55 Targ_align 985 
Opiates 0 Transfers_adj 2 Pow_size_A 985 
Regan 3 0 Pop_bef 0 Pow_size_B 985 
Dif_c_link 0 Pop_5aft 249 B_deaths_ Amax 1233 
C_beg_mth 0 Pop_10aft 527 B_deaths_ Asum 1233 
C_beg_yr 0 Pop_growth 392 B_deaths_Bmax 1345 
C_end_mth 0 Inf_deaths 0 B_deaths_Bsum 1345 
C_end_yr 0 Illit_bef 30 C_deaths_max 2018 
No_borders 0 Illit_aft 30 C_deaths_sum 2018 
EUGene MID 0 Cult_fract 27 IO_int 0 
MID_ongo 0 Water_access 29 Int_neutr 0 
MID_ongo_freq 0 State_area 27 Int_supp_gov 0 
MID_init 0 Borders_no 0 Int_supp_reb 0 
Host_A 0 DYADIC DATA (DD) Troop_act 276 
Host_B 0 EUGene SV 9925276 Agress_act 0 
Host_MID 0 Mil_cap_A 146688 Troop_no_max 499 
B_init_kMID 0 Mil_cap_B 146688 Troop_no_sum 499 
B_target_kMID 0 Big_pow_A 0 Air_incurs 893 
B_revis_kMID 0 Big_pow_B 0 Naval_icurs 1153 
B_revis 0 Reg_A 0 Navy_size 2590 
B_beg_mth 0 Reg_B 0 Outside_firing 682 
B_beg_yr 0 Dir_contig 0 Intern_c 505 
B_end_mth 0 Col_contig 0 Pol_int 15 
B_end_yr 0 Distance 0 Social_int 890 
Fatal_A 0 Tau_reg 182978 Pursuit_int 338 
Fatal_B 0 Tau_glob 182978 Econ_int 1096 
Fatal_MID 0 Alliance_reg 182978 Strat_int 457 
 324 
 
Top_act_A 0 Alliance_glob 182978 Hum_int 462 
Top_act_B 0 Dem_A 496057 Territ_int 530 
Top_act_MID 0 Dem_B 496057 Protect_int 1313 
Mutual_MID 0 Dem_A_lg 507763 Contiquity 378 
Allies_A 0 Dem_B_lg 507763 Contiq_int 63 
Allies_B 0 Democr_A 519207 Joint_hist_type 0 
New_MID 0 Democr_B 519207 Joint_hist 0 
 
5. Coding table – data compilation 
The coding table that provides relevant information about all the variables 
included into the data compilation is available on the web pages of the Maastricht 
Graduate School of Governance. The users of the data compilation can find there 
the original source of the variable, its original form, and all the carried out 
adjustments including the grouping operator used (if applicable). The table also 
indicates the newly assigned name and coding of the merged variables. The table is 
divided by the data types: country-year ‘structural data’ (CD-SD); country year 
‘crisis-event data’ (CD-ED); country year ‘intervention-event data’ (CD-ED); and 
dyadic structural, crisis and intervention data (DD).  
 
6. Coding table – quantified JWT 
The following table presents the variables quantifying the JWT and its constituting 
criteria. Apart from the main JWT indexes, the table also includes the intermediate 
variables describing the various forms of the progressive adjustments. 
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SAMENVATTING 
De legitimiteit van “Humanitaire Militaire Interventies” 
 
Het rechtvaardigen van “Humanitaire Militaire Interventies” (HMI) en het 
verdedigen van het onderliggende concept in internationale discussies zijn 
bijzonder problematisch. Ondanks de zwakke rechtsstatus van het concept 
“humanitaire militaire interventies” (HMI) zelf, kan het concept niet 
eenvoudigweg genegeerd worden en kunnen de acties zelf niet als strikt illegaal 
bekeken worden. Als HMI inderdaad legitimiteit zouden hebben of krijgen, dan 
zou die legitimiteit de illegaliteit in vraag stellen. Het zou druk uitoefenen op het 
onderliggend normatieve kader en zou HMI stap voor stap in het internationale 
rechtssysteem verder kunnen introduceren. Het is daarom van belang dat om te 
bestuderen of de argumenten voor HMI en dus de legitimiteit van het concept zelf 
niet zo overtuigend zijn, dat het concept de voor onderstelde illegaliteit zou 
kunnen overstijgen en de interveniërende landen een legitem recht op interventie 
zou kunnen verstreken. Dit is wat deze studie beoogt te doen: de studie gaat na in 
hoeverre de meer dan 1000 HMI’s na de Tweede Wereldoorlog empirisch 
gesproken aanspraak op een robuuste legitimiteit kunnen maken door na te gaan 
in hoeverre humanitaire motieven en humanitaire resultaten bij de interventies een 
rol hebben gespeeld. 
     Er zijn sterke en valide argumenten om HMI zowel te verdedigen als te 
veroordelen als een legitieme actie. Aan de ene kant kan worden beargumenteerd 
dat het respect voor territoriale integriteit en het afzien van het gebruik van geweld 
in het internationale politieke verkeer zo belangrijk zijn voor het bewaren van de 
vrede en de internationale stabiliteit, dat HMI niet eens als legitiem laat staan als 
legaal zouden kunnen beschouwd worden. Aan de andere kant, is het duidelijk dat 
het garanderen van het internationale recht en de verdediging van de 
mensenrechten vragen om de mogelijkheid om op te kunnen treden tegen 
inbreuken op deze principes ook buiten de territoriale grenzen van een land. De 
vraag is welke van de beweegredenen zou moeten overwegen: vrede en stabiliteit 
of mensenrechten en internationaal recht? 
     Deze studie neemt radicaal afstand van het moeilijke morele en legale debat 
over de legitimiteit van HMI. Als een alternatief voor het wegen en herwegen van 
het morele gewicht van diverse argumenten, wil deze studie aan de discussie zelf 
bijdragen door het aandragen van empirische gegevens die zouden moetent 
toelaten om de “humanitaire” lading van elk van de 1114 humanitaire militaire 
interventies in the periode 1946 – 2005. De originaliteit van deze benadering is 
gelegen in de systematische evaluatie van het “humanitaire gehalte” van de 
“motieven en middelen” voor de interventies en de “resultaten van de interventies. 
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Op basis van deze evaluatie wordt nagegaan in welke mate het humanitaire 
karakter van de motieven en middelen ook leiden tot het bereiken van humanitair 
gunstige resultaten. Op deze manier wordt een index ontwikkeld die toelaat om te 
beoordelen welke van de onderzochte interventies het predicaat “legitieme 
humanitaire militaire interventie” verdienen.  
     De resultaten van de studie laten toe om te besluiten dat er sprake is van een 
empirische associatie tussen “humanitaire motieven en middelen” en “humanitaire 
resultaten”. Dat suggereert dat het mogelijk is om humanitair acceptabele 
resultaten te boeken met militaire middelen. Dat was speciaal het geval als de 
acties ondernomen werden door een “derde partij” en als ze ondernomen werden 
om een regering in een derde land te ondersteunen. Bij het gebruik van meer 
specifieke testen om de “Just-War-Criteria” te beoordelen blijken de “just cause”en 
“just tintent” (rechtvaardige reden en rechtvaardige intentie) het meeste gewicht te 
hebben; naarmate zij meer aanwezig zijn, zijn de humanitaire resultaten ook beter. 
Dit verantwoordt de keuze voor een definitie van “legitieme humanitaire militaire 
interventies” die gebruik maakt van humanitaire motieven en middelen en van 
humanitaire resultaten. 
     De resultaten van de studie leiden tot de volgende definitie van een “legitieme 
humanitaire militaire interventie”: “een militaire interventie door een derde land 
of een groep van derde landen ingegeven door humanitaire doelstellingen om 
ernstige inbreuken op de mensenrechten of andere elementen van het 
internationale humanitaire recht te voorkomen of the beëindigen, bij voorkeur om 
een zittende regering in een land bij te staan en gericht op het verminderen van het 
lijden van de bevolking in het betrokken land. Deze definitie heeft enerzijds 
elementen van de “just war” theorie door het vragen naar rechtvaardige reden 
voor de interventie (ernstige inbreuken op…) en het vragen naar een rechtvaardige 
intentie en anderzijds door erop aan te dringen dat er sprake is van een humanitair 
acceptabel resultaat (minder lijden van de bevolking). Het element in de definitie 
dat vraagt naar acties om een zittende regering bij te staan, is het meest 
problematische. Ondanks de hierboven besproken empirische associatie van acties 
ten behoeve van zittende regeringen met goede humanitaire resultaten, is aan de 
definitie toch de woorden “bij voorkeur toegevoegd”; het zou moreel te 
verdragend zijn om het als een noodzakelijke conditie op te leggen. 
     Het zou immers impliceren dat, als de inbreuken op de mensenrechten door een 
regering zelf zouden gepleegd worden, de internationale gemeenschap lijdzaam 
toe zou moeten zien en niet in zou kunnen grijpen. Dit betekent niet dat het 
gemakkelijke overwegingen zouden zijn: in de voorgestelde definitie wordt dit 
echter aan het oordeel van de politici overgelaten. Die kunnen in hun 
oordeelsvorming meewegen dat de empirische resultaten in deze studie aangeven 
dat humanitaire militaire interventies ten behoeve van rebellen groeperingen een 
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groter risico inhouden met betrekking tot het eindelijk resultaat. Het is moeilijk om 
in deze omstandigheden te garanderen dat het menselijk lijden voor de bevolking 
inderdaad afneemt door de interventie. Overigens is deze overweging in het 
algemeen van belang: een van de resultaten van deze studie is dat ze laat zien dat 
het bereiken van een netto positief resultaat in termen van lijden van de bevolking 
geen eenvoudige zaak is.  
     De studie heeft ook, uit het geheel van 1114 interventies een aantal kandidaten 
geselecteerd die aan de voorgestelde definitie voldoen en als dusdanig het 
predicaat “legitiem” zouden verdienen. Zij voldoen zowel aan de criteria met 
betrekking tot de “humanitaire motieven en middelen” als met betrekking tot 
“humanitaire resultaten”. Elk van de geselecteerde interventies heeft een hoger 
dan gemiddelde score op de Just War indicatoren en resulteerde in een aanzienlijk 
lager gevechts- en civiele doden. Van de 1114 interventies in de periode 1946 – 
2005 voldeden 18 aan alle vereisten van de definitie. Als niet het totale aantal 
doden maar alleen de afname van de gevechtsdaden als criterium wordt genomen, 
zouden 81 interventies aan de definitie voldoen. 
     Op basis van de empirische studie is het mogelijk om enkele algemene 
conclusies te trekken met betrekking tot de legitimiteit van HMI. Die legitimiteit is 
te verdedigen op basis van de “Just War Theory” gecombineerd met de vereisten 
opgelegd in het kader van de zogenaamde “consequentialist approach”. Ervan 
uitgaande dat op basis van de geldende internationale rechtsregels een HMI nog 
steeds als illegaal kan worden bestempeld, bevestigt deze studie de spanning die 
er bestaat tussen de formele illegaliteit en de legitimiteit. De vraag of de 
bevindingen van deze studie overtuigend genoeg zijn om het recht om te 
interveniëren of beter de plicht om te beschermen ook formeel in het internationale 
recht in te schrijven, moeten we ontbeantwoord laten. De empirische argumenten 
zijn aangedragen in deze studie: zij kunnen een rol spelen bij het toekomstige 
debat. 
     In het licht van het voorgaande dient ook nog opgemerkt te worden dat de 
coëfficiënten van het aantal gespaarde levens niet erg groot zijn. Toch lijken er 
argumenten aanwezig om de “verantwoordelijkheid om te beschermen” een 
belangrijke plaats in deze context te geven. Vooral het feit dat het aantoonbaar 
mogelijk is dat een humanitaire militaire interventie inderdaad het menselijk lijden 
van de bevolking doet afnemen, is daarbij van aanzienlijk belang. Het is dus niet 
automatisch zo dat het inbrengen van meer troepen en wapens in een conflictzone, 
tot meer ellende leidt.; toch bieden te resultaten geen grond voor al te overdreven 
optimisme: in veel gevallen is er nog steeds sprake van een aanzienlijke 
hoeveelheid menselijke verliezen ondanks de goed bedoelde motieven van de 
interveniërende staten. 
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     In weerwil van de significante en positieve resultaten, biedt de studie nog geen 
overtuigend antwoord op de gestelde morele vragen. Een humanitaire militaire 
interventie, ook als die ingegeven wordt door het verantwoordelijkheid om te 
beschermen, blijft een hachelijke onderneming die aanzienlijke risico’s inhoudt. In 
alle gevallen zal een uiterst zorgvuldige politieke afweging plaats dienen te vinden 
waarin de potentiële korte- en lange termijn risico’s tegen elkaar afgewogen 
worden in het licht van elke nieuwe humanitaire crisis. 
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